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+THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
+
+by Immanuel Kant
+
+translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn
+
+
+
+PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION, 1781
+
+Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to
+consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented
+by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every
+faculty of the mind.
+
+It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It
+begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field
+of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same
+time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in
+obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more
+remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its
+labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease
+to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have
+recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while
+they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into
+confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence
+of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because
+the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience,
+cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless
+contests is called Metaphysic.
+
+Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we
+take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as
+regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of
+honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and
+scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like
+Hecuba:
+
+ Modo maxima rerum,
+ Tot generis, natisque potens...
+ Nunc trahor exul, inops.
+ -- Ovid, Metamorphoses. xiii
+
+At first, her government, under the administration of the
+dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative
+continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire
+gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of
+anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent
+habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time
+those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their
+number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely
+put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new
+edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times
+the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the
+legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the
+human understanding--that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found
+that--although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not
+refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience,
+a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims--as
+this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of
+her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into
+the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again
+became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to
+save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general
+persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness
+and complete indifferentism--the mother of chaos and night in the
+scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least
+the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science,
+when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill
+directed effort.
+
+For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to
+such inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity.
+Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try
+to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by
+changes on the language of the schools, unavoidably fall into
+metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to
+regard with so much contempt. At the same time, this indifference,
+which has arisen in the world of science, and which relates to that
+kind of knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the last, is
+a phenomenon that well deserves our attention and reflection. It is
+plainly not the effect of the levity, but of the matured judgement*
+of the age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory
+knowledge, It is, in fact, a call to reason, again to undertake the
+most laborious of all tasks--that of self-examination, and to
+establish a tribunal, which may secure it in its well-grounded claims,
+while it pronounces against all baseless assumptions and
+pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according to its own
+eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal is nothing less than
+the critical investigation of pure reason.
+
+[*Footnote: We very often hear complaints of the shallowness of the
+present age, and of the decay of profound science. But I do not think
+that those which rest upon a secure foundation, such as mathematics,
+physical science, etc., in the least deserve this reproach, but that
+they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case,
+indeed, far surpass it. The same would be the case with the other
+kinds of cognition, if their principles were but firmly established.
+In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally,
+severe criticism are rather signs of a profound habit of thought.
+Our age is the age of criticism, to which everything must be
+subjected. The sacredness of religion, and the authority of
+legislation, are by many regarded as grounds of exemption from the
+examination of this tribunal. But, if they on they are exempted,
+they become the subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to
+sincere respect, which reason accords only to that which has stood
+the test of a free and public examination.]
+
+I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a
+critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the
+cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of
+experience; in other words, the solution of the question regarding
+the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination
+of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science.
+All this must be done on the basis of principles.
+
+This path--the only one now remaining--has been entered upon by
+me; and I flatter myself that I have, in this way, discovered the
+cause of--and consequently the mode of removing--all the errors
+which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself, in the
+sphere of non-empirical thought. I have not returned an evasive answer
+to the questions of reason, by alleging the inability and limitation
+of the faculties of the mind; I have, on the contrary, examined them
+completely in the light of principles, and, after having discovered
+the cause of the doubts and contradictions into which reason fell,
+have solved them to its perfect satisfaction. It is true, these
+questions have not been solved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies and
+desires, had expected; for it can only be satisfied by the exercise
+of magical arts, and of these I have no knowledge. But neither do these
+come within the compass of our mental powers; and it was the duty of
+philosophy to destroy the illusions which had their origin in
+misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and valued expectations may
+be ruined by its explanations. My chief aim in this work has been
+thoroughness; and I make bold to say that there is not a single
+metaphysical problem that does not find its solution, or at least
+the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect unity; and
+therefore, if the principle presented by it prove to be insufficient
+for the solution of even a single one of those questions to which
+the very nature of reason gives birth, we must reject it, as we could
+not be perfectly certain of its sufficiency in the case of the others.
+
+While I say this, I think I see upon the countenance of the reader
+signs of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when he hears
+declarations which sound so boastful and extravagant; and yet they
+are beyond comparison more moderate than those advanced by the commonest
+author of the commonest philosophical programme, in which the
+dogmatist professes to demonstrate the simple nature of the soul, or
+the necessity of a primal being. Such a dogmatist promises to extend
+human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience; while I
+humbly confess that this is completely beyond my power. Instead of
+any such attempt, I confine myself to the examination of reason alone
+and its pure thought; and I do not need to seek far for the
+sum-total of its cognition, because it has its seat in my own mind.
+Besides, common logic presents me with a complete and systematic
+catalogue of all the simple operations of reason; and it is my task
+to answer the question how far reason can go, without the material
+presented and the aid furnished by experience.
+
+So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary in the
+execution of the present task. The aims set before us are not
+arbitrarily proposed, but are imposed upon us by the nature of
+cognition itself.
+
+The above remarks relate to the matter of our critical inquiry. As
+regards the form, there are two indispensable conditions, which any
+one who undertakes so difficult a task as that of a critique of pure
+reason, is bound to fulfil. These conditions are certitude and
+clearness.
+
+As regards certitude, I have fully convinced myself that, in this
+sphere of thought, opinion is perfectly inadmissible, and that
+everything which bears the least semblance of an hypothesis must be
+excluded, as of no value in such discussions. For it is a necessary
+condition of every cognition that is to be established upon a priori
+grounds that it shall be held to be absolutely necessary; much more
+is this the case with an attempt to determine all pure a priori
+cognition, and to furnish the standard--and consequently an example--
+of all apodeictic (philosophical) certitude. Whether I have
+succeeded in what I professed to do, it is for the reader to
+determine; it is the author's business merely to adduce grounds and
+reasons, without determining what influence these ought to have on
+the mind of his judges. But, lest anything he may have said may become
+the innocent cause of doubt in their minds, or tend to weaken the effect
+which his arguments might otherwise produce--he may be allowed to
+point out those passages which may occasion mistrust or difficulty,
+although these do not concern the main purpose of the present work.
+He does this solely with the view of removing from the mind of the
+reader any doubts which might affect his judgement of the work as a
+whole, and in regard to its ultimate aim.
+
+I know no investigations more necessary for a full insight into
+the nature of the faculty which we call understanding, and at the same
+time for the determination of the rules and limits of its use, than
+those undertaken in the second chapter of the "Transcendental
+Analytic," under the title of "Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of
+the Understanding"; and they have also cost me by far the greatest
+labour--labour which, I hope, will not remain uncompensated. The
+view there taken, which goes somewhat deeply into the subject, has
+two sides, The one relates to the objects of the pure understanding,
+and is intended to demonstrate and to render comprehensible the
+objective validity of its a priori conceptions; and it forms for
+this reason an essential part of the Critique. The other considers
+the pure understanding itself, its possibility and its powers of
+cognition--that is, from a subjective point of view; and, although
+this exposition is of great importance, it does not belong essentially
+to the main purpose of the work, because the grand question is what
+and how much can reason and understanding, apart from experience,
+cognize, and not, how is the faculty of thought itself possible? As
+the latter is an inquiry into the cause of a given effect, and has
+thus in it some semblance of an hypothesis (although, as I shall
+show on another occasion, this is really not the fact), it would
+seem that, in the present instance, I had allowed myself to enounce
+a mere opinion, and that the reader must therefore be at liberty to
+hold a different opinion. But I beg to remind him that, if my
+subjective deduction does not produce in his mind the conviction of
+its certitude at which I aimed, the objective deduction, with which
+alone the present work is properly concerned, is in every respect
+satisfactory.
+
+As regards clearness, the reader has a right to demand, in the first
+place, discursive or logical clearness, that is, on the basis of
+conceptions, and, secondly, intuitive or aesthetic clearness, by means
+of intuitions, that is, by examples or other modes of illustration
+in concreto. I have done what I could for the first kind of
+intelligibility. This was essential to my purpose; and it thus
+became the accidental cause of my inability to do complete justice
+to the second requirement. I have been almost always at a loss, during
+the progress of this work, how to settle this question. Examples and
+illustrations always appeared to me necessary, and, in the first
+sketch of the Critique, naturally fell into their proper places. But
+I very soon became aware of the magnitude of my task, and the numerous
+problems with which I should be engaged; and, as I perceived that this
+critical investigation would, even if delivered in the driest
+scholastic manner, be far from being brief, I found it unadvisable
+to enlarge it still more with examples and explanations, which are
+necessary only from a popular point of view. I was induced to take
+this course from the consideration also that the present work is not
+intended for popular use, that those devoted to science do not require
+such helps, although they are always acceptable, and that they would
+have materially interfered with my present purpose. Abbe Terrasson
+remarks with great justice that, if we estimate the size of a work,
+not from the number of its pages, but from the time which we require
+to make ourselves master of it, it may be said of many a book that
+it would be much shorter, if it were not so short. On the other
+hand, as regards the comprehensibility of a system of speculative
+cognition, connected under a single principle, we may say with equal
+justice: many a book would have been much clearer, if it had not
+been intended to be so very clear. For explanations and examples,
+and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension of
+parts, but they distract the attention, dissipate the mental power
+of the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear
+conception of the whole; as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey
+of the system, and the colouring and embellishments bestowed upon it
+prevent his observing its articulation or organization--which is the
+most important consideration with him, when he comes to judge of its
+unity and stability.
+
+The reader must naturally have a strong inducement to co-operate
+with the present author, if he has formed the intention of erecting
+a complete and solid edifice of metaphysical science, according to
+the plan now laid before him. Metaphysics, as here represented, is
+the only science which admits of completion--and with little labour,
+if it is united, in a short time; so that nothing will be left to future
+generations except the task of illustrating and applying it
+didactically. For this science is nothing more than the inventory of
+all that is given us by pure reason, systematically arranged.
+Nothing can escape our notice; for what reason produces from itself
+cannot lie concealed, but must be brought to the light by reason
+itself, so soon as we have discovered the common principle of the
+ideas we seek. The perfect unity of this kind of cognitions, which
+are based upon pure conceptions, and uninfluenced by any empirical
+element, or any peculiar intuition leading to determinate
+experience, renders this completeness not only practicable, but also
+necessary.
+
+ Tecum habita, et noris quam sit tibi curta supellex.
+ -- Persius. Satirae iv. 52.
+
+Such a system of pure speculative reason I hope to be able to
+publish under the title of Metaphysic of Nature*. The content of this
+work (which will not be half so long) will be very much richer than
+that of the present Critique, which has to discover the sources of
+this cognition and expose the conditions of its possibility, and at
+the same time to clear and level a fit foundation for the scientific
+edifice. In the present work, I look for the patient hearing and the
+impartiality of a judge; in the other, for the good-will and
+assistance of a co-labourer. For, however complete the list of
+principles for this system may be in the Critique, the correctness
+of the system requires that no deduced conceptions should be absent.
+These cannot be presented a priori, but must be gradually
+discovered; and, while the synthesis of conceptions has been fully
+exhausted in the Critique, it is necessary that, in the proposed work,
+the same should be the case with their analysis. But this will be
+rather an amusement than a labour.
+
+[*Footnote: In contradistinction to the Metaphysic of Ethics. This
+work was never published.]
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION, 1787
+
+Whether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies
+within the province of pure reason advances with that undeviating
+certainty which characterizes the progress of science, we shall be
+at no loss to determine. If we find those who are engaged in
+metaphysical pursuits, unable to come to an understanding as to the
+method which they ought to follow; if we find them, after the most
+elaborate preparations, invariably brought to a stand before the
+goal is reached, and compelled to retrace their steps and strike
+into fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure that they are far from
+having attained to the certainty of scientific progress and may rather
+be said to be merely groping about in the dark. In these circumstances
+we shall render an important service to reason if we succeed in simply
+indicating the path along which it must travel, in order to arrive
+at any results--even if it should be found necessary to abandon many
+of those aims which, without reflection, have been proposed for its
+attainment.
+
+That logic has advanced in this sure course, even from the
+earliest times, is apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it
+has been unable to advance a step and, thus, to all appearance has
+reached its completion. For, if some of the moderns have thought to
+enlarge its domain by introducing psychological discussions on the
+mental faculties, such as imagination and wit, metaphysical,
+discussions on the origin of knowledge and the different kinds of
+certitude, according to the difference of the objects (idealism,
+scepticism, and so on), or anthropological discussions on
+prejudices, their causes and remedies: this attempt, on the part of
+these authors, only shows their ignorance of the peculiar nature of
+logical science. We do not enlarge but disfigure the sciences when
+we lose sight of their respective limits and allow them to run into
+one another. Now logic is enclosed within limits which admit of
+perfectly clear definition; it is a science which has for its object
+nothing but the exposition and proof of the formal laws of all
+thought, whether it be a priori or empirical, whatever be its origin
+or its object, and whatever the difficulties--natural or accidental--
+which it encounters in the human mind.
+
+The early success of logic must be attributed exclusively to the
+narrowness of its field, in which abstraction may, or rather must,
+be made of all the objects of cognition with their characteristic
+distinctions, and in which the understanding has only to deal with
+itself and with its own forms. It is, obviously, a much more difficult
+task for reason to strike into the sure path of science, where it
+has to deal not simply with itself, but with objects external to
+itself. Hence, logic is properly only a propaedeutic--forms, as it
+were, the vestibule of the sciences; and while it is necessary to
+enable us to form a correct judgement with regard to the various
+branches of knowledge, still the acquisition of real, substantive
+knowledge is to be sought only in the sciences properly so called,
+that is, in the objective sciences.
+
+Now these sciences, if they can be termed rational at all, must
+contain elements of a priori cognition, and this cognition may stand
+in a twofold relation to its object. Either it may have to determine
+the conception of the object--which must be supplied extraneously,
+or it may have to establish its reality. The former is theoretical,
+the latter practical, rational cognition. In both, the pure or a
+priori element must be treated first, and must be carefully
+distinguished from that which is supplied from other sources. Any
+other method can only lead to irremediable confusion.
+
+Mathematics and physics are the two theoretical sciences which
+have to determine their objects a priori. The former is purely a
+priori, the latter is partially so, but is also dependent on other
+sources of cognition.
+
+In the earliest times of which history affords us any record,
+mathematics had already entered on the sure course of science, among
+that wonderful nation, the Greeks. Still it is not to be supposed that
+it was as easy for this science to strike into, or rather to construct
+for itself, that royal road, as it was for logic, in which reason
+has only to deal with itself. On the contrary, I believe that it
+must have remained long--chiefly among the Egyptians--in the stage
+of blind groping after its true aims and destination, and that it
+was revolutionized by the happy idea of one man, who struck out and
+determined for all time the path which this science must follow, and
+which admits of an indefinite advancement. The history of this
+intellectual revolution--much more important in its results than the
+discovery of the passage round the celebrated Cape of Good Hope--and
+of its author, has not been preserved. But Diogenes Laertius, in
+naming the supposed discoverer of some of the simplest elements of
+geometrical demonstration--elements which, according to the ordinary
+opinion, do not even require to be proved--makes it apparent that
+the change introduced by the first indication of this new path, must
+have seemed of the utmost importance to the mathematicians of that
+age, and it has thus been secured against the chance of oblivion. A
+new light must have flashed on the mind of the first man (Thales, or
+whatever may have been his name) who demonstrated the properties of
+the isosceles triangle. For he found that it was not sufficient to
+meditate on the figure, as it lay before his eyes, or the conception
+of it, as it existed in his mind, and thus endeavour to get at the
+knowledge of its properties, but that it was necessary to produce
+these properties, as it were, by a positive a priori construction;
+and that, in order to arrive with certainty at a priori cognition,
+he must not attribute to the object any other properties than those
+which necessarily followed from that which he had himself, in accordance
+with his conception, placed in the object.
+
+A much longer period elapsed before physics entered on the highway
+of science. For it is only about a century and a half since the wise
+Bacon gave a new direction to physical studies, or rather--as others
+were already on the right track--imparted fresh vigour to the
+pursuit of this new direction. Here, too, as in the case of
+mathematics, we find evidence of a rapid intellectual revolution. In
+the remarks which follow I shall confine myself to the empirical
+side of natural science.
+
+When Galilei experimented with balls of a definite weight on the
+inclined plane, when Torricelli caused the air to sustain a weight
+which he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite
+column of water, or when Stahl, at a later period, converted metals
+into lime, and reconverted lime into metal, by the addition and
+subtraction of certain elements; [Footnote: I do not here follow
+with exactness the history of the experimental method, of which,
+indeed, the first steps are involved in some obscurity.] a light broke
+upon all natural philosophers. They learned that reason only perceives
+that which it produces after its own design; that it must not be content
+to follow, as it were, in the leading-strings of nature, but must proceed
+in advance with principles of judgement according to unvarying laws,
+and compel nature to reply its questions. For accidental observations,
+made according to no preconceived plan, cannot be united under a
+necessary law. But it is this that reason seeks for and requires. It
+is only the principles of reason which can give to concordant
+phenomena the validity of laws, and it is only when experiment is
+directed by these rational principles that it can have any real
+utility. Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of
+receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a
+pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but
+in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those
+questions which he himself thinks fit to propose. To this single
+idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which, after groping in the
+dark for so many centuries, natural science was at length conducted
+into the path of certain progress.
+
+We come now to metaphysics, a purely speculative science, which
+occupies a completely isolated position and is entirely independent
+of the teachings of experience. It deals with mere conceptions--not,
+like mathematics, with conceptions applied to intuition--and in it,
+reason is the pupil of itself alone. It is the oldest of the sciences,
+and would still survive, even if all the rest were swallowed up in
+the abyss of an all-destroying barbarism. But it has not yet had the
+good fortune to attain to the sure scientific method. This will be
+apparent; if we apply the tests which we proposed at the outset. We
+find that reason perpetually comes to a stand, when it attempts to
+gain a priori the perception even of those laws which the most
+common experience confirms. We find it compelled to retrace its
+steps in innumerable instances, and to abandon the path on which it
+had entered, because this does not lead to the desired result. We
+find, too, that those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits are
+far from being able to agree among themselves, but that, on the
+contrary, this science appears to furnish an arena specially adapted
+for the display of skill or the exercise of strength in mock-contests--
+a field in which no combatant ever yet succeeded in gaining an inch
+of ground, in which, at least, no victory was ever yet crowned with
+permanent possession.
+
+This leads us to inquire why it is that, in metaphysics, the sure
+path of science has not hitherto been found. Shall we suppose that
+it is impossible to discover it? Why then should nature have visited
+our reason with restless aspirations after it, as if it were one of
+our weightiest concerns? Nay, more, how little cause should we have
+to place confidence in our reason, if it abandons us in a matter about
+which, most of all, we desire to know the truth--and not only so,
+but even allures us to the pursuit of vain phantoms, only to betray
+us in the end? Or, if the path has only hitherto been missed, what
+indications do we possess to guide us in a renewed investigation,
+and to enable us to hope for greater success than has fallen to the
+lot of our predecessors?
+
+It appears to me that the examples of mathematics and natural
+philosophy, which, as we have seen, were brought into their present
+condition by a sudden revolution, are sufficiently remarkable to fix
+our attention on the essential circumstances of the change which has
+proved so advantageous to them, and to induce us to make the
+experiment of imitating them, so far as the analogy which, as rational
+sciences, they bear to metaphysics may permit. It has hitherto been
+assumed that our cognition must conform to the objects; but all
+attempts to ascertain anything about these objects a priori, by
+means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge,
+have been rendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the
+experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if
+we assume that the objects must conform to our cognition. This appears,
+at all events, to accord better with the possibility of our gaining
+the end we have in view, that is to say, of arriving at the
+cognition of objects a priori, of determining something with respect
+to these objects, before they are given to us. We here propose to do
+just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial
+movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming
+that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed
+the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator
+revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same
+experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition
+must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can
+know anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the object
+conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then
+easily conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge. Now
+as I cannot rest in the mere intuitions, but--if they are to become
+cognitions--must refer them, as representations, to something, as
+object, and must determine the latter by means of the former, here
+again there are two courses open to me. Either, first, I may assume
+that the conceptions, by which I effect this determination, conform
+to the object--and in this case I am reduced to the same perplexity
+as before; or secondly, I may assume that the objects, or, which is
+the same thing, that experience, in which alone as given objects they
+are cognized, conform to my conceptions--and then I am at no loss
+how to proceed. For experience itself is a mode of cognition which
+requires understanding. Before objects, are given to me, that is, a
+priori, I must presuppose in myself laws of the understanding which
+are expressed in conceptions a priori. To these conceptions, then,
+all the objects of experience must necessarily conform. Now there are
+objects which reason thinks, and that necessarily, but which cannot
+be given in experience, or, at least, cannot be given so as reason
+thinks them. The attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish
+an excellent test of the new method of thought which we have adopted,
+and which is based on the principle that we only cognize in things
+a priori that which we ourselves place in them.*
+
+[*Footnote: This method, accordingly, which we have borrowed from the
+natural philosopher, consists in seeking for the elements of pure reason
+in that which admits of confirmation or refutation by experiment. Now
+the propositions of pure reason, especially when they transcend the
+limits of possible experience, do not admit of our making any experiment
+with their objects, as in natural science. Hence, with regard to those
+conceptions and principles which we assume a priori, our only course
+ill be to view them from two different sides. We must regard one and
+the same conception, on the one hand, in relation to experience as
+an object of the senses and of the understanding, on the other hand,
+in relation to reason, isolated and transcending the limits of
+experience, as an object of mere thought. Now if we find that, when
+we regard things from this double point of view, the result is in harmony
+with the principle of pure reason, but that, when we regard them
+from a single point of view, reason is involved in self-contradiction,
+then the experiment will establish the correctness of this
+distinction.]
+
+This attempt succeeds as well as we could desire, and promises to
+metaphysics, in its first part--that is, where it is occupied with
+conceptions a priori, of which the corresponding objects may be
+given in experience--the certain course of science. For by this new
+method we are enabled perfectly to explain the possibility of a priori
+cognition, and, what is more, to demonstrate satisfactorily the laws
+which lie a priori at the foundation of nature, as the sum of the
+objects of experience--neither of which was possible according to
+the procedure hitherto followed. But from this deduction of the
+faculty of a priori cognition in the first part of metaphysics, we
+derive a surprising result, and one which, to all appearance,
+militates against the great end of metaphysics, as treated in the
+second part. For we come to the conclusion that our faculty of
+cognition is unable to transcend the limits of possible experience;
+and yet this is precisely the most essential object of this science.
+The estimate of our rational cognition a priori at which we arrive
+is that it has only to do with phenomena, and that things in
+themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its
+sphere. Here we are enabled to put the justice of this estimate to
+the test. For that which of necessity impels us to transcend the limits
+of experience and of all phenomena is the unconditioned, which reason
+absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves, in order to
+complete the series of conditions. Now, if it appears that when, on
+the one hand, we assume that our cognition conforms to its objects
+as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought without
+contradiction, and that when, on the other hand, we assume that our
+representation of things as they are given to us, does not conform
+to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects,
+as phenomena, conform to our mode of representation, the contradiction
+disappears: we shall then be convinced of the truth of that which we
+began by assuming for the sake of experiment; we may look upon it as
+established that the unconditioned does not lie in things as we know
+them, or as they are given to us, but in things as they are in
+themselves, beyond the range of our cognition.*
+
+[*Footnote: This experiment of pure reason has a great similarity to
+that of the chemists, which they term the experiment of reduction,
+or, more usually, the synthetic process. The analysis of the metaphysician
+separates pure cognition a priori into two heterogeneous elements,
+viz., the cognition of things as phenomena, and of things in
+themselves. Dialectic combines these again into harmony with the
+necessary rational idea of the unconditioned, and finds that this
+harmony never results except through the above distinction, which
+is, therefore, concluded to be just.]
+
+But, after we have thus denied the power of speculative reason to
+make any progress in the sphere of the supersensible, it still remains
+for our consideration whether data do not exist in practical cognition
+which may enable us to determine the transcendent conception of the
+unconditioned, to rise beyond the limits of all possible experience
+from a practical point of view, and thus to satisfy the great ends
+of metaphysics. Speculative reason has thus, at least, made room for
+such an extension of our knowledge: and, if it must leave this space
+vacant, still it does not rob us of the liberty to fill it up, if we
+can, by means of practical data--nay, it even challenges us to make
+the attempt.*
+
+[*Footnote: So the central laws of the movements of the heavenly bodies
+established the truth of that which Copernicus, first, assumed only
+as a hypothesis, and, at the same time, brought to light that invisible
+force (Newtonian attraction) which holds the universe together. The
+latter would have remained forever undiscovered, if Copernicus had
+not ventured on the experiment--contrary to the senses but still just--
+of looking for the observed movements not in the heavenly bodies,
+but in the spectator. In this Preface I treat the new metaphysical
+method as a hypothesis with the view of rendering apparent the first
+attempts at such a change of method, which are always hypothetical.
+But in the Critique itself it will be demonstrated, not
+hypothetically, but apodeictically, from the nature of our
+representations of space and time, and from the elementary conceptions
+of the understanding.]
+
+This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure
+of metaphysics, after the example of the geometricians and natural
+philosophers, constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure
+Speculative Reason. It is a treatise on the method to be followed,
+not a system of the science itself. But, at the same time, it marks
+out and defines both the external boundaries and the internal structure
+of this science. For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity,
+that, in choosing the various objects of thought, it is able to define
+the limits of its own faculties, and even to give a complete
+enumeration of the possible modes of proposing problems to itself,
+and thus to sketch out the entire system of metaphysics. For, on the
+one hand, in cognition a priori, nothing must be attributed to the
+objects but what the thinking subject derives from itself; and, on
+the other hand, reason is, in regard to the principles of cognition,
+a perfectly distinct, independent unity, in which, as in an organized
+body, every member exists for the sake of the others, and all for the
+sake of each, so that no principle can be viewed, with safety, in one
+relationship, unless it is, at the same time, viewed in relation to
+the total use of pure reason. Hence, too, metaphysics has this
+singular advantage--an advantage which falls to the lot of no other
+science which has to do with objects--that, if once it is conducted
+into the sure path of science, by means of this criticism, it can then
+take in the whole sphere of its cognitions, and can thus complete
+its work, and leave it for the use of posterity, as a capital which
+can never receive fresh accessions. For metaphysics has to deal only
+with principles and with the limitations of its own employment as
+determined by these principles. To this perfection it is, therefore,
+bound, as the fundamental science, to attain, and to it the maxim
+may justly be applied:
+
+ Nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum.
+
+But, it will be asked, what kind of a treasure is this that we
+propose to bequeath to posterity? What is the real value of this
+system of metaphysics, purified by criticism, and thereby reduced to
+a permanent condition? A cursory view of the present work will lead
+to the supposition that its use is merely negative, that it only serves
+to warn us against venturing, with speculative reason, beyond the
+limits of experience. This is, in fact, its primary use. But this,
+at once, assumes a positive value, when we observe that the principles
+with which speculative reason endeavours to transcend its limits
+lead inevitably, not to the extension, but to the contraction of the
+use of reason, inasmuch as they threaten to extend the limits of
+sensibility, which is their proper sphere, over the entire realm of
+thought and, thus, to supplant the pure (practical) use of reason.
+So far, then, as this criticism is occupied in confining speculative
+reason within its proper bounds, it is only negative; but, inasmuch
+as it thereby, at the same time, removes an obstacle which impedes
+and even threatens to destroy the use of practical reason, it possesses
+a positive and very important value. In order to admit this, we have
+only to be convinced that there is an absolutely necessary use of pure
+reason--the moral use--in which it inevitably transcends the limits
+of sensibility, without the aid of speculation, requiring only to be
+insured against the effects of a speculation which would involve it
+in contradiction with itself. To deny the positive advantage of the
+service which this criticism renders us would be as absurd as to
+maintain that the system of police is productive of no positive
+benefit, since its main business is to prevent the violence which
+citizen has to apprehend from citizen, that so each may pursue his
+vocation in peace and security. That space and time are only forms
+of sensible intuition, and hence are only conditions of the
+existence of things as phenomena; that, moreover, we have no
+conceptions of the understanding, and, consequently, no elements for
+the cognition of things, except in so far as a corresponding intuition
+can be given to these conceptions; that, accordingly, we can have no
+cognition of an object, as a thing in itself, but only as an object
+of sensible intuition, that is, as phenomenon--all this is proved in
+the analytical part of the Critique; and from this the limitation of
+all possible speculative cognition to the mere objects of
+experience, follows as a necessary result. At the same time, it must
+be carefully borne in mind that, while we surrender the power of
+cognizing, we still reserve the power of thinking objects, as things
+in themselves.* For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the
+existence of an appearance, without something that appears--which
+would be absurd. Now let us suppose, for a moment, that we had not
+undertaken this criticism and, accordingly, had not drawn the
+necessary distinction between things as objects of experience and
+things as they are in themselves. The principle of causality, and,
+by consequence, the mechanism of nature as determined by causality,
+would then have absolute validity in relation to all things as
+efficient causes. I should then be unable to assert, with regard to
+one and the same being, e.g., the human soul, that its will is free,
+and yet, at the same time, subject to natural necessity, that is,
+not free, without falling into a palpable contradiction, for in both
+propositions I should take the soul in the same signification, as a
+thing in general, as a thing in itself--as, without previous
+criticism, I could not but take it. Suppose now, on the other hand,
+that we have undertaken this criticism, and have learnt that an object
+may be taken in two senses, first, as a phenomenon, secondly, as a
+thing in itself; and that, according to the deduction of the
+conceptions of the understanding, the principle of causality has
+reference only to things in the first sense. We then see how it does
+not involve any contradiction to assert, on the one hand, that the
+will, in the phenomenal sphere--in visible action--is necessarily
+obedient to the law of nature, and, in so far, not free; and, on the
+other hand, that, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is not subject
+to that law, and, accordingly, is free. Now, it is true that I cannot,
+by means of speculative reason, and still less by empirical
+observation, cognize my soul as a thing in itself and consequently,
+cannot cognize liberty as the property of a being to which I ascribe
+effects in the world of sense. For, to do so, I must cognize this
+being as existing, and yet not in time, which--since I cannot
+support my conception by any intuition--is impossible. At the same
+time, while I cannot cognize, I can quite well think freedom, that
+is to say, my representation of it involves at least no contradiction,
+if we bear in mind the critical distinction of the two modes of
+representation (the sensible and the intellectual) and the
+consequent limitation of the conceptions of the pure understanding
+and of the principles which flow from them. Suppose now that morality
+necessarily presupposed liberty, in the strictest sense, as a property
+of our will; suppose that reason contained certain practical, original
+principles a priori, which were absolutely impossible without this
+presupposition; and suppose, at the same time, that speculative reason
+had proved that liberty was incapable of being thought at all. It
+would then follow that the moral presupposition must give way to the
+speculative affirmation, the opposite of which involves an obvious
+contradiction, and that liberty and, with it, morality must yield to
+the mechanism of nature; for the negation of morality involves no
+contradiction, except on the presupposition of liberty. Now morality
+does not require the speculative cognition of liberty; it is enough
+that I can think it, that its conception involves no contradiction,
+that it does not interfere with the mechanism of nature. But even this
+requirement we could not satisfy, if we had not learnt the twofold
+sense in which things may be taken; and it is only in this way that
+the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined
+within their proper limits. For this result, then, we are indebted
+to a criticism which warns us of our unavoidable ignorance with regard
+to things in themselves, and establishes the necessary limitation of
+our theoretical cognition to mere phenomena.
+
+[*Footnote: In order to cognize an object, I must be able to prove
+its possibility, either from its reality as attested by experience,
+or a priori, by means of reason. But I can think what I please, provided
+only I do not contradict myself; that is, provided my conception is
+a possible thought, though I may be unable to answer for the existence
+of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities. But something
+more is required before I can attribute to such a conception objective
+validity, that is real possibility--the other possibility being merely
+logical. We are not, however, confined to theoretical sources of
+cognition for the means of satisfying this additional requirement,
+but may derive them from practical sources.]
+
+The positive value of the critical principles of pure reason in
+relation to the conception of God and of the simple nature of the
+soul, admits of a similar exemplification; but on this point I shall
+not dwell. I cannot even make the assumption--as the practical
+interests of morality require--of God, freedom, and immortality, if
+I do not deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent
+insight. For to arrive at these, it must make use of principles which,
+in fact, extend only to the objects of possible experience, and
+which cannot be applied to objects beyond this sphere without
+converting them into phenomena, and thus rendering the practical
+extension of pure reason impossible. I must, therefore, abolish
+knowledge, to make room for belief. The dogmatism of metaphysics, that
+is, the presumption that it is possible to advance in metaphysics
+without previous criticism, is the true source of the unbelief (always
+dogmatic) which militates against morality.
+
+Thus, while it may be no very difficult task to bequeath a legacy to
+posterity, in the shape of a system of metaphysics constructed in
+accordance with the Critique of Pure Reason, still the value of such
+a bequest is not to be depreciated. It will render an important
+service to reason, by substituting the certainty of scientific
+method for that random groping after results without the guidance of
+principles, which has hitherto characterized the pursuit of
+metaphysical studies. It will render an important service to the
+inquiring mind of youth, by leading the student to apply his powers
+to the cultivation of genuine science, instead of wasting them, as
+at present, on speculations which can never lead to any result, or
+on the idle attempt to invent new ideas and opinions. But, above all,
+it will confer an inestimable benefit on morality and religion, by
+showing that all the objections urged against them may be silenced
+for ever by the Socratic method, that is to say, by proving the ignorance
+of the objector. For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never
+will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it
+is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it
+powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error.
+
+This important change in the field of the sciences, this loss of its
+fancied possessions, to which speculative reason must submit, does
+not prove in any way detrimental to the general interests of humanity.
+The advantages which the world has derived from the teachings of pure
+reason are not at all impaired. The loss falls, in its whole extent,
+on the monopoly of the schools, but does not in the slightest degree
+touch the interests of mankind. I appeal to the most obstinate
+dogmatist, whether the proof of the continued existence of the soul
+after death, derived from the simplicity of its substance; of the
+freedom of the will in opposition to the general mechanism of
+nature, drawn from the subtle but impotent distinction of subjective
+and objective practical necessity; or of the existence of God, deduced
+from the conception of an ens realissimum--the contingency of the
+changeable, and the necessity of a prime mover, has ever been able
+to pass beyond the limits of the schools, to penetrate the public
+mind, or to exercise the slightest influence on its convictions. It
+must be admitted that this has not been the case and that, owing to
+the unfitness of the common understanding for such subtle
+speculations, it can never be expected to take place. On the contrary,
+it is plain that the hope of a future life arises from the feeling,
+which exists in the breast of every man, that the temporal is
+inadequate to meet and satisfy the demands of his nature. In like
+manner, it cannot be doubted that the clear exhibition of duties in
+opposition to all the claims of inclination, gives rise to the
+consciousness of freedom, and that the glorious order, beauty, and
+providential care, everywhere displayed in nature, give rise to the
+belief in a wise and great Author of the Universe. Such is the genesis
+of these general convictions of mankind, so far as they depend on
+rational grounds; and this public property not only remains
+undisturbed, but is even raised to greater importance, by the doctrine
+that the schools have no right to arrogate to themselves a more
+profound insight into a matter of general human concernment than
+that to which the great mass of men, ever held by us in the highest
+estimation, can without difficulty attain, and that the schools
+should, therefore, confine themselves to the elaboration of these
+universally comprehensible and, from a moral point of view, amply
+satisfactory proofs. The change, therefore, affects only the
+arrogant pretensions of the schools, which would gladly retain, in
+their own exclusive possession, the key to the truths which they
+impart to the public.
+
+Quod mecum nescit, solus vult scire videri.
+
+At the same time it does not deprive the speculative philosopher of
+his just title to be the sole depositor of a science which benefits
+the public without its knowledge--I mean, the Critique of Pure Reason.
+This can never become popular and, indeed, has no occasion to be so;
+for finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as
+little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle
+objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both
+inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of
+speculation, it becomes the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon
+a thorough investigation of the rights of speculative reason and,
+thus, to prevent the scandal which metaphysical controversies are
+sure, sooner or later, to cause even to the masses. It is only by
+criticism that metaphysicians (and, as such, theologians too) can be
+saved from these controversies and from the consequent perversion of
+their doctrines. Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of
+materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and
+superstition, which are universally injurious--as well as of
+idealism and scepticism, which are dangerous to the schools, but can
+scarcely pass over to the public. If governments think proper to
+interfere with the affairs of the learned, it would be more consistent
+with a wise regard for the interests of science, as well as for
+those of society, to favour a criticism of this kind, by which alone
+the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to
+support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud
+cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of
+which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which,
+therefore, it can never feel.
+
+This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of
+reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be
+dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure
+principles a priori--but to dogmatism, that is, to the presumption
+that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition,
+derived from (philosophical) conceptions, according to the
+principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing--
+without first inquiring in what way and by what right reason has
+come into the possession of these principles. Dogmatism is thus the
+dogmatic procedure of pure reason without previous criticism of its
+own powers, and in opposing this procedure, we must not be supposed
+to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates
+to itself the name of popularity, nor yet to scepticism, which makes
+short work with the whole science of metaphysics. On the contrary,
+our criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific
+system of metaphysics which must perform its task entirely a priori,
+to the complete satisfaction of speculative reason, and must,
+therefore, be treated, not popularly, but scholastically. In
+carrying out the plan which the Critique prescribes, that is, in the
+future system of metaphysics, we must have recourse to the strict
+method of the celebrated Wolf, the greatest of all dogmatic
+philosophers. He was the first to point out the necessity of
+establishing fixed principles, of clearly defining our conceptions,
+and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe scrutiny,
+instead of rashly jumping at conclusions. The example which he set
+served to awaken that spirit of profound and thorough investigation
+which is not yet extinct in Germany. He would have been peculiarly
+well fitted to give a truly scientific character to metaphysical
+studies, had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a criticism
+of the organum, that is, of pure reason itself. That he failed to
+perceive the necessity of such a procedure must be ascribed to the
+dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age, and on this
+point the philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous
+times, have nothing to reproach each other with. Those who reject at
+once the method of Wolf, and of the Critique of Pure Reason, can
+have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science, to change
+labour into sport, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into
+philodoxy.
+
+In this second edition, I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to
+remove the difficulties and obscurity which, without fault of mine
+perhaps, have given rise to many misconceptions even among acute
+thinkers. In the propositions themselves, and in the demonstrations
+by which they are supported, as well as in the form and the entire
+plan of the work, I have found nothing to alter; which must be attributed
+partly to the long examination to which I had subjected the whole
+before offering it to the public and partly to the nature of the case.
+For pure speculative reason is an organic structure in which there
+is nothing isolated or independent, but every Single part is essential
+to all the rest; and hence, the slightest imperfection, whether defect
+or positive error, could not fail to betray itself in use. I
+venture, further, to hope, that this system will maintain the same
+unalterable character for the future. I am led to entertain this
+confidence, not by vanity, but by the evidence which the equality of
+the result affords, when we proceed, first, from the simplest elements
+up to the complete whole of pure reason and, and then, backwards
+from the whole to each part. We find that the attempt to make the
+slightest alteration, in any part, leads inevitably to contradictions,
+not merely in this system, but in human reason itself. At the same
+time, there is still much room for improvement in the exposition of
+the doctrines contained in this work. In the present edition, I have
+endeavoured to remove misapprehensions of the aesthetical part,
+especially with regard to the conception of time; to clear away the
+obscurity which has been found in the deduction of the conceptions
+of the understanding; to supply the supposed want of sufficient
+evidence in the demonstration of the principles of the pure
+understanding; and, lastly, to obviate the misunderstanding of the
+paralogisms which immediately precede the rational psychology.
+Beyond this point--the end of the second main division of the
+"Transcendental Dialectic"--I have not extended my alterations,*
+partly from want of time, and partly because I am not aware that any
+portion of the remainder has given rise to misconceptions among
+intelligent and impartial critics, whom I do not here mention with
+that praise which is their due, but who will find that their
+suggestions have been attended to in the work itself.
+
+[*Footnote: The only addition, properly so called--and that only in
+the method of proof--which I have made in the present edition, consists
+of a new refutation of psychological idealism, and a strict
+demonstration--the only one possible, as I believe--of the objective
+reality of external intuition. However harmless idealism may be
+considered--although in reality it is not so--in regard to the
+essential ends of metaphysics, it must still remain a scandal to
+philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume,
+as an article of mere belief, the existence of things external to
+ourselves (from which, yet, we derive the whole material of
+cognition for the internal sense), and not to be able to oppose a
+satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in question. As there
+is some obscurity of expression in the demonstration as it stands in
+the text, I propose to alter the passage in question as follows:
+"But this permanent cannot be an intuition in me. For all the
+determining grounds of my existence which can be found in me are
+representations and, as such, do themselves require a permanent,
+distinct from them, which may determine my existence in relation to
+their changes, that is, my existence in time, wherein they change."
+It may, probably, be urged in opposition to this proof that, after
+all, I am only conscious immediately of that which is in me, that is,
+of my representation of external things, and that, consequently, it
+must always remain uncertain whether anything corresponding to this
+representation does or does not exist externally to me. But I am
+conscious, through internal experience, of my existence in time
+(consequently, also, of the determinability of the former in the
+latter), and that is more than the simple consciousness of my
+representation. It is, in fact, the same as the empirical
+consciousness of my existence, which can only be determined in
+relation to something, which, while connected with my existence, is
+external to me. This consciousness of my existence in time is,
+therefore, identical with the consciousness of a relation to something
+external to me, and it is, therefore, experience, not fiction,
+sense, not imagination, which inseparably connects the external with
+my internal sense. For the external sense is, in itself, the
+relation of intuition to something real, external to me; and the
+reality of this something, as opposed to the mere imagination of it,
+rests solely on its inseparable connection with internal experience
+as the condition of its possibility. If with the intellectual
+consciousness of my existence, in the representation: I am, which
+accompanies all my judgements, and all the operations of my
+understanding, I could, at the same time, connect a determination of
+my existence by intellectual intuition, then the consciousness of a
+relation to something external to me would not be necessary. But the
+internal intuition in which alone my existence can be determined,
+though preceded by that purely intellectual consciousness, is itself
+sensible and attached to the condition of time. Hence this
+determination of my existence, and consequently my internal experience
+itself, must depend on something permanent which is not in me, which
+can be, therefore, only in something external to me, to which I must
+look upon myself as being related. Thus the reality of the external
+sense is necessarily connected with that of the internal, in order
+to the possibility of experience in general; that is, I am just as
+certainly conscious that there are things external to me related to
+my sense as I am that I myself exist as determined in time. But in
+order to ascertain to what given intuitions objects, external me,
+really correspond, in other words, what intuitions belong to the
+external sense and not to imagination, I must have recourse, in
+every particular case, to those rules according to which experience
+in general (even internal experience) is distinguished from
+imagination, and which are always based on the proposition that
+there really is an external experience. We may add the remark that
+the representation of something permanent in existence, is not the
+same thing as the permanent representation; for a representation may
+be very variable and changing--as all our representations, even that
+of matter, are--and yet refer to something permanent, which must,
+therefore, be distinct from all my representations and external to
+me, the existence of which is necessarily included in the determination
+of my own existence, and with it constitutes one experience--an
+experience which would not even be possible internally, if it were
+not also at the same time, in part, external. To the question How?
+we are no more able to reply, than we are, in general, to think the
+stationary in time, the coexistence of which with the variable,
+produces the conception of change.]
+
+In attempting to render the exposition of my views as intelligible
+as possible, I have been compelled to leave out or abridge various
+passages which were not essential to the completeness of the work,
+but which many readers might consider useful in other respects, and
+might be unwilling to miss. This trifling loss, which could not be
+avoided without swelling the book beyond due limits, may be
+supplied, at the pleasure of the reader, by a comparison with the
+first edition, and will, I hope, be more than compensated for by the
+greater clearness of the exposition as it now stands.
+
+I have observed, with pleasure and thankfulness, in the pages of
+various reviews and treatises, that the spirit of profound and
+thorough investigation is not extinct in Germany, though it may have
+been overborne and silenced for a time by the fashionable tone of a
+licence in thinking, which gives itself the airs of genius, and that
+the difficulties which beset the paths of criticism have not prevented
+energetic and acute thinkers from making themselves masters of the
+science of pure reason to which these paths conduct--a science which
+is not popular, but scholastic in its character, and which alone can
+hope for a lasting existence or possess an abiding value. To these
+deserving men, who so happily combine profundity of view with a talent
+for lucid exposition--a talent which I myself am not conscious of
+possessing--I leave the task of removing any obscurity which may still
+adhere to the statement of my doctrines. For, in this case, the danger
+is not that of being refuted, but of being misunderstood. For my own
+part, I must henceforward abstain from controversy, although I shall
+carefully attend to all suggestions, whether from friends or
+adversaries, which may be of use in the future elaboration of the
+system of this propaedeutic. As, during these labours, I have advanced
+pretty far in years this month I reach my sixty-fourth year--it will
+be necessary for me to economize time, if I am to carry out my plan
+of elaborating the metaphysics of nature as well as of morals, in
+confirmation of the correctness of the principles established in
+this Critique of Pure Reason, both speculative and practical; and I
+must, therefore, leave the task of clearing up the obscurities of
+the present work--inevitable, perhaps, at the outset--as well as,
+the defence of the whole, to those deserving men, who have made my
+system their own. A philosophical system cannot come forward armed
+at all points like a mathematical treatise, and hence it may be
+quite possible to take objection to particular passages, while the
+organic structure of the system, considered as a unity, has no
+danger to apprehend. But few possess the ability, and still fewer
+the inclination, to take a comprehensive view of a new system. By
+confining the view to particular passages, taking these out of their
+connection and comparing them with one another, it is easy to pick
+out apparent contradictions, especially in a work written with any
+freedom of style. These contradictions place the work in an unfavourable
+light in the eyes of those who rely on the judgement of others, but
+are easily reconciled by those who have mastered the idea of the whole.
+If a theory possesses stability in itself, the action and reaction
+which seemed at first to threaten its existence serve only, in the
+course of time, to smooth down any superficial roughness or
+inequality, and--if men of insight, impartiality, and truly popular
+gifts, turn their attention to it--to secure to it, in a short time,
+the requisite elegance also.
+
+
+
+Konigsberg, April 1787.
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+
+
+I. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge
+
+That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt.
+For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be
+awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect
+our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly
+rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to
+connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of
+our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is
+called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours
+is antecedent to experience, but begins with it.
+
+But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means
+follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it
+is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that
+which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of
+cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely
+the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original
+element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to,
+and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which
+requires close investigation, and not to be answered at first sight,
+whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience,
+and even of all sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called
+a priori, in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its
+sources a posteriori, that is, in experience.
+
+But the expression, "a priori," is not as yet definite enough
+adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above
+started. For, in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in
+experience, we are wont to say, that this or that may be known a
+priori, because we do not derive this knowledge immediately from
+experience, but from a general rule, which, however, we have itself
+borrowed from experience. Thus, if a man undermined his house, we say,
+"he might know a priori that it would have fallen;" that is, he needed
+not to have waited for the experience that it did actually fall. But
+still, a priori, he could not know even this much. For, that bodies
+are heavy, and, consequently, that they fall when their supports are
+taken away, must have been known to him previously, by means of
+experience.
+
+By the term "knowledge a priori," therefore, we shall in the
+sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind
+of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed
+to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only a
+posteriori, that is, through experience. Knowledge a priori is
+either pure or impure. Pure knowledge a priori is that with which no
+empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, "Every
+change has a cause," is a proposition a priori, but impure, because
+change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.
+
+
+
+II. The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State,
+ is in Possession of Certain Cognitions "a priori".
+
+The question now is as to a criterion, by which we may securely
+distinguish a pure from an empirical cognition. Experience no doubt
+teaches us that this or that object is constituted in such and such
+a manner, but not that it could not possibly exist otherwise. Now,
+in the first place, if we have a proposition which contains the idea
+of necessity in its very conception, it is a if, moreover, it is not
+derived from any other proposition, unless from one equally
+involving the idea of necessity, it is absolutely priori. Secondly,
+an empirical judgement never exhibits strict and absolute, but only
+assumed and comparative universality (by induction); therefore, the
+most we can say is--so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no
+exception to this or that rule. If, on the other hand, a judgement
+carries with it strict and absolute universality, that is, admits of
+no possible exception, it is not derived from experience, but is valid
+absolutely a priori.
+
+Empirical universality is, therefore, only an arbitrary extension of
+validity, from that which may be predicated of a proposition valid
+in most cases, to that which is asserted of a proposition which
+holds good in all; as, for example, in the affirmation, "All bodies
+are heavy." When, on the contrary, strict universality characterizes
+a judgement, it necessarily indicates another peculiar source of
+knowledge, namely, a faculty of cognition a priori. Necessity and
+strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for
+distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, and are inseparably
+connected with each other. But as in the use of these criteria the
+empirical limitation is sometimes more easily detected than the
+contingency of the judgement, or the unlimited universality which we
+attach to a judgement is often a more convincing proof than its
+necessity, it may be advisable to use the criteria separately, each
+being by itself infallible.
+
+Now, that in the sphere of human cognition we have judgements
+which are necessary, and in the strictest sense universal,
+consequently pure a priori, it will be an easy matter to show. If we
+desire an example from the sciences, we need only take any proposition
+in mathematics. If we cast our eyes upon the commonest operations of
+the understanding, the proposition, "Every change must have a
+cause," will amply serve our purpose. In the latter case, indeed,
+the conception of a cause so plainly involves the conception of a
+necessity of connection with an effect, and of a strict universality
+of the law, that the very notion of a cause would entirely
+disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume, from a frequent
+association of what happens with that which precedes; and the habit
+thence originating of connecting representations--the necessity
+inherent in the judgement being therefore merely subjective.
+Besides, without seeking for such examples of principles existing a
+priori in cognition, we might easily show that such principles are
+the indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and
+consequently prove their existence a priori. For whence could our
+experience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which it
+depends were themselves empirical, and consequently fortuitous? No
+one, therefore, can admit the validity of the use of such rules as
+first principles. But, for the present, we may content ourselves
+with having established the fact, that we do possess and exercise a
+faculty of pure a priori cognition; and, secondly, with having pointed
+out the proper tests of such cognition, namely, universality and
+necessity.
+
+Not only in judgements, however, but even in conceptions, is an a
+priori origin manifest. For example, if we take away by degrees from
+our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous
+experience--colour, hardness or softness, weight, even
+impenetrability--the body will then vanish; but the space which it
+occupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to
+annihilate in thought. Again, if we take away, in like manner, from
+our empirical conception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal,
+all properties which mere experience has taught us to connect with
+it, still we cannot think away those through which we cogitate it as
+substance, or adhering to substance, although our conception of
+substance is more determined than that of an object. Compelled,
+therefore, by that necessity with which the conception of substance
+forces itself upon us, we must confess that it has its seat in our
+faculty of cognition a priori.
+
+
+
+III. Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall
+ Determine the Possibility, Principles, and Extent of
+ Human Knowledge "a priori"
+
+Of far more importance than all that has been above said, is the
+consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above
+the sphere of all possible experience, and by means of conceptions,
+to which there exists in the whole extent of experience no
+corresponding object, seem to extend the range of our judgements
+beyond its bounds. And just in this transcendental or supersensible
+sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor
+guidance, lie the investigations of reason, which, on account of their
+importance, we consider far preferable to, and as having a far more
+elevated aim than, all that the understanding can achieve within the
+sphere of sensuous phenomena. So high a value do we set upon these
+investigations, that even at the risk of error, we persist in
+following them out, and permit neither doubt nor disregard nor
+indifference to restrain us from the pursuit. These unavoidable
+problems of mere pure reason are God, freedom (of will), and
+immortality. The science which, with all its preliminaries, has for
+its especial object the solution of these problems is named
+metaphysics--a science which is at the very outset dogmatical, that
+is, it confidently takes upon itself the execution of this task
+without any previous investigation of the ability or inability of
+reason for such an undertaking.
+
+Now the safe ground of experience being thus abandoned, it seems
+nevertheless natural that we should hesitate to erect a building
+with the cognitions we possess, without knowing whence they come,
+and on the strength of principles, the origin of which is
+undiscovered. Instead of thus trying to build without a foundation,
+it is rather to be expected that we should long ago have put the
+question, how the understanding can arrive at these a priori
+cognitions, and what is the extent, validity, and worth which they
+may possess? We say, "This is natural enough," meaning by the word
+natural, that which is consistent with a just and reasonable way of
+thinking; but if we understand by the term, that which usually
+happens, nothing indeed could be more natural and more
+comprehensible than that this investigation should be left long
+unattempted. For one part of our pure knowledge, the science of
+mathematics, has been long firmly established, and thus leads us to
+form flattering expectations with regard to others, though these may
+be of quite a different nature. Besides, when we get beyond the bounds
+of experience, we are of course safe from opposition in that
+quarter; and the charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so
+great that, unless we are brought to a standstill by some evident
+contradiction, we hurry on undoubtingly in our course. This,
+however, may be avoided, if we are sufficiently cautious in the
+construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on
+that account.
+
+Mathematical science affords us a brilliant example, how far,
+independently of all experience, we may carry our a priori
+knowledge. It is true that the mathematician occupies himself with
+objects and cognitions only in so far as they can be represented by
+means of intuition. But this circumstance is easily overlooked,
+because the said intuition can itself be given a priori, and therefore
+is hardly to be distinguished from a mere pure conception. Deceived
+by such a proof of the power of reason, we can perceive no limits to
+the extension of our knowledge. The light dove cleaving in free flight
+the thin air, whose resistance it feels, might imagine that her
+movements would be far more free and rapid in airless space. Just in
+the same way did Plato, abandoning the world of sense because of the
+narrow limits it sets to the understanding, venture upon the wings
+of ideas beyond it, into the void space of pure intellect. He did
+not reflect that he made no real progress by all his efforts; for he
+met with no resistance which might serve him for a support, as it
+were, whereon to rest, and on which he might apply his powers, in
+order to let the intellect acquire momentum for its progress. It is,
+indeed, the common fate of human reason in speculation, to finish
+the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly as possible, and then for
+the first time to begin to examine whether the foundation is a solid
+one or no. Arrived at this point, all sorts of excuses are sought
+after, in order to console us for its want of stability, or rather,
+indeed, to enable Us to dispense altogether with so late and dangerous
+an investigation. But what frees us during the process of building
+from all apprehension or suspicion, and flatters us into the belief
+of its solidity, is this. A great part, perhaps the greatest part,
+of the business of our reason consists in the analysation of the
+conceptions which we already possess of objects. By this means we gain
+a multitude of cognitions, which although really nothing more than
+elucidations or explanations of that which (though in a confused
+manner) was already thought in our conceptions, are, at least in
+respect of their form, prized as new introspections; whilst, so far
+as regards their matter or content, we have really made no addition
+to our conceptions, but only disinvolved them. But as this process
+does furnish a real priori knowledge, which has a sure progress and
+useful results, reason, deceived by this, slips in, without being
+itself aware of it, assertions of a quite different kind; in which,
+to given conceptions it adds others, a priori indeed, but entirely
+foreign to them, without our knowing how it arrives at these, and,
+indeed, without such a question ever suggesting itself. I shall
+therefore at once proceed to examine the difference between these
+two modes of knowledge.
+
+
+
+IV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements.
+
+In all judgements wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate
+is cogitated (I mention affirmative judgements only here; the
+application to negative will be very easy), this relation is
+possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to
+the subject A, as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) in
+the conception A; or the predicate B lies completely out of the conception
+A, although it stands in connection with it. In the first instance,
+I term the judgement analytical, in the second, synthetical.
+Analytical judgements (affirmative) are therefore those in which the
+connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through
+identity; those in which this connection is cogitated without
+identity, are called synthetical judgements. The former may be
+called explicative, the latter augmentative judgements; because the
+former add in the predicate nothing to the conception of the
+subject, but only analyse it into its constituent conceptions, which
+were thought already in the subject, although in a confused manner;
+the latter add to our conceptions of the subject a predicate which
+was not contained in it, and which no analysis could ever have
+discovered therein. For example, when I say, "All bodies are
+extended," this is an analytical judgement. For I need not go beyond
+the conception of body in order to find extension connected with it,
+but merely analyse the conception, that is, become conscious of the
+manifold properties which I think in that conception, in order to
+discover this predicate in it: it is therefore an analytical
+judgement. On the other hand, when I say, "All bodies are heavy,"
+the predicate is something totally different from that which I think
+in the mere conception of a body. By the addition of such a predicate,
+therefore, it becomes a synthetical judgement.
+
+Judgements of experience, as such, are always synthetical. For it
+would be absurd to think of grounding an analytical judgement on
+experience, because in forming such a judgement I need not go out of
+the sphere of my conceptions, and therefore recourse to the
+testimony of experience is quite unnecessary. That "bodies are
+extended" is not an empirical judgement, but a proposition which
+stands firm a priori. For before addressing myself to experience, I
+already have in my conception all the requisite conditions for the
+judgement, and I have only to extract the predicate from the
+conception, according to the principle of contradiction, and thereby
+at the same time become conscious of the necessity of the judgement,
+a necessity which I could never learn from experience. On the other
+hand, though at first I do not at all include the predicate of
+weight in my conception of body in general, that conception still
+indicates an object of experience, a part of the totality of
+experience, to which I can still add other parts; and this I do when
+I recognize by observation that bodies are heavy. I can cognize
+beforehand by analysis the conception of body through the
+characteristics of extension, impenetrability, shape, etc., all
+which are cogitated in this conception. But now I extend my knowledge,
+and looking back on experience from which I had derived this
+conception of body, I find weight at all times connected with the
+above characteristics, and therefore I synthetically add to my
+conceptions this as a predicate, and say, "All bodies are heavy." Thus
+it is experience upon which rests the possibility of the synthesis
+of the predicate of weight with the conception of body, because both
+conceptions, although the one is not contained in the other, still
+belong to one another (only contingently, however), as parts of a
+whole, namely, of experience, which is itself a synthesis of
+intuitions.
+
+But to synthetical judgements a priori, such aid is entirely
+wanting. If I go out of and beyond the conception A, in order to
+recognize another B as connected with it, what foundation have I to
+rest on, whereby to render the synthesis possible? I have here no
+longer the advantage of looking out in the sphere of experience for
+what I want. Let us take, for example, the proposition, "Everything
+that happens has a cause." In the conception of "something that
+happens," I indeed think an existence which a certain time
+antecedes, and from this I can derive analytical judgements. But the
+conception of a cause lies quite out of the above conception, and
+indicates something entirely different from "that which happens,"
+and is consequently not contained in that conception. How then am I
+able to assert concerning the general conception--"that which
+happens"--something entirely different from that conception, and to
+recognize the conception of cause although not contained in it, yet
+as belonging to it, and even necessarily? what is here the unknown
+= X, upon which the understanding rests when it believes it has found,
+out of the conception A a foreign predicate B, which it nevertheless
+considers to be connected with it? It cannot be experience, because
+the principle adduced annexes the two representations, cause and
+effect, to the representation existence, not only with universality,
+which experience cannot give, but also with the expression of
+necessity, therefore completely a priori and from pure conceptions.
+Upon such synthetical, that is augmentative propositions, depends
+the whole aim of our speculative knowledge a priori; for although
+analytical judgements are indeed highly important and necessary,
+they are so, only to arrive at that clearness of conceptions which
+is requisite for a sure and extended synthesis, and this alone is a
+real acquisition.
+
+
+
+V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements
+"a priori" are contained as Principles.
+
+1. Mathematical judgements are always synthetical. Hitherto this
+fact, though incontestably true and very important in its
+consequences, seems to have escaped the analysts of the human mind,
+nay, to be in complete opposition to all their conjectures. For as
+it was found that mathematical conclusions all proceed according to
+the principle of contradiction (which the nature of every apodeictic
+certainty requires), people became persuaded that the fundamental
+principles of the science also were recognized and admitted in the
+same way. But the notion is fallacious; for although a synthetical
+proposition can certainly be discerned by means of the principle of
+contradiction, this is possible only when another synthetical
+proposition precedes, from which the latter is deduced, but never
+of itself.
+
+Before all, be it observed, that proper mathematical propositions
+are always judgements a priori, and not empirical, because they
+carry along with them the conception of necessity, which cannot be
+given by experience. If this be demurred to, it matters not; I will
+then limit my assertion to pure mathematics, the very conception of
+which implies that it consists of knowledge altogether non-empirical
+and a priori.
+
+We might, indeed at first suppose that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is
+a merely analytical proposition, following (according to the principle
+of contradiction) from the conception of a sum of seven and five.
+But if we regard it more narrowly, we find that our conception of
+the sum of seven and five contains nothing more than the uniting of
+both sums into one, whereby it cannot at all be cogitated what this
+single number is which embraces both. The conception of twelve is by
+no means obtained by merely cogitating the union of seven and five;
+and we may analyse our conception of such a possible sum as long as
+we will, still we shall never discover in it the notion of twelve.
+We must go beyond these conceptions, and have recourse to an intuition
+which corresponds to one of the two--our five fingers, for example,
+or like Segner in his Arithmetic five points, and so by degrees, add
+the units contained in the five given in the intuition, to the
+conception of seven. For I first take the number 7, and, for the
+conception of 5 calling in the aid of the fingers of my hand as
+objects of intuition, I add the units, which I before took together
+to make up the number 5, gradually now by means of the material image
+my hand, to the number 7, and by this process, I at length see the
+number 12 arise. That 7 should be added to 5, I have certainly
+cogitated in my conception of a sum = 7 + 5, but not that this sum
+was equal to 12. Arithmetical propositions are therefore always
+synthetical, of which we may become more clearly convinced by trying
+large numbers. For it will thus become quite evident that, turn and
+twist our conceptions as we may, it is impossible, without having
+recourse to intuition, to arrive at the sum total or product by
+means of the mere analysis of our conceptions. Just as little is any
+principle of pure geometry analytical. "A straight line between two
+points is the shortest," is a synthetical proposition. For my
+conception of straight contains no notion of quantity, but is merely
+qualitative. The conception of the shortest is therefore fore wholly
+an addition, and by no analysis can it be extracted from our
+conception of a straight line. Intuition must therefore here lend
+its aid, by means of which, and thus only, our synthesis is possible.
+
+Some few principles preposited by geometricians are, indeed,
+really analytical, and depend on the principle of contradiction.
+They serve, however, like identical propositions, as links in the
+chain of method, not as principles--for example, a = a, the whole is
+equal to itself, or (a+b) > a, the whole is greater than its part.
+And yet even these principles themselves, though they derive their
+validity from pure conceptions, are only admitted in mathematics
+because they can be presented in intuition. What causes us here
+commonly to believe that the predicate of such apodeictic judgements
+is already contained in our conception, and that the judgement is
+therefore analytical, is merely the equivocal nature of the
+expression. We must join in thought a certain predicate to a given
+conception, and this necessity cleaves already to the conception.
+But the question is, not what we must join in thought to the given
+conception, but what we really think therein, though only obscurely,
+and then it becomes manifest that the predicate pertains to these
+conceptions, necessarily indeed, yet not as thought in the
+conception itself, but by virtue of an intuition, which must be
+added to the conception.
+
+2. The science of natural philosophy (physics) contains in itself
+synthetical judgements a priori, as principles. I shall adduce two
+propositions. For instance, the proposition, "In all changes of the
+material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged"; or, that,
+"In all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be
+equal." In both of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore
+their origin a priori clear, but also that they are synthetical
+propositions. For in the conception of matter, I do not cogitate its
+permanency, but merely its presence in space, which it fills. I
+therefore really go out of and beyond the conception of matter, in
+order to think on to it something a priori, which I did not think in
+it. The proposition is therefore not analytical, but synthetical,
+and nevertheless conceived a priori; and so it is with regard to the
+other propositions of the pure part of natural philosophy.
+
+3. As to metaphysics, even if we look upon it merely as an attempted
+science, yet, from the nature of human reason, an indispensable one,
+we find that it must contain synthetical propositions a priori. It
+is not merely the duty of metaphysics to dissect, and thereby
+analytically to illustrate the conceptions which we form a priori of
+things; but we seek to widen the range of our a priori knowledge.
+For this purpose, we must avail ourselves of such principles as add
+something to the original conception--something not identical with,
+nor contained in it, and by means of synthetical judgements a
+priori, leave far behind us the limits of experience; for example,
+in the proposition, "the world must have a beginning," and such
+like. Thus metaphysics, according to the proper aim of the science,
+consists merely of synthetical propositions a priori.
+
+
+
+VI. The Universal Problem of Pure Reason.
+
+It is extremely advantageous to be able to bring a number of
+investigations under the formula of a single problem. For in this
+manner, we not only facilitate our own labour, inasmuch as we define
+it clearly to ourselves, but also render it more easy for others to
+decide whether we have done justice to our undertaking. The proper
+problem of pure reason, then, is contained in the question: "How are
+synthetical judgements a priori possible?"
+
+That metaphysical science has hitherto remained in so vacillating
+a state of uncertainty and contradiction, is only to be attributed
+to the fact that this great problem, and perhaps even the difference
+between analytical and synthetical judgements, did not sooner
+suggest itself to philosophers. Upon the solution of this problem,
+or upon sufficient proof of the impossibility of synthetical knowledge
+a priori, depends the existence or downfall of the science of
+metaphysics. Among philosophers, David Hume came the nearest of all
+to this problem; yet it never acquired in his mind sufficient
+precision, nor did he regard the question in its universality. On
+the contrary, he stopped short at the synthetical proposition of the
+connection of an effect with its cause (principium causalitatis),
+insisting that such proposition a priori was impossible. According
+to his conclusions, then, all that we term metaphysical science is
+a mere delusion, arising from the fancied insight of reason into that
+which is in truth borrowed from experience, and to which habit has
+given the appearance of necessity. Against this assertion, destructive
+to all pure philosophy, he would have been guarded, had he had our
+problem before his eyes in its universality. For he would then have
+perceived that, according to his own argument, there likewise could
+not be any pure mathematical science, which assuredly cannot exist
+without synthetical propositions a priori--an absurdity from which
+his good understanding must have saved him.
+
+In the solution of the above problem is at the same time
+comprehended the possibility of the use of pure reason in the
+foundation and construction of all sciences which contain
+theoretical knowledge a priori of objects, that is to say, the
+answer to the following questions:
+
+How is pure mathematical science possible?
+
+How is pure natural science possible?
+
+Respecting these sciences, as they do certainly exist, it may with
+propriety be asked, how they are possible?--for that they must be
+possible is shown by the fact of their really existing.* But as to
+metaphysics, the miserable progress it has hitherto made, and the fact
+that of no one system yet brought forward, far as regards its true
+aim, can it be said that this science really exists, leaves any one
+at liberty to doubt with reason the very possibility of its existence.
+
+[*Footnote: As to the existence of pure natural science, or physics,
+perhaps many may still express doubts. But we have only to look at
+the different propositions which are commonly treated of at the
+commencement of proper (empirical) physical science--those, for
+example, relating to the permanence of the same quantity of matter,
+the vis inertiae, the equality of action and reaction, etc.--to be
+soon convinced that they form a science of pure physics (physica pura,
+or rationalis), which well deserves to be separately exposed as a
+special science, in its whole extent, whether that be great or
+confined.]
+
+Yet, in a certain sense, this kind of knowledge must
+unquestionably be looked upon as given; in other words, metaphysics
+must be considered as really existing, if not as a science,
+nevertheless as a natural disposition of the human mind (metaphysica
+naturalis). For human reason, without any instigations imputable to
+the mere vanity of great knowledge, unceasingly progresses, urged on
+by its own feeling of need, towards such questions as cannot be
+answered by any empirical application of reason, or principles derived
+therefrom; and so there has ever really existed in every man some
+system of metaphysics. It will always exist, so soon as reason
+awakes to the exercise of its power of speculation. And now the
+question arises: "How is metaphysics, as a natural disposition,
+possible?" In other words, how, from the nature of universal human
+reason, do those questions arise which pure reason proposes to itself,
+and which it is impelled by its own feeling of need to answer as
+well as it can?
+
+But as in all the attempts hitherto made to answer the questions
+which reason is prompted by its very nature to propose to itself,
+for example, whether the world had a beginning, or has existed from
+eternity, it has always met with unavoidable contradictions, we must
+not rest satisfied with the mere natural disposition of the mind to
+metaphysics, that is, with the existence of the faculty of pure
+reason, whence, indeed, some sort of metaphysical system always
+arises; but it must be possible to arrive at certainty in regard to
+the question whether we know or do not know the things of which
+metaphysics treats. We must be able to arrive at a decision on the
+subjects of its questions, or on the ability or inability of reason
+to form any judgement respecting them; and therefore either to extend
+with confidence the bounds of our pure reason, or to set strictly
+defined and safe limits to its action. This last question, which
+arises out of the above universal problem, would properly run thus:
+"How is metaphysics possible as a science?"
+
+Thus, the critique of reason leads at last, naturally and
+necessarily, to science; and, on the other hand, the dogmatical use
+of reason without criticism leads to groundless assertions, against
+which others equally specious can always be set, thus ending unavoidably
+in scepticism.
+
+Besides, this science cannot be of great and formidable prolixity,
+because it has not to do with objects of reason, the variety of
+which is inexhaustible, but merely with Reason herself and her
+problems; problems which arise out of her own bosom, and are not
+proposed to her by the nature of outward things, but by her own
+nature. And when once Reason has previously become able completely
+to understand her own power in regard to objects which she meets
+with in experience, it will be easy to determine securely the extent
+and limits of her attempted application to objects beyond the confines
+of experience.
+
+We may and must, therefore, regard the attempts hitherto made to
+establish metaphysical science dogmatically as non-existent. For
+what of analysis, that is, mere dissection of conceptions, is
+contained in one or other, is not the aim of, but only a preparation
+for metaphysics proper, which has for its object the extension, by
+means of synthesis, of our a priori knowledge. And for this purpose,
+mere analysis is of course useless, because it only shows what is
+contained in these conceptions, but not how we arrive, a priori, at
+them; and this it is her duty to show, in order to be able
+afterwards to determine their valid use in regard to all objects of
+experience, to all knowledge in general. But little self-denial,
+indeed, is needed to give up these pretensions, seeing the undeniable,
+and in the dogmatic mode of procedure, inevitable contradictions of
+Reason with herself, have long since ruined the reputation of every
+system of metaphysics that has appeared up to this time. It will
+require more firmness to remain undeterred by difficulty from
+within, and opposition from without, from endeavouring, by a method
+quite opposed to all those hitherto followed, to further the growth
+and fruitfulness of a science indispensable to human reason--a science
+from which every branch it has borne may be cut away, but whose
+roots remain indestructible.
+
+
+
+VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the
+ Name of a Critique of Pure Reason.
+
+From all that has been said, there results the idea of a
+particular science, which may be called the Critique of Pure Reason.
+For reason is the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of
+knowledge a priori. Hence, pure reason is the faculty which contains
+the principles of cognizing anything absolutely a priori. An organon
+of pure reason would be a compendium of those principles according
+to which alone all pure cognitions a priori can be obtained. The
+completely extended application of such an organon would afford us
+a system of pure reason. As this, however, is demanding a great deal,
+and it is yet doubtful whether any extension of our knowledge be
+here possible, or, if so, in what cases; we can regard a science of
+the mere criticism of pure reason, its sources and limits, as the
+propaedeutic to a system of pure reason. Such a science must not be
+called a doctrine, but only a critique of pure reason; and its use,
+in regard to speculation, would be only negative, not to enlarge the
+bounds of, but to purify, our reason, and to shield it against
+error--which alone is no little gain. I apply the term
+transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with
+objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far
+as this mode of cognition is possible a priori. A system of such
+conceptions would be called transcendental philosophy. But this,
+again, is still beyond the bounds of our present essay. For as such
+a science must contain a complete exposition not only of our
+synthetical a priori, but of our analytical a priori knowledge, it
+is of too wide a range for our present purpose, because we do not
+require to carry our analysis any farther than is necessary to
+understand, in their full extent, the principles of synthesis a
+priori, with which alone we have to do. This investigation, which we
+cannot properly call a doctrine, but only a transcendental critique,
+because it aims not at the enlargement, but at the correction and
+guidance, of our knowledge, and is to serve as a touchstone of the
+worth or worthlessness of all knowledge a priori, is the sole object
+of our present essay. Such a critique is consequently, as far as
+possible, a preparation for an organon; and if this new organon should
+be found to fail, at least for a canon of pure reason, according to
+which the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, whether
+it extend or limit the bounds of that reason, might one day be set
+forth both analytically and synthetically. For that this is
+possible, nay, that such a system is not of so great extent as to
+preclude the hope of its ever being completed, is evident. For we have
+not here to do with the nature of outward objects, which is
+infinite, but solely with the mind, which judges of the nature of
+objects, and, again, with the mind only in respect of its cognition
+a priori. And the object of our investigations, as it is not to be
+sought without, but, altogether within, ourselves, cannot remain
+concealed, and in all probability is limited enough to be completely
+surveyed and fairly estimated, according to its worth or
+worthlessness. Still less let the reader here expect a critique of
+books and systems of pure reason; our present object is exclusively
+a critique of the faculty of pure reason itself. Only when we make
+this critique our foundation, do we possess a pure touchstone for
+estimating the philosophical value of ancient and modern writings on
+this subject; and without this criterion, the incompetent historian
+or judge decides upon and corrects the groundless assertions of others
+with his own, which have themselves just as little foundation.
+
+Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the
+Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan
+architectonically, that is, from principles, with a full guarantee
+for the validity and stability of all the parts which enter into the
+building. It is the system of all the principles of pure reason. If
+this Critique itself does not assume the title of transcendental
+philosophy, it is only because, to be a complete system, it ought to
+contain a full analysis of all human knowledge a priori. Our
+critique must, indeed, lay before us a complete enumeration of all
+the radical conceptions which constitute the said pure knowledge. But
+from the complete analysis of these conceptions themselves, as also
+from a complete investigation of those derived from them, it abstains
+with reason; partly because it would be deviating from the end in view
+to occupy itself with this analysis, since this process is not
+attended with the difficulty and insecurity to be found in the
+synthesis, to which our critique is entirely devoted, and partly
+because it would be inconsistent with the unity of our plan to
+burden this essay with the vindication of the completeness of such
+an analysis and deduction, with which, after all, we have at present
+nothing to do. This completeness of the analysis of these radical
+conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the conceptions a priori
+which may be given by the analysis, we can, however, easily attain,
+provided only that we are in possession of all these radical
+conceptions, which are to serve as principles of the synthesis, and
+that in respect of this main purpose nothing is wanting.
+
+To the Critique of Pure Reason, therefore, belongs all that
+constitutes transcendental philosophy; and it is the complete idea
+of transcendental philosophy, but still not the science itself;
+because it only proceeds so far with the analysis as is necessary to
+the power of judging completely of our synthetical knowledge a priori.
+
+The principal thing we must attend to, in the division of the
+parts of a science like this, is that no conceptions must enter it
+which contain aught empirical; in other words, that the knowledge a
+priori must be completely pure. Hence, although the highest principles
+and fundamental conceptions of morality are certainly cognitions a
+priori, yet they do not belong to transcendental philosophy;
+because, though they certainly do not lay the conceptions of pain,
+pleasure, desires, inclinations, etc. (which are all of empirical
+origin), at the foundation of its precepts, yet still into the
+conception of duty--as an obstacle to be overcome, or as an incitement
+which should not be made into a motive--these empirical conceptions
+must necessarily enter, in the construction of a system of pure
+morality. Transcendental philosophy is consequently a philosophy of
+the pure and merely speculative reason. For all that is practical,
+so far as it contains motives, relates to feelings, and these belong
+to empirical sources of cognition.
+
+If we wish to divide this science from the universal point of view
+of a science in general, it ought to comprehend, first, a Doctrine
+of the Elements, and, secondly, a Doctrine of the Method of pure
+reason. Each of these main divisions will have its subdivisions, the
+separate reasons for which we cannot here particularize. Only so
+much seems necessary, by way of introduction of premonition, that
+there are two sources of human knowledge (which probably spring from
+a common, but to us unknown root), namely, sense and understanding.
+By the former, objects are given to us; by the latter, thought. So
+far as the faculty of sense may contain representations a priori, which
+form the conditions under which objects are given, in so far it
+belongs to transcendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of
+sense must form the first part of our science of elements, because
+the conditions under which alone the objects of human knowledge are
+given must precede those under which they are thought.
+
+
+
+
+I. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.
+
+FIRST PART. TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC.
+
+SS I. Introductory.
+
+In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate
+to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which
+it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. To this
+as the indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition
+can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again,
+is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect
+the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving
+representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are
+affected by objects, objects, is called sensibility. By means of
+sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone
+furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought,
+and from it arise conceptions. But an thought must directly, or
+indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to
+intuitions; consequently, with us, to sensibility, because in no other
+way can an object be given to us.
+
+The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far
+as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of
+intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called
+an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical
+intuition is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon
+corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that which
+effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under
+certain relations, I call its form. But that in which our sensations
+are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming
+a certain form, cannot be itself sensation. It is, then, the matter
+of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori; the form must lie
+ready a priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be
+regarded separately from all sensation.
+
+I call all representations pure, in the transcendental meaning of
+the word, wherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation. And
+accordingly we find existing in the mind a priori, the pure form of
+sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of
+the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations.
+This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition. Thus, if
+I take away from our representation of a body all that the
+understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force,
+divisibility, etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as
+impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc.; yet there is still
+something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, extension
+and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori in
+the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object
+of the senses or any sensation.
+
+The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori, I call
+transcendental aesthetic.* There must, then, be such a science forming
+the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in
+contradistinction to that part which contains the principles of pure
+thought, and which is called transcendental logic.
+
+[Footnote: The Germans are the only people who at present use this
+word to indicate what others call the critique of taste. At the foundation
+of this term lies the disappointed hope, which the eminent analyst,
+Baumgarten, conceived, of subjecting the criticism of the beautiful
+to principles of reason, and so of elevating its rules into a science.
+But his endeavours were vain. For the said rules or criteria are, in
+respect to their chief sources, merely empirical, consequently never
+can serve as determinate laws a priori, by which our judgement in
+matters of taste is to be directed. It is rather our judgement which
+forms the proper test as to the correctness of the principles. On this
+account it is advisable to give up the use of the term as
+designating the critique of taste, and to apply it solely to that
+doctrine, which is true science--the science of the laws of
+sensibility--and thus come nearer to the language and the sense of
+the ancients in their well-known division of the objects of cognition
+into aiotheta kai noeta, or to share it with speculative philosophy,
+and employ it partly in a transcendental, partly in a psychological
+signification.]
+
+In the science of transcendental aesthetic accordingly, we shall
+first isolate sensibility or the sensuous faculty, by separating
+from it all that is annexed to its perceptions by the conceptions of
+understanding, so that nothing be left but empirical intuition. In
+the next place we shall take away from this intuition all that belongs
+to sensation, so that nothing may remain but pure intuition, and the
+mere form of phenomena, which is all that the sensibility can afford
+a priori. From this investigation it will be found that there are two
+pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge a priori,
+namely, space and time. To the consideration of these we shall now
+proceed.
+
+
+
+SECTION I. Of Space.
+
+SS 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.
+
+By means of the external sense (a property of the mind), we
+represent to ourselves objects as without us, and these all in
+space. Herein alone are their shape, dimensions, and relations to each
+other determined or determinable. The internal sense, by means of
+which the mind contemplates itself or its internal state, gives,
+indeed, no intuition of the soul as an object; yet there is
+nevertheless a determinate form, under which alone the contemplation
+of our internal state is possible, so that all which relates to the
+inward determinations of the mind is represented in relations of time.
+Of time we cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can
+have an internal intuition of space. What then are time and space?
+Are they real existences? Or, are they merely relations or
+determinations of things, such, however, as would equally belong to
+these things in themselves, though they should never become objects
+of intuition; or, are they such as belong only to the form of
+intuition, and consequently to the subjective constitution of the
+mind, without which these predicates of time and space could not be
+attached to any object? In order to become informed on these points,
+we shall first give an exposition of the conception of space. By
+exposition, I mean the clear, though not detailed, representation of
+that which belongs to a conception; and an exposition is
+metaphysical when it contains that which represents the conception
+as given a priori.
+
+1. Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward
+experiences. For, in order that certain sensations may relate to
+something without me (that is, to something which occupies a different
+part of space from that in which I am); in like manner, in order
+that I may represent them not merely as without, of, and near to
+each other, but also in separate places, the representation of space
+must already exist as a foundation. Consequently, the representation
+of space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena
+through experience; but, on the contrary, this external experience
+is itself only possible through the said antecedent representation.
+
+2. Space then is a necessary representation a priori, which serves
+for the foundation of all external intuitions. We never can imagine
+or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space,
+though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it.
+It must, therefore, be considered as the condition of the
+possibility of phenomena, and by no means as a determination dependent
+on them, and is a representation a priori, which necessarily
+supplies the basis for external phenomena.
+
+3. Space is no discursive, or as we say, general conception of the
+relations of things, but a pure intuition. For, in the first place,
+we can only represent to ourselves one space, and, when we talk of
+divers spaces, we mean only parts of one and the same space. Moreover,
+these parts cannot antecede this one all-embracing space, as the
+component parts from which the aggregate can be made up, but can be
+cogitated only as existing in it. Space is essentially one, and
+multiplicity in it, consequently the general notion of spaces, of this
+or that space, depends solely upon limitations. Hence it follows
+that an a priori intuition (which is not empirical) lies at the root
+of all our conceptions of space. Thus, moreover, the principles of
+geometry--for example, that "in a triangle, two sides together are
+greater than the third," are never deduced from general conceptions
+of line and triangle, but from intuition, and this a priori, with
+apodeictic certainty.
+
+4. Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. Now every
+conception must indeed be considered as a representation which is
+contained in an infinite multitude of different possible
+representations, which, therefore, comprises these under itself; but
+no conception, as such, can be so conceived, as if it contained within
+itself an infinite multitude of representations. Nevertheless, space
+is so conceived of, for all parts of space are equally capable of
+being produced to infinity. Consequently, the original
+representation of space is an intuition a priori, and not a
+conception.
+
+
+
+SS 3. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space.
+
+By a transcendental exposition, I mean the explanation of a
+conception, as a principle, whence can be discerned the possibility
+of other synthetical a priori cognitions. For this purpose, it is
+requisite, firstly, that such cognitions do really flow from the given
+conception; and, secondly, that the said cognitions are only
+possible under the presupposition of a given mode of explaining this
+conception.
+
+Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space
+synthetically, and yet a priori. What, then, must be our
+representation of space, in order that such a cognition of it may be
+possible? It must be originally intuition, for from a mere conception,
+no propositions can be deduced which go out beyond the conception,
+and yet this happens in geometry. (Introd. V.) But this intuition must
+be found in the mind a priori, that is, before any perception of
+objects, consequently must be pure, not empirical, intuition. For
+geometrical principles are always apodeictic, that is, united with
+the consciousness of their necessity, as: "Space has only three
+dimensions." But propositions of this kind cannot be empirical
+judgements, nor conclusions from them. (Introd. II.) Now, how can an
+external intuition anterior to objects themselves, and in which our
+conception of objects can be determined a priori, exist in the human
+mind? Obviously not otherwise than in so far as it has its seat in
+the subject only, as the formal capacity of the subject's being affected
+by objects, and thereby of obtaining immediate representation, that
+is, intuition; consequently, only as the form of the external sense
+in general.
+
+Thus it is only by means of our explanation that the possibility
+of geometry, as a synthetical science a priori, becomes
+comprehensible. Every mode of explanation which does not show us
+this possibility, although in appearance it may be similar to ours,
+can with the utmost certainty be distinguished from it by these marks.
+
+
+
+SS 4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions.
+
+(a) Space does not represent any property of objects as
+things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relations
+to each other; in other words, space does not represent to us any
+determination of objects such as attaches to the objects themselves,
+and would remain, even though all subjective conditions of the
+intuition were abstracted. For neither absolute nor relative
+determinations of objects can be intuited prior to the existence of
+the things to which they belong, and therefore not a priori.
+
+(b) Space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the
+external sense, that is, the subjective condition of the
+sensibility, under which alone external intuition is possible. Now,
+because the receptivity or capacity of the subject to be affected by
+objects necessarily antecedes all intuitions of these objects, it is
+easily understood how the form of all phenomena can be given in the
+mind previous to all actual perceptions, therefore a priori, and how
+it, as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined,
+can contain principles of the relations of these objects prior to
+all experience.
+
+It is therefore from the human point of view only that we can
+speak of space, extended objects, etc. If we depart from the
+subjective condition, under which alone we can obtain external
+intuition, or, in other words, by means of which we are affected by
+objects, the representation of space has no meaning whatsoever. This
+predicate is only applicable to things in so far as they appear to
+us, that is, are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this
+receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of
+all relations in which objects can be intuited as existing without
+us, and when abstraction of these objects is made, is a pure intuition,
+to which we give the name of space. It is clear that we cannot make
+the special conditions of sensibility into conditions of the possibility
+of things, but only of the possibility of their existence as far as
+they are phenomena. And so we may correctly say that space contains
+all which can appear to us externally, but not all things considered
+as things in themselves, be they intuited or not, or by whatsoever
+subject one will. As to the intuitions of other thinking beings, we
+cannot judge whether they are or are not bound by the same
+conditions which limit our own intuition, and which for us are
+universally valid. If we join the limitation of a judgement to the
+conception of the subject, then the judgement will possess
+unconditioned validity. For example, the proposition, "All objects
+are beside each other in space," is valid only under the limitation
+that these things are taken as objects of our sensuous intuition. But
+if I join the condition to the conception and say, "All things, as
+external phenomena, are beside each other in space," then the rule
+is valid universally, and without any limitation. Our expositions,
+consequently, teach the reality (i.e., the objective validity) of
+space in regard of all which can be presented to us externally as
+object, and at the same time also the ideality of space in regard to
+objects when they are considered by means of reason as things in
+themselves, that is, without reference to the constitution of our
+sensibility. We maintain, therefore, the empirical reality of space
+in regard to all possible external experience, although we must admit
+its transcendental ideality; in other words, that it is nothing, so
+soon as we withdraw the condition upon which the possibility of all
+experience depends and look upon space as something that belongs to
+things in themselves.
+
+But, with the exception of space, there is no representation,
+subjective and referring to something external to us, which could
+be called objective a priori. For there are no other subjective
+representations from which we can deduce synthetical propositions a
+priori, as we can from the intuition of space. (See SS 3.)
+Therefore, to speak accurately, no ideality whatever belongs to these,
+although they agree in this respect with the representation of
+space, that they belong merely to the subjective nature of the mode
+of sensuous perception; such a mode, for example, as that of sight,
+of hearing, and of feeling, by means of the sensations of colour,
+sound, and heat, but which, because they are only sensations and not
+intuitions, do not of themselves give us the cognition of any
+object, least of all, an a priori cognition. My purpose, in the
+above remark, is merely this: to guard any one against illustrating
+the asserted ideality of space by examples quite insufficient, for
+example, by colour, taste, etc.; for these must be contemplated not
+as properties of things, but only as changes in the subject, changes
+which may be different in different men. For, in such a case, that
+which is originally a mere phenomenon, a rose, for example, is taken
+by the empirical understanding for a thing in itself, though to
+every different eye, in respect of its colour, it may appear
+different. On the contrary, the transcendental conception of phenomena
+in space is a critical admonition, that, in general, nothing which
+is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a
+form which belongs as a property to things; but that objects are quite
+unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are
+nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form
+is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not
+known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but
+respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made.
+
+
+
+
+SECTION II. Of Time.
+
+SS 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.
+
+1. Time is not an empirical conception. For neither coexistence
+nor succession would be perceived by us, if the representation of time
+did not exist as a foundation a priori. Without this presupposition
+we could not represent to ourselves that things exist together at one
+and the same time, or at different times, that is, contemporaneously,
+or in succession.
+
+2. Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of
+all our intuitions. With regard to phenomena in general, we cannot
+think away time from them, and represent them to ourselves as out of
+and unconnected with time, but we can quite well represent to
+ourselves time void of phenomena. Time is therefore given a priori.
+In it alone is all reality of phenomena possible. These may all be
+annihilated in thought, but time itself, as the universal condition
+of their possibility, cannot be so annulled.
+
+3. On this necessity a priori is also founded the possibility of
+apodeictic principles of the relations of time, or axioms of time in
+general, such as: "Time has only one dimension," "Different times
+are not coexistent but successive" (as different spaces are not
+successive but coexistent). These principles cannot be derived from
+experience, for it would give neither strict universality, nor
+apodeictic certainty. We should only be able to say, "so common
+experience teaches us," but not "it must be so." They are valid as
+rules, through which, in general, experience is possible; and they
+instruct us respecting experience, and not by means of it.
+
+4. Time is not a discursive, or as it is called, general conception,
+but a pure form of the sensuous intuition. Different times are
+merely parts of one and the same time. But the representation which
+can only be given by a single object is an intuition. Besides, the
+proposition that different times cannot be coexistent could not be
+derived from a general conception. For this proposition is
+synthetical, and therefore cannot spring out of conceptions alone.
+It is therefore contained immediately in the intuition and
+representation of time.
+
+5. The infinity of time signifies nothing more than that every
+determined quantity of time is possible only through limitations of
+one time lying at the foundation. Consequently, the original
+representation, time, must be given as unlimited. But as the
+determinate representation of the parts of time and of every
+quantity of an object can only be obtained by limitation, the complete
+representation of time must not be furnished by means of
+conceptions, for these contain only partial representations.
+Conceptions, on the contrary, must have immediate intuition for
+their basis.
+
+
+
+SS 6 Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time.
+
+I may here refer to what is said above (SS 5, 3), where, for or sake
+of brevity, I have placed under the head of metaphysical exposition,
+that which is properly transcendental. Here I shall add that the
+conception of change, and with it the conception of motion, as
+change of place, is possible only through and in the representation
+of time; that if this representation were not an intuition (internal)
+a priori, no conception, of whatever kind, could render comprehensible
+the possibility of change, in other words, of a conjunction of
+contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object, for
+example, the presence of a thing in a place and the non-presence of
+the same thing in the same place. It is only in time that it is
+possible to meet with two contradictorily opposed determinations in
+one thing, that is, after each other. Thus our conception of time
+explains the possibility of so much synthetical knowledge a priori,
+as is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion, which is not a
+little fruitful.
+
+
+
+SS 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions.
+
+(a) Time is not something which subsists of itself, or which inheres
+in things as an objective determination, and therefore remains, when
+abstraction is made of the subjective conditions of the intuition of
+things. For in the former case, it would be something real, yet
+without presenting to any power of perception any real object. In
+the latter case, as an order or determination inherent in things
+themselves, it could not be antecedent to things, as their
+condition, nor discerned or intuited by means of synthetical
+propositions a priori. But all this is quite possible when we regard
+time as merely the subjective condition under which all our intuitions
+take place. For in that case, this form of the inward intuition can
+be represented prior to the objects, and consequently a priori.
+
+(b) Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that
+is, of the intuitions of self and of our internal state. For time
+cannot be any determination of outward phenomena. It has to do neither
+with shape nor position; on the contrary, it determines the relation
+of representations in our internal state. And precisely because this
+internal intuition presents to us no shape or form, we endeavour to
+supply this want by analogies, and represent the course of time by
+a line progressing to infinity, the content of which constitutes a
+series which is only of one dimension; and we conclude from the
+properties of this line as to all the properties of time, with this
+single exception, that the parts of the line are coexistent, whilst
+those of time are successive. From this it is clear also that the
+representation of time is itself an intuition, because all its
+relations can be expressed in an external intuition.
+
+(c) Time is the formal condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever.
+Space, as the pure form of external intuition, is limited as a
+condition a priori to external phenomena alone. On the other hand,
+because all representations, whether they have or have not external
+things for their objects, still in themselves, as determinations of the
+mind, belong to our internal state; and because this internal state is
+subject to the formal condition of the internal intuition, that is, to
+time--time is a condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever--the
+immediate condition of all internal, and thereby the mediate condition
+of all external phenomena. If I can say a priori, "All outward
+phenomena are in space, and determined a priori according to the
+relations of space," I can also, from the principle of the internal
+sense, affirm universally, "All phenomena in general, that is, all
+objects of the senses, are in time and stand necessarily in relations
+of time."
+
+If we abstract our internal intuition of ourselves and all external
+intuitions, possible only by virtue of this internal intuition and
+presented to us by our faculty of representation, and consequently take
+objects as they are in themselves, then time is nothing. It is only of
+objective validity in regard to phenomena, because these are things
+which we regard as objects of our senses. It no longer objective we,
+make abstraction of the sensuousness of our intuition, in other words,
+of that mode of representation which is peculiar to us, and speak of
+things in general. Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of
+our (human) intuition (which is always sensuous, that is, so far as we
+are affected by objects), and in itself, independently of the mind or
+subject, is nothing. Nevertheless, in respect of all phenomena,
+consequently of all things which come within the sphere of our
+experience, it is necessarily objective. We cannot say, "All things are
+in time," because in this conception of things in general, we abstract
+and make no mention of any sort of intuition of things. But this is the
+proper condition under which time belongs to our representation of
+objects. If we add the condition to the conception, and say, "All
+things, as phenomena, that is, objects of sensuous intuition, are in
+time," then the proposition has its sound objective validity and
+universality a priori.
+
+What we have now set forth teaches, therefore, the empirical reality
+of time; that is, its objective validity in reference to all objects
+which can ever be presented to our senses. And as our intuition is
+always sensuous, no object ever can be presented to us in
+experience, which does not come under the conditions of time. On the
+other hand, we deny to time all claim to absolute reality; that is,
+we deny that it, without having regard to the form of our sensuous
+intuition, absolutely inheres in things as a condition or property.
+Such properties as belong to objects as things in themselves never
+can be presented to us through the medium of the senses. Herein
+consists, therefore, the transcendental ideality of time, according
+to which, if we abstract the subjective conditions of sensuous intuition,
+it is nothing, and cannot be reckoned as subsisting or inhering in
+objects as things in themselves, independently of its relation to
+our intuition. This ideality, like that of space, is not to be
+proved or illustrated by fallacious analogies with sensations, for
+this reason--that in such arguments or illustrations, we make the
+presupposition that the phenomenon, in which such and such
+predicates inhere, has objective reality, while in this case we can
+only find such an objective reality as is itself empirical, that is,
+regards the object as a mere phenomenon. In reference to this subject,
+see the remark in Section I (SS 4)
+
+
+
+SS 8. Elucidation.
+
+Against this theory, which grants empirical reality to time, but denies
+to it absolute and transcendental reality, I have heard from
+intelligent men an objection so unanimously urged that I conclude that
+it must naturally present itself to every reader to whom these
+considerations are novel. It runs thus: "Changes are real" (this the
+continual change in our own representations demonstrates, even though
+the existence of all external phenomena, together with their changes,
+is denied). Now, changes are only possible in time, and therefore time
+must be something real. But there is no difficulty in answering this. I
+grant the whole argument. Time, no doubt, is something real, that is,
+it is the real form of our internal intuition. It therefore has
+subjective reality, in reference to our internal experience, that is, I
+have really the representation of time and of my determinations
+therein. Time, therefore, is not to be regarded as an object, but as
+the mode of representation of myself as an object. But if I could
+intuite myself, or be intuited by another being, without this condition
+of sensibility, then those very determinations which we now represent
+to ourselves as changes, would present to us a knowledge in which the
+representation of time, and consequently of change, would not appear.
+The empirical reality of time, therefore, remains, as the condition of
+all our experience. But absolute reality, according to what has been
+said above, cannot be granted it. Time is nothing but the form of our
+internal intuition.* If we take away from it the special condition of
+our sensibility, the conception of time also vanishes; and it inheres
+not in the objects themselves, but solely in the subject (or mind)
+which intuites them.
+
+[*Footnote: I can indeed say "my representations follow one another,
+or are successive"; but this means only that we are conscious of them
+as in a succession, that is, according to the form of the internal
+sense. Time, therefore, is not a thing in itself, nor is it any objective
+determination pertaining to, or inherent in things.]
+
+But the reason why this objection is so unanimously brought
+against our doctrine of time, and that too by disputants who cannot
+start any intelligible arguments against the doctrine of the
+ideality of space, is this--they have no hope of demonstrating
+apodeictically the absolute reality of space, because the doctrine
+of idealism is against them, according to which the reality of
+external objects is not capable of any strict proof. On the other
+hand, the reality of the object of our internal sense (that is, myself
+and my internal state) is clear immediately through consciousness.
+The former--external objects in space--might be a mere delusion, but
+the latter--the object of my internal perception--is undeniably real.
+They do not, however, reflect that both, without question of their
+reality as representations, belong only to the genus phenomenon, which
+has always two aspects, the one, the object considered as a thing in
+itself, without regard to the mode of intuiting it, and the nature
+of which remains for this very reason problematical, the other, the
+form of our intuition of the object, which must be sought not in the
+object as a thing in itself, but in the subject to which it appears--
+which form of intuition nevertheless belongs really and necessarily
+to the phenomenal object.
+
+Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge, from which,
+a priori, various synthetical cognitions can be drawn. Of this we find
+a striking example in the cognitions of space and its relations, which
+form the foundation of pure mathematics. They are the two pure forms
+of all intuitions, and thereby make synthetical propositions a
+priori possible. But these sources of knowledge being merely
+conditions of our sensibility, do therefore, and as such, strictly
+determine their own range and purpose, in that they do not and
+cannot present objects as things in themselves, but are applicable
+to them solely in so far as they are considered as sensuous phenomena.
+The sphere of phenomena is the only sphere of their validity, and if
+we venture out of this, no further objective use can be made of
+them. For the rest, this formal reality of time and space leaves the
+validity of our empirical knowledge unshaken; for our certainty in
+that respect is equally firm, whether these forms necessarily inhere
+in the things themselves, or only in our intuitions of them. On the
+other hand, those who maintain the absolute reality of time and space,
+whether as essentially subsisting, or only inhering, as modifications,
+in things, must find themselves at utter variance with the
+principles of experience itself. For, if they decide for the first
+view, and make space and time into substances, this being the side
+taken by mathematical natural philosophers, they must admit two
+self-subsisting nonentities, infinite and eternal, which exist (yet
+without there being anything real) for the purpose of containing in
+themselves everything that is real. If they adopt the second view of
+inherence, which is preferred by some metaphysical natural
+philosophers, and regard space and time as relations (contiguity in
+space or succession in time), abstracted from experience, though
+represented confusedly in this state of separation, they find
+themselves in that case necessitated to deny the validity of
+mathematical doctrines a priori in reference to real things (for
+example, in space)--at all events their apodeictic certainty. For such
+certainty cannot be found in an a posteriori proposition; and the
+conceptions a priori of space and time are, according to this opinion,
+mere creations of the imagination, having their source really in
+experience, inasmuch as, out of relations abstracted from
+experience, imagination has made up something which contains,
+indeed, general statements of these relations, yet of which no
+application can be made without the restrictions attached thereto by
+nature. The former of these parties gains this advantage, that they
+keep the sphere of phenomena free for mathematical science. On the
+other hand, these very conditions (space and time) embarrass them
+greatly, when the understanding endeavours to pass the limits of
+that sphere. The latter has, indeed, this advantage, that the
+representations of space and time do not come in their way when they
+wish to judge of objects, not as phenomena, but merely in their
+relation to the understanding. Devoid, however, of a true and
+objectively valid a priori intuition, they can neither furnish any
+basis for the possibility of mathematical cognitions a priori, nor
+bring the propositions of experience into necessary accordance with
+those of mathematics. In our theory of the true nature of these two
+original forms of the sensibility, both difficulties are surmounted.
+
+In conclusion, that transcendental aesthetic cannot contain any more
+than these two elements--space and time, is sufficiently obvious
+from the fact that all other conceptions appertaining to
+sensibility, even that of motion, which unites in itself both
+elements, presuppose something empirical. Motion, for example,
+presupposes the perception of something movable. But space
+considered in itself contains nothing movable, consequently motion
+must be something which is found in space only through experience--
+in other words, an empirical datum. In like manner, transcendental
+aesthetic cannot number the conception of change among its data a
+priori; for time itself does not change, but only something which is
+in time. To acquire the conception of change, therefore, the
+perception of some existing object and of the succession of its
+determinations, in one word, experience, is necessary.
+
+
+
+SS 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Aesthetic.
+
+I. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, it will be requisite,
+in the first place, to recapitulate, as clearly as possible, what
+our opinion is with respect to the fundamental nature of our
+sensuous cognition in general. We have intended, then, to say that
+all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that
+the things which we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our
+representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in
+themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take
+away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our
+senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects
+in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and
+that these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in
+us. What may be the nature of objects considered as things in
+themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility
+is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our mode of
+perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which, though not of
+necessity pertaining to every animated being, is so to the whole human
+race. With this alone we have to do. Space and time are the pure forms
+thereof; sensation the matter. The former alone can we cognize a
+priori, that is, antecedent to all actual perception; and for this
+reason such cognition is called pure intuition. The latter is that
+in our cognition which is called cognition a posteriori, that is,
+empirical intuition. The former appertain absolutely and necessarily
+to our sensibility, of whatsoever kind our sensations may be; the
+latter may be of very diversified character. Supposing that we
+should carry our empirical intuition even to the very highest degree
+of clearness, we should not thereby advance one step nearer to a
+knowledge of the constitution of objects as things in themselves.
+For we could only, at best, arrive at a complete cognition of our
+own mode of intuition, that is of our sensibility, and this always
+under the conditions originally attaching to the subject, namely,
+the conditions of space and time; while the question: "What are
+objects considered as things in themselves?" remains unanswerable even
+after the most thorough examination of the phenomenal world.
+
+To say, then, that all our sensibility is nothing but the confused
+representation of things containing exclusively that which belongs
+to them as things in themselves, and this under an accumulation of
+characteristic marks and partial representations which we cannot
+distinguish in consciousness, is a falsification of the conception
+of sensibility and phenomenization, which renders our whole doctrine
+thereof empty and useless. The difference between a confused and a
+clear representation is merely logical and has nothing to do with
+content. No doubt the conception of right, as employed by a sound
+understanding, contains all that the most subtle investigation could
+unfold from it, although, in the ordinary practical use of the word,
+we are not conscious of the manifold representations comprised in
+the conception. But we cannot for this reason assert that the ordinary
+conception is a sensuous one, containing a mere phenomenon, for
+right cannot appear as a phenomenon; but the conception of it lies
+in the understanding, and represents a property (the moral property)
+of actions, which belongs to them in themselves. On the other hand,
+the representation in intuition of a body contains nothing which could
+belong to an object considered as a thing in itself, but merely the
+phenomenon or appearance of something, and the mode in which we are
+affected by that appearance; and this receptivity of our faculty of
+cognition is called sensibility, and remains toto caelo different from
+the cognition of an object in itself, even though we should examine
+the content of the phenomenon to the very bottom.
+
+It must be admitted that the Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy has
+assigned an entirely erroneous point of view to all investigations
+into the nature and origin of our cognitions, inasmuch as it regards
+the distinction between the sensuous and the intellectual as merely
+logical, whereas it is plainly transcendental, and concerns not merely
+the clearness or obscurity, but the content and origin of both. For
+the faculty of sensibility not only does not present us with an
+indistinct and confused cognition of objects as things in
+themselves, but, in fact, gives us no knowledge of these at all. On
+the contrary, so soon as we abstract in thought our own subjective
+nature, the object represented, with the properties ascribed to it
+by sensuous intuition, entirely disappears, because it was only this
+subjective nature that determined the form of the object as a
+phenomenon.
+
+In phenomena, we commonly, indeed, distinguish that which
+essentially belongs to the intuition of them, and is valid for the
+sensuous faculty of every human being, from that which belongs to
+the same intuition accidentally, as valid not for the sensuous faculty
+in general, but for a particular state or organization of this or that
+sense. Accordingly, we are accustomed to say that the former is a
+cognition which represents the object itself, whilst the latter
+presents only a particular appearance or phenomenon thereof. This
+distinction, however, is only empirical. If we stop here (as is
+usual), and do not regard the empirical intuition as itself a mere
+phenomenon (as we ought to do), in which nothing that can appertain
+to a thing in itself is to be found, our transcendental distinction
+is lost, and we believe that we cognize objects as things in
+themselves, although in the whole range of the sensuous world,
+investigate the nature of its objects as profoundly as we may, we have
+to do with nothing but phenomena. Thus, we call the rainbow a mere
+appearance of phenomenon in a sunny shower, and the rain, the
+reality or thing in itself; and this is right enough, if we understand
+the latter conception in a merely physical sense, that is, as that
+which in universal experience, and under whatever conditions of
+sensuous perception, is known in intuition to be so and so determined,
+and not otherwise. But if we consider this empirical datum
+generally, and inquire, without reference to its accordance with all
+our senses, whether there can be discovered in it aught which
+represents an object as a thing in itself (the raindrops of course
+are not such, for they are, as phenomena, empirical objects), the question
+of the relation of the representation to the object is transcendental;
+and not only are the raindrops mere phenomena, but even their circular
+form, nay, the space itself through which they fall, is nothing in
+itself, but both are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions
+of our sensuous intuition, whilst the transcendental object remains
+for us utterly unknown.
+
+The second important concern of our aesthetic is that it does not
+obtain favour merely as a plausible hypothesis, but possess as
+undoubted a character of certainty as can be demanded of any theory
+which is to serve for an organon. In order fully to convince the
+reader of this certainty, we shall select a case which will serve to
+make its validity apparent, and also to illustrate what has been
+said in SS 3.
+
+Suppose, then, that space and time are in themselves objective,
+and conditions of the--possibility of objects as things in themselves.
+In the first place, it is evident that both present us, with very many
+apodeictic and synthetic propositions a priori, but especially
+space--and for this reason we shall prefer it for investigation at
+present. As the propositions of geometry are cognized synthetically
+a priori, and with apodeictic certainty, I inquire: Whence do you
+obtain propositions of this kind, and on what basis does the
+understanding rest, in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary
+and universally valid truths?
+
+There is no other way than through intuitions or conceptions, as
+such; and these are given either a priori or a posteriori. The latter,
+namely, empirical conceptions, together with the empirical intuition
+on which they are founded, cannot afford any synthetical
+proposition, except such as is itself also empirical, that is, a
+proposition of experience. But an empirical proposition cannot possess
+the qualities of necessity and absolute universality, which,
+nevertheless, are the characteristics of all geometrical propositions.
+As to the first and only means to arrive at such cognitions, namely,
+through mere conceptions or intuitions a priori, it is quite clear
+that from mere conceptions no synthetical cognitions, but only
+analytical ones, can be obtained. Take, for example, the
+proposition: "Two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and with
+these alone no figure is possible," and try to deduce it from the
+conception of a straight line and the number two; or take the
+proposition: "It is possible to construct a figure with three straight
+lines," and endeavour, in like manner, to deduce it from the mere
+conception of a straight line and the number three. All your
+endeavours are in vain, and you find yourself forced to have
+recourse to intuition, as, in fact, geometry always does. You
+therefore give yourself an object in intuition. But of what kind is
+this intuition? Is it a pure a priori, or is it an empirical
+intuition? If the latter, then neither an universally valid, much less
+an apodeictic proposition can arise from it, for experience never
+can give us any such proposition. You must, therefore, give yourself
+an object a priori in intuition, and upon that ground your synthetical
+proposition. Now if there did not exist within you a faculty of
+intuition a priori; if this subjective condition were not in respect
+to its form also the universal condition a priori under which alone
+the object of this external intuition is itself possible; if the
+object (that is, the triangle) were something in itself, without
+relation to you the subject; how could you affirm that that which lies
+necessarily in your subjective conditions in order to construct a
+triangle, must also necessarily belong to the triangle in itself?
+For to your conceptions of three lines, you could not add anything
+new (that is, the figure); which, therefore, must necessarily be found
+in the object, because the object is given before your cognition,
+and not by means of it. If, therefore, space (and time also) were
+not a mere form of your intuition, which contains conditions a priori,
+under which alone things can become external objects for you, and
+without which subjective conditions the objects are in themselves
+nothing, you could not construct any synthetical proposition
+whatsoever regarding external objects. It is therefore not merely
+possible or probable, but indubitably certain, that space and time,
+as the necessary conditions of all our external and internal
+experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuitions,
+in relation to which all objects are therefore mere phenomena, and
+not things in themselves, presented to us in this particular manner.
+And for this reason, in respect to the form of phenomena, much may
+be said a priori, whilst of the thing in itself, which may lie at the
+foundation of these phenomena, it is impossible to say anything.
+
+II. In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external
+as well as internal sense, consequently of all objects of sense, as
+mere phenomena, we may especially remark that all in our cognition
+that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations.
+(The feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will, which are not
+cognitions, are excepted.) The relations, to wit, of place in an
+intuition (extension), change of place (motion), and laws according
+to which this change is determined (moving forces). That, however,
+which is present in this or that place, or any operation going on,
+or result taking place in the things themselves, with the exception
+of change of place, is not given to us by intuition. Now by means of
+mere relations, a thing cannot be known in itself; and it may therefore
+be fairly concluded, that, as through the external sense nothing but
+mere representations of relations are given us, the said external
+sense in its representation can contain only the relation of the
+object to the subject, but not the essential nature of the object as
+a thing in itself.
+
+The same is the case with the internal intuition, not only
+because, in the internal intuition, the representation of the external
+senses constitutes the material with which the mind is occupied; but
+because time, in which we place, and which itself antecedes the
+consciousness of, these representations in experience, and which, as
+the formal condition of the mode according to which objects are placed
+in the mind, lies at the foundation of them, contains relations of
+the successive, the coexistent, and of that which always must be
+coexistent with succession, the permanent. Now that which, as
+representation, can antecede every exercise of thought (of an object),
+is intuition; and when it contains nothing but relations, it is the
+form of the intuition, which, as it presents us with no
+representation, except in so far as something is placed in the mind,
+can be nothing else than the mode in which the mind is affected by
+its own activity, to wit--its presenting to itself representations,
+consequently the mode in which the mind is affected by itself; that
+is, it can be nothing but an internal sense in respect to its form.
+Everything that is represented through the medium of sense is so far
+phenomenal; consequently, we must either refuse altogether to admit
+an internal sense, or the subject, which is the object of that sense,
+could only be represented by it as phenomenon, and not as it would
+judge of itself, if its intuition were pure spontaneous activity, that
+is, were intellectual. The difficulty here lies wholly in the
+question: How can the subject have an internal intuition of itself?
+But this difficulty is common to every theory. The consciousness of
+self (apperception) is the simple representation of the "ego"; and
+if by means of that representation alone, all the manifold
+representations in the subject were spontaneously given, then our
+internal intuition would be intellectual. This consciousness in man
+requires an internal perception of the manifold representations
+which are previously given in the subject; and the manner in which
+these representations are given in the mind without spontaneity, must,
+on account of this difference (the want of spontaneity), be called
+sensibility. If the faculty of self-consciousness is to apprehend what
+lies in the mind, it must all act that and can in this way alone
+produce an intuition of self. But the form of this intuition, which
+lies in the original constitution of the mind, determines, in the
+representation of time, the manner in which the manifold
+representations are to combine themselves in the mind; since the
+subject intuites itself, not as it would represent itself
+immediately and spontaneously, but according to the manner in which
+the mind is internally affected, consequently, as it appears, and
+not as it is.
+
+III. When we say that the intuition of external objects, and also
+the self-intuition of the subject, represent both, objects and
+subject, in space and time, as they affect our senses, that is, as
+they appear--this is by no means equivalent to asserting that these
+objects are mere illusory appearances. For when we speak of things
+as phenomena, the objects, nay, even the properties which we ascribe
+to them, are looked upon as really given; only that, in so far as this
+or that property depends upon the mode of intuition of the subject,
+in the relation of the given object to the subject, the object as
+phenomenon is to be distinguished from the object as a thing in
+itself. Thus I do not say that bodies seem or appear to be external
+to me, or that my soul seems merely to be given in my self-consciousness,
+although I maintain that the properties of space and time, in
+conformity to which I set both, as the condition of their existence,
+abide in my mode of intuition, and not in the objects in themselves.
+It would be my own fault, if out of that which I should reckon as
+phenomenon, I made mere illusory appearance.* But this will not
+happen, because of our principle of the ideality of all sensuous
+intuitions. On the contrary, if we ascribe objective reality to
+these forms of representation, it becomes impossible to avoid changing
+everything into mere appearance. For if we regard space and time as
+properties, which must be found in objects as things in themselves,
+as sine quibus non of the possibility of their existence, and reflect
+on the absurdities in which we then find ourselves involved,
+inasmuch as we are compelled to admit the existence of two infinite
+things, which are nevertheless not substances, nor anything really
+inhering in substances, nay, to admit that they are the necessary
+conditions of the existence of all things, and moreover, that they
+must continue to exist, although all existing things were annihilated--
+we cannot blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere
+illusory appearances. Nay, even our own existence, which would in this
+case depend upon the self-existent reality of such a mere nonentity
+as time, would necessarily be changed with it into mere appearance--an
+absurdity which no one has as yet been guilty of.
+
+[*Footnote: The predicates of the phenomenon can be affixed to the
+object itself in relation to our sensuous faculty; for example, the
+red colour or the perfume to the rose. But (illusory) appearance never
+can be attributed as a predicate to an object, for this very reason,
+that it attributes to this object in itself that which belongs to it
+only in relation to our sensuous faculty, or to the subject in
+general, e.g., the two handles which were formerly ascribed to Saturn.
+That which is never to be found in the object itself, but always in
+the relation of the object to the subject, and which moreover is
+inseparable from our representation of the object, we denominate
+phenomenon. Thus the predicates of space and time are rightly
+attributed to objects of the senses as such, and in this there is no
+illusion. On the contrary, if I ascribe redness of the rose as a thing
+in itself, or to Saturn his handles, or extension to all external
+objects, considered as things in themselves, without regarding the
+determinate relation of these objects to the subject, and without
+limiting my judgement to that relation--then, and then only, arises
+illusion.]
+
+IV. In natural theology, where we think of an object--God--which
+never can be an object of intuition to us, and even to himself can
+never be an object of sensuous intuition, we carefully avoid
+attributing to his intuition the conditions of space and time--and
+intuition all his cognition must be, and not thought, which always
+includes limitation. But with what right can we do this if we make
+them forms of objects as things in themselves, and such, moreover,
+as would continue to exist as a priori conditions of the existence
+of things, even though the things themselves were annihilated? For
+as conditions of all existence in general, space and time must be
+conditions of the existence of the Supreme Being also. But if we do
+not thus make them objective forms of all things, there is no other
+way left than to make them subjective forms of our mode of
+intuition--external and internal; which is called sensuous, because
+it is not primitive, that is, is not such as gives in itself the
+existence of the object of the intuition (a mode of intuition which,
+so far as we can judge, can belong only to the Creator), but is
+dependent on the existence of the object, is possible, therefore, only
+on condition that the representative faculty of the subject is
+affected by the object.
+
+It is, moreover, not necessary that we should limit the mode of
+intuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man. It may
+well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily in this
+respect agree with man (though as to this we cannot decide), but
+sensibility does not on account of this universality cease to be
+sensibility, for this very reason, that it is a deduced (intuitus
+derivativus), and not an original (intuitus originarius), consequently
+not an intellectual intuition, and this intuition, as such, for
+reasons above mentioned, seems to belong solely to the Supreme
+Being, but never to a being dependent, quoad its existence, as well
+as its intuition (which its existence determines and limits relatively
+to given objects). This latter remark, however, must be taken only
+as an illustration, and not as any proof of the truth of our
+aesthetical theory.
+
+
+
+SS 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic.
+
+We have now completely before us one part of the solution of the
+grand general problem of transcendental philosophy, namely, the
+question: "How are synthetical propositions a priori possible?" That
+is to say, we have shown that we are in possession of pure a priori
+intuitions, namely, space and time, in which we find, when in a
+judgement a priori we pass out beyond the given conception,
+something which is not discoverable in that conception, but is
+certainly found a priori in the intuition which corresponds to the
+conception, and can be united synthetically with it. But the
+judgements which these pure intuitions enable us to make, never
+reach farther than to objects of the senses, and are valid only for
+objects of possible experience.
+
+
+
+
+SECOND PART. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
+
+INTRODUCTION. Idea of a Transcendental Logic.
+
+I. Of Logic in General.
+
+Our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, first of
+which is the faculty or power of receiving representations
+(receptivity for impressions); the second is the power of cognizing
+by means of these representations (spontaneity in the production of
+conceptions). Through the first an object is given to us; through
+the second, it is, in relation to the representation (which is a
+mere determination of the mind), thought. Intuition and conceptions
+constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that
+neither conceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding
+to them, nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a cognition.
+Both are either pure or empirical. They are empirical, when sensation
+(which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained
+in them; and pure, when no sensation is mixed with the representation.
+Sensations we may call the matter of sensuous cognition. Pure
+intuition consequently contains merely the form under which
+something is intuited, and pure conception only the form of the
+thought of an object. Only pure intuitions and pure conceptions are
+possible a priori; the empirical only a posteriori.
+
+We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for
+impressions, in so far as it is in some way affected; and, on the
+other hand, we call the faculty of spontaneously producing
+representations, or the spontaneity of cognition, understanding. Our
+nature is so constituted that intuition with us never can be other
+than sensuous, that is, it contains only the mode in which we are
+affected by objects. On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the
+object of sensuous intuition is the understanding. Neither of these
+faculties has a preference over the other. Without the sensuous
+faculty no object would be given to us, and without the
+understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content
+are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind. Hence it is as
+necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous (that is, to
+join to them the object in intuition), as to make its intuitions
+intelligible (that is, to bring them under conceptions). Neither of
+these faculties can exchange its proper function. Understanding cannot
+intuite, and the sensuous faculty cannot think. In no other way than
+from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise. But no one
+ought, on this account, to overlook the difference of the elements
+contributed by each; we have rather great reason carefully to separate
+and distinguish them. We therefore distinguish the science of the laws
+of sensibility, that is, aesthetic, from the science of the laws of
+the understanding, that is, logic.
+
+Now, logic in its turn may be considered as twofold--namely, as
+logic of the general, or of the particular use of the understanding.
+The first contains the absolutely necessary laws of thought, without
+which no use whatsoever of the understanding is possible, and gives
+laws therefore to the understanding, without regard to the
+difference of objects on which it may be employed. The logic of the
+particular use of the understanding contains the laws of correct
+thinking upon a particular class of objects. The former may be
+called elemental logic--the latter, the organon of this or that
+particular science. The latter is for the most part employed in the
+schools, as a propaedeutic to the sciences, although, indeed,
+according to the course of human reason, it is the last thing we
+arrive at, when the science has been already matured, and needs only
+the finishing touches towards its correction and completion; for our
+knowledge of the objects of our attempted science must be tolerably
+extensive and complete before we can indicate the laws by which a
+science of these objects can be established.
+
+General logic is again either pure or applied. In the former, we
+abstract all the empirical conditions under which the understanding
+is exercised; for example, the influence of the senses, the play of
+the fantasy or imagination, the laws of the memory, the force of habit,
+of inclination, etc., consequently also, the sources of prejudice--in
+a word, we abstract all causes from which particular cognitions arise,
+because these causes regard the understanding under certain
+circumstances of its application, and, to the knowledge of them
+experience is required. Pure general logic has to do, therefore,
+merely with pure a priori principles, and is a canon of
+understanding and reason, but only in respect of the formal part of
+their use, be the content what it may, empirical or transcendental.
+General logic is called applied, when it is directed to the laws of
+the use of the understanding, under the subjective empirical
+conditions which psychology teaches us. It has therefore empirical
+principles, although, at the same time, it is in so far general,
+that it applies to the exercise of the understanding, without regard
+to the difference of objects. On this account, moreover, it is neither
+a canon of the understanding in general, nor an organon of a
+particular science, but merely a cathartic of the human understanding.
+
+In general logic, therefore, that part which constitutes pure
+logic must be carefully distinguished from that which constitutes
+applied (though still general) logic. The former alone is properly
+science, although short and dry, as the methodical exposition of an
+elemental doctrine of the understanding ought to be. In this,
+therefore, logicians must always bear in mind two rules:
+
+1. As general logic, it makes abstraction of all content of the
+cognition of the understanding, and of the difference of objects,
+and has to do with nothing but the mere form of thought.
+
+2. As pure logic, it has no empirical principles, and consequently
+draws nothing (contrary to the common persuasion) from psychology,
+which therefore has no influence on the canon of the understanding.
+It is a demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain
+completely a priori.
+
+What I called applied logic (contrary to the common acceptation of
+this term, according to which it should contain certain exercises
+for the scholar, for which pure logic gives the rules), is a
+representation of the understanding, and of the rules of its necessary
+employment in concreto, that is to say, under the accidental
+conditions of the subject, which may either hinder or promote this
+employment, and which are all given only empirically. Thus applied
+logic treats of attention, its impediments and consequences, of the
+origin of error, of the state of doubt, hesitation, conviction,
+etc., and to it is related pure general logic in the same way that
+pure morality, which contains only the necessary moral laws of a
+free will, is related to practical ethics, which considers these
+laws under all the impediments of feelings, inclinations, and passions
+to which men are more or less subjected, and which never can furnish
+us with a true and demonstrated science, because it, as well as
+applied logic, requires empirical and psychological principles.
+
+
+
+II. Of Transcendental Logic.
+
+General logic, as we have seen, makes abstraction of all content
+of cognition, that is, of all relation of cognition to its object,
+and regards only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to
+each other, that is, the form of thought in general. But as we have
+both pure and empirical intuitions (as transcendental aesthetic proves),
+in like manner a distinction might be drawn between pure and empirical
+thought (of objects). In this case, there would exist a kind of logic,
+in which we should not make abstraction of all content of cognition;
+for or logic which should comprise merely the laws of pure thought
+(of an object), would of course exclude all those cognitions which
+were of empirical content. This kind of logic would also examine the
+origin of our cognitions of objects, so far as that origin cannot be
+ascribed to the objects themselves; while, on the contrary, general
+logic has nothing to do with the origin of our cognitions, but contemplates
+our representations, be they given primitively a priori in
+ourselves, or be they only of empirical origin, solely according to
+the laws which the understanding observes in employing them in the
+process of thought, in relation to each other. Consequently, general
+logic treats of the form of the understanding only, which can be
+applied to representations, from whatever source they may have arisen.
+
+And here I shall make a remark, which the reader must bear well in
+mind in the course of the following considerations, to wit, that not
+every cognition a priori, but only those through which we cognize that
+and how certain representations (intuitions or conceptions) are
+applied or are possible only a priori; that is to say, the a priori
+possibility of cognition and the a priori use of it are
+transcendental. Therefore neither is space, nor any a priori
+geometrical determination of space, a transcendental Representation,
+but only the knowledge that such a representation is not of
+empirical origin, and the possibility of its relating to objects of
+experience, although itself a priori, can be called transcendental.
+So also, the application of space to objects in general would be
+transcendental; but if it be limited to objects of sense it is
+empirical. Thus, the distinction of the transcendental and empirical
+belongs only to the critique of cognitions, and does not concern the
+relation of these to their object.
+
+Accordingly, in the expectation that there may perhaps be
+conceptions which relate a priori to objects, not as pure or
+sensuous intuitions, but merely as acts of pure thought (which are
+therefore conceptions, but neither of empirical nor aesthetical
+origin)--in this expectation, I say, we form to ourselves, by
+anticipation, the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational
+cognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely a
+priori. A science of this kind, which should determine the origin,
+the extent, and the objective validity of such cognitions, must be
+called transcendental logic, because it has not, like general logic,
+to do with the laws of understanding and reason in relation to
+empirical as well as pure rational cognitions without distinction,
+but concerns itself with these only in an a priori relation to objects.
+
+
+
+III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic.
+
+The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a
+corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms
+or confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole
+art, is this: "What is truth?" The definition of the word truth, to
+wit, "the accordance of the cognition with its object," is presupposed
+in the question; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what
+is the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition.
+
+To know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a
+strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence. For if a question be
+in itself absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer, it is
+attended with the danger--not to mention the shame that falls upon
+the person who proposes it--of seducing the unguarded listener into
+making absurd answers, and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle
+of one (as the ancients said) "milking the he-goat, and the other
+holding a sieve."
+
+If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its
+object, this object must be, ipso facto, distinguished from all
+others; for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the object
+to which it relates, although it contains something which may be
+affirmed of other objects. Now an universal criterion of truth would
+be that which is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of
+their objects. But it is evident that since, in the case of such a
+criterion, we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that
+is, of all relation to its object), and truth relates precisely to
+this content, it must be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth
+of this content of cognition; and that, accordingly, a sufficient,
+and at the same time universal, test of truth cannot possibly be found.
+As we have already termed the content of a cognition its matter, we
+shall say: "Of the truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter,
+no universal test can be demanded, because such a demand is
+self-contradictory."
+
+On the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect of its
+mere form (excluding all content), it is equally manifest that
+logic, in so far as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of
+the understanding, must in these very laws present us with criteria
+of truth. Whatever contradicts these rules is false, because thereby
+the understanding is made to contradict its own universal laws of
+thought; that is, to contradict itself. These criteria, however, apply
+solely to the form of truth, that is, of thought in general, and in
+so far they are perfectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although
+a cognition may be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that is,
+not self-contradictory, it is notwithstanding quite possible that it
+may not stand in agreement with its object. Consequently, the merely
+logical criterion of truth, namely, the accordance of a cognition with
+the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason, is
+nothing more than the conditio sine qua non, or negative condition
+of all truth. Farther than this logic cannot go, and the error which
+depends not on the form, but on the content of the cognition, it has
+no test to discover.
+
+General logic, then, resolves the whole formal business of
+understanding and reason into its elements, and exhibits them as
+principles of all logical judging of our cognitions. This part of
+logic may, therefore, be called analytic, and is at least the negative
+test of truth, because all cognitions must first of an be estimated
+and tried according to these laws before we proceed to investigate
+them in respect of their content, in order to discover whether they
+contain positive truth in regard to their object. Because, however,
+the mere form of a cognition, accurately as it may accord with logical
+laws, is insufficient to supply us with material (objective) truth,
+no one, by means of logic alone, can venture to predicate anything
+of or decide concerning objects, unless he has obtained, independently
+of logic, well-grounded information about them, in order afterwards
+to examine, according to logical laws, into the use and connection,
+in a cohering whole, of that information, or, what is still better,
+merely to test it by them. Notwithstanding, there lies so seductive
+a charm in the possession of a specious art like this--an art which
+gives to all our cognitions the form of the understanding, although
+with respect to the content thereof we may be sadly deficient--that
+general logic, which is merely a canon of judgement, has been employed
+as an organon for the actual production, or rather for the semblance
+of production, of objective assertions, and has thus been grossly
+misapplied. Now general logic, in its assumed character of organon,
+is called dialectic.
+
+Different as are the significations in which the ancients used
+this term for a science or an art, we may safely infer, from their
+actual employment of it, that with them it was nothing else than a
+logic of illusion--a sophistical art for giving ignorance, nay, even
+intentional sophistries, the colouring of truth, in which the
+thoroughness of procedure which logic requires was imitated, and their
+topic employed to cloak the empty pretensions. Now it may be taken
+as a safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an
+organon, must always be a logic of illusion, that is, be
+dialectical, for, as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the
+content of our cognitions, but merely the formal conditions of their
+accordance with the understanding, which do not relate to and are
+quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt to employ it as
+an instrument (organon) in order to extend and enlarge the range of
+our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain
+or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion
+whatever.
+
+Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy.
+For these reasons we have chosen to denominate this part of logic
+dialectic, in the sense of a critique of dialectical illusion, and
+we wish the term to be so understood in this place.
+
+
+
+IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental
+ Analytic and Dialectic.
+
+In transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (as in
+transcendental aesthetic the sensibility) and select from our
+cognition merely that part of thought which has its origin in the
+understanding alone. The exercise of this pure cognition, however,
+depends upon this as its condition, that objects to which it may be
+applied be given to us in intuition, for without intuition the whole
+of our cognition is without objects, and is therefore quite void. That
+part of transcendental logic, then, which treats of the elements of
+pure cognition of the understanding, and of the principles without
+which no object at all can be thought, is transcendental analytic,
+and at the same time a logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict
+it, without losing at the same time all content, that is, losing all
+reference to an object, and therefore all truth. But because we are
+very easily seduced into employing these pure cognitions and
+principles of the understanding by themselves, and that even beyond
+the boundaries of experience, which yet is the only source whence we
+can obtain matter (objects) on which those pure conceptions may be
+employed--understanding runs the risk of making, by means of empty
+sophisms, a material and objective use of the mere formal principles
+of the pure understanding, and of passing judgements on objects
+without distinction--objects which are not given to us, nay, perhaps
+cannot be given to us in any way. Now, as it ought properly to be only
+a canon for judging of the empirical use of the understanding, this
+kind of logic is misused when we seek to employ it as an organon of
+the universal and unlimited exercise of the understanding, and attempt
+with the pure understanding alone to judge synthetically, affirm,
+and determine respecting objects in general. In this case the exercise
+of the pure understanding becomes dialectical. The second part of
+our transcendental logic must therefore be a critique of dialectical
+illusion, and this critique we shall term transcendental dialectic--
+not meaning it as an art of producing dogmatically such illusion (an
+art which is unfortunately too current among the practitioners of
+metaphysical juggling), but as a critique of understanding and
+reason in regard to their hyperphysical use. This critique will expose
+the groundless nature of the pretensions of these two faculties, and
+invalidate their claims to the discovery and enlargement of our
+cognitions merely by means of transcendental principles, and show that
+the proper employment of these faculties is to test the judgements
+made by the pure understanding, and to guard it from sophistical
+delusion.
+
+
+
+
+TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. FIRST DIVISION.
+
+TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC.
+
+SS I.
+
+Transcendental analytic is the dissection of the whole of our a priori
+knowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding.
+In order to effect our purpose, it is necessary: (1) That the
+conceptions be pure and not empirical; (2) That they belong not to
+intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understanding; (3) That
+they be elementary conceptions, and as such, quite different from
+deduced or compound conceptions; (4) That our table of these elementary
+conceptions be complete, and fill up the whole sphere of the pure
+understanding. Now this completeness of a science cannot be accepted
+with confidence on the guarantee of a mere estimate of its existence in
+an aggregate formed only by means of repeated experiments and attempts.
+The completeness which we require is possible only by means of an idea
+of the totality of the a priori cognition of the understanding, and
+through the thereby determined division of the conceptions which form
+the said whole; consequently, only by means of their connection in a
+system. Pure understanding distinguishes itself not merely from
+everything empirical, but also completely from all sensibility. It is a
+unity self-subsistent, self-sufficient, and not to be enlarged by any
+additions from without. Hence the sum of its cognition constitutes a
+system to be determined by and comprised under an idea; and the
+completeness and articulation of this system can at the same time serve
+as a test of the correctness and genuineness of all the parts of
+cognition that belong to it. The whole of this part of transcendental
+logic consists of two books, of which the one contains the conceptions,
+and the other the principles of pure understanding.
+
+
+
+BOOK I.
+
+SS 2. Analytic of Conceptions.
+
+By the term Analytic of Conceptions, I do not understand the
+analysis of these, or the usual process in philosophical
+investigations of dissecting the conceptions which present themselves,
+according to their content, and so making them clear; but I mean the
+hitherto little attempted dissection of the faculty of understanding
+itself, in order to investigate the possibility of conceptions a
+priori, by looking for them in the understanding alone, as their
+birthplace, and analysing the pure use of this faculty. For this is
+the proper duty of a transcendental philosophy; what remains is the
+logical treatment of the conceptions in philosophy in general. We
+shall therefore follow up the pure conceptions even to their germs
+and beginnings in the human understanding, in which they lie, until
+they are developed on occasions presented by experience, and, freed
+by the same understanding from the empirical conditions attaching to
+them, are set forth in their unalloyed purity.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure
+ Conceptions of the Understanding.
+
+SS 3. Introductory.
+
+When we call into play a faculty of cognition, different conceptions
+manifest themselves according to the different circumstances, and make
+known this faculty, and assemble themselves into a more or less
+extensive collection, according to the time or penetration that has
+been applied to the consideration of them. Where this process,
+conducted as it is mechanically, so to speak, will end, cannot be
+determined with certainty. Besides, the conceptions which we
+discover in this haphazard manner present themselves by no means in
+order and systematic unity, but are at last coupled together only
+according to resemblances to each other, and arranged in series,
+according to the quantity of their content, from the simpler to the
+more complex--series which are anything but systematic, though not
+altogether without a certain kind of method in their construction.
+
+Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, and moreover the
+duty, of searching for its conceptions according to a principle;
+because these conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the
+understanding as an absolute unity, and therefore must be connected
+with each other according to one conception or idea. A connection of
+this kind, however, furnishes us with a ready prepared rule, by
+which its proper place may be assigned to every pure conception of
+the understanding, and the completeness of the system of all be determined
+a priori--both which would otherwise have been dependent on mere
+choice or chance.
+
+
+
+SS 4. SECTION 1. Of defined above Use of understanding in General.
+
+The understanding was defined above only negatively, as a
+non-sensuous faculty of cognition. Now, independently of
+sensibility, we cannot possibly have any intuition; consequently,
+the understanding is no faculty of intuition. But besides intuition
+there is no other mode of cognition, except through conceptions;
+consequently, the cognition of every, at least of every human,
+understanding is a cognition through conceptions--not intuitive, but
+discursive. All intuitions, as sensuous, depend on affections;
+conceptions, therefore, upon functions. By the word function I
+understand the unity of the act of arranging diverse representations
+under one common representation. Conceptions, then, are based on the
+spontaneity of thought, as sensuous intuitions are on the
+receptivity of impressions. Now, the understanding cannot make any
+other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them. As no
+representation, except an intuition, relates immediately to its
+object, a conception never relates immediately to an object, but
+only to some other representation thereof, be that an intuition or
+itself a conception. A judgement, therefore, is the mediate
+cognition of an object, consequently the representation of a
+representation of it. In every judgement there is a conception which
+applies to, and is valid for many other conceptions, and which among
+these comprehends also a given representation, this last being
+immediately connected with an object. For example, in the judgement--
+"All bodies are divisible," our conception of divisible applies to
+various other conceptions; among these, however, it is here
+particularly applied to the conception of body, and this conception
+of body relates to certain phenomena which occur to us. These objects,
+therefore, are mediately represented by the conception of
+divisibility. All judgements, accordingly, are functions of unity in
+our representations, inasmuch as, instead of an immediate, a higher
+representation, which comprises this and various others, is used for
+our cognition of the object, and thereby many possible cognitions
+are collected into one. But we can reduce all acts of the
+understanding to judgements, so that understanding may be
+represented as the faculty of judging. For it is, according to what
+has been said above, a faculty of thought. Now thought is cognition
+by means of conceptions. But conceptions, as predicates of possible
+judgements, relate to some representation of a yet undetermined
+object. Thus the conception of body indicates something--for
+example, metal--which can be cognized by means of that conception.
+It is therefore a conception, for the reason alone that other
+representations are contained under it, by means of which it can
+relate to objects. It is therefore the predicate to a possible
+judgement; for example: "Every metal is a body." All the functions
+of the understanding therefore can be discovered, when we can
+completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgements. And that this
+may be effected very easily, the following section will show.
+
+
+
+SS 5. SECTION II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in
+ Judgements.
+
+If we abstract all the content of a judgement, and consider only the
+intellectual form thereof, we find that the function of thought in
+a judgement can be brought under four heads, of which each contains
+three momenta. These may be conveniently represented in the
+following table:
+
+ 1
+ Quantity of judgements
+ Universal
+ Particular
+ Singular
+
+ 2 3
+ Quality Relation
+ Affirmative Categorical
+ Negative Hypothetical
+ Infinite Disjunctive
+
+ 4
+ Modality
+ Problematical
+ Assertorical
+ Apodeictical
+
+
+As this division appears to differ in some, though not essential
+points, from the usual technique of logicians, the following
+observations, for the prevention of otherwise possible
+misunderstanding, will not be without their use.
+
+1. Logicians say, with justice, that in the use of judgements in
+syllogisms, singular judgements may be treated like universal ones.
+For, precisely because a singular judgement has no extent at all,
+its predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is contained in
+the conception of the subject and be excluded from the rest. The predicate
+is valid for the whole conception just as if it were a general
+conception, and had extent, to the whole of which the predicate
+applied. On the other hand, let us compare a singular with a general
+judgement, merely as a cognition, in regard to quantity. The
+singular judgement relates to the general one, as unity to infinity,
+and is therefore in itself essentially different. Thus, if we estimate
+a singular judgement (judicium singulare) not merely according to
+its intrinsic validity as a judgement, but also as a cognition
+generally, according to its quantity in comparison with that of
+other cognitions, it is then entirely different from a general
+judgement (judicium commune), and in a complete table of the momenta
+of thought deserves a separate place--though, indeed, this would not
+be necessary in a logic limited merely to the consideration of the
+use of judgements in reference to each other.
+
+2. In like manner, in transcendental logic, infinite must be
+distinguished from affirmative judgements, although in general logic
+they are rightly enough classed under affirmative. General logic
+abstracts all content of the predicate (though it be negative), and
+only considers whether the said predicate be affirmed or denied of
+the subject. But transcendental logic considers also the worth or
+content of this logical affirmation--an affirmation by means of a
+merely negative predicate, and inquires how much the sum total of
+our cognition gains by this affirmation. For example, if I say of
+the soul, "It is not mortal"--by this negative judgement I should at
+least ward off error. Now, by the proposition, "The soul is not
+mortal," I have, in respect of the logical form, really affirmed,
+inasmuch as I thereby place the soul in the unlimited sphere of
+immortal beings. Now, because of the whole sphere of possible
+existences, the mortal occupies one part, and the immortal the
+other, neither more nor less is affirmed by the proposition than
+that the soul is one among the infinite multitude of things which
+remain over, when I take away the whole mortal part. But by this
+proceeding we accomplish only this much, that the infinite sphere of
+all possible existences is in so far limited that the mortal is
+excluded from it, and the soul is placed in the remaining part of
+the extent of this sphere. But this part remains, notwithstanding this
+exception, infinite, and more and more parts may be taken away from
+the whole sphere, without in the slightest degree thereby augmenting
+or affirmatively determining our conception of the soul. These
+judgements, therefore, infinite in respect of their logical extent,
+are, in respect of the content of their cognition, merely
+limitative; and are consequently entitled to a place in our
+transcendental table of all the momenta of thought in judgements,
+because the function of the understanding exercised by them may
+perhaps be of importance in the field of its pure a priori cognition.
+
+3. All relations of thought in judgements are those (a) of the
+predicate to the subject; (b) of the principle to its consequence;
+(c) of the divided cognition and all the members of the division to
+each other. In the first of these three classes, we consider only two
+conceptions; in the second, two judgements; in the third, several
+judgements in relation to each other. The hypothetical proposition,
+"If perfect justice exists, the obstinately wicked are punished,"
+contains properly the relation to each other of two propositions,
+namely, "Perfect justice exists," and "The obstinately wicked are
+punished." Whether these propositions are in themselves true is a
+question not here decided. Nothing is cogitated by means of this
+judgement except a certain consequence. Finally, the disjunctive
+judgement contains a relation of two or more propositions to each
+other--a relation not of consequence, but of logical opposition, in
+so far as the sphere of the one proposition excludes that of the other.
+But it contains at the same time a relation of community, in so far
+as all the propositions taken together fill up the sphere of the
+cognition. The disjunctive judgement contains, therefore, the relation
+of the parts of the whole sphere of a cognition, since the sphere of
+each part is a complemental part of the sphere of the other, each
+contributing to form the sum total of the divided cognition. Take,
+for example, the proposition, "The world exists either through blind
+chance, or through internal necessity, or through an external
+cause." Each of these propositions embraces a part of the sphere of
+our possible cognition as to the existence of a world; all of them
+taken together, the whole sphere. To take the cognition out of one
+of these spheres, is equivalent to placing it in one of the others;
+and, on the other hand, to place it in one sphere is equivalent to
+taking it out of the rest. There is, therefore, in a disjunctive
+judgement a certain community of cognitions, which consists in this,
+that they mutually exclude each other, yet thereby determine, as a
+whole, the true cognition, inasmuch as, taken together, they make up
+the complete content of a particular given cognition. And this is
+all that I find necessary, for the sake of what follows, to remark
+in this place.
+
+4. The modality of judgements is a quite peculiar function, with
+this distinguishing characteristic, that it contributes nothing to
+the content of a judgement (for besides quantity, quality, and relation,
+there is nothing more that constitutes the content of a judgement),
+but concerns itself only with the value of the copula in relation to
+thought in general. Problematical judgements are those in which the
+affirmation or negation is accepted as merely possible (ad libitum).
+In the assertorical, we regard the proposition as real (true); in
+the apodeictical, we look on it as necessary.* Thus the two judgements
+(antecedens et consequens), the relation of which constitutes a
+hypothetical judgement, likewise those (the members of the division)
+in whose reciprocity the disjunctive consists, are only problematical.
+In the example above given the proposition, "There exists perfect
+justice," is not stated assertorically, but as an ad libitum
+judgement, which someone may choose to adopt, and the consequence
+alone is assertorical. Hence such judgements may be obviously false,
+and yet, taken problematically, be conditions of our cognition of
+the truth. Thus the proposition, "The world exists only by blind
+chance," is in the disjunctive judgement of problematical import only:
+that is to say, one may accept it for the moment, and it helps us
+(like the indication of the wrong road among all the roads that one
+can take) to find out the true proposition. The problematical
+proposition is, therefore, that which expresses only logical
+possibility (which is not objective); that is, it expresses a free
+choice to admit the validity of such a proposition--a merely arbitrary
+reception of it into the understanding. The assertorical speaks of
+logical reality or truth; as, for example, in a hypothetical
+syllogism, the antecedens presents itself in a problematical form in
+the major, in an assertorical form in the minor, and it shows that
+the proposition is in harmony with the laws of the understanding. The
+apodeictical proposition cogitates the assertorical as determined by
+these very laws of the understanding, consequently as affirming a
+priori, and in this manner it expresses logical necessity. Now because
+all is here gradually incorporated with the understanding--inasmuch
+as in the first place we judge problematically; then accept
+assertorically our judgement as true; lastly, affirm it as inseparably
+united with the understanding, that is, as necessary and apodeictical--
+we may safely reckon these three functions of modality as so many
+momenta of thought.
+
+[*Footnote: Just as if thought were in the first instance a function
+of the understanding; in the second, of judgement; in the third, of
+reason. A remark which will be explained in the sequel.]
+
+
+
+SS 6. SECTION III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or
+ Categories.
+
+General logic, as has been repeatedly said, makes abstraction of all
+content of cognition, and expects to receive representations from some
+other quarter, in order, by means of analysis, to convert them into
+conceptions. On the contrary, transcendental logic has lying before
+it the manifold content of a priori sensibility, which transcendental
+aesthetic presents to it in order to give matter to the pure
+conceptions of the understanding, without which transcendental logic
+would have no content, and be therefore utterly void. Now space and
+time contain an infinite diversity of determinations of pure a
+priori intuition, but are nevertheless the condition of the mind's
+receptivity, under which alone it can obtain representations of
+objects, and which, consequently, must always affect the conception
+of these objects. But the spontaneity of thought requires that this
+diversity be examined after a certain manner, received into the
+mind, and connected, in order afterwards to form a cognition out of
+it. This Process I call synthesis.
+
+By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I
+understand the process of joining different representations to each
+other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition. This
+synthesis is pure when the diversity is not given empirically but a
+priori (as that in space and time). Our representations must be
+given previously to any analysis of them; and no conceptions can
+arise, quoad their content, analytically. But the synthesis of a
+diversity (be it given a priori or empirically) is the first requisite
+for the production of a cognition, which in its beginning, indeed,
+may be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis--still,
+synthesis is that by which alone the elements of our cognitions are
+collected and united into a certain content, consequently it is the
+first thing on which we must fix our attention, if we wish to
+investigate the origin of our knowledge.
+
+Synthesis, generally speaking, is, as we shall afterwards see, the
+mere operation of the imagination--a blind but indispensable
+function of the soul, without which we should have no cognition
+whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious.
+But to reduce this synthesis to conceptions is a function of the
+understanding, by means of which we attain to cognition, in the proper
+meaning of the term.
+
+Pure synthesis, represented generally, gives us the pure
+conception of the understanding. But by this pure synthesis, I mean
+that which rests upon a basis of a priori synthetical unity. Thus,
+our numeration (and this is more observable in large numbers) is a
+synthesis according to conceptions, because it takes place according
+to a common basis of unity (for example, the decade). By means of this
+conception, therefore, the unity in the synthesis of the manifold
+becomes necessary.
+
+By means of analysis different representations are brought under one
+conception--an operation of which general logic treats. On the other
+hand, the duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions,
+not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations. The
+first thing which must be given to us for the sake of the a priori
+cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition;
+the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the
+second; but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which
+give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the
+representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the
+third requisite for the cognition of an object, and these
+conceptions are given by the understanding.
+
+The same function which gives unity to the different
+representation in a judgement, gives also unity to the mere
+synthesis of different representations in an intuition; and this unity
+we call the pure conception of the understanding. Thus, the same
+understanding, and by the same operations, whereby in conceptions,
+by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a
+judgement, introduces, by means of the synthetical unity of the
+manifold in intuition, a transcendental content into its
+representations, on which account they are called pure conceptions
+of the understanding, and they apply a priori to objects, a result
+not within the power of general logic.
+
+In this manner, there arise exactly so many pure conceptions of
+the understanding, applying a priori to objects of intuition in
+general, as there are logical functions in all possible judgements.
+For there is no other function or faculty existing in the
+understanding besides those enumerated in that table. These
+conceptions we shall, with Aristotle, call categories, our purpose
+being originally identical with his, notwithstanding the great
+difference in the execution.
+
+ TABLE OF THE CATEGORIES
+
+ 1 2
+
+ Of Quantity Of Quality
+ Unity Reality
+ Plurality Negation
+ Totality Limitation
+
+ 3
+ Of Relation
+ Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens)
+ Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)
+ Of Community (reciprocity between the agent and patient)
+
+ 4
+ Of Modality
+ Possibility--Impossibility
+ Existence--Non-existence
+ Necessity--Contingence
+
+
+This, then, is a catalogue of all the originally pure conceptions of
+the synthesis which the understanding contains a priori, and these
+conceptions alone entitle it to be called a pure understanding;
+inasmuch as only by them it can render the manifold of intuition
+conceivable, in other words, think an object of intuition. This
+division is made systematically from a common principle, namely the
+faculty of judgement (which is just the same as the power of thought),
+and has not arisen rhapsodically from a search at haphazard after pure
+conceptions, respecting the full number of which we never could be
+certain, inasmuch as we employ induction alone in our search,
+without considering that in this way we can never understand wherefore
+precisely these conceptions, and none others, abide in the pure
+understanding. It was a design worthy of an acute thinker like
+Aristotle, to search for these fundamental conceptions. Destitute,
+however, of any guiding principle, he picked them up just as they
+occurred to him, and at first hunted out ten, which he called
+categories (predicaments). Afterwards be believed that he had
+discovered five others, which were added under the name of post
+predicaments. But his catalogue still remained defective. Besides,
+there are to be found among them some of the modes of pure sensibility
+(quando, ubi, situs, also prius, simul), and likewise an empirical
+conception (motus)--which can by no means belong to this
+genealogical register of the pure understanding. Moreover, there are
+deduced conceptions (actio, passio) enumerated among the original
+conceptions, and, of the latter, some are entirely wanting.
+
+With regard to these, it is to be remarked, that the categories,
+as the true primitive conceptions of the pure understanding, have also
+their pure deduced conceptions, which, in a complete system of
+transcendental philosophy, must by no means be passed over; though
+in a merely critical essay we must be contented with the simple
+mention of the fact.
+
+Let it be allowed me to call these pure, but deduced conceptions
+of the understanding, the predicables of the pure understanding, in
+contradistinction to predicaments. If we are in possession of the
+original and primitive, the deduced and subsidiary conceptions can
+easily be added, and the genealogical tree of the understanding
+completely delineated. As my present aim is not to set forth a
+complete system, but merely the principles of one, I reserve this task
+for another time. It may be easily executed by any one who will
+refer to the ontological manuals, and subordinate to the category of
+causality, for example, the predicables of force, action, passion;
+to that of community, those of presence and resistance; to the
+categories of modality, those of origination, extinction, change;
+and so with the rest. The categories combined with the modes of pure
+sensibility, or with one another, afford a great number of deduced
+a priori conceptions; a complete enumeration of which would be a
+useful and not unpleasant, but in this place a perfectly
+dispensable, occupation.
+
+I purposely omit the definitions of the categories in this treatise.
+I shall analyse these conceptions only so far as is necessary for
+the doctrine of method, which is to form a part of this critique. In
+a system of pure reason, definitions of them would be with justice
+demanded of me, but to give them here would only bide from our view
+the main aim of our investigation, at the same time raising doubts
+and objections, the consideration of which, without injustice to our
+main purpose, may be very well postponed till another opportunity.
+Meanwhile, it ought to be sufficiently clear, from the little we
+have already said on this subject, that the formation of a complete
+vocabulary of pure conceptions, accompanied by all the requisite
+explanations, is not only a possible, but an easy undertaking. The
+compartments already exist; it is only necessary to fill them up;
+and a systematic topic like the present, indicates with perfect
+precision the proper place to which each conception belongs, while
+it readily points out any that have not yet been filled up.
+
+
+
+SS 7.
+
+Our table of the categories suggests considerations of some
+importance, which may perhaps have significant results in regard to
+the scientific form of all rational cognitions. For, that this table
+is useful in the theoretical part of philosophy, nay, indispensable
+for the sketching of the complete plan of a science, so far as that
+science rests upon conceptions a priori, and for dividing it
+mathematically, according to fixed principles, is most manifest from
+the fact that it contains all the elementary conceptions of the
+understanding, nay, even the form of a system of these in the
+understanding itself, and consequently indicates all the momenta,
+and also the internal arrangement of a projected speculative
+science, as I have elsewhere shown. [Footnote: In the
+Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science.] Here follow some of these
+observations.
+
+I. This table, which contains four classes of conceptions of the
+understanding, may, in the first instance, be divided into two
+classes, the first of which relates to objects of intuition--pure as
+well as empirical; the second, to the existence of these objects,
+either in relation to one another, or to the understanding.
+
+The former of these classes of categories I would entitle the
+mathematical, and the latter the dynamical categories. The former,
+as we see, has no correlates; these are only to be found in the second
+class. This difference must have a ground in the nature of the human
+understanding.
+
+II. The number of the categories in each class is always the same,
+namely, three--a fact which also demands some consideration, because
+in all other cases division a priori through conceptions is
+necessarily dichotomy. It is to be added, that the third category in
+each triad always arises from the combination of the second with the
+first.
+
+Thus totality is nothing else but plurality contemplated as unity;
+limitation is merely reality conjoined with negation; community is
+the causality of a substance, reciprocally determining, and determined
+by other substances; and finally, necessity is nothing but
+existence, which is given through the possibility itself. Let it not
+be supposed, however, that the third category is merely a deduced,
+and not a primitive conception of the pure understanding. For the
+conjunction of the first and second, in order to produce the third
+conception, requires a particular function of the understanding, which
+is by no means identical with those which are exercised in the first
+and second. Thus, the conception of a number (which belongs to the
+category of totality) is not always possible, where the conceptions
+of multitude and unity exist (for example, in the representation of
+the infinite). Or, if I conjoin the conception of a cause with that
+of a substance, it does not follow that the conception of influence,
+that is, how one substance can be the cause of something in another
+substance, will be understood from that. Thus it is evident that a
+particular act of the understanding is here necessary; and so in the
+other instances.
+
+III. With respect to one category, namely, that of community,
+which is found in the third class, it is not so easy as with the
+others to detect its accordance with the form of the disjunctive
+judgement which corresponds to it in the table of the logical
+functions.
+
+In order to assure ourselves of this accordance, we must observe
+that in every disjunctive judgement, the sphere of the judgement (that
+is, the complex of all that is contained in it) is represented as a
+whole divided into parts; and, since one part cannot be contained in
+the other, they are cogitated as co-ordinated with, not subordinated
+to each other, so that they do not determine each other
+unilaterally, as in a linear series, but reciprocally, as in an
+aggregate--(if one member of the division is posited, all the rest
+are excluded; and conversely).
+
+Now a like connection is cogitated in a whole of things; for one
+thing is not subordinated, as effect, to another as cause of its
+existence, but, on the contrary, is co-ordinated contemporaneously
+and reciprocally, as a cause in relation to the determination of the
+others (for example, in a body--the parts of which mutually attract
+and repel each other). And this is an entirely different kind of
+connection from that which we find in the mere relation of the cause
+to the effect (the principle to the consequence), for in such a
+connection the consequence does not in its turn determine the
+principle, and therefore does not constitute, with the latter, a
+whole--just as the Creator does not with the world make up a whole.
+The process of understanding by which it represents to itself the
+sphere of a divided conception, is employed also when we think of a
+thing as divisible; and in the same manner as the members of the
+division in the former exclude one another, and yet are connected in
+one sphere, so the understanding represents to itself the parts of
+the latter, as having--each of them--an existence (as substances),
+independently of the others, and yet as united in one whole.
+
+
+
+SS 8.
+
+In the transcendental philosophy of the ancients there exists one more
+leading division, which contains pure conceptions of the understanding,
+and which, although not numbered among the categories, ought, according
+to them, as conceptions a priori, to be valid of objects. But in this
+case they would augment the number of the categories; which cannot be.
+These are set forth in the proposition, so renowned among the
+schoolmen--"Quodlibet ens est UNUM, VERUM, BONUM." Now, though the
+inferences from this principle were mere tautological propositions, and
+though it is allowed only by courtesy to retain a place in modern
+metaphysics, yet a thought which maintained itself for such a length of
+time, however empty it seems to be, deserves an investigation of its
+origin, and justifies the conjecture that it must be grounded in some
+law of the understanding, which, as is often the case, has only been
+erroneously interpreted. These pretended transcendental predicates are,
+in fact, nothing but logical requisites and criteria of all cognition
+of objects, and they employ, as the basis for this cognition, the
+categories of quantity, namely, unity, plurality, and totality. But
+these, which must be taken as material conditions, that is, as
+belonging to the possibility of things themselves, they employed merely
+in a formal signification, as belonging to the logical requisites of
+all cognition, and yet most unguardedly changed these criteria of
+thought into properties of objects, as things in themselves. Now, in
+every cognition of an object, there is unity of conception, which may
+be called qualitative unity, so far as by this term we understand only
+the unity in our connection of the manifold; for example, unity of the
+theme in a play, an oration, or a story. Secondly, there is truth in
+respect of the deductions from it. The more true deductions we have
+from a given conception, the more criteria of its objective reality.
+This we might call the qualitative plurality of characteristic marks,
+which belong to a conception as to a common foundation, but are not
+cogitated as a quantity in it. Thirdly, there is perfection--which
+consists in this, that the plurality falls back upon the unity of the
+conception, and accords completely with that conception and with no
+other. This we may denominate qualitative completeness. Hence it is
+evident that these logical criteria of the possibility of cognition are
+merely the three categories of quantity modified and transformed to
+suit an unauthorized manner of applying them. That is to say, the three
+categories, in which the unity in the production of the quantum must be
+homogeneous throughout, are transformed solely with a view to the
+connection of heterogeneous parts of cognition in one act of
+consciousness, by means of the quality of the cognition, which is the
+principle of that connection. Thus the criterion of the possibility of
+a conception (not of its object) is the definition of it, in which the
+unity of the conception, the truth of all that may be immediately
+deduced from it, and finally, the completeness of what has been thus
+deduced, constitute the requisites for the reproduction of the whole
+conception. Thus also, the criterion or test of an hypothesis is the
+intelligibility of the received principle of explanation, or its unity
+(without help from any subsidiary hypothesis)--the truth of our
+deductions from it (consistency with each other and with
+experience)--and lastly, the completeness of the principle of the
+explanation of these deductions, which refer to neither more nor less
+than what was admitted in the hypothesis, restoring analytically and a
+posteriori, what was cogitated synthetically and a priori. By the
+conceptions, therefore, of unity, truth, and perfection, we have made
+no addition to the transcendental table of the categories, which is
+complete without them. We have, on the contrary, merely employed the
+three categories of quantity, setting aside their application to
+objects of experience, as general logical laws of the consistency of
+cognition with itself.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II Of the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding.
+
+SS 9. SECTION I Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction
+ in general.
+
+Teachers of jurisprudence, when speaking of rights and claims,
+distinguish in a cause the question of right (quid juris) from the
+question of fact (quid facti), and while they demand proof of both,
+they give to the proof of the former, which goes to establish right
+or claim in law, the name of deduction. Now we make use of a great
+number of empirical conceptions, without opposition from any one; and
+consider ourselves, even without any attempt at deduction, justified
+in attaching to them a sense, and a supposititious signification,
+because we have always experience at hand to demonstrate their
+objective reality. There exist also, however, usurped conceptions,
+such as fortune, fate, which circulate with almost universal
+indulgence, and yet are occasionally challenged by the question, "quid
+juris?" In such cases, we have great difficulty in discovering any
+deduction for these terms, inasmuch as we cannot produce any
+manifest ground of right, either from experience or from reason, on
+which the claim to employ them can be founded.
+
+Among the many conceptions, which make up the very variegated web of
+human cognition, some are destined for pure use a priori,
+independent of all experience; and their title to be so employed
+always requires a deduction, inasmuch as, to justify such use of them,
+proofs from experience are not sufficient; but it is necessary to know
+how these conceptions can apply to objects without being derived
+from experience. I term, therefore, an examination of the manner in
+which conceptions can apply a priori to objects, the transcendental
+deduction of conceptions, and I distinguish it from the empirical
+deduction, which indicates the mode in which conception is obtained
+through experience and reflection thereon; consequently, does not
+concern itself with the right, but only with the fact of our obtaining
+conceptions in such and such a manner. We have already seen that we
+are in possession of two perfectly different kinds of conceptions,
+which nevertheless agree with each other in this, that they both apply
+to objects completely a priori. These are the conceptions of space
+and time as forms of sensibility, and the categories as pure conceptions
+of the understanding. To attempt an empirical deduction of either of
+these classes would be labour in vain, because the distinguishing
+characteristic of their nature consists in this, that they apply to
+their objects, without having borrowed anything from experience
+towards the representation of them. Consequently, if a deduction of
+these conceptions is necessary, it must always be transcendental.
+
+Meanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all
+our cognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the
+principle of their possibility, yet the occasioning causes of their
+production. It will be found that the impressions of sense give the
+first occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of
+cognition, and for the production of experience, which contains two
+very dissimilar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, given by
+the senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter,
+arising out of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought; and
+these, on occasion given by sensuous impressions, are called into exercise
+and produce conceptions. Such an investigation into the first efforts
+of our faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to
+general conceptions is undoubtedly of great utility; and we have to
+thank the celebrated Locke for having first opened the way for this
+inquiry. But a deduction of the pure a priori conceptions of course
+never can be made in this way, seeing that, in regard to their
+future employment, which must be entirely independent of experience,
+they must have a far different certificate of birth to show from
+that of a descent from experience. This attempted physiological
+derivation, which cannot properly be called deduction, because it
+relates merely to a quaestio facti, I shall entitle an explanation
+of the possession of a pure cognition. It is therefore manifest that
+there can only be a transcendental deduction of these conceptions
+and by no means an empirical one; also, that all attempts at an
+empirical deduction, in regard to pure a priori conceptions, are vain,
+and can only be made by one who does not understand the altogether
+peculiar nature of these cognitions.
+
+But although it is admitted that the only possible deduction of pure
+a priori cognition is a transcendental deduction, it is not, for
+that reason, perfectly manifest that such a deduction is absolutely
+necessary. We have already traced to their sources the conceptions
+of space and time, by means of a transcendental deduction, and we have
+explained and determined their objective validity a priori.
+Geometry, nevertheless, advances steadily and securely in the province
+of pure a priori cognitions, without needing to ask from philosophy
+any certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its
+fundamental conception of space. But the use of the conception in this
+science extends only to the external world of sense, the pure form
+of the intuition of which is space; and in this world, therefore,
+all geometrical cognition, because it is founded upon a priori
+intuition, possesses immediate evidence, and the objects of this
+cognition are given a priori (as regards their form) in intuition by
+and through the cognition itself. With the pure conceptions of
+understanding, on the contrary, commences the absolute necessity of
+seeking a transcendental deduction, not only of these conceptions
+themselves, but likewise of space, because, inasmuch as they make
+affirmations concerning objects not by means of the predicates of
+intuition and sensibility, but of pure thought a priori, they apply
+to objects without any of the conditions of sensibility. Besides, not
+being founded on experience, they are not presented with any object
+in a priori intuition upon which, antecedently to experience, they
+might base their synthesis. Hence results, not only doubt as to the
+objective validity and proper limits of their use, but that even our
+conception of space is rendered equivocal; inasmuch as we are very
+ready with the aid of the categories, to carry the use of this
+conception beyond the conditions of sensuous intuition--and, for
+this reason, we have already found a transcendental deduction of it
+needful. The reader, then, must be quite convinced of the absolute
+necessity of a transcendental deduction, before taking a single step
+in the field of pure reason; because otherwise he goes to work
+blindly, and after he has wondered about in all directions, returns
+to the state of utter ignorance from which he started. He ought,
+moreover, clearly to recognize beforehand the unavoidable difficulties
+in his undertaking, so that he may not afterwards complain of the
+obscurity in which the subject itself is deeply involved, or become
+too soon impatient of the obstacles in his path; because we have a
+choice of only two things--either at once to give up all pretensions
+to knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience, or to bring
+this critical investigation to completion.
+
+We have been able, with very little trouble, to make it
+comprehensible how the conceptions of space and time, although a
+priori cognitions, must necessarily apply to external objects, and
+render a synthetical cognition of these possible, independently of
+all experience. For inasmuch as only by means of such pure form of
+sensibility an object can appear to us, that is, be an object of
+empirical intuition, space and time are pure intuitions, which contain
+a priori the condition of the possibility of objects as phenomena,
+and an a priori synthesis in these intuitions possesses objective
+validity.
+
+On the other hand, the categories of the understanding do not
+represent the conditions under which objects are given to us in
+intuition; objects can consequently appear to us without necessarily
+connecting themselves with these, and consequently without any
+necessity binding on the understanding to contain a priori the
+conditions of these objects. Thus we find ourselves involved in a
+difficulty which did not present itself in the sphere of
+sensibility, that is to say, we cannot discover how the subjective
+conditions of thought can have objective validity, in other words,
+can become conditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects;
+for phenomena may certainly be given to us in intuition without any
+help from the functions of the understanding. Let us take, for
+example, the conception of cause, which indicates a peculiar kind of
+synthesis, namely, that with something, A, something entirely
+different, B, is connected according to a law. It is not a priori
+manifest why phenomena should contain anything of this kind (we are
+of course debarred from appealing for proof to experience, for the
+objective validity of this conception must be demonstrated a
+priori), and it hence remains doubtful a priori, whether such a
+conception be not quite void and without any corresponding object
+among phenomena. For that objects of sensuous intuition must
+correspond to the formal conditions of sensibility existing a priori
+in the mind is quite evident, from the fact that without these they
+could not be objects for us; but that they must also correspond to
+the conditions which understanding requires for the synthetical unity
+of thought is an assertion, the grounds for which are not so easily
+to be discovered. For phenomena might be so constituted as not to
+correspond to the conditions of the unity of thought; and all things
+might lie in such confusion that, for example, nothing could be met
+with in the sphere of phenomena to suggest a law of synthesis, and
+so correspond to the conception of cause and effect; so that this
+conception would be quite void, null, and without significance. Phenomena
+would nevertheless continue to present objects to our intuition; for
+mere intuition does not in any respect stand in need of the functions
+of thought.
+
+If we thought to free ourselves from the labour of these
+investigations by saying: "Experience is constantly offering us
+examples of the relation of cause and effect in phenomena, and
+presents us with abundant opportunity of abstracting the conception
+of cause, and so at the same time of corroborating the objective validity
+of this conception"; we should in this case be overlooking the fact,
+that the conception of cause cannot arise in this way at all; that,
+on the contrary, it must either have an a priori basis in the
+understanding, or be rejected as a mere chimera. For this conception
+demands that something, A, should be of such a nature that something
+else, B, should follow from it necessarily, and according to an
+absolutely universal law. We may certainly collect from phenomena a
+law, according to which this or that usually happens, but the
+element of necessity is not to be found in it. Hence it is evident
+that to the synthesis of cause and effect belongs a dignity, which
+is utterly wanting in any empirical synthesis; for it is no mere
+mechanical synthesis, by means of addition, but a dynamical one;
+that is to say, the effect is not to be cogitated as merely annexed
+to the cause, but as posited by and through the cause, and resulting
+from it. The strict universality of this law never can be a
+characteristic of empirical laws, which obtain through induction
+only a comparative universality, that is, an extended range of
+practical application. But the pure conceptions of the understanding
+would entirely lose all their peculiar character, if we treated them
+merely as the productions of experience.
+
+
+
+SS 10. Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the
+ Categories.
+
+There are only two possible ways in which synthetical representation
+and its objects can coincide with and relate necessarily to each
+other, and, as it were, meet together. Either the object alone makes
+the representation possible, or the representation alone makes the
+object possible. In the former case, the relation between them is only
+empirical, and an a priori representation is impossible. And this is
+the case with phenomena, as regards that in them which is referable
+to mere sensation. In the latter case--although representation alone
+(for of its causality, by means of the will, we do not here speak)
+does not produce the object as to its existence, it must nevertheless
+be a priori determinative in regard to the object, if it is only by
+means of the representation that we can cognize anything as an object.
+Now there are only two conditions of the possibility of a cognition
+of objects; firstly, intuition, by means of which the object, though
+only as phenomenon, is given; secondly, conception, by means of which
+the object which corresponds to this intuition is thought. But it is
+evident from what has been said on aesthetic that the first condition,
+under which alone objects can be intuited, must in fact exist, as a
+formal basis for them, a priori in the mind. With this formal
+condition of sensibility, therefore, all phenomena necessarily
+correspond, because it is only through it that they can be phenomena
+at all; that is, can be empirically intuited and given. Now the
+question is whether there do not exist, a priori in the mind,
+conceptions of understanding also, as conditions under which alone
+something, if not intuited, is yet thought as object. If this question
+be answered in the affirmative, it follows that all empirical
+cognition of objects is necessarily conformable to such conceptions,
+since, if they are not presupposed, it is impossible that anything
+can be an object of experience. Now all experience contains, besides
+the intuition of the senses through which an object is given, a conception
+also of an object that is given in intuition. Accordingly, conceptions
+of objects in general must lie as a priori conditions at the
+foundation of all empirical cognition; and consequently, the objective
+validity of the categories, as a priori conceptions, will rest upon
+this, that experience (as far as regards the form of thought) is
+possible only by their means. For in that case they apply
+necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, because only
+through them can an object of experience be thought.
+
+The whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all a priori
+conceptions is to show that these conceptions are a priori
+conditions of the possibility of all experience. Conceptions which
+afford us the objective foundation of the possibility of experience
+are for that very reason necessary. But the analysis of the
+experiences in which they are met with is not deduction, but only an
+illustration of them, because from experience they could never
+derive the attribute of necessity. Without their original
+applicability and relation to all possible experience, in which all
+objects of cognition present themselves, the relation of the
+categories to objects, of whatever nature, would be quite
+incomprehensible.
+
+The celebrated Locke, for want of due reflection on these points,
+and because he met with pure conceptions of the understanding in
+experience, sought also to deduce them from experience, and yet
+proceeded so inconsequently as to attempt, with their aid, to arrive
+it cognitions which lie far beyond the limits of all experience. David
+Hume perceived that, to render this possible, it was necessary that
+the conceptions should have an a priori origin. But as he could not
+explain how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected
+with each other in the understanding must nevertheless be thought as
+necessarily connected in the object--and it never occurred to him that
+the understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these
+conceptions, be the author of the experience in which its objects were
+presented to it--he was forced to drive these conceptions from
+experience, that is, from a subjective necessity arising from repeated
+association of experiences erroneously considered to be objective--
+in one word, from habit. But he proceeded with perfect consequence
+and declared it to be impossible, with such conceptions and the principles
+arising from them, to overstep the limits of experience. The empirical
+derivation, however, which both of these philosophers attributed to
+these conceptions, cannot possibly be reconciled with the fact that
+we do possess scientific a priori cognitions, namely, those of pure
+mathematics and general physics.
+
+The former of these two celebrated men opened a wide door to
+extravagance--(for if reason has once undoubted right on its side,
+it will not allow itself to be confined to set limits, by vague
+recommendations of moderation); the latter gave himself up entirely
+to scepticism--a natural consequence, after having discovered, as he
+thought, that the faculty of cognition was not trustworthy. We now
+intend to make a trial whether it be not possible safely to conduct
+reason between these two rocks, to assign her determinate limits,
+and yet leave open for her the entire sphere of her legitimate
+activity.
+
+I shall merely premise an explanation of what the categories are.
+They are conceptions of an object in general, by means of which its
+intuition is contemplated as determined in relation to one of the
+logical functions of judgement. The following will make this plain.
+The function of the categorical judgement is that of the relation of
+subject to predicate; for example, in the proposition: "All bodies
+are divisible." But in regard to the merely logical use of the
+understanding, it still remains undetermined to which Of these two
+conceptions belongs the function Of subject and to which that of
+predicate. For we could also say: "Some divisible is a body." But
+the category of substance, when the conception of a body is brought
+under it, determines that; and its empirical intuition in experience
+must be contemplated always as subject and never as mere predicate.
+And so with all the other categories.
+
+
+
+SS 11. SECTION II Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of
+ the Understanding.
+
+Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold representations
+given by Sense.
+
+The manifold content in our representations can be given in an
+intuition which is merely sensuous--in other words, is nothing but
+susceptibility; and the form of this intuition can exist a priori in
+our faculty of representation, without being anything else but the
+mode in which the subject is affected. But the conjunction
+(conjunctio) of a manifold in intuition never can be given us by the
+senses; it cannot therefore be contained in the pure form of
+sensuous intuition, for it is a spontaneous act of the faculty of
+representation. And as we must, to distinguish it from sensibility,
+entitle this faculty understanding; so all conjunction whether
+conscious or unconscious, be it of the manifold in intuition, sensuous
+or non-sensuous, or of several conceptions--is an act of the
+understanding. To this act we shall give the general appellation of
+synthesis, thereby to indicate, at the same time, that we cannot
+represent anything as conjoined in the object without having
+previously conjoined it ourselves. Of all mental notions, that of
+conjunction is the only one which cannot be given through objects,
+but can be originated only by the subject itself, because it is an
+act of its purely spontaneous activity. The reader will easily enough
+perceive that the possibility of conjunction must be grounded in the
+very nature of this act, and that it must be equally valid for all
+conjunction, and that analysis, which appears to be its contrary,
+must, nevertheless, always presuppose it; for where the
+understanding has not previously conjoined, it cannot dissect or
+analyse, because only as conjoined by it, must that which is to be
+analysed have been given to our faculty of representation.
+
+But the conception of conjunction includes, besides the conception
+of the manifold and of the synthesis of it, that of the unity of it
+also. Conjunction is the representation of the synthetical unity of
+the manifold.* This idea of unity, therefore, cannot arise out of that
+of conjunction; much rather does that idea, by combining itself with
+the representation of the manifold, render the conception of
+conjunction possible. This unity, which a priori precedes all
+conceptions of conjunction, is not the category of unity (SS 6); for
+all the categories are based upon logical functions of judgement,
+and in these functions we already have conjunction, and consequently
+unity of given conceptions. It is therefore evident that the
+category of unity presupposes conjunction. We must therefore look
+still higher for this unity (as qualitative, SS 8), in that, namely,
+which contains the ground of the unity of diverse conceptions in
+judgements, the ground, consequently, of the possibility of the
+existence of the understanding, even in regard to its logical use.
+
+[*Footnote: Whether the representations are in themselves identical,
+and consequently whether one can be thought analytically by means of
+and through the other, is a question which we need not at present
+consider. Our Consciousness of the one, when we speak of the manifold,
+is always distinguishable from our consciousness of the other; and
+it is only respecting the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness
+that we here treat.]
+
+
+
+SS 12. Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception.
+
+The "I think" must accompany all my representations, for otherwise
+something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in
+other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at
+least be, in relation to me, nothing. That representation which can
+be given previously to all thought is called intuition. All the diversity
+or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation
+to the "I think," in the subject in which this diversity is found.
+But this representation, "I think," is an act of spontaneity; that
+is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility.
+I call it pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from empirical;
+or primitive apperception, because it is self-consciousness which,
+whilst it gives birth to the representation "I think," must necessarily
+be capable of accompanying all our representations. It is in all acts
+of consciousness one and the same, and unaccompanied by it, no
+representation can exist for me. The unity of this apperception I call
+the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate
+the possibility of a priori cognition arising from it. For the
+manifold representations which are given in an intuition would not
+all of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one
+self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (even although I
+am not conscious of them as such), they must conform to the condition
+under which alone they can exist together in a common
+self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without
+exception belong to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many
+important results.
+
+For example, this universal identity of the apperception of the
+manifold given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations
+and is possible only by means of the consciousness of this
+synthesis. For the empirical consciousness which accompanies different
+representations is in itself fragmentary and disunited, and without
+relation to the identity of the subject. This relation, then, does
+not exist because I accompany every representation with consciousness,
+but because I join one representation to another, and am conscious
+of the synthesis of them. Consequently, only because I can connect
+a variety of given representations in one consciousness, is it
+possible that I can represent to myself the identity of
+consciousness in these representations; in other words, the analytical
+unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of
+a synthetical unity.* The thought, "These representations given in
+intuition belong all of them to me," is accordingly just the same
+as, "I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so
+unite them"; and although this thought is not itself the consciousness
+of the synthesis of representations, it presupposes the possibility
+of it; that is to say, for the reason alone that I can comprehend the
+variety of my representations in one consciousness, do I call them
+my representations, for otherwise I must have as many-coloured and
+various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious.
+Synthetical unity of the manifold in intuitions, as given a priori,
+is therefore the foundation of the identity of apperception itself,
+which antecedes a priori all determinate thought. But the conjunction
+of representations into a conception is not to be found in objects
+themselves, nor can it be, as it were, borrowed from them and taken
+up into the understanding by perception, but it is on the contrary
+an operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than
+the faculty of conjoining a priori and of bringing the variety of
+given representations under the unity of apperception. This
+principle is the highest in all human cognition.
+
+[*Footnote: All general conceptions--as such--depend, for their existence,
+on the analytical unity of consciousness. For example, when I think
+of red in general, I thereby think to myself a property which (as a
+characteristic mark) can be discovered somewhere, or can be united
+with other representations; consequently, it is only by means of a
+forethought possible synthetical unity that I can think to myself
+the analytical. A representation which is cogitated as common to
+different representations, is regarded as belonging to such as,
+besides this common representation, contain something different;
+consequently it must be previously thought in synthetical unity with
+other although only possible representations, before I can think in
+it the analytical unity of consciousness which makes it a conceptas
+communis. And thus the synthetical unity of apperception is the
+highest point with which we must connect every operation of the
+understanding, even the whole of logic, and after it our
+transcendental philosophy; indeed, this faculty is the understanding
+itself.]
+
+This fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apperception is
+indeed an identical, and therefore analytical, proposition; but it
+nevertheless explains the necessity for a synthesis of the manifold
+given in an intuition, without which the identity of
+self-consciousness would be incogitable. For the ego, as a simple
+representation, presents us with no manifold content; only in
+intuition, which is quite different from the representation ego, can
+it be given us, and by means of conjunction it is cogitated in one
+self-consciousness. An understanding, in which all the manifold should
+be given by means of consciousness itself, would be intuitive; our
+understanding can only think and must look for its intuition to sense.
+I am, therefore, conscious of my identical self, in relation to all
+the variety of representations given to me in an intuition, because
+I call all of them my representations. In other words, I am
+conscious myself of a necessary a priori synthesis of my
+representations, which is called the original synthetical unity of
+apperception, under which rank all the representations presented to
+me, but that only by means of a synthesis.
+
+
+
+SS 13. The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is
+ the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understanding.
+
+The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in
+relation to sensibility was, according to our transcendental
+aesthetic, that all the manifold in intuition be subject to the formal
+conditions of space and time. The supreme principle of the possibility
+of it in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold in
+it be subject to conditions of the originally synthetical unity or
+apperception.* To the former of these two principles are subject all
+the various representations of intuition, in so far as they are
+given to us; to the latter, in so far as they must be capable of
+conjunction in one consciousness; for without this nothing can be
+thought or cognized, because the given representations would not
+have in common the act Of the apperception "I think" and therefore
+could not be connected in one self-consciousness.
+
+[*Footnote: Space and time, and all portions thereof, are intuitions;
+consequently are, with a manifold for their content, single
+representations. (See the Transcendental Aesthetic.) Consequently,
+they are not pure conceptions, by means of which the same
+consciousness is found in a great number of representations; but, on
+the contrary, they are many representations contained in one, the
+consciousness of which is, so to speak, compounded. The unity of
+consciousness is nevertheless synthetical and, therefore, primitive.
+From this peculiar character of consciousness follow many important
+consequences. (See SS 21.)]
+
+Understanding is, to speak generally, the faculty Of cognitions.
+These consist in the determined relation of given representation to
+an object. But an object is that, in the conception of which the manifold
+in a given intuition is united. Now all union of representations
+requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them.
+Consequently, it is the unity of consciousness alone that
+constitutes the possibility of representations relating to an
+object, and therefore of their objective validity, and of their
+becoming cognitions, and consequently, the possibility of the
+existence of the understanding itself.
+
+The first pure cognition of understanding, then, upon which is
+founded all its other exercise, and which is at the same time
+perfectly independent of all conditions of mere sensuous intuition,
+is the principle of the original synthetical unity of apperception.
+Thus the mere form of external sensuous intuition, namely, space,
+affords us, per se, no cognition; it merely contributes the manifold
+in a priori intuition to a possible cognition. But, in order to
+cognize something in space (for example, a line), I must draw it,
+and thus produce synthetically a determined conjunction of the given
+manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the
+unity of consciousness (in the conception of a line), and by this
+means alone is an object (a determinate space) cognized. The
+synthetical unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective
+condition of all cognition, which I do not merely require in order
+to cognize an object, but to which every intuition must necessarily
+be subject, in order to become an object for me; because in any other
+way, and without this synthesis, the manifold in intuition could not
+be united in one consciousness.
+
+This proposition is, as already said, itself analytical, although it
+constitutes the synthetical unity, the condition of all thought; for
+it states nothing more than that all my representations in any given
+intuition must be subject to the condition which alone enables me to
+connect them, as my representation with the identical self, and so
+to unite them synthetically in one apperception, by means of the
+general expression, "I think."
+
+But this principle is not to be regarded as a principle for every
+possible understanding, but only for the understanding by means of
+whose pure apperception in the thought I am, no manifold content is
+given. The understanding or mind which contained the manifold in
+intuition, in and through the act itself of its own
+self-consciousness, in other words, an understanding by and in the
+representation of which the objects of the representation should at
+the same time exist, would not require a special act of synthesis of
+the manifold as the condition of the unity of its consciousness, an
+act of which the human understanding, which thinks only and cannot
+intuite, has absolute need. But this principle is the first
+principle of all the operations of our understanding, so that we
+cannot form the least conception of any other possible
+understanding, either of one such as should be itself intuition, or
+possess a sensuous intuition, but with forms different from those of
+space and time.
+
+
+
+SS 14. What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is.
+
+It is by means of the transcendental unity of apperception that
+all the manifold, given in an intuition is united into a conception
+of the object. On this account it is called objective, and must be
+distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is
+a determination of the internal sense, by means of which the said
+manifold in intuition is given empirically to be so united. Whether
+I can be empirically conscious of the manifold as coexistent or as
+successive, depends upon circumstances, or empirical conditions. Hence
+the empirical unity of consciousness by means of association of
+representations, itself relates to a phenomenal world and is wholly
+contingent. On the contrary, the pure form of intuition in time,
+merely as an intuition, which contains a given manifold, is subject
+to the original unity of consciousness, and that solely by means of
+the necessary relation of the manifold in intuition to the "I think,"
+consequently by means of the pure synthesis of the understanding,
+which lies a priori at the foundation of all empirical synthesis.
+The transcendental unity of apperception is alone objectively valid;
+the empirical which we do not consider in this essay, and which is
+merely a unity deduced from the former under given conditions in
+concreto, possesses only subjective validity. One person connects
+the notion conveyed in a word with one thing, another with another
+thing; and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical,
+is, in relation to that which is given by experience, not
+necessarily and universally valid.
+
+
+
+SS 15. The Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective
+ Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein.
+
+I could never satisfy myself with the definition which logicians
+give of a judgement. It is, according to them, the representation of
+a relation between two conceptions. I shall not dwell here on the
+faultiness of this definition, in that it suits only for categorical
+and not for hypothetical or disjunctive judgements, these latter
+containing a relation not of conceptions but of judgements themselves--
+a blunder from which many evil results have followed.* It is more
+important for our present purpose to observe, that this definition
+does not determine in what the said relation consists.
+
+[*Footnote: The tedious doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns
+only categorical syllogisms; and although it is nothing more than an
+artifice by surreptitiously introducing immediate conclusions
+(consequentiae immediatae) among the premises of a pure syllogism,
+to give ism' give rise to an appearance of more modes of drawing a
+conclusion than that in the first figure, the artifice would not
+have had much success, had not its authors succeeded in bringing
+categorical judgements into exclusive respect, as those to which all
+others must be referred--a doctrine, however, which, according to SS
+5, is utterly false.]
+
+But if I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions
+in every judgement, and distinguish it, as belonging to the
+understanding, from the relation which is produced according to laws
+of the reproductive imagination (which has only subjective
+validity), I find that judgement is nothing but the mode of bringing
+given cognitions under the objective unit of apperception. This is
+plain from our use of the term of relation is in judgements, in
+order to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from
+the subjective unity. For this term indicates the relation of these
+representations to the original apperception, and also their necessary
+unity, even although the judgement is empirical, therefore contingent,
+as in the judgement: "All bodies are heavy." I do not mean by this,
+that these representations do necessarily belong to each other in
+empirical intuition, but that by means of the necessary unity of
+appreciation they belong to each other in the synthesis of intuitions,
+that is to say, they belong to each other according to principles of
+the objective determination of all our representations, in so far as
+cognition can arise from them, these principles being all deduced from
+the main principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. In
+this way alone can there arise from this relation a judgement, that
+is, a relation which has objective validity, and is perfectly distinct
+from that relation of the very same representations which has only
+subjective validity--a relation, to wit, which is produced according
+to laws of association. According to these laws, I could only say:
+"When I hold in my hand or carry a body, I feel an impression of
+weight"; but I could not say: "It, the body, is heavy"; for this is
+tantamount to saying both these representations are conjoined in the
+object, that is, without distinction as to the condition of the
+subject, and do not merely stand together in my perception, however
+frequently the perceptive act may be repeated.
+
+
+
+SS 16. All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as
+ Conditions under which alone the manifold Content of them
+ can be united in one Consciousness.
+
+The manifold content given in a sensuous intuition comes necessarily
+under the original synthetical unity of apperception, because
+thereby alone is the unity of intuition possible (SS 13). But that
+act of the understanding, by which the manifold content of given
+representations (whether intuitions or conceptions) is brought under
+one apperception, is the logical function of judgements (SS 15). All
+the manifold, therefore, in so far as it is given in one empirical
+intuition, is determined in relation to one of the logical functions
+of judgement, by means of which it is brought into union in one
+consciousness. Now the categories are nothing else than these
+functions of judgement so far as the manifold in a given intuition
+is determined in relation to them (SS 9). Consequently, the manifold
+in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories of the
+understanding.
+
+
+
+SS 17. Observation.
+
+The manifold in an intuition, which I call mine, is represented by
+means of the synthesis of the understanding, as belonging to the
+necessary unity of self-consciousness, and this takes place by means
+of the category.* The category indicates accordingly that the
+empirical consciousness of a given manifold in an intuition is subject
+to a pure self-consciousness a priori, in the same manner as an
+empirical intuition is subject to a pure sensuous intuition, which
+is also a priori. In the above proposition, then, lies the beginning
+of a deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding. Now, as
+the categories have their origin in the understanding alone,
+independently of sensibility, I must in my deduction make
+abstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an empirical
+intuition is given, in order to fix my attention exclusively on the
+unity which is brought by the understanding into the intuition by
+means of the category. In what follows (SS 22), it will be shown, from
+the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in the faculty of
+sensibility, that the unity which belongs to it is no other than
+that which the category (according to SS 16) imposes on the manifold
+in a given intuition, and thus, its a priori validity in regard to
+all objects of sense being established, the purpose of our deduction
+will be fully attained.
+
+[*Footnote: The proof of this rests on the represented unity of intuition,
+by means of which an object is given, and which always includes in
+itself a synthesis of the manifold to be intuited, and also the relation
+of this latter to unity of apperception.]
+
+But there is one thing in the above demonstration of which I could
+not make abstraction, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must
+be given previously to the synthesis of the understanding, and
+independently of it. How this takes place remains here undetermined.
+For if I cogitate an understanding which was itself intuitive (as,
+for example, a divine understanding which should not represent given
+objects, but by whose representation the objects themselves should
+be given or produced), the categories would possess no significance
+in relation to such a faculty of cognition. They are merely rules for
+an understanding, whose whole power consists in thought, that is, in
+the act of submitting the synthesis of the manifold which is presented
+to it in intuition from a very different quarter, to the unity of
+apperception; a faculty, therefore, which cognizes nothing per se,
+but only connects and arranges the material of cognition, the intuition,
+namely, which must be presented to it by means of the object. But to
+show reasons for this peculiar character of our understandings, that
+it produces unity of apperception a priori only by means of
+categories, and a certain kind and number thereof, is as impossible
+as to explain why we are endowed with precisely so many functions of
+judgement and no more, or why time and space are the only forms of
+our intuition.
+
+
+
+SS 18. In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is
+ the only legitimate use of the Category.
+
+To think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same
+thing. In cognition there are two elements: firstly, the conception,
+whereby an object is cogitated (the category); and, secondly, the
+intuition, whereby the object is given. For supposing that to the
+conception a corresponding intuition could not be given, it would
+still be a thought as regards its form, but without any object, and
+no cognition of anything would be possible by means of it, inasmuch
+as, so far as I knew, there existed and could exist nothing to which
+my thought could be applied. Now all intuition possible to us is
+sensuous; consequently, our thought of an object by means of a pure
+conception of the understanding, can become cognition for us only in
+so far as this conception is applied to objects of the senses.
+Sensuous intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or
+empirical intuition--of that which is immediately represented in space
+and time by means of sensation as real. Through the determination of
+pure intuition we obtain a priori cognitions of objects, as in
+mathematics, but only as regards their form as phenomena; whether
+there can exist things which must be intuited in this form is not
+thereby established. All mathematical conceptions, therefore, are
+not per se cognition, except in so far as we presuppose that there
+exist things which can only be represented conformably to the form
+of our pure sensuous intuition. But things in space and time are given
+only in so far as they are perceptions (representations accompanied
+with sensation), therefore only by empirical representation.
+Consequently the pure conceptions of the understanding, even when they
+are applied to intuitions a priori (as in mathematics), produce
+cognition only in so far as these (and therefore the conceptions of
+the understanding by means of them) can be applied to empirical
+intuitions. Consequently the categories do not, even by means of
+pure intuition afford us any cognition of things; they can only do
+so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intuition. That is
+to say, the categories serve only to render empirical cognition
+possible. But this is what we call experience. Consequently, in
+cognition, their application to objects of experience is the only
+legitimate use of the categories.
+
+
+
+SS 19.
+
+The foregoing proposition is of the utmost importance, for it
+determines the limits of the exercise of the pure conceptions of the
+understanding in regard to objects, just as transcendental aesthetic
+determined the limits of the exercise of the pure form of our sensuous
+intuition. Space and time, as conditions of the possibility of the
+presentation of objects to us, are valid no further than for objects
+of sense, consequently, only for experience. Beyond these limits
+they represent to us nothing, for they belong only to sense, and
+have no reality apart from it. The pure conceptions of the
+understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to objects
+of intuition in general, be the intuition like or unlike to ours,
+provided only it be sensuous, and not intellectual. But this extension
+of conceptions beyond the range of our intuition is of no advantage;
+for they are then mere empty conceptions of objects, as to the
+possibility or impossibility of the existence of which they furnish
+us with no means of discovery. They are mere forms of thought, without
+objective reality, because we have no intuition to which the
+synthetical unity of apperception, which alone the categories contain,
+could be applied, for the purpose of determining an object. Our
+sensuous and empirical intuition can alone give them significance
+and meaning.
+
+If, then, we suppose an object of a non-sensuous intuition to be
+given we can in that case represent it by all those predicates which
+are implied in the presupposition that nothing appertaining to
+sensuous intuition belongs to it; for example, that it is not
+extended, or in space; that its duration is not time; that in it no
+change (the effect of the determinations in time) is to be met with,
+and so on. But it is no proper knowledge if I merely indicate what
+the intuition of the object is not, without being able to say what
+is contained in it, for I have not shown the possibility of an object
+to which my pure conception of understanding could be applicable,
+because I have not been able to furnish any intuition corresponding
+to it, but am only able to say that our intuition is not valid for
+it. But the most important point is this, that to a something of this
+kind not one category can be found applicable. Take, for example, the
+conception of substance, that is, something that can exist as subject,
+but never as mere predicate; in regard to this conception I am quite
+ignorant whether there can really be anything to correspond to such
+a determination of thought, if empirical intuition did not afford me
+the occasion for its application. But of this more in the sequel.
+
+
+
+SS 20. Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the
+ Senses in general.
+
+The pure conceptions of the understanding apply to objects of
+intuition in general, through the understanding alone, whether the
+intuition be our own or some other, provided only it be sensuous,
+but are, for this very reason, mere forms of thought, by means of
+which alone no determined object can be cognized. The synthesis or
+conjunction of the manifold in these conceptions relates, we have
+said, only to the unity of apperception, and is for this reason the
+ground of the possibility of a priori cognition, in so far as this
+cognition is dependent on the understanding. This synthesis is,
+therefore, not merely transcendental, but also purely intellectual.
+But because a certain form of sensuous intuition exists in the mind
+a priori which rests on the receptivity of the representative
+faculty (sensibility), the understanding, as a spontaneity, is able
+to determine the internal sense by means of the diversity of given
+representations, conformably to the synthetical unity of apperception,
+and thus to cogitate the synthetical unity of the apperception of
+the manifold of sensuous intuition a priori, as the condition to which
+must necessarily be submitted all objects of human intuition. And in
+this manner the categories as mere forms of thought receive
+objective reality, that is, application to objects which are given
+to us in intuition, but that only as phenomena, for it is only of
+phenomena that we are capable of a priori intuition.
+
+This synthesis of the manifold of sensuous intuition, which is
+possible and necessary a priori, may be called figurative (synthesis
+speciosa), in contradistinction to that which is cogitated in the mere
+category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general, and
+is called connection or conjunction of the understanding (synthesis
+intellectualis). Both are transcendental, not merely because they
+themselves precede a priori all experience, but also because they form
+the basis for the possibility of other cognition a priori.
+
+But the figurative synthesis, when it has relation only to the
+originally synthetical unity of apperception, that is to the
+transcendental unity cogitated in the categories, must, to be
+distinguished from the purely intellectual conjunction, be entitled
+the transcendental synthesis of imagination. Imagination is the
+faculty of representing an object even without its presence in
+intuition. Now, as all our intuition is sensuous, imagination, by
+reason of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a
+corresponding intuition to the conceptions of the understanding,
+belongs to sensibility. But in so far as the synthesis of the
+imagination is an act of spontaneity, which is determinative, and not,
+like sense, merely determinable, and which is consequently able to
+determine sense a priori, according to its form, conformably to the
+unity of apperception, in so far is the imagination a faculty of
+determining sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions
+according to the categories must be the transcendental synthesis of
+the imagination. It is an operation of the understanding on
+sensibility, and the first application of the understanding to objects
+of possible intuition, and at the same time the basis for the exercise
+of the other functions of that faculty. As figurative, it is
+distinguished from the merely intellectual synthesis, which is
+produced by the understanding alone, without the aid of imagination.
+Now, in so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes call it also
+the productive imagination, and distinguish it from the
+reproductive, the synthesis of which is subject entirely to
+empirical laws, those of association, namely, and which, therefore,
+contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a
+priori cognition, and for this reason belongs not to transcendental
+philosophy, but to psychology.
+
+We have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradox
+which must have struck every one in our exposition of the internal
+sense (SS 6), namely--how this sense represents us to our own
+consciousness, only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in
+ourselves, because, to wit, we intuite ourselves only as we are
+inwardly affected. Now this appears to be contradictory, inasmuch as
+we thus stand in a passive relation to ourselves; and therefore in
+the systems of psychology, the internal sense is commonly held to be
+one with the faculty of apperception, while we, on the contrary, carefully
+distinguish them.
+
+That which determines the internal sense is the understanding, and
+its original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition, that is,
+of bringing this under an apperception (upon which rests the
+possibility of the understanding itself). Now, as the human
+understanding is not in itself a faculty of intuition, and is unable
+to exercise such a power, in order to conjoin, as it were, the
+manifold of its own intuition, the synthesis of understanding is,
+considered per se, nothing but the unity of action, of which, as such,
+it is self-conscious, even apart from sensibility, by which, moreover,
+it is able to determine our internal sense in respect of the
+manifold which may be presented to it according to the form of
+sensuous intuition. Thus, under the name of a transcendental synthesis
+of imagination, the understanding exercises an activity upon the
+passive subject, whose faculty it is; and so we are right in saying
+that the internal sense is affected thereby. Apperception and its
+synthetical unity are by no means one and the same with the internal
+sense. The former, as the source of all our synthetical conjunction,
+applies, under the name of the categories, to the manifold of
+intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects.
+The internal sense, on the contrary, contains merely the form of
+intuition, but without any synthetical conjunction of the manifold
+therein, and consequently does not contain any determined intuition,
+which is possible only through consciousness of the determination of
+the manifold by the transcendental act of the imagination (synthetical
+influence of the understanding on the internal sense), which I have
+named figurative synthesis.
+
+This we can indeed always perceive in ourselves. We cannot
+cogitate a geometrical line without drawing it in thought, nor a
+circle without describing it, nor represent the three dimensions of
+space without drawing three lines from the same point perpendicular
+to one another. We cannot even cogitate time, unless, in drawing a
+straight line (which is to serve as the external figurative
+representation of time), we fix our attention on the act of the
+synthesis of the manifold, whereby we determine successively the
+internal sense, and thus attend also to the succession of this
+determination. Motion as an act of the subject (not as a determination
+of an object),* consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space,
+if we make abstraction of space and attend merely to the act by
+which we determine the internal sense according to its form, is that
+which produces the conception of succession. The understanding,
+therefore, does by no means find in the internal sense any such
+synthesis of the manifold, but produces it, in that it affects this
+sense. At the same time, how "I who think" is distinct from the "I"
+which intuites itself (other modes of intuition being cogitable as
+at least possible), and yet one and the same with this latter as the
+same subject; how, therefore, I am able to say: "I, as an intelligence
+and thinking subject, cognize myself as an object thought, so far as
+I am, moreover, given to myself in intuition--only, like other
+phenomena, not as I am in myself, and as considered by the
+understanding, but merely as I appear"--is a question that has in it
+neither more nor less difficulty than the question--"How can I be an
+object to myself?" or this--"How I can be an object of my own
+intuition and internal perceptions?" But that such must be the fact,
+if we admit that space is merely a pure form of the phenomena of
+external sense, can be clearly proved by the consideration that we
+cannot represent time, which is not an object of external intuition,
+in any other way than under the image of a line, which we draw in
+thought, a mode of representation without which we could not cognize
+the unity of its dimension, and also that we are necessitated to
+take our determination of periods of time, or of points of time, for
+all our internal perceptions from the changes which we perceive in
+outward things. It follows that we must arrange the determinations
+of the internal sense, as phenomena in time, exactly in the same
+manner as we arrange those of the external senses in space. And
+consequently, if we grant, respecting this latter, that by means of
+them we know objects only in so far as we are affected externally,
+we must also confess, with regard to the internal sense, that by means
+of it we intuite ourselves only as we are internally affected by
+ourselves; in other words, as regards internal intuition, we cognize
+our own subject only as phenomenon, and not as it is in itself.*[2]
+
+
+[*Footnote: Motion of an object in space does not belong to a pure
+science, consequently not to geometry; because, that a thing is movable
+cannot be known a priori, but only from experience. But motion,
+considered as the description of a space, is a pure act of the
+successive synthesis of the manifold in external intuition by means
+of productive imagination, and belongs not only to geometry, but even
+to transcendental philosophy.]
+
+[*[2]Footnote: I do not see why so much difficulty should be found
+in admitting that our internal sense is affected by ourselves. Every
+act of attention exemplifies it. In such an act the understanding
+determines the internal sense by the synthetical conjunction which
+it cogitates, conformably to the internal intuition which
+corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding.
+How much the mind is usually affected thereby every one will be able
+to perceive in himself.]
+
+
+
+SS 21.
+
+On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold
+content of representations, consequently in the synthetical unity of
+apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself,
+nor as I am in myself, but only that "I am." This representation is
+a thought, not an intuition. Now, as in order to cognize ourselves,
+in addition to the act of thinking, which subjects the manifold of
+every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, there is
+necessary a determinate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is
+given; although my own existence is certainly not mere phenomenon
+(much less mere illusion), the determination of my existence* Can only
+take place conformably to the form of the internal sense, according
+to the particular mode in which the manifold which I conjoin is given
+in internal intuition, and I have therefore no knowledge of myself
+as I am, but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self
+is thus very far from a knowledge of self, in which I do not use the
+categories, whereby I cogitate an object, by means of the
+conjunction of the manifold in one apperception. In the same way as
+I require, for the sake of the cognition of an object distinct from
+myself, not only the thought of an object in general (in the
+category), but also an intuition by which to determine that general
+conception, in the same way do I require, in order to the cognition
+of myself, not only the consciousness of myself or the thought that
+I think myself, but in addition an intuition of the manifold in
+myself, by which to determine this thought. It is true that I exist
+as an intelligence which is conscious only of its faculty of
+conjunction or synthesis, but subjected in relation to the manifold
+which this intelligence has to conjoin to a limitative conjunction
+called the internal sense. My intelligence (that is, I) can render
+that conjunction or synthesis perceptible only according to the
+relations of time, which are quite beyond the proper sphere of the
+conceptions of the understanding and consequently cognize itself in
+respect to an intuition (which cannot possibly be intellectual, nor
+given by the understanding), only as it appears to itself, and not
+as it would cognize itself, if its intuition were intellectual.
+
+
+[*Footnote: The "I think" expresses the act of determining my own
+existence. My existence is thus already given by the act of consciousness;
+but the mode in which I must determine my existence, that is, the mode
+in which I must place the manifold belonging to my existence, is not
+thereby given. For this purpose intuition of self is required, and
+this intuition possesses a form given a priori, namely, time, which
+is sensuous, and belongs to our receptivity of the determinable. Now,
+as I do not possess another intuition of self which gives the
+determining in me (of the spontaneity of which I am conscious),
+prior to the act of determination, in the same manner as time gives
+the determinable, it is clear that I am unable to determine my own
+existence as that of a spontaneous being, but I am only able to
+represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of my
+determination, and my existence remains ever determinable in a
+purely sensuous manner, that is to say, like the existence of a
+phenomenon. But it is because of this spontaneity that I call myself
+an intelligence.]
+
+
+
+SS 22. Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible employment
+ in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding.
+
+In the metaphysical deduction, the a priori origin of categories was
+proved by their complete accordance with the general logical of
+thought; in the transcendental deduction was exhibited the possibility
+of the categories as a priori cognitions of objects of an intuition
+in general (SS 16 and 17).At present we are about to explain the
+possibility of cognizing, a priori, by means of the categories, all
+objects which can possibly be presented to our senses, not, indeed,
+according to the form of their intuition, but according to the laws
+of their conjunction or synthesis, and thus, as it were, of prescribing
+laws to nature and even of rendering nature possible. For if the
+categories were inadequate to this task, it would not be evident to
+us why everything that is presented to our senses must be subject to
+those laws which have an a priori origin in the understanding itself.
+
+I premise that by the term synthesis of apprehension I understand
+the combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition, whereby
+perception, that is, empirical consciousness of the intuition (as
+phenomenon), is possible.
+
+We have a priori forms of the external and internal sensuous
+intuition in the representations of space and time, and to these
+must the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon
+be always comformable, because the synthesis itself can only take
+place according to these forms. But space and time are not merely
+forms of sensuous intuition, but intuitions themselves (which
+contain a manifold), and therefore contain a priori the
+determination of the unity of this manifold.* (See the Transcendent
+Aesthetic.) Therefore is unity of the synthesis of the manifold
+without or within us, consequently also a conjunction to which all
+that is to be represented as determined in space or time must
+correspond, given a priori along with (not in) these intuitions, as
+the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension of them. But this
+synthetical unity can be no other than that of the conjunction of
+the manifold of a given intuition in general, in a primitive act of
+consciousness, according to the categories, but applied to our
+sensuous intuition. Consequently all synthesis, whereby alone is
+even perception possible, is subject to the categories. And, as
+experience is cognition by means of conjoined perceptions, the
+categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and are
+therefore valid a priori for all objects of experience.
+
+[*Footnote: Space represented as an object (as geometry really requires
+it to be) contains more than the mere form of the intuition; namely,
+a combination of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility
+into a representation that can be intuited; so that the form of the
+intuition gives us merely the manifold, but the formal intuition gives
+unity of representation. In the aesthetic, I regarded this unity as
+belonging entirely to sensibility, for the purpose of indicating
+that it antecedes all conceptions, although it presupposes a synthesis
+which does not belong to sense, through which alone, however, all
+our conceptions of space and time are possible. For as by means of
+this unity alone (the understanding determining the sensibility) space
+and time are given as intuitions, it follows that the unity of this
+intuition a priori belongs to space and time, and not to the
+conception of the understanding (SS 20).]
+
+When, then, for example, I make the empirical intuition of a house
+by apprehension of the manifold contained therein into a perception,
+the necessary unity of space and of my external sensuous intuition
+lies at the foundation of this act, and I, as it were, draw the form
+of the house conformably to this synthetical unity of the manifold
+in space. But this very synthetical unity remains, even when I
+abstract the form of space, and has its seat in the understanding,
+and is in fact the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in
+an intuition; that is to say, the category of quantity, to which the
+aforesaid synthesis of apprehension, that is, the perception, must
+be completely conformable.*
+
+[*Footnote: In this manner it is proved, that the synthesis of
+apprehension, which is empirical, must necessarily be conformable to
+the synthesis of apperception, which is intellectual, and contained
+a priori in the category. It is one and the same spontaneity which
+at one time, under the name of imagination, at another under that of
+understanding, produces conjunction in the manifold of intuition.]
+
+To take another example, when I perceive the freezing of water, I
+apprehend two states (fluidity and solidity), which, as such, stand
+toward each other mutually in a relation of time. But in the time,
+which I place as an internal intuition, at the foundation of this
+phenomenon, I represent to myself synthetical unity of the manifold,
+without which the aforesaid relation could not be given in an
+intuition as determined (in regard to the succession of time). Now
+this synthetical unity, as the a priori condition under which I
+conjoin the manifold of an intuition, is, if I make abstraction of
+the permanent form of my internal intuition (that is to say, of time),
+the category of cause, by means of which, when applied to my
+sensibility, I determine everything that occurs according to relations
+of time. Consequently apprehension in such an event, and the event
+itself, as far as regards the possibility of its perception, stands
+under the conception of the relation of cause and effect: and so in
+all other cases.
+
+Categories are conceptions which prescribe laws a priori to
+phenomena, consequently to nature as the complex of all phenomena
+(natura materialiter spectata). And now the question arises--
+inasmuch as these categories are not derived from nature, and do not
+regulate themselves according to her as their model (for in that
+case they would be empirical)--how it is conceivable that nature
+must regulate herself according to them, in other words, how the
+categories can determine a priori the synthesis of the manifold of
+nature, and yet not derive their origin from her. The following is
+the solution of this enigma.
+
+It is not in the least more difficult to conceive how the laws of the
+phenomena of nature must harmonize with the understanding and with its
+a priori form--that is, its faculty of conjoining the manifold--than
+it is to understand how the phenomena themselves must correspond with
+the a priori form of our sensuous intuition. For laws do not exist in
+the phenomena any more than the phenomena exist as things in
+themselves. Laws do not exist except by relation to the subject in
+which the phenomena inhere, in so far as it possesses understanding,
+just as phenomena have no existence except by relation to the same
+existing subject in so far as it has senses. To things as things in
+themselves, conformability to law must necessarily belong independently
+of an understanding to cognize them. But phenomena are only
+representations of things which are utterly unknown in respect to what
+they are in themselves. But as mere representations, they stand under
+no law of conjunction except that which the conjoining faculty
+prescribes. Now that which conjoins the manifold of sensuous intuition
+is imagination, a mental act to which understanding contributes unity
+of intellectual synthesis, and sensibility, manifoldness of
+apprehension. Now as all possible perception depends on the synthesis
+of apprehension, and this empirical synthesis itself on the
+transcendental, consequently on the categories, it is evident that all
+possible perceptions, and therefore everything that can attain to
+empirical consciousness, that is, all phenomena of nature, must, as
+regards their conjunction, be subject to the categories. And nature
+(considered merely as nature in general) is dependent on them, as the
+original ground of her necessary conformability to law (as natura
+formaliter spectata). But the pure faculty (of the understanding) of
+prescribing laws a priori to phenomena by means of mere categories, is
+not competent to enounce other or more laws than those on which a
+nature in general, as a conformability to law of phenomena of space and
+time, depends. Particular laws, inasmuch as they concern empirically
+determined phenomena, cannot be entirely deduced from pure laws,
+although they all stand under them. Experience must be superadded in
+order to know these particular laws; but in regard to experience in
+general, and everything that can be cognized as an object thereof,
+these a priori laws are our only rule and guide.
+
+
+
+SS 23. Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the
+ Understanding.
+
+We cannot think any object except by means of the categories; we
+cannot cognize any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding
+to these conceptions. Now all our intuitions are sensuous, and our
+cognition, in so far as the object of it is given, is empirical. But
+empirical cognition is experience; consequently no a priori
+cognition is possible for us, except of objects of possible
+experience.*
+
+[Footnote: Lest my readers should stumble at this assertion, and the
+conclusions that may be too rashly drawn from it, I must remind them
+that the categories in the act of thought are by no means limited by
+the conditions of our sensuous intuition, but have an unbounded sphere
+of action. It is only the cognition of the object of thought, the
+determining of the object, which requires intuition. In the absence
+of intuition, our thought of an object may still have true and useful
+consequences in regard to the exercise of reason by the subject. But
+as this exercise of reason is not always directed on the determination
+of the object, in other words, on cognition thereof, but also on the
+determination of the subject and its volition, I do not intend to
+treat of it in this place.]
+
+But this cognition, which is limited to objects of experience, is
+not for that reason derived entirely, from, experience, but--and
+this is asserted of the pure intuitions and the pure conceptions of
+the understanding--there are, unquestionably, elements of cognition,
+which exist in the mind a priori. Now there are only two ways in which
+a necessary harmony of experience with the conceptions of its
+objects can be cogitated. Either experience makes these conceptions
+possible, or the conceptions make experience possible. The former of
+these statements will not bold good with respect to the categories
+(nor in regard to pure sensuous intuition), for they are a priori
+conceptions, and therefore independent of experience. The assertion
+of an empirical origin would attribute to them a sort of generatio
+aequivoca. Consequently, nothing remains but to adopt the second
+alternative (which presents us with a system, as it were, of the
+epigenesis of pure reason), namely, that on the part of the
+understanding the categories do contain the grounds of the possibility
+of all experience. But with respect to the questions how they make
+experience possible, and what are the principles of the possibility
+thereof with which they present us in their application to
+phenomena, the following section on the transcendental exercise of
+the faculty of judgement will inform the reader.
+
+It is quite possible that someone may propose a species of
+preformation-system of pure reason--a middle way between the two--to
+wit, that the categories are neither innate and first a priori
+principles of cognition, nor derived from experience, but are merely
+subjective aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously
+with our existence, which were so ordered and disposed by our Creator,
+that their exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws of nature which
+regulate experience. Now, not to mention that with such an
+hypothesis it is impossible to say at what point we must stop in the
+employment of predetermined aptitudes, the fact that the categories
+would in this case entirely lose that character of necessity which
+is essentially involved in the very conception of them, is a
+conclusive objection to it. The conception of cause, for example,
+which expresses the necessity of an effect under a presupposed
+condition, would be false, if it rested only upon such an arbitrary
+subjective necessity of uniting certain empirical representations
+according to such a rule of relation. I could not then say--"The
+effect is connected with its cause in the object (that is,
+necessarily)," but only, "I am so constituted that I can think this
+representation as so connected, and not otherwise." Now this is just
+what the sceptic wants. For in this case, all our knowledge, depending
+on the supposed objective validity of our judgement, is nothing but
+mere illusion; nor would there be wanting people who would deny any
+such subjective necessity in respect to themselves, though they must
+feel it. At all events, we could not dispute with any one on that
+which merely depends on the manner in which his subject is organized.
+
+
+
+Short view of the above Deduction.
+
+The foregoing deduction is an exposition of the pure conceptions
+of the understanding (and with them of all theoretical a priori
+cognition), as principles of the possibility of experience, but of
+experience as the determination of all phenomena in space and time
+in general--of experience, finally, from the principle of the original
+synthetical unity of apperception, as the form of the understanding
+in relation to time and space as original forms of sensibility.
+
+I consider the division by paragraphs to be necessary only up to
+this point, because we had to treat of the elementary conceptions.
+As we now proceed to the exposition of the employment of these, I
+shall not designate the chapters in this manner any further.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK II.
+
+Analytic of Principles.
+
+General logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly
+with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are,
+understanding, judgement, and reason. This science, accordingly,
+treats in its analytic of conceptions, judgements, and conclusions
+in exact correspondence with the functions and order of those mental
+powers which we include generally under the generic denomination of
+understanding.
+
+As this merely formal logic makes abstraction of all content of
+cognition, whether pure or empirical, and occupies itself with the
+mere form of thought (discursive cognition), it must contain in its
+analytic a canon for reason. For the form of reason has its law,
+which, without taking into consideration the particular nature of
+the cognition about which it is employed, can be discovered a
+priori, by the simple analysis of the action of reason into its
+momenta.
+
+Transcendental logic, limited as it is to a determinate content,
+that of pure a priori cognitions, to wit, cannot imitate general logic
+in this division. For it is evident that the transcendental employment
+of reason is not objectively valid, and therefore does not belong to
+the logic of truth (that is, to analytic), but as a logic of illusion,
+occupies a particular department in the scholastic system under the
+name of transcendental dialectic.
+
+Understanding and judgement accordingly possess in transcendental
+logic a canon of objectively valid, and therefore true exercise, and
+are comprehended in the analytical department of that logic. But
+reason, in her endeavours to arrive by a priori means at some true
+statement concerning objects and to extend cognition beyond the bounds
+of possible experience, is altogether dialectic, and her illusory
+assertions cannot be constructed into a canon such as an analytic
+ought to contain.
+
+Accordingly, the analytic of principles will be merely a canon for
+the faculty of judgement, for the instruction of this faculty in its
+application to phenomena of the pure conceptions of the understanding,
+which contain the necessary condition for the establishment of a
+priori laws. On this account, although the subject of the following
+chapters is the especial principles of understanding, I shall make
+use of the term Doctrine of the faculty of judgement, in order to define
+more particularly my present purpose.
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION. Of the Transcendental Faculty of judgement in General.
+
+If understanding in general be defined as the faculty of laws or
+rules, the faculty of judgement may be termed the faculty of
+subsumption under these rules; that is, of distinguishing whether this
+or that does or does not stand under a given rule (casus datae legis).
+General logic contains no directions or precepts for the faculty of
+judgement, nor can it contain any such. For as it makes abstraction
+of all content of cognition, no duty is left for it, except that of
+exposing analytically the mere form of cognition in conceptions,
+judgements, and conclusions, and of thereby establishing formal
+rules for all exercise of the understanding. Now if this logic
+wished to give some general direction how we should subsume under
+these rules, that is, how we should distinguish whether this or that
+did or did not stand under them, this again could not be done
+otherwise than by means of a rule. But this rule, precisely because
+it is a rule, requires for itself direction from the faculty of
+judgement. Thus, it is evident that the understanding is capable of
+being instructed by rules, but that the judgement is a peculiar
+talent, which does not, and cannot require tuition, but only exercise.
+This faculty is therefore the specific quality of the so-called mother
+wit, the want of which no scholastic discipline can compensate.
+
+For although education may furnish, and, as it were, engraft upon
+a limited understanding rules borrowed from other minds, yet the power
+of employing these rules correctly must belong to the pupil himself;
+and no rule which we can prescribe to him with this purpose is, in
+the absence or deficiency of this gift of nature, secure from misuse.*
+A physician therefore, a judge or a statesman, may have in his head
+many admirable pathological, juridical, or political rules, in a degree
+that may enable him to be a profound teacher in his particular
+science, and yet in the application of these rules he may very
+possibly blunder--either because he is wanting in natural judgement
+(though not in understanding) and, whilst he can comprehend the
+general in abstracto, cannot distinguish whether a particular case
+in concreto ought to rank under the former; or because his faculty
+of judgement has not been sufficiently exercised by examples and
+real practice. Indeed, the grand and only use of examples, is to
+sharpen the judgement. For as regards the correctness and precision
+of the insight of the understanding, examples are commonly injurious
+rather than otherwise, because, as casus in terminis they seldom
+adequately fulfil the conditions of the rule. Besides, they often
+weaken the power of our understanding to apprehend rules or laws in
+their universality, independently of particular circumstances of
+experience; and hence, accustom us to employ them more as formulae
+than as principles. Examples are thus the go-cart of the judgement,
+which he who is naturally deficient in that faculty cannot afford to
+dispense with.
+
+[*Footnote: Deficiency in judgement is properly that which is called
+stupidity; and for such a failing we know no remedy. A dull or
+narrow-minded person, to whom nothing is wanting but a proper degree
+of understanding, may be improved by tuition, even so far as to deserve
+the epithet of learned. But as such persons frequently labour under
+a deficiency in the faculty of judgement, it is not uncommon to find
+men extremely learned who in the application of their science betray
+a lamentable degree this irremediable want.]
+
+But although general logic cannot give directions to the faculty
+of judgement, the case is very different as regards transcendental
+logic, insomuch that it appears to be the especial duty of the
+latter to secure and direct, by means of determinate rules, the
+faculty of judgement in the employment of the pure understanding. For,
+as a doctrine, that is, as an endeavour to enlarge the sphere of the
+understanding in regard to pure a priori cognitions, philosophy is
+worse than useless, since from all the attempts hitherto made,
+little or no ground has been gained. But, as a critique, in order to
+guard against the mistakes of the faculty of judgement (lapsus
+judicii) in the employment of the few pure conceptions of the
+understanding which we possess, although its use is in this case
+purely negative, philosophy is called upon to apply all its
+acuteness and penetration.
+
+But transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity, that besides
+indicating the rule, or rather the general condition for rules,
+which is given in the pure conception of the understanding, it can,
+at the same time, indicate a priori the case to which the rule must
+be applied. The cause of the superiority which, in this respect,
+transcendental philosophy possesses above all other sciences except
+mathematics, lies in this: it treats of conceptions which must
+relate a priori to their objects, whose objective validity
+consequently cannot be demonstrated a posteriori, and is, at the
+same time, under the obligation of presenting in general but
+sufficient tests, the conditions under which objects can be given in
+harmony with those conceptions; otherwise they would be mere logical
+forms, without content, and not pure conceptions of the understanding.
+
+Our transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgement will contain
+two chapters. The first will treat of the sensuous condition under
+which alone pure conceptions of the understanding can be employed--
+that is, of the schematism of the pure understanding. The second
+will treat of those synthetical judgements which are derived a
+priori from pure conceptions of the understanding under those
+conditions, and which lie a priori at the foundation of all other
+cognitions, that is to say, it will treat of the principles of the
+pure understanding.
+
+
+
+TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT
+OR, ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES.
+
+CHAPTER I. Of the Schematism at of the Pure Conceptions
+ of the Understanding.
+
+In all subsumptions of an object under a conception, the
+representation of the object must be homogeneous with the
+conception; in other words, the conception must contain that which
+is represented in the object to be subsumed under it. For this is
+the meaning of the expression: "An object is contained under a
+conception." Thus the empirical conception of a plate is homogeneous
+with the pure geometrical conception of a circle, inasmuch as the
+roundness which is cogitated in the former is intuited in the latter.
+
+But pure conceptions of the understanding, when compared with
+empirical intuitions, or even with sensuous intuitions in general,
+are quite heterogeneous, and never can be discovered in any intuition.
+How then is the subsumption of the latter under the former, and
+consequently the application of the categories to phenomena,
+possible?--For it is impossible to say, for example: "Causality can
+be intuited through the senses and is contained in the phenomenon."--This
+natural and important question forms the real cause of the necessity
+of a transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgement, with the
+purpose, to wit, of showing how pure conceptions of the
+understanding can be applied to phenomena. In all other sciences,
+where the conceptions by which the object is thought in the general
+are not so different and heterogeneous from those which represent
+the object in concreto--as it is given, it is quite unnecessary to
+institute any special inquiries concerning the application of the
+former to the latter.
+
+Now it is quite clear that there must be some third thing, which
+on the one side is homogeneous with the category, and with the
+phenomenon on the other, and so makes the application of the former
+to the latter possible. This mediating representation must be pure
+(without any empirical content), and yet must on the one side be
+intellectual, on the other sensuous. Such a representation is the
+transcendental schema.
+
+The conception of the understanding contains pure synthetical
+unity of the manifold in general. Time, as the formal condition of
+the manifold of the internal sense, consequently of the conjunction
+of all representations, contains a priori a manifold in the pure intuition.
+Now a transcendental determination of time is so far homogeneous
+with the category, which constitutes the unity thereof, that it is
+universal and rests upon a rule a priori. On the other hand, it is
+so far homogeneous with the phenomenon, inasmuch as time is
+contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Thus an
+application of the category to phenomena becomes possible, by means
+of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of
+the conceptions of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of
+the latter under the former.
+
+After what has been proved in our deduction of the categories, no
+one, it is to be hoped, can hesitate as to the proper decision of
+the question, whether the employment of these pure conceptions of
+the understanding ought to be merely empirical or also transcendental;
+in other words, whether the categories, as conditions of a possible
+experience, relate a priori solely to phenomena, or whether, as
+conditions of the possibility of things in general, their
+application can be extended to objects as things in themselves. For
+we have there seen that conceptions are quite impossible, and utterly
+without signification, unless either to them, or at least to the
+elements of which they consist, an object be given; and that,
+consequently, they cannot possibly apply to objects as things in
+themselves without regard to the question whether and how these may
+be given to us; and, further, that the only manner in which objects
+can be given to us is by means of the modification of our sensibility;
+and, finally, that pure a priori conceptions, in addition to the
+function of the understanding in the category, must contain a priori
+formal conditions of sensibility (of the internal sense, namely),
+which again contain the general condition under which alone the
+category can be applied to any object. This formal and pure
+condition of sensibility, to which the conception of the understanding
+is restricted in its employment, we shall name the schema of the
+conception of the understanding, and the procedure of the
+understanding with these schemata we shall call the schematism of
+the pure understanding.
+
+The schema is, in itself, always a mere product of the
+imagination. But, as the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no
+single intuition, but merely unity in the determination of
+sensibility, the schema is clearly distinguishable from the image.
+Thus, if I place five points one after another .... this is an image
+of the number five. On the other hand, if I only think a number in
+general, which may be either five or a hundred, this thought is rather
+the representation of a method of representing in an image a sum
+(e.g., a thousand) in conformity with a conception, than the image
+itself, an image which I should find some little difficulty in
+reviewing, and comparing with the conception. Now this
+representation of a general procedure of the imagination to present
+its image to a conception, I call the schema of this conception.
+
+In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at
+the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. No image could ever
+be adequate to our conception of a triangle in general. For the
+generalness of the conception it never could attain to, as this
+includes under itself all triangles, whether right-angled,
+acute-angled, etc., whilst the image would always be limited to a
+single part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist
+nowhere else than in thought, and it indicates a rule of the synthesis
+of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space. Still less is
+an object of experience, or an image of the object, ever to the
+empirical conception. On the contrary, the conception always relates
+immediately to the schema of the imagination, as a rule for the
+determination of our intuition, in conformity with a certain general
+conception. The conception of a dog indicates a rule, according to
+which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed
+animal in general, without being limited to any particular
+individual form which experience presents to me, or indeed to any
+possible image that I can represent to myself in concreto. This
+schematism of our understanding in regard to phenomena and their
+mere form, is an art, hidden in the depths of the human soul, whose
+true modes of action we shall only with difficulty discover and
+unveil. Thus much only can we say: "The image is a product of the
+empirical faculty of the productive imagination--the schema of
+sensuous conceptions (of figures in space, for example) is a
+product, and, as it were, a monogram of the pure imagination a priori,
+whereby and according to which images first become possible, which,
+however, can be connected with the conception only mediately by
+means of the schema which they indicate, and are in themselves never
+fully adequate to it." On the other hand, the schema of a pure
+conception of the understanding is something that cannot be reduced
+into any image--it is nothing else than the pure synthesis expressed
+by the category, conformably, to a rule of unity according to
+conceptions. It is a transcendental product of the imagination, a
+product which concerns the determination of the internal sense,
+according to conditions of its form (time) in respect to all
+representations, in so far as these representations must be
+conjoined a priori in one conception, conformably to the unity of
+apperception.
+
+Without entering upon a dry and tedious analysis of the essential
+requisites of transcendental schemata of the pure conceptions of the
+understanding, we shall rather proceed at once to give an
+explanation of them according to the order of the categories, and in
+connection therewith.
+
+For the external sense the pure image of all quantities
+(quantorum) is space; the pure image of all objects of sense in
+general, is time. But the pure schema of quantity (quantitatis) as
+a conception of the understanding, is number, a representation which
+comprehends the successive addition of one to one (homogeneous
+quantities). Thus, number is nothing else than the unity of the
+synthesis of the manifold in a homogeneous intuition, by means of my
+generating time itself in my apprehension of the intuition.
+
+Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that
+which corresponds to a sensation in general; that, consequently, the
+conception of which indicates a being (in time). Negation is that
+the conception of which represents a not-being (in time). The
+opposition of these two consists therefore in the difference of one
+and the same time, as a time filled or a time empty. Now as time is
+only the form of intuition, consequently of objects as phenomena, that
+which in objects corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter
+of all objects as things in themselves (Sachheit, reality). Now
+every sensation has a degree or quantity by which it can fill time,
+that is to say, the internal sense in respect of the representation
+of an object, more or less, until it vanishes into nothing (= 0 =
+negatio). Thus there is a relation and connection between reality
+and negation, or rather a transition from the former to the latter,
+which makes every reality representable to us as a quantum; and the
+schema of a reality as the quantity of something in so far as it fills
+time, is exactly this continuous and uniform generation of the reality
+in time, as we descend in time from the sensation which has a
+certain degree, down to the vanishing thereof, or gradually ascend
+from negation to the quantity thereof.
+
+The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time;
+that is, the representation of it as a substratum of the empirical
+determination of time; a substratum which therefore remains, whilst
+all else changes. (Time passes not, but in it passes the existence
+of the changeable. To time, therefore, which is itself unchangeable
+and permanent, corresponds that which in the phenomenon is
+unchangeable in existence, that is, substance, and it is only by it
+that the succession and coexistence of phenomena can be determined
+in regard to time.)
+
+The schema of cause and of the causality of a thing is the real
+which, when posited, is always followed by something else. It
+consists, therefore, in the succession of the manifold, in so far as
+that succession is subjected to a rule.
+
+The schema of community (reciprocity of action and reaction), or the
+reciprocal causality of substances in respect of their accidents, is
+the coexistence of the determinations of the one with those of the
+other, according to a general rule.
+
+The schema of possibility is the accordance of the synthesis of
+different representations with the conditions of time in general
+(as, for example, opposites cannot exist together at the same time
+in the same thing, but only after each other), and is therefore the
+determination of the representation of a thing at any time.
+
+The schema of reality is existence in a determined time.
+
+The schema of necessity is the existence of an object in all time.
+
+It is clear, from all this, that the schema of the category of
+quantity contains and represents the generation (synthesis) of time
+itself, in the successive apprehension of an object; the schema of
+quality the synthesis of sensation with the representation of time,
+or the filling up of time; the schema of relation the relation of
+perceptions to each other in all time (that is, according to a rule
+of the determination of time): and finally, the schema of modality
+and its categories, time itself, as the correlative of the determination
+of an object--whether it does belong to time, and how. The schemata,
+therefore, are nothing but a priori determinations of time according
+to rules, and these, in regard to all possible objects, following
+the arrangement of the categories, relate to the series in time, the
+content in time, the order in time, and finally, to the complex or
+totality in time.
+
+Hence it is apparent that the schematism of the understanding, by
+means of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, amounts to
+nothing else than the unity of the manifold of intuition in the
+internal sense, and thus indirectly to the unity of apperception, as
+a function corresponding to the internal sense (a receptivity). Thus,
+the schemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding are the true
+and only conditions whereby our understanding receives an
+application to objects, and consequently significance. Finally,
+therefore, the categories are only capable of empirical use,
+inasmuch as they serve merely to subject phenomena to the universal
+rules of synthesis, by means of an a priori necessary unity (on
+account of the necessary union of all consciousness in one original
+apperception); and so to render them susceptible of a complete
+connection in one experience. But within this whole of possible
+experience lie all our cognitions, and in the universal relation to
+this experience consists transcendental truth, which antecedes all
+empirical truth, and renders the latter possible.
+
+It is, however, evident at first sight, that although the schemata
+of sensibility are the sole agents in realizing the categories, they
+do, nevertheless, also restrict them, that is, they limit the
+categories by conditions which lie beyond the sphere of understanding--
+namely, in sensibility. Hence the schema is properly only the
+phenomenon, or the sensuous conception of an object in harmony with
+the category. (Numerus est quantitas phaenomenon--sensatio realitas
+phaenomenon; constans et perdurabile rerum substantia phaenomenon--
+aeternitas, necessitas, phaenomena, etc.) Now, if we remove a
+restrictive condition, we thereby amplify, it appears, the formerly
+limited conception. In this way, the categories in their pure
+signification, free from all conditions of sensibility, ought to be
+valid of things as they are, and not, as the schemata represent
+them, merely as they appear; and consequently the categories must have
+a significance far more extended, and wholly independent of all
+schemata. In truth, there does always remain to the pure conceptions
+of the understanding, after abstracting every sensuous condition, a
+value and significance, which is, however, merely logical. But in this
+case, no object is given them, and therefore they have no meaning
+sufficient to afford us a conception of an object. The notion of
+substance, for example, if we leave out the sensuous determination
+of permanence, would mean nothing more than a something which can be
+cogitated as subject, without the possibility of becoming a
+predicate to anything else. Of this representation I can make nothing,
+inasmuch as it does not indicate to me what determinations the thing
+possesses which must thus be valid as premier subject. Consequently,
+the categories, without schemata are merely functions of the
+understanding for the production of conceptions, but do not
+represent any object. This significance they derive from
+sensibility, which at the same time realizes the understanding and
+restricts it.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II. System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding.
+
+In the foregoing chapter we have merely considered the general
+conditions under which alone the transcendental faculty of judgement
+is justified in using the pure conceptions of the understanding for
+synthetical judgements. Our duty at present is to exhibit in
+systematic connection those judgements which the understanding
+really produces a priori. For this purpose, our table of the
+categories will certainly afford us the natural and safe guidance.
+For it is precisely the categories whose application to possible
+experience must constitute all pure a priori cognition of the
+understanding; and the relation of which to sensibility will, on
+that very account, present us with a complete and systematic catalogue
+of all the transcendental principles of the use of the understanding.
+
+Principles a priori are so called, not merely because they contain
+in themselves the grounds of other judgements, but also because they
+themselves are not grounded in higher and more general cognitions.
+This peculiarity, however, does not raise them altogether above the
+need of a proof. For although there could be found no higher
+cognition, and therefore no objective proof, and although such a
+principle rather serves as the foundation for all cognition of the
+object, this by no means hinders us from drawing a proof from the
+subjective sources of the possibility of the cognition of an object.
+Such a proof is necessary, moreover, because without it the
+principle might be liable to the imputation of being a mere gratuitous
+assertion.
+
+In the second place, we shall limit our investigations to those
+principles which relate to the categories. For as to the principles
+of transcendental aesthetic, according to which space and time are
+the conditions of the possibility of things as phenomena, as also the
+restriction of these principles, namely, that they cannot be applied
+to objects as things in themselves--these, of course, do not fall
+within the scope of our present inquiry. In like manner, the
+principles of mathematical science form no part of this system,
+because they are all drawn from intuition, and not from the pure
+conception of the understanding. The possibility of these
+principles, however, will necessarily be considered here, inasmuch
+as they are synthetical judgements a priori, not indeed for the
+purpose of proving their accuracy and apodeictic certainty, which is
+unnecessary, but merely to render conceivable and deduce the
+possibility of such evident a priori cognitions.
+
+But we shall have also to speak of the principle of analytical
+judgements, in opposition to synthetical judgements, which is the
+proper subject of our inquiries, because this very opposition will
+free the theory of the latter from all ambiguity, and place it clearly
+before our eyes in its true nature.
+
+
+
+SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING.
+
+SECTION I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgements.
+
+Whatever may be the content of our cognition, and in whatever manner
+our cognition may be related to its object, the universal, although
+only negative conditions of all our judgements is that they do not
+contradict themselves; otherwise these judgements are in themselves
+(even without respect to the object) nothing. But although there may
+exist no contradiction in our judgement, it may nevertheless connect
+conceptions in such a manner that they do not correspond to the
+object, or without any grounds either a priori or a posteriori for
+arriving at such a judgement, and thus, without being
+self-contradictory, a judgement may nevertheless be either false or
+groundless.
+
+Now, the proposition: "No subject can have a predicate that
+contradicts it," is called the principle of contradiction, and is a
+universal but purely negative criterion of all truth. But it belongs
+to logic alone, because it is valid of cognitions, merely as
+cognitions and without respect to their content, and declares that
+the contradiction entirely nullifies them. We can also, however, make
+a positive use of this principle, that is, not merely to banish
+falsehood and error (in so far as it rests upon contradiction), but
+also for the cognition of truth. For if the judgement is analytical,
+be it affirmative or negative, its truth must always be recognizable
+by means of the principle of contradiction. For the contrary of that
+which lies and is cogitated as conception in the cognition of the
+object will be always properly negatived, but the conception itself
+must always be affirmed of the object, inasmuch as the contrary
+thereof would be in contradiction to the object.
+
+We must therefore hold the principle of contradiction to be the
+universal and fully sufficient Principle of all analytical
+cognition. But as a sufficient criterion of truth, it has no further
+utility or authority. For the fact that no cognition can be at
+variance with this principle without nullifying itself, constitutes
+this principle the sine qua non, but not the determining ground of
+the truth of our cognition. As our business at present is properly
+with the synthetical part of our knowledge only, we shall always be
+on our guard not to transgress this inviolable principle; but at the
+same time not to expect from it any direct assistance in the
+establishment of the truth of any synthetical proposition.
+
+There exists, however, a formula of this celebrated principle--a
+principle merely formal and entirely without content--which contains
+a synthesis that has been inadvertently and quite unnecessarily mixed
+up with it. It is this: "It is impossible for a thing to be and not
+to be at the same time." Not to mention the superfluousness of the
+addition of the word impossible to indicate the apodeictic
+certainty, which ought to be self-evident from the proposition itself,
+the proposition is affected by the condition of time, and as it were
+says: "A thing = A, which is something = B, cannot at the same time
+be non-B." But both, B as well as non-B, may quite well exist in
+succession. For example, a man who is young cannot at the same time
+be old; but the same man can very well be at one time young, and at
+another not young, that is, old. Now the principle of contradiction
+as a merely logical proposition must not by any means limit its
+application merely to relations of time, and consequently a formula
+like the preceding is quite foreign to its true purpose. The
+misunderstanding arises in this way. We first of all separate a
+predicate of a thing from the conception of the thing, and
+afterwards connect with this predicate its opposite, and hence do
+not establish any contradiction with the subject, but only with its
+predicate, which has been conjoined with the subject synthetically--
+a contradiction, moreover, which obtains only when the first and
+second predicate are affirmed in the same time. If I say: "A man who
+is ignorant is not learned," the condition "at the same time" must
+be added, for he who is at one time ignorant, may at another be
+learned. But if I say: "No ignorant man is a learned man," the
+proposition is analytical, because the characteristic ignorance is
+now a constituent part of the conception of the subject; and in this
+case the negative proposition is evident immediately from the
+proposition of contradiction, without the necessity of adding the
+condition "the same time." This is the reason why I have altered the
+formula of this principle--an alteration which shows very clearly
+the nature of an analytical proposition.
+
+
+
+SECTION II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgements.
+
+The explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgements is a task
+with which general logic has nothing to do; indeed she needs not even
+be acquainted with its name. But in transcendental logic it is the most
+important matter to be dealt with--indeed the only one, if the question
+is of the possibility of synthetical judgements a priori, the
+conditions and extent of their validity. For when this question is
+fully decided, it can reach its aim with perfect ease, the
+determination, to wit, of the extent and limits of the pure
+understanding.
+
+In an analytical judgement I do not go beyond the given conception, in
+order to arrive at some decision respecting it. If the judgement is
+affirmative, I predicate of the conception only that which was already
+cogitated in it; if negative, I merely exclude from the conception its
+contrary. But in synthetical judgements, I must go beyond the given
+conception, in order to cogitate, in relation with it, something quite
+different from that which was cogitated in it, a relation which is
+consequently never one either of identity or contradiction, and by
+means of which the truth or error of the judgement cannot be discerned
+merely from the judgement itself.
+
+Granted, then, that we must go out beyond a given conception, in
+order to compare it synthetically with another, a third thing is
+necessary, in which alone the synthesis of two conceptions can
+originate. Now what is this tertium quid that is to be the medium of
+all synthetical judgements? It is only a complex in which all our
+representations are contained, the internal sense to wit, and its form
+a priori, time.
+
+The synthesis of our representations rests upon the imagination;
+their synthetical unity (which is requisite to a judgement), upon
+the unity of apperception. In this, therefore, is to be sought the
+possibility of synthetical judgements, and as all three contain the
+sources of a priori representations, the possibility of pure
+synthetical judgements also; nay, they are necessary upon these
+grounds, if we are to possess a knowledge of objects, which rests
+solely upon the synthesis of representations.
+
+If a cognition is to have objective reality, that is, to relate to
+an object, and possess sense and meaning in respect to it, it is
+necessary that the object be given in some way or another. Without
+this, our conceptions are empty, and we may indeed have thought by
+means of them, but by such thinking we have not, in fact, cognized
+anything, we have merely played with representation. To give an
+object, if this expression be understood in the sense of "to
+present" the object, not mediately but immediately in intuition, means
+nothing else than to apply the representation of it to experience,
+be that experience real or only possible. Space and time themselves,
+pure as these conceptions are from all that is empirical, and
+certain as it is that they are represented fully a priori in the mind,
+would be completely without objective validity, and without sense
+and significance, if their necessary use in the objects of
+experience were not shown. Nay, the representation of them is a mere
+schema, that always relates to the reproductive imagination, which
+calls up the objects of experience, without which they have no
+meaning. And so it is with all conceptions without distinction.
+
+The possibility of experience is, then, that which gives objective
+reality to all our a priori cognitions. Now experience depends upon
+the synthetical unity of phenomena, that is, upon a synthesis
+according to conceptions of the object of phenomena in general, a
+synthesis without which experience never could become knowledge, but
+would be merely a rhapsody of perceptions, never fitting together into
+any connected text, according to rules of a thoroughly united
+(possible) consciousness, and therefore never subjected to the
+transcendental and necessary unity of apperception. Experience has
+therefore for a foundation, a priori principles of its form, that is
+to say, general rules of unity in the synthesis of phenomena, the
+objective reality of which rules, as necessary conditions even of
+the possibility of experience can which rules, as necessary
+conditions--even of the possibility of experience--can always be shown
+in experience. But apart from this relation, a priori synthetical
+propositions are absolutely impossible, because they have no third
+term, that is, no pure object, in which the synthetical unity can
+exhibit the objective reality of its conceptions.
+
+Although, then, respecting space, or the forms which productive
+imagination describes therein, we do cognize much a priori in
+synthetical judgements, and are really in no need of experience for
+this purpose, such knowledge would nevertheless amount to nothing
+but a busy trifling with a mere chimera, were not space to be
+considered as the condition of the phenomena which constitute the
+material of external experience. Hence those pure synthetical
+judgements do relate, though but mediately, to possible experience,
+or rather to the possibility of experience, and upon that alone is
+founded the objective validity of their synthesis.
+
+While then, on the one hand, experience, as empirical synthesis,
+is the only possible mode of cognition which gives reality to all
+other synthesis; on the other hand, this latter synthesis, as
+cognition a priori, possesses truth, that is, accordance with its
+object, only in so far as it contains nothing more than what is
+necessary to the synthetical unity of experience.
+
+Accordingly, the supreme principle of all synthetical judgements is:
+"Every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the
+synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible
+experience."
+
+A priori synthetical judgements are possible when we apply the
+formal conditions of the a priori intuition, the synthesis of the
+imagination, and the necessary unity of that synthesis in a
+transcendental apperception, to a possible cognition of experience,
+and say: "The conditions of the possibility of experience in general
+are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of
+experience, and have, for that reason, objective validity in an a
+priori synthetical judgement."
+
+
+
+SECTION III. Systematic Representation of all Synthetical
+ Principles of the Pure Understanding.
+
+That principles exist at all is to be ascribed solely to the pure
+understanding, which is not only the faculty of rules in regard to
+that which happens, but is even the source of principles according
+to which everything that can be presented to us as an object is
+necessarily subject to rules, because without such rules we never
+could attain to cognition of an object. Even the laws of nature, if
+they are contemplated as principles of the empirical use of the
+understanding, possess also a characteristic of necessity, and we
+may therefore at least expect them to be determined upon grounds which
+are valid a priori and antecedent to all experience. But all laws of
+nature, without distinction, are subject to higher principles of the
+understanding, inasmuch as the former are merely applications of the
+latter to particular cases of experience. These higher principles
+alone therefore give the conception, which contains the necessary
+condition, and, as it were, the exponent of a rule; experience, on
+the other hand, gives the case which comes under the rule.
+
+There is no danger of our mistaking merely empirical principles
+for principles of the pure understanding, or conversely; for the
+character of necessity, according to conceptions which distinguish
+the latter, and the absence of this in every empirical proposition,
+how extensively valid soever it may be, is a perfect safeguard against
+confounding them. There are, however, pure principles a priori,
+which nevertheless I should not ascribe to the pure understanding--for
+this reason, that they are not derived from pure conceptions, but
+(although by the mediation of the understanding) from pure intuitions.
+But understanding is the faculty of conceptions. Such principles
+mathematical science possesses, but their application to experience,
+consequently their objective validity, nay the possibility of such
+a priori synthetical cognitions (the deduction thereof) rests entirely
+upon the pure understanding.
+
+On this account, I shall not reckon among my principles those of
+mathematics; though I shall include those upon the possibility and
+objective validity a priori, of principles of the mathematical
+science, which, consequently, are to be looked upon as the principle
+of these, and which proceed from conceptions to intuition, and not
+from intuition to conceptions.
+
+In the application of the pure conceptions of the understanding to
+possible experience, the employment of their synthesis is either
+mathematical or dynamical, for it is directed partly on the
+intuition alone, partly on the existence of a phenomenon. But the a
+priori conditions of intuition are in relation to a possible
+experience absolutely necessary, those of the existence of objects
+of a possible empirical intuition are in themselves contingent.
+Hence the principles of the mathematical use of the categories will
+possess a character of absolute necessity, that is, will be
+apodeictic; those, on the other hand, of the dynamical use, the
+character of an a priori necessity indeed, but only under the
+condition of empirical thought in an experience, therefore only
+mediately and indirectly. Consequently they will not possess that
+immediate evidence which is peculiar to the former, although their
+application to experience does not, for that reason, lose its truth
+and certitude. But of this point we shall be better able to judge at
+the conclusion of this system of principles.
+
+The table of the categories is naturally our guide to the table of
+principles, because these are nothing else than rules for the
+objective employment of the former. Accordingly, all principles of
+the pure understanding are:
+
+ 1
+ Axioms
+ of Intuition
+
+ 2 3
+ Anticipations Analogies
+ of Perception of Experience
+ 4
+ Postulates of
+ Empirical Thought
+ in general
+
+
+These appellations I have chosen advisedly, in order that we might
+not lose sight of the distinctions in respect of the evidence and
+the employment of these principles. It will, however, soon appear
+that--a fact which concerns both the evidence of these principles,
+and the a priori determination of phenomena--according to the categories
+of quantity and quality (if we attend merely to the form of these),
+the principles of these categories are distinguishable from those of
+the two others, in as much as the former are possessed of an
+intuitive, but the latter of a merely discursive, though in both
+instances a complete, certitude. I shall therefore call the former
+mathematical, and the latter dynamical principles.* It must be
+observed, however, that by these terms I mean just as little in the
+one case the principles of mathematics as those of general
+(physical) dynamics in the other. I have here in view merely the
+principles of the pure understanding, in their application to the
+internal sense (without distinction of the representations given
+therein), by means of which the sciences of mathematics and dynamics
+become possible. Accordingly, I have named these principles rather
+with reference to their application than their content; and I shall
+now proceed to consider them in the order in which they stand in the
+table.
+
+
+[*Footnote: All combination (conjunctio) is either composition
+(compositio) or connection (nexus). The former is the synthesis of a
+manifold, the parts of which do not necessarily belong to each other.
+For example, the two triangles into which a square is divided by a
+diagonal, do not necessarily belong to each other, and of this kind is
+the synthesis of the homogeneous in everything that can be
+mathematically considered. This synthesis can be divided into those of
+aggregation and coalition, the former of which is applied to extensive,
+the latter to intensive quantities. The second sort of combination
+(nexus) is the synthesis of a manifold, in so far as its parts do
+belong necessarily to each other; for example, the accident to a
+substance, or the effect to the cause. Consequently it is a synthesis
+of that which though heterogeneous, is represented as connected a
+priori. This combination--not an arbitrary one--I entitle dynamical
+because it concerns the connection of the existence of the manifold.
+This, again, may be divided into the physical synthesis, of the
+phenomena divided among each other, and the metaphysical synthesis, or
+the connection of phenomena a priori in the faculty of cognition.]
+
+
+1. AXIOMS OF INTUITION.
+
+
+The principle of these is: All Intuitions are Extensive Quantities.
+
+
+PROOF.
+
+
+All phenomena contain, as regards their form, an intuition in
+space and time, which lies a priori at the foundation of all without
+exception. Phenomena, therefore, cannot be apprehended, that is,
+received into empirical consciousness otherwise than through the
+synthesis of a manifold, through which the representations of a
+determinate space or time are generated; that is to say, through the
+composition of the homogeneous and the consciousness of the
+synthetical unity of this manifold (homogeneous). Now the
+consciousness of a homogeneous manifold in intuition, in so far as
+thereby the representation of an object is rendered possible, is the
+conception of a quantity (quanti). Consequently, even the perception
+of an object as phenomenon is possible only through the same
+synthetical unity of the manifold of the given sensuous intuition,
+through which the unity of the composition of the homogeneous manifold
+in the conception of a quantity is cogitated; that is to say, all
+phenomena are quantities, and extensive quantities, because as
+intuitions in space or time they must be represented by means of the
+same synthesis through which space and time themselves are determined.
+
+An extensive quantity I call that wherein the representation of
+the parts renders possible (and therefore necessarily antecedes) the
+representation of the whole. I cannot represent to myself any line,
+however small, without drawing it in thought, that is, without
+generating from a point all its parts one after another, and in this
+way alone producing this intuition. Precisely the same is the case
+with every, even the smallest, portion of time. I cogitate therein
+only the successive progress from one moment to another, and hence,
+by means of the different portions of time and the addition of them,
+a determinate quantity of time is produced. As the pure intuition in
+all phenomena is either time or space, so is every phenomenon in its
+character of intuition an extensive quantity, inasmuch as it can
+only be cognized in our apprehension by successive synthesis (from
+part to part). All phenomena are, accordingly, to be considered as
+aggregates, that is, as a collection of previously given parts;
+which is not the case with every sort of quantities, but only with
+those which are represented and apprehended by us as extensive.
+
+On this successive synthesis of the productive imagination, in the
+generation of figures, is founded the mathematics of extension, or
+geometry, with its axioms, which express the conditions of sensuous
+intuition a priori, under which alone the schema of a pure
+conception of external intuition can exist; for example, "be tween
+two points only one straight line is possible," "two straight lines
+cannot enclose a space," etc. These are the axioms which properly relate
+only to quantities (quanta) as such.
+
+But, as regards the quantity of a thing (quantitas), that is to say,
+the answer to the question: "How large is this or that object?"
+although, in respect to this question, we have various propositions
+synthetical and immediately certain (indemonstrabilia); we have, in
+the proper sense of the term, no axioms. For example, the
+propositions: "If equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal";
+"If equals be taken from equals, the remainders are equal"; are
+analytical, because I am immediately conscious of the identity of
+the production of the one quantity with the production of the other;
+whereas axioms must be a priori synthetical propositions. On the other
+hand, the self-evident propositions as to the relation of numbers,
+are certainly synthetical but not universal, like those of geometry,
+and for this reason cannot be called axioms, but numerical formulae.
+That 7 + 5 = 12 is not an analytical proposition. For neither in the
+representation of seven, nor of five, nor of the composition of the
+two numbers, do I cogitate the number twelve. (Whether I cogitate
+the number in the addition of both, is not at present the question;
+for in the case of an analytical proposition, the only point is
+whether I really cogitate the predicate in the representation of the
+subject.) But although the proposition is synthetical, it is
+nevertheless only a singular proposition. In so far as regard is
+here had merely to the synthesis of the homogeneous (the units), it
+cannot take place except in one manner, although our use of these
+numbers is afterwards general. If I say: "A triangle can be
+constructed with three lines, any two of which taken together are
+greater than the third," I exercise merely the pure function of the
+productive imagination, which may draw the lines longer or shorter
+and construct the angles at its pleasure. On the contrary, the number
+seven is possible only in one manner, and so is likewise the number
+twelve, which results from the synthesis of seven and five. Such
+propositions, then, cannot be termed axioms (for in that case we
+should have an infinity of these), but numerical formulae.
+
+This transcendental principle of the mathematics of phenomena
+greatly enlarges our a priori cognition. For it is by this principle
+alone that pure mathematics is rendered applicable in all its
+precision to objects of experience, and without it the validity of
+this application would not be so self-evident; on the contrary,
+contradictions and confusions have often arisen on this very point.
+Phenomena are not things in themselves. Empirical intuition is
+possible only through pure intuition (of space and time);
+consequently, what geometry affirms of the latter, is indisputably
+valid of the former. All evasions, such as the statement that
+objects of sense do not conform to the rules of construction in
+space (for example, to the rule of the infinite divisibility of
+lines or angles), must fall to the ground. For, if these objections
+hold good, we deny to space, and with it to all mathematics, objective
+validity, and no longer know wherefore, and how far, mathematics can
+be applied to phenomena. The synthesis of spaces and times as the
+essential form of all intuition, is that which renders possible the
+apprehension of a phenomenon, and therefore every external experience,
+consequently all cognition of the objects of experience; and
+whatever mathematics in its pure use proves of the former, must
+necessarily hold good of the latter. All objections are but the
+chicaneries of an ill-instructed reason, which erroneously thinks to
+liberate the objects of sense from the formal conditions of our
+sensibility, and represents these, although mere phenomena, as
+things in themselves, presented as such to our understanding. But in
+this case, no a priori synthetical cognition of them could be
+possible, consequently not through pure conceptions of space and the
+science which determines these conceptions, that is to say,
+geometry, would itself be impossible.
+
+
+
+2. ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION.
+
+The principle of these is: In all phenomena the Real, that
+which is an object of sensation, has Intensive Quantity,
+that is, has a Degree.
+
+
+PROOF.
+
+
+Perception is empirical consciousness, that is to say, a
+consciousness which contains an element of sensation. Phenomena as
+objects of perception are not pure, that is, merely formal intuitions,
+like space and time, for they cannot be perceived in themselves.
+[Footnote: They can be perceived only as phenomena, and some part of
+them must always belong to the non-ego; whereas pure intuitions are
+entirely the products of the mind itself, and as such are coguized
+IN THEMSELVES.--Tr] They contain, then, over and above the intuition,
+the materials for an object (through which is represented something
+existing in space or time), that is to say, they contain the real of
+sensation, as a representation merely subjective, which gives us merely
+the consciousness that the subject is affected, and which we refer
+to some external object. Now, a gradual transition from empirical
+consciousness to pure consciousness is possible, inasmuch as the
+real in this consciousness entirely vanishes, and there remains a
+merely formal consciousness (a priori) of the manifold in time and
+space; consequently there is possible a synthesis also of the
+production of the quantity of a sensation from its commencement,
+that is, from the pure intuition = 0 onwards up to a certain
+quantity of the sensation. Now as sensation in itself is not an
+objective representation, and in it is to be found neither the
+intuition of space nor of time, it cannot possess any extensive
+quantity, and yet there does belong to it a quantity (and that by
+means of its apprehension, in which empirical consciousness can within
+a certain time rise from nothing = 0 up to its given amount),
+consequently an intensive quantity. And thus we must ascribe intensive
+quantity, that is, a degree of influence on sense to all objects of
+perception, in so far as this perception contains sensation.
+
+All cognition, by means of which I am enabled to cognize and
+determine a priori what belongs to empirical cognition, may be
+called an anticipation; and without doubt this is the sense in which
+Epicurus employed his expression prholepsis. But as there is in
+phenomena something which is never cognized a priori, which on this
+account constitutes the proper difference between pure and empirical
+cognition, that is to say, sensation (as the matter of perception),
+it follows, that sensation is just that element in cognition which
+cannot be at all anticipated. On the other hand, we might very well
+term the pure determinations in space and time, as well in regard to
+figure as to quantity, anticipations of phenomena, because they represent
+a priori that which may always be given a posteriori in experience.
+But suppose that in every sensation, as sensation in general,
+without any particular sensation being thought of, there existed
+something which could be cognized a priori, this would deserve to be
+called anticipation in a special sense--special, because it may seem
+surprising to forestall experience, in that which concerns the
+matter of experience, and which we can only derive from itself. Yet
+such really is the case here.
+
+Apprehension*, by means of sensation alone, fills only one moment,
+that is, if I do not take into consideration a succession of many
+sensations. As that in the phenomenon, the apprehension of which is
+not a successive synthesis advancing from parts to an entire
+representation, sensation has therefore no extensive quantity; the
+want of sensation in a moment of time would represent it as empty,
+consequently = 0. That which in the empirical intuition corresponds
+to sensation is reality (realitas phaenomenon); that which corresponds
+to the absence of it, negation = 0. Now every sensation is capable
+of a diminution, so that it can decrease, and thus gradually disappear.
+Therefore, between reality in a phenomenon and negation, there
+exists a continuous concatenation of many possible intermediate
+sensations, the difference of which from each other is always
+smaller than that between the given sensation and zero, or complete
+negation. That is to say, the real in a phenomenon has always a
+quantity, which however is not discoverable in apprehension,
+inasmuch as apprehension take place by means of mere sensation in
+one instant, and not by the successive synthesis of many sensations,
+and therefore does not progress from parts to the whole. Consequently,
+it has a quantity, but not an extensive quantity.
+
+[*Footnote: Apprehension is the Kantian word for preception, in the
+largest sense in which we employ that term. It is the genus which
+includes under i, as species, perception proper and sensation proper--Tr]
+
+Now that quantity which is apprehended only as unity, and in which
+plurality can be represented only by approximation to negation = O,
+I term intensive quantity. Consequently, reality in a phenomenon has
+intensive quantity, that is, a degree. If we consider this reality
+as cause (be it of sensation or of another reality in the
+phenomenon, for example, a change), we call the degree of reality in
+its character of cause a momentum, for example, the momentum of
+weight; and for this reason, that the degree only indicates that
+quantity the apprehension of which is not successive, but
+instantaneous. This, however, I touch upon only in passing, for with
+causality I have at present nothing to do.
+
+Accordingly, every sensation, consequently every reality in
+phenomena, however small it may be, has a degree, that is, an
+intensive quantity, which may always be lessened, and between
+reality and negation there exists a continuous connection of
+possible realities, and possible smaller perceptions. Every colour--
+for example, red--has a degree, which, be it ever so small, is never
+the smallest, and so is it always with heat, the momentum of weight,
+etc.
+
+This property of quantities, according to which no part of them is
+the smallest possible (no part simple), is called their continuity.
+Space and time are quanta continua, because no part of them can be
+given, without enclosing it within boundaries (points and moments),
+consequently, this given part is itself a space or a time. Space,
+therefore, consists only of spaces, and time of times. Points and
+moments are only boundaries, that is, the mere places or positions
+of their limitation. But places always presuppose intuitions which
+are to limit or determine them; and we cannot conceive either space
+or time composed of constituent parts which are given before space
+or time. Such quantities may also be called flowing, because synthesis
+(of the productive imagination) in the production of these
+quantities is a progression in time, the continuity of which we are
+accustomed to indicate by the expression flowing.
+
+All phenomena, then, are continuous quantities, in respect both to
+intuition and mere perception (sensation, and with it reality). In
+the former case they are extensive quantities; in the latter, intensive.
+When the synthesis of the manifold of a phenomenon is interrupted,
+there results merely an aggregate of several phenomena, and not
+properly a phenomenon as a quantity, which is not produced by the mere
+continuation of the productive synthesis of a certain kind, but by
+the repetition of a synthesis always ceasing. For example, if I call
+thirteen dollars a sum or quantity of money, I employ the term quite
+correctly, inasmuch as I understand by thirteen dollars the value of
+a mark in standard silver, which is, to be sure, a continuous
+quantity, in which no part is the smallest, but every part might
+constitute a piece of money, which would contain material for still
+smaller pieces. If, however, by the words thirteen dollars I
+understand so many coins (be their value in silver what it may), it
+would be quite erroneous to use the expression a quantity of
+dollars; on the contrary, I must call them aggregate, that is, a
+number of coins. And as in every number we must have unity as the
+foundation, so a phenomenon taken as unity is a quantity, and as
+such always a continuous quantity (quantum continuum).
+
+Now, seeing all phenomena, whether considered as extensive or
+intensive, are continuous quantities, the proposition: "All change
+(transition of a thing from one state into another) is continuous,"
+might be proved here easily, and with mathematical evidence, were it
+not that the causality of a change lies, entirely beyond the bounds
+of a transcendental philosophy, and presupposes empirical principles.
+For of the possibility of a cause which changes the condition of things,
+that is, which determines them to the contrary to a certain given
+state, the understanding gives us a priori no knowledge; not merely
+because it has no insight into the possibility of it (for such insight
+is absent in several a priori cognitions), but because the notion of
+change concerns only certain determinations of phenomena, which
+experience alone can acquaint us with, while their cause lies in the
+unchangeable. But seeing that we have nothing which we could here
+employ but the pure fundamental conceptions of all possible
+experience, among which of course nothing empirical can be admitted,
+we dare not, without injuring the unity of our system, anticipate
+general physical science, which is built upon certain fundamental
+experiences.
+
+Nevertheless, we are in no want of proofs of the great influence
+which the principle above developed exercises in the anticipation of
+perceptions, and even in supplying the want of them, so far as to
+shield us against the false conclusions which otherwise we might
+rashly draw.
+
+If all reality in perception has a degree, between which and
+negation there is an endless sequence of ever smaller degrees, and
+if, nevertheless, every sense must have a determinate degree of
+receptivity for sensations; no perception, and consequently no
+experience is possible, which can prove, either immediately or
+mediately, an entire absence of all reality in a phenomenon; in
+other words, it is impossible ever to draw from experience a proof
+of the existence of empty space or of empty time. For in the first
+place, an entire absence of reality in a sensuous intuition cannot
+of course be an object of perception; secondly, such absence cannot
+be deduced from the contemplation of any single phenomenon, and the
+difference of the degrees in its reality; nor ought it ever to be
+admitted in explanation of any phenomenon. For if even the complete
+intuition of a determinate space or time is thoroughly real, that
+is, if no part thereof is empty, yet because every reality has its
+degree, which, with the extensive quantity of the phenomenon
+unchanged, can diminish through endless gradations down to nothing
+(the void), there must be infinitely graduated degrees, with which
+space or time is filled, and the intensive quantity in different
+phenomena may be smaller or greater, although the extensive quantity
+of the intuition remains equal and unaltered.
+
+We shall give an example of this. Almost all natural philosophers,
+remarking a great difference in the quantity of the matter of
+different kinds in bodies with the same volume (partly on account of
+the momentum of gravity or weight, partly on account of the momentum
+of resistance to other bodies in motion), conclude unanimously that
+this volume (extensive quantity of the phenomenon) must be void in
+all bodies, although in different proportion. But who would suspect
+that these for the most part mathematical and mechanical inquirers
+into nature should ground this conclusion solely on a metaphysical
+hypothesis--a sort of hypothesis which they profess to disparage and
+avoid? Yet this they do, in assuming that the real in space (I must
+not here call it impenetrability or weight, because these are
+empirical conceptions) is always identical, and can only be
+distinguished according to its extensive quantity, that is,
+multiplicity. Now to this presupposition, for which they can have no
+ground in experience, and which consequently is merely metaphysical,
+I oppose a transcendental demonstration, which it is true will not
+explain the difference in the filling up of spaces, but which
+nevertheless completely does away with the supposed necessity of the
+above-mentioned presupposition that we cannot explain the said
+difference otherwise than by the hypothesis of empty spaces. This
+demonstration, moreover, has the merit of setting the understanding
+at liberty to conceive this distinction in a different manner, if the
+explanation of the fact requires any such hypothesis. For we
+perceive that although two equal spaces may be completely filled by
+matters altogether different, so that in neither of them is there left
+a single point wherein matter is not present, nevertheless, every
+reality has its degree (of resistance or of weight), which, without
+diminution of the extensive quantity, can become less and less ad
+infinitum, before it passes into nothingness and disappears. Thus an
+expansion which fills a space--for example, caloric, or any other
+reality in the phenomenal world--can decrease in its degrees to
+infinity, yet without leaving the smallest part of the space empty;
+on the contrary, filling it with those lesser degrees as completely
+as another phenomenon could with greater. My intention here is by no
+means to maintain that this is really the case with the difference
+of matters, in regard to their specific gravity; I wish only to prove,
+from a principle of the pure understanding, that the nature of our
+perceptions makes such a mode of explanation possible, and that it
+is erroneous to regard the real in a phenomenon as equal quoad its
+degree, and different only quoad its aggregation and extensive
+quantity, and this, too, on the pretended authority of an a priori
+principle of the understanding.
+
+Nevertheless, this principle of the anticipation of perception
+must somewhat startle an inquirer whom initiation into
+transcendental philosophy has rendered cautious. We must naturally
+entertain some doubt whether or not the understanding can enounce
+any such synthetical proposition as that respecting the degree of
+all reality in phenomena, and consequently the possibility of the
+internal difference of sensation itself--abstraction being made of
+its empirical quality. Thus it is a question not unworthy of solution:
+"How the understanding can pronounce synthetically and a priori
+respecting phenomena, and thus anticipate these, even in that which
+is peculiarly and merely empirical, that, namely, which concerns
+sensation itself?"
+
+The quality of sensation is in all cases merely empirical, and
+cannot be represented a priori (for example, colours, taste, etc.).
+But the real--that which corresponds to sensation--in opposition to
+negation = 0, only represents something the conception of which in
+itself contains a being (ein seyn), and signifies nothing but the
+synthesis in an empirical consciousness. That is to say, the empirical
+consciousness in the internal sense can be raised from 0 to every
+higher degree, so that the very same extensive quantity of
+intuition, an illuminated surface, for example, excites as great a
+sensation as an aggregate of many other surfaces less illuminated.
+We can therefore make complete abstraction of the extensive quantity
+of a phenomenon, and represent to ourselves in the mere sensation in
+a certain momentum, a synthesis of homogeneous ascension from 0 up
+to the given empirical consciousness, All sensations therefore as such
+are given only a posteriori, but this property thereof, namely, that
+they have a degree, can be known a priori. It is worthy of remark,
+that in respect to quantities in general, we can cognize a priori only
+a single quality, namely, continuity; but in respect to all quality
+(the real in phenomena), we cannot cognize a priori anything more than
+the intensive quantity thereof, namely, that they have a degree. All
+else is left to experience.
+
+
+
+3. ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE.
+
+The principle of these is: Experience is possible only
+through the representation of a necessary connection of Perceptions.
+
+
+PROOF.
+
+
+Experience is an empirical cognition; that is to say, a cognition
+which determines an object by means of perceptions. It is therefore
+a synthesis of perceptions, a synthesis which is not itself
+contained in perception, but which contains the synthetical unity of
+the manifold of perception in a consciousness; and this unity
+constitutes the essential of our cognition of objects of the senses,
+that is, of experience (not merely of intuition or sensation). Now
+in experience our perceptions come together contingently, so that no
+character of necessity in their connection appears, or can appear from
+the perceptions themselves, because apprehension is only a placing
+together of the manifold of empirical intuition, and no representation
+of a necessity in the connected existence of the phenomena which
+apprehension brings together, is to be discovered therein. But as
+experience is a cognition of objects by means of perceptions, it
+follows that the relation of the existence of the existence of the
+manifold must be represented in experience not as it is put together
+in time, but as it is objectively in time. And as time itself cannot
+be perceived, the determination of the existence of objects in time
+can only take place by means of their connection in time in general,
+consequently only by means of a priori connecting conceptions. Now
+as these conceptions always possess the character of necessity,
+experience is possible only by means of a representation of the
+necessary connection of perception.
+
+The three modi of time are permanence, succession, and
+coexistence. Accordingly, there are three rules of all relations of
+time in phenomena, according to which the existence of every
+phenomenon is determined in respect of the unity of all time, and
+these antecede all experience and render it possible.
+
+The general principle of all three analogies rests on the
+necessary unity of apperception in relation to all possible
+empirical consciousness (perception) at every time, consequently, as
+this unity lies a priori at the foundation of all mental operations,
+the principle rests on the synthetical unity of all phenomena
+according to their relation in time. For the original apperception
+relates to our internal sense (the complex of all representations),
+and indeed relates a priori to its form, that is to say, the
+relation of the manifold empirical consciousness in time. Now this
+manifold must be combined in original apperception according to
+relations of time--a necessity imposed by the a priori
+transcendental unity of apperception, to which is subjected all that
+can belong to my (i.e., my own) cognition, and therefore all that
+can become an object for me. This synthetical and a priori
+determined unity in relation of perceptions in time is therefore the
+rule: "All empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules
+of the general determination of time"; and the analogies of
+experience, of which we are now about to treat, must be rules of
+this nature.
+
+These principles have this peculiarity, that they do not concern
+phenomena, and the synthesis of the empirical intuition thereof, but
+merely the existence of phenomena and their relation to each other
+in regard to this existence. Now the mode in which we apprehend a
+thing in a phenomenon can be determined a priori in such a manner that
+the rule of its synthesis can give, that is to say, can produce this
+a priori intuition in every empirical example. But the existence of
+phenomena cannot be known a priori, and although we could arrive by
+this path at a conclusion of the fact of some existence, we could
+not cognize that existence determinately, that is to say, we should
+be incapable of anticipating in what respect the empirical intuition
+of it would be distinguishable from that of others.
+
+The two principles above mentioned, which I called mathematical,
+in consideration of the fact of their authorizing the application of
+mathematic phenomena, relate to these phenomena only in regard to
+their possibility, and instruct us how phenomena, as far as regards
+their intuition or the real in their perception, can be generated
+according to the rules of a mathematical synthesis. Consequently,
+numerical quantities, and with them the determination of a
+phenomenon as a quantity, can be employed in the one case as well as
+in the other. Thus, for example, out of 200,000 illuminations by the
+moon, I might compose and give a priori, that is construct, the degree
+of our sensations of the sun-light.* We may therefore entitle these
+two principles constitutive.
+
+[*Footnote: Kant's meaning is: The two principles enunciated under
+the heads of "Axioms of Intuition," and "Anticipations of Perception,"
+authorize the application to phenomena of determinations of size and
+number, that is of mathematic. For exampkle, I may compute the light
+of the sun, and say that its quantity is a certain number of times
+greater than that of the moon. In the same way, heat is measured by
+the comparison of its different effects on water, &c., and on mercury
+in a thermometer.--Tr]
+
+The case is very different with those principles whose province it
+is to subject the existence of phenomena to rules a priori. For as
+existence does not admit of being constructed, it is clear that they
+must only concern the relations of existence and be merely
+regulative principles. In this case, therefore, neither axioms nor
+anticipations are to be thought of. Thus, if a perception is given
+us, in a certain relation of time to other (although undetermined)
+perceptions, we cannot then say a priori, what and how great (in
+quantity) the other perception necessarily connected with the former
+is, but only how it is connected, quoad its existence, in this given
+modus of time. Analogies in philosophy mean something very different
+from that which they represent in mathematics. In the latter they
+are formulae, which enounce the equality of two relations of quantity,
+and are always constitutive, so that if two terms of the proportion
+are given, the third is also given, that is, can be constructed by
+the aid of these formulae. But in philosophy, analogy is not the
+equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations. In this
+case, from three given terms, I can give a priori and cognize the
+relation to a fourth member, but not this fourth term itself, although
+I certainly possess a rule to guide me in the search for this fourth
+term in experience, and a mark to assist me in discovering it. An
+analogy of experience is therefore only a rule according to which
+unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in respect to
+objects (phenomena) not as a constitutive, but merely as a
+regulative principle. The same holds good also of the postulates of
+empirical thought in general, which relate to the synthesis of mere
+intuition (which concerns the form of phenomena), the synthesis of
+perception (which concerns the matter of phenomena), and the synthesis
+of experience (which concerns the relation of these perceptions).
+For they are only regulative principles, and clearly distinguishable
+from the mathematical, which are constitutive, not indeed in regard
+to the certainty which both possess a priori, but in the mode of evidence
+thereof, consequently also in the manner of demonstration.
+
+But what has been observed of all synthetical propositions, and must
+be particularly remarked in this place, is this, that these
+analogies possess significance and validity, not as principles of
+the transcendental, but only as principles of the empirical use of
+the understanding, and their truth can therefore be proved only as
+such, and that consequently the phenomena must not be subjoined directly
+under the categories, but only under their schemata. For if the
+objects to which those principles must be applied were things in
+themselves, it would be quite impossible to cognize aught concerning
+them synthetically a priori. But they are nothing but phenomena; a
+complete knowledge of which--a knowledge to which all principles a
+priori must at last relate--is the only possible experience. It
+follows that these principles can have nothing else for their aim than
+the conditions of the empirical cognition in the unity of synthesis
+of phenomena. But this synthesis is cogitated only in the schema of
+the pure conception of the understanding, of whose unity, as that of
+a synthesis in general, the category contains the function
+unrestricted by any sensuous condition. These principles will
+therefore authorize us to connect phenomena according to an analogy,
+with the logical and universal unity of conceptions, and
+consequently to employ the categories in the principles themselves;
+but in the application of them to experience, we shall use only
+their schemata, as the key to their proper application, instead of
+the categories, or rather the latter as restricting conditions, under
+the title of "formulae" of the former.
+
+
+
+A. FIRST ANALOGY.
+
+Principle of the Permanence of Substance.
+
+In all changes of phenomena, substance is permanent, and the
+quantum thereof in nature is neither increased nor diminished.
+
+
+PROOF.
+
+
+All phenomena exist in time, wherein alone as substratum, that is,
+as the permanent form of the internal intuition, coexistence and
+succession can be represented. Consequently time, in which all changes
+of phenomena must be cogitated, remains and changes not, because it
+is that in which succession and coexistence can be represented only
+as determinations thereof. Now, time in itself cannot be an object
+of perception. It follows that in objects of perception, that is, in
+phenomena, there must be found a substratum which represents time in
+general, and in which all change or coexistence can be perceived by
+means of the relation of phenomena to it. But the substratum of all
+reality, that is, of all that pertains to the existence of things,
+is substance; all that pertains to existence can be cogitated only
+as a determination of substance. Consequently, the permanent, in
+relation to which alone can all relations of time in phenomena be
+determined, is substance in the world of phenomena, that is, the
+real in phenomena, that which, as the substratum of all change,
+remains ever the same. Accordingly, as this cannot change in
+existence, its quantity in nature can neither be increased nor
+diminished.
+
+Our apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon is always
+successive, is Consequently always changing. By it alone we could,
+therefore, never determine whether this manifold, as an object of
+experience, is coexistent or successive, unless it had for a
+foundation something fixed and permanent, of the existence of which
+all succession and coexistence are nothing but so many modes (modi
+of time). Only in the permanent, then, are relations of time
+possible (for simultaneity and succession are the only relations in
+time); that is to say, the permanent is the substratum of our
+empirical representation of time itself, in which alone all
+determination of time is possible. Permanence is, in fact, just
+another expression for time, as the abiding correlate of all existence
+of phenomena, and of all change, and of all coexistence. For change
+does not affect time itself, but only the phenomena in time (just as
+coexistence cannot be regarded as a modus of time itself, seeing
+that in time no parts are coexistent, but all successive). If we
+were to attribute succession to time itself, we should be obliged to
+cogitate another time, in which this succession would be possible.
+It is only by means of the permanent that existence in different parts
+of the successive series of time receives a quantity, which we entitle
+duration. For in mere succession, existence is perpetually vanishing
+and recommencing, and therefore never has even the least quantity.
+Without the permanent, then, no relation in time is possible. Now,
+time in itself is not an object of perception; consequently the
+permanent in phenomena must be regarded as the substratum of all
+determination of time, and consequently also as the condition of the
+possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions, that is, of
+experience; and all existence and all change in time can only be
+regarded as a mode in the existence of that which abides unchangeably.
+Therefore, in all phenomena, the permanent is the object in itself,
+that is, the substance (phenomenon); but all that changes or can
+change belongs only to the mode of the existence of this substance
+or substances, consequently to its determinations.
+
+I find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but even the
+common understanding, has preposited this permanence as a substratum
+of all change in phenomena; indeed, I am compelled to believe that
+they will always accept this as an indubitable fact. Only the
+philosopher expresses himself in a more precise and definite manner,
+when he says: "In all changes in the world, the substance remains,
+and the accidents alone are changeable." But of this decidedly synthetical
+proposition, I nowhere meet with even an attempt at proof; nay, it
+very rarely has the good fortune to stand, as it deserves to do, at
+the head of the pure and entirely a priori laws of nature. In truth,
+the statement that substance is permanent, is tautological. For this
+very permanence is the ground on which we apply the category of
+substance to the phenomenon; and we should have been obliged to
+prove that in all phenomena there is something permanent, of the
+existence of which the changeable is nothing but a determination.
+But because a proof of this nature cannot be dogmatical, that is,
+cannot be drawn from conceptions, inasmuch as it concerns a
+synthetical proposition a priori, and as philosophers never
+reflected that such propositions are valid only in relation to
+possible experience, and therefore cannot be proved except by means
+of a deduction of the possibility of experience, it is no wonder that
+while it has served as the foundation of all experience (for we feel
+the need of it in empirical cognition), it has never been supported
+by proof.
+
+A philosopher was asked: "What is the weight of smoke?" He answered:
+"Subtract from the weight of the burnt wood the weight of the
+remaining ashes, and you will have the weight of the smoke." Thus he
+presumed it to be incontrovertible that even in fire the matter
+(substance) does not perish, but that only the form of it undergoes
+a change. In like manner was the saying: "From nothing comes nothing,"
+only another inference from the principle or permanence, or rather
+of the ever-abiding existence of the true subject in phenomena. For
+if that in the phenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper
+substratum of all determination of time, it follows that all existence
+in past as well as in future time, must be determinable by means of
+it alone. Hence we are entitled to apply the term substance to a
+phenomenon, only because we suppose its existence in all time, a
+notion which the word permanence does not fully express, as it seems
+rather to be referable to future time. However, the internal necessity
+perpetually to be, is inseparably connected with the necessity
+always to have been, and so the expression may stand as it is.
+"Gigni de nihilo nihil; in nihilum nil posse reverti,"* are two
+propositions which the ancients never parted, and which people
+nowadays sometimes mistakenly disjoin, because they imagine that the
+propositions apply to objects as things in themselves, and that the
+former might be inimical to the dependence (even in respect of its
+substance also) of the world upon a supreme cause. But this
+apprehension is entirely needless, for the question in this case is
+only of phenomena in the sphere of experience, the unity of which
+never could be possible, if we admitted the possibility that new
+things (in respect of their substance) should arise. For in that case,
+we should lose altogether that which alone can represent the unity
+of time, to wit, the identity of the substratum, as that through which
+alone all change possesses complete and thorough unity. This
+permanence is, however, nothing but the manner in which we represent
+to ourselves the existence of things in the phenomenal world.
+
+[*Footnote: Persius, Satirae, iii.83-84.]
+
+The determinations of a substance, which are only particular modes
+of its existence, are called accidents. They are always real,
+because they concern the existence of substance (negations are only
+determinations, which express the non-existence of something in the
+substance). Now, if to this real in the substance we ascribe a
+particular existence (for example, to motion as an accident of
+matter), this existence is called inherence, in contradistinction to
+the existence of substance, which we call subsistence. But hence arise
+many misconceptions, and it would be a more accurate and just mode
+of expression to designate the accident only as the mode in which
+the existence of a substance is positively determined. Meanwhile, by
+reason of the conditions of the logical exercise of our understanding,
+it is impossible to avoid separating, as it were, that which in the
+existence of a substance is subject to change, whilst the substance
+remains, and regarding it in relation to that which is properly
+permanent and radical. On this account, this category of substance
+stands under the title of relation, rather because it is the condition
+thereof than because it contains in itself any relation.
+
+Now, upon this notion of permanence rests the proper notion of the
+conception change. Origin and extinction are not changes of that which
+originates or becomes extinct. Change is but a mode of existence,
+which follows on another mode of existence of the same object; hence
+all that changes is permanent, and only the condition thereof changes.
+Now since this mutation affects only determinations, which can have
+a beginning or an end, we may say, employing an expression which seems
+somewhat paradoxical: "Only the permanent (substance) is subject to
+change; the mutable suffers no change, but rather alternation, that
+is, when certain determinations cease, others begin."
+
+Change, when, cannot be perceived by us except in substances, and
+origin or extinction in an absolute sense, that does not concern
+merely a determination of the permanent, cannot be a possible
+perception, for it is this very notion of the permanent which
+renders possible the representation of a transition from one state
+into another, and from non-being to being, which, consequently, can
+be empirically cognized only as alternating determinations of that
+which is permanent. Grant that a thing absolutely begins to be; we
+must then have a point of time in which it was not. But how and by
+what can we fix and determine this point of time, unless by that which
+already exists? For a void time--preceding--is not an object of
+perception; but if we connect this beginning with objects which
+existed previously, and which continue to exist till the object in
+question in question begins to be, then the latter can only be a
+determination of the former as the permanent. The same holds good of
+the notion of extinction, for this presupposes the empirical
+representation of a time, in which a phenomenon no longer exists.
+
+Substances (in the world of phenomena) are the substratum of all
+determinations of time. The beginning of some, and the ceasing to be
+of other substances, would utterly do away with the only condition
+of the empirical unity of time; and in that case phenomena would
+relate to two different times, in which, side by side, existence would
+pass; which is absurd. For there is only one time in which all
+different times must be placed, not as coexistent, but as successive.
+
+Accordingly, permanence is a necessary condition under which alone
+phenomena, as things or objects, are determinable in a possible
+experience. But as regards the empirical criterion of this necessary
+permanence, and with it of the substantiality of phenomena, we shall
+find sufficient opportunity to speak in the sequel.
+
+
+
+B. SECOND ANALOGY.
+
+Principle of the Succession of Time According to the Law of Causality.
+All changes take place according to the law of the connection of Cause
+and Effect.
+
+
+PROOF.
+
+
+(That all phenomena in the succession of time are only changes, that
+is, a successive being and non-being of the determinations of
+substance, which is permanent; consequently that a being of
+substance itself which follows on the non-being thereof, or a
+non-being of substance which follows on the being thereof, in other
+words, that the origin or extinction of substance itself, is
+impossible--all this has been fully established in treating of the
+foregoing principle. This principle might have been expressed as
+follows: "All alteration (succession) of phenomena is merely
+change"; for the changes of substance are not origin or extinction,
+because the conception of change presupposes the same subject as
+existing with two opposite determinations, and consequently as
+permanent. After this premonition, we shall proceed to the proof.)
+
+I perceive that phenomena succeed one another, that is to say, a
+state of things exists at one time, the opposite of which existed in
+a former state. In this case, then, I really connect together two
+perceptions in time. Now connection is not an operation of mere
+sense and intuition, but is the product of a synthetical faculty of
+imagination, which determines the internal sense in respect of a
+relation of time. But imagination can connect these two states in
+two ways, so that either the one or the other may antecede in time;
+for time in itself cannot be an object of perception, and what in an
+object precedes and what follows cannot be empirically determined in
+relation to it. I am only conscious, then, that my imagination
+places one state before and the other after; not that the one state
+antecedes the other in the object. In other words, the objective
+relation of the successive phenomena remains quite undetermined by
+means of mere perception. Now in order that this relation may be
+cognized as determined, the relation between the two states must be
+so cogitated that it is thereby determined as necessary, which of them
+must be placed before and which after, and not conversely. But the
+conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical unity,
+can be none other than a pure conception of the understanding which
+does not lie in mere perception; and in this case it is the conception
+of "the relation of cause and effect," the former of which determines
+the latter in time, as its necessary consequence, and not as something
+which might possibly antecede (or which might in some cases not be
+perceived to follow). It follows that it is only because we subject
+the sequence of phenomena, and consequently all change, to the law
+of causality, that experience itself, that is, empirical cognition
+of phenomena, becomes possible; and consequently, that phenomena
+themselves, as objects of experience, are possible only by virtue of
+this law.
+
+Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is always
+successive. The representations of parts succeed one another.
+Whether they succeed one another in the object also, is a second point
+for reflection, which was not contained in the former. Now we may
+certainly give the name of object to everything, even to every
+representation, so far as we are conscious thereof; but what this word
+may mean in the case of phenomena, not merely in so far as they (as
+representations) are objects, but only in so far as they indicate an
+object, is a question requiring deeper consideration. In so far as
+they, regarded merely as representations, are at the same time objects
+of consciousness, they are not to be distinguished from
+apprehension, that is, reception into the synthesis of imagination,
+and we must therefore say: "The manifold of phenomena is always
+produced successively in the mind." If phenomena were things in
+themselves, no man would be able to conjecture from the succession
+of our representations how this manifold is connected in the object;
+for we have to do only with our representations. How things may be
+in themselves, without regard to the representations through which
+they affect us, is utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition. Now
+although phenomena are not things in themselves, and are
+nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized, it is my
+duty to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold
+in phenomena themselves, while the representation of this manifold
+in apprehension is always successive. For example, the apprehension
+of the manifold in the phenomenon of a house which stands before me,
+is successive. Now comes the question whether the manifold of this
+house is in itself successive--which no one will be at all willing
+to grant. But, so soon as I raise my conception of an object to the
+transcendental signification thereof, I find that the house is not
+a thing in itself, but only a phenomenon, that is, a representation,
+the transcendental object of which remains utterly unknown. What then
+am I to understand by the question: "How can the manifold be connected
+in the phenomenon itself--not considered as a thing in itself, but
+merely as a phenomenon?" Here that which lies in my successive apprehension
+is regarded as representation, whilst the phenomenon which is given
+me, notwithstanding that it is nothing more than a complex of these
+representations, is regarded as the object thereof, with which my
+conception, drawn from the representations of apprehension, must
+harmonize. It is very soon seen that, as accordance of the cognition
+with its object constitutes truth, the question now before us can only
+relate to the formal conditions of empirical truth; and that the
+phenomenon, in opposition to the representations of apprehension,
+can only be distinguished therefrom as the object of them, if it is
+subject to a rule which distinguishes it from every other
+apprehension, and which renders necessary a mode of connection of
+the manifold. That in the phenomenon which contains the condition of
+this necessary rule of apprehension, is the object.
+
+Let us now proceed to our task. That something happens, that is to
+say, that something or some state exists which before was not,
+cannot be empirically perceived, unless a phenomenon precedes, which
+does not contain in itself this state. For a reality which should
+follow upon a void time, in other words, a beginning, which no state
+of things precedes, can just as little be apprehended as the void time
+itself. Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which
+follows upon another perception. But as this is the case with all
+synthesis of apprehension, as I have shown above in the example of
+a house, my apprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently
+distinguished from other apprehensions. But I remark also that if in
+a phenomenon which contains an occurrence, I call the antecedent state
+of my perception, A, and the following state, B, the perception B
+can only follow A in apprehension, and the perception A cannot
+follow B, but only precede it. For example, I see a ship float down
+the stream of a river. My perception of its place lower down follows
+upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river,
+and it is impossible that, in the apprehension of this phenomenon,
+the vessel should be perceived first below and afterwards higher up
+the stream. Here, therefore, the order in the sequence of perceptions
+in apprehension is determined; and by this order apprehension is
+regulated. In the former example, my perceptions in the apprehension
+of a house might begin at the roof and end at the foundation, or
+vice versa; or I might apprehend the manifold in this empirical
+intuition, by going from left to right, and from right to left.
+Accordingly, in the series of these perceptions, there was no
+determined order, which necessitated my beginning at a certain
+point, in order empirically to connect the manifold. But this rule
+is always to be met with in the perception of that which happens,
+and it makes the order of the successive perceptions in the
+apprehension of such a phenomenon necessary.
+
+I must, therefore, in the present case, deduce the subjective
+sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena,
+for otherwise the former is quite undetermined, and one phenomenon
+is not distinguishable from another. The former alone proves nothing
+as to the connection of the manifold in an object, for it is quite
+arbitrary. The latter must consist in the order of the manifold in
+a phenomenon, according to which order the apprehension of one thing
+(that which happens) follows that of another thing (which precedes),
+in conformity with a rule. In this way alone can I be authorized to
+say of the phenomenon itself, and not merely of my own apprehension,
+that a certain order or sequence is to be found therein. That is, in
+other words, I cannot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in this
+order.
+
+In conformity with this rule, then, it is necessary that in that
+which antecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule,
+according to which in this event follows always and necessarily; but
+I cannot reverse this and go back from the event, and determine (by
+apprehension) that which antecedes it. For no phenomenon goes back
+from the succeeding point of time to the preceding point, although
+it does certainly relate to a preceding point of time; from a given
+time, on the other hand, there is always a necessary progression to
+the determined succeeding time. Therefore, because there certainly
+is something that follows, I must of necessity connect it with
+something else, which antecedes, and upon which it follows, in
+conformity with a rule, that is necessarily, so that the event, as
+conditioned, affords certain indication of a condition, and this
+condition determines the event.
+
+Let us suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which this event
+must follow in conformity with a rule. All sequence of perception
+would then exist only in apprehension, that is to say, would be merely
+subjective, and it could not thereby be objectively determined what
+thing ought to precede, and what ought to follow in perception. In
+such a case, we should have nothing but a play of representations,
+which would possess no application to any object. That is to say, it
+would not be possible through perception to distinguish one phenomenon
+from another, as regards relations of time; because the succession
+in the act of apprehension would always be of the same sort, and
+therefore there would be nothing in the phenomenon to determine the
+succession, and to render a certain sequence objectively necessary.
+And, in this case, I cannot say that two states in a phenomenon follow
+one upon the other, but only that one apprehension follows upon
+another. But this is merely subjective, and does not determine an
+object, and consequently cannot be held to be cognition of an
+object--not even in the phenomenal world.
+
+Accordingly, when we know in experience that something happens, we
+always presuppose that something precedes, whereupon it follows in
+conformity with a rule. For otherwise I could not say of the object
+that it follows; because the mere succession in my apprehension, if
+it be not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding,
+does not authorize succession in the object. Only, therefore, in
+reference to a rule, according to which phenomena are determined in
+their sequence, that is, as they happen, by the preceding state, can
+I make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective, and it
+is only under this presupposition that even the experience of an event
+is possible.
+
+No doubt it appears as if this were in thorough contradiction to all
+the notions which people have hitherto entertained in regard to the
+procedure of the human understanding. According to these opinions,
+it is by means of the perception and comparison of similar
+consequences following upon certain antecedent phenomena that the
+understanding is led to the discovery of a rule, according to which
+certain events always follow certain phenomena, and it is only by this
+process that we attain to the conception of cause. Upon such a
+basis, it is clear that this conception must be merely empirical,
+and the rule which it furnishes us with--"Everything that happens must
+have a cause"--would be just as contingent as experience itself. The
+universality and necessity of the rule or law would be perfectly
+spurious attributes of it. Indeed, it could not possess universal
+validity, inasmuch as it would not in this case be a priori, but
+founded on deduction. But the same is the case with this law as with
+other pure a priori representations (e.g., space and time), which we
+can draw in perfect clearness and completeness from experience, only
+because we had already placed them therein, and by that means, and
+by that alone, had rendered experience possible. Indeed, the logical
+clearness of this representation of a rule, determining the series
+of events, is possible only when we have made use thereof in
+experience. Nevertheless, the recognition of this rule, as a condition
+of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time, was the ground of
+experience itself and consequently preceded it a priori.
+
+It is now our duty to show by an example that we never, even in
+experience, attribute to an object the notion of succession or
+effect (of an event--that is, the happening of something that did
+not exist before), and distinguish it from the subjective succession
+of apprehension, unless when a rule lies at the foundation, which
+compels us to observe this order of perception in preference to any
+other, and that, indeed, it is this necessity which first renders
+possible the representation of a succession in the object.
+
+We have representations within us, of which also we can be
+conscious. But, however widely extended, however accurate and
+thoroughgoing this consciousness may be, these representations are
+still nothing more than representations, that is, internal
+determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time. Now how
+happens it that to these representations we should set an object, or
+that, in addition to their subjective reality, as modifications, we
+should still further attribute to them a certain unknown objective
+reality? It is clear that objective significancy cannot consist in
+a relation to another representation (of that which we desire to term
+object), for in that case the question again arises: "How does this
+other representation go out of itself, and obtain objective
+significancy over and above the subjective, which is proper to it,
+as a determination of a state of mind?" If we try to discover what
+sort of new property the relation to an object gives to our subjective
+representations, and what new importance they thereby receive, we
+shall find that this relation has no other effect than that of
+rendering necessary the connection of our representations in a certain
+manner, and of subjecting them to a rule; and that conversely, it is
+only because a certain order is necessary in the relations of time
+of our representations, that objective significancy is ascribed to
+them.
+
+In the synthesis of phenomena, the manifold of our representations
+is always successive. Now hereby is not represented an object, for
+by means of this succession, which is common to all apprehension, no
+one thing is distinguished from another. But so soon as I perceive
+or assume that in this succession there is a relation to a state
+antecedent, from which the representation follows in accordance with
+a rule, so soon do I represent something as an event, or as a thing
+that happens; in other words, I cognize an object to which I must assign
+a certain determinate position in time, which cannot be altered,
+because of the preceding state in the object. When, therefore, I
+perceive that something happens, there is contained in this
+representation, in the first place, the fact, that something
+antecedes; because, it is only in relation to this that the
+phenomenon obtains its proper relation of time, in other words, exists
+after an antecedent time, in which it did not exist. But it can
+receive its determined place in time only by the presupposition that
+something existed in the foregoing state, upon which it follows
+inevitably and always, that is, in conformity with a rule. From all
+this it is evident that, in the first place, I cannot reverse the
+order of succession, and make that which happens precede that upon
+which it follows; and that, in the second place, if the antecedent
+state be posited, a certain determinate event inevitably and
+necessarily follows. Hence it follows that there exists a certain
+order in our representations, whereby the present gives a sure
+indication of some previously existing state, as a correlate, though
+still undetermined, of the existing event which is given--a
+correlate which itself relates to the event as its consequence,
+conditions it, and connects it necessarily with itself in the series
+of time.
+
+If then it be admitted as a necessary law of sensibility, and
+consequently a formal condition of all perception, that the
+preceding necessarily determines the succeeding time (inasmuch as I
+cannot arrive at the succeeding except through the preceding), it must
+likewise be an indispensable law of empirical representation of the
+series of time that the phenomena of the past determine all
+phenomena in the succeeding time, and that the latter, as events,
+cannot take place, except in so far as the former determine their
+existence in time, that is to say, establish it according to a rule.
+For it is of course only in phenomena that we can empirically
+cognize this continuity in the connection of times.
+
+For all experience and for the possibility of experience,
+understanding is indispensable, and the first step which it takes in
+this sphere is not to render the representation of objects clear,
+but to render the representation of an object in general, possible.
+It does this by applying the order of time to phenomena, and their
+existence. In other words, it assigns to each phenomenon, as a
+consequence, a place in relation to preceding phenomena, determined
+a priori in time, without which it could not harmonize with time
+itself, which determines a place a priori to all its parts. This
+determination of place cannot be derived from the relation of
+phenomena to absolute time (for it is not an object of perception);
+but, on the contrary, phenomena must reciprocally determine the places
+in time of one another, and render these necessary in the order of
+time. In other words, whatever follows or happens, must follow in
+conformity with a universal rule upon that which was contained in
+the foregoing state. Hence arises a series of phenomena, which, by
+means of the understanding, produces and renders necessary exactly
+the same order and continuous connection in the series of our possible
+perceptions, as is found a priori in the form of internal intuition
+(time), in which all our perceptions must have place.
+
+That something happens, then, is a perception which belongs to a
+possible experience, which becomes real only because I look upon the
+phenomenon as determined in regard to its place in time,
+consequently as an object, which can always be found by means of a
+rule in the connected series of my perceptions. But this rule of the
+determination of a thing according to succession in time is as
+follows: "In what precedes may be found the condition, under which
+an event always (that is, necessarily) follows." From all this it is
+obvious that the principle of cause and effect is the principle of
+possible experience, that is, of objective cognition of phenomena,
+in regard to their relations in the succession of time.
+
+The proof of this fundamental proposition rests entirely on the
+following momenta of argument. To all empirical cognition belongs
+the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination, a synthesis which
+is always successive, that is, in which the representations therein
+always follow one another. But the order of succession in
+imagination is not determined, and the series of successive
+representations may be taken retrogressively as well as progressively.
+But if this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension (of the
+manifold of a given phenomenon), then the order is determined in the
+object, or to speak more accurately, there is therein an order of
+successive synthesis which determines an object, and according to
+which something necessarily precedes, and when this is posited,
+something else necessarily follows. If, then, my perception is to
+contain the cognition of an event, that is, of something which
+really happens, it must be an empirical judgement, wherein we think
+that the succession is determined; that is, it presupposes another
+phenomenon, upon which this event follows necessarily, or in
+conformity with a rule. If, on the contrary, when I posited the
+antecedent, the event did not necessarily follow, I should be
+obliged to consider it merely as a subjective play of my
+imagination, and if in this I represented to myself anything as
+objective, I must look upon it as a mere dream. Thus, the relation
+of phenomena (as possible perceptions), according to which that
+which happens is, as to its existence, necessarily determined in
+time by something which antecedes, in conformity with a rule--in other
+words, the relation of cause and effect--is the condition of the
+objective validity of our empirical judgements in regard to the
+sequence of perceptions, consequently of their empirical truth, and
+therefore of experience. The principle of the relation of causality
+in the succession of phenomena is therefore valid for all objects of
+experience, because it is itself the ground of the possibility of
+experience.
+
+Here, however, a difficulty arises, which must be resolved. The
+principle of the connection of causality among phenomena is limited
+in our formula to the succession thereof, although in practice we find
+that the principle applies also when the phenomena exist together in
+the same time, and that cause and effect may be simultaneous. For
+example, there is heat in a room, which does not exist in the open
+air. I look about for the cause, and find it to be the fire, Now the
+fire as the cause is simultaneous with its effect, the heat of the
+room. In this case, then, there is no succession as regards time,
+between cause and effect, but they are simultaneous; and still the
+law holds good. The greater part of operating causes in nature are
+simultaneous with their effects, and the succession in time of the
+latter is produced only because the cause cannot achieve the total
+of its effect in one moment. But at the moment when the effect first
+arises, it is always simultaneous with the causality of its cause,
+because, if the cause had but a moment before ceased to be, the effect
+could not have arisen. Here it must be specially remembered that we
+must consider the order of time and not the lapse thereof. The
+relation remains, even though no time has elapsed. The time between
+the causality of the cause and its immediate effect may entirely
+vanish, and the cause and effect be thus simultaneous, but the
+relation of the one to the other remains always determinable according
+to time. If, for example, I consider a leaden ball, which lies upon
+a cushion and makes a hollow in it, as a cause, then it is
+simultaneous with the effect. But I distinguish the two through the
+relation of time of the dynamical connection of both. For if I lay
+the ball upon the cushion, then the hollow follows upon the before
+smooth surface; but supposing the cushion has, from some cause or
+another, a hollow, there does not thereupon follow a leaden ball.
+
+Thus, the law of succession of time is in all instances the only
+empirical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of the
+antecedent cause. The glass is the cause of the rising of the water
+above its horizontal surface, although the two phenomena are
+contemporaneous. For, as soon as I draw some water with the glass from
+a larger vessel, an effect follows thereupon, namely, the change of
+the horizontal state which the water had in the large vessel into a
+concave, which it assumes in the glass.
+
+This conception of causality leads us to the conception of action;
+that of action, to the conception of force; and through it, to the
+conception of substance. As I do not wish this critical essay, the
+sole purpose of which is to treat of the sources of our synthetical
+cognition a priori, to be crowded with analyses which merely
+explain, but do not enlarge the sphere of our conceptions, I reserve
+the detailed explanation of the above conceptions for a future
+system of pure reason. Such an analysis, indeed, executed with great
+particularity, may already be found in well-known works on this
+subject. But I cannot at present refrain from making a few remarks
+on the empirical criterion of a substance, in so far as it seems to
+be more evident and more easily recognized through the conception of
+action than through that of the permanence of a phenomenon.
+
+Where action (consequently activity and force) exists, substance
+also must exist, and in it alone must be sought the seat of that
+fruitful source of phenomena. Very well. But if we are called upon
+to explain what we mean by substance, and wish to avoid the vice of
+reasoning in a circle, the answer is by no means so easy. How shall
+we conclude immediately from the action to the permanence of that which
+acts, this being nevertheless an essential and peculiar criterion of
+substance (phenomenon)? But after what has been said above, the
+solution of this question becomes easy enough, although by the
+common mode of procedure--merely analysing our conceptions--it would
+be quite impossible. The conception of action indicates the relation
+of the subject of causality to the effect. Now because all effect
+consists in that which happens, therefore in the changeable, the
+last subject thereof is the permanent, as the substratum of all that
+changes, that is, substance. For according to the principle of
+causality, actions are always the first ground of all change in
+phenomena and, consequently, cannot be a property of a subject which
+itself changes, because if this were the case, other actions and
+another subject would be necessary to determine this change. From
+all this it results that action alone, as an empirical criterion, is
+a sufficient proof of the presence of substantiality, without any
+necessity on my part of endeavouring to discover the permanence of
+substance by a comparison. Besides, by this mode of induction we could
+not attain to the completeness which the magnitude and strict
+universality of the conception requires. For that the primary
+subject of the causality of all arising and passing away, all origin
+and extinction, cannot itself (in the sphere of phenomena) arise and
+pass away, is a sound and safe conclusion, a conclusion which leads
+us to the conception of empirical necessity and permanence in
+existence, and consequently to the conception of a substance as
+phenomenon.
+
+When something happens, the mere fact of the occurrence, without
+regard to that which occurs, is an object requiring investigation.
+The transition from the non-being of a state into the existence of
+it, supposing that this state contains no quality which previously
+existed in the phenomenon, is a fact of itself demanding inquiry. Such
+an event, as has been shown in No. A, does not concern substance (for
+substance does not thus originate), but its condition or state. It
+is therefore only change, and not origin from nothing. If this
+origin be regarded as the effect of a foreign cause, it is termed
+creation, which cannot be admitted as an event among phenomena,
+because the very possibility of it would annihilate the unity of
+experience. If, however, I regard all things not as phenomena, but
+as things in themselves and objects of understanding alone, they,
+although substances, may be considered as dependent, in respect of
+their existence, on a foreign cause. But this would require a very
+different meaning in the words, a meaning which could not apply to
+phenomena as objects of possible experience.
+
+How a thing can be changed, how it is possible that upon one state
+existing in one point of time, an opposite state should follow in
+another point of time--of this we have not the smallest conception
+a priori. There is requisite for this the knowledge of real powers,
+which can only be given empirically; for example, knowledge of
+moving forces, or, in other words, of certain successive phenomena
+(as movements) which indicate the presence of such forces. But the
+form of every change, the condition under which alone it can take place
+as the coming into existence of another state (be the content of the
+change, that is, the state which is changed, what it may), and
+consequently the succession of the states themselves can very well
+be considered a priori, in relation to the law of causality and the
+conditions of time.*
+
+[*Footnote: It must be remarked that I do not speak of the change of
+certain relations, but of the change of the state. Thus, when a body
+moves in a uniform manner, it does not change its state (of motion);
+but only when all motion increases or decreases.]
+
+When a substance passes from one state, a, into another state, b,
+the point of time in which the latter exists is different from, and
+subsequent to that in which the former existed. In like manner, the
+second state, as reality (in the phenomenon), differs from the
+first, in which the reality of the second did not exist, as b from
+zero. That is to say, if the state, b, differs from the state, a, only
+in respect to quantity, the change is a coming into existence of
+b - a, which in the former state did not exist, and in relation to
+which that state is = O.
+
+Now the question arises how a thing passes from one state = a,
+into another state = b. Between two moments there is always a
+certain time, and between two states existing in these moments there
+is always a difference having a certain quantity (for all parts of
+phenomena are in their turn quantities). Consequently, every
+transition from one state into another is always effected in a time
+contained between two moments, of which the first determines the state
+which leaves, and the second determines the state into the thing
+passes. The thing leaves, and the second determines the state into
+which the thing Both moments, then, are limitations of the time of
+a change, consequently of the intermediate state between both, and
+as such they belong to the total of the change. Now every change has
+a cause, which evidences its causality in the whole time during which
+the charge takes place. The cause, therefore, does not produce the
+change all at once or in one moment, but in a time, so that, as the
+time gradually increases from the commencing instant, a, to its
+completion at b, in like manner also, the quantity of the reality
+(b - a) is generated through the lesser degrees which are contained
+between the first and last. All change is therefore possible only
+through a continuous action of the causality, which, in so far as it
+is uniform, we call a momentum. The change does not consist of these
+momenta, but is generated or produced by them as their effect.
+
+Such is the law of the continuity of all change, the ground of which
+is that neither time itself nor any phenomenon in time consists of
+parts which are the smallest possible, but that, notwithstanding,
+the state of a thing passes in the process of a change through all
+these parts, as elements, to its second state. There is no smallest
+degree of reality in a phenomenon, just as there is no smallest degree
+in the quantity of time; and so the new state of reality grows up
+out of the former state, through all the infinite degrees thereof,
+the differences of which one from another, taken all together, are
+less than the difference between o and a.
+
+It is not our business to inquire here into the utility of this
+principle in the investigation of nature. But how such a
+proposition, which appears so greatly to extend our knowledge of
+nature, is possible completely a priori, is indeed a question which
+deserves investigation, although the first view seems to demonstrate
+the truth and reality of the principle, and the question, how it is
+possible, may be considered superfluous. For there are so many
+groundless pretensions to the enlargement of our knowledge by pure
+reason that we must take it as a general rule to be mistrustful of
+all such, and without a thoroughgoing and radical deduction, to believe
+nothing of the sort even on the clearest dogmatical evidence.
+
+Every addition to our empirical knowledge, and every advance made in
+the exercise of our perception, is nothing more than an extension of
+the determination of the internal sense, that is to say, a progression
+in time, be objects themselves what they may, phenomena, or pure
+intuitions. This progression in time determines everything, and is
+itself determined by nothing else. That is to say, the parts of the
+progression exist only in time, and by means of the synthesis thereof,
+and are not given antecedently to it. For this reason, every
+transition in perception to anything which follows upon another in
+time, is a determination of time by means of the production of this
+perception. And as this determination of time is, always and in all
+its parts, a quantity, the perception produced is to be considered
+as a quantity which proceeds through all its degrees--no one of
+which is the smallest possible--from zero up to its determined degree.
+From this we perceive the possibility of cognizing a priori a law of
+changes--a law, however, which concerns their form merely. We merely
+anticipate our own apprehension, the formal condition of which,
+inasmuch as it is itself to be found in the mind antecedently to all
+given phenomena, must certainly be capable of being cognized a priori.
+
+Thus, as time contains the sensuous condition a priori of the
+possibility of a continuous progression of that which exists to that
+which follows it, the understanding, by virtue of the unity of
+apperception, contains the condition a priori of the possibility of
+a continuous determination of the position in time of all phenomena,
+and this by means of the series of causes and effects, the former of
+which necessitate the sequence of the latter, and thereby render
+universally and for all time, and by consequence, objectively, valid
+the empirical cognition of the relations of time.
+
+
+
+C. THIRD ANALOGY.
+
+Principle of Coexistence, According to the Law of Reciprocity or Community.
+
+All substances, in so far as they can be perceived in space
+at the same time, exist in a state of complete reciprocity of action.
+
+
+PROOF.
+
+
+Things are coexistent, when in empirical intuition the perception of
+the one can follow upon the perception of the other, and vice versa--
+which cannot occur in the succession of phenomena, as we have shown
+in the explanation of the second principle. Thus I can perceive the
+moon and then the earth, or conversely, first the earth and then the
+moon; and for the reason that my perceptions of these objects can
+reciprocally follow each other, I say, they exist contemporaneously.
+Now coexistence is the existence of the manifold in the same time.
+But time itself is not an object of perception; and therefore we cannot
+conclude from the fact that things are placed in the same time, the
+other fact, that the perception of these things can follow each
+other reciprocally. The synthesis of the imagination in apprehension
+would only present to us each of these perceptions as present in the
+subject when the other is not present, and contrariwise; but would
+not show that the objects are coexistent, that is to say, that, if
+the one exists, the other also exists in the same time, and that this
+is necessarily so, in order that the perceptions may be capable of
+following each other reciprocally. It follows that a conception of
+the understanding or category of the reciprocal sequence of the
+determinations of phenomena (existing, as they do, apart from each
+other, and yet contemporaneously), is requisite to justify us in
+saying that the reciprocal succession of perceptions has its
+foundation in the object, and to enable us to represent coexistence
+as objective. But that relation of substances in which the one contains
+determinations the ground of which is in the other substance, is the
+relation of influence. And, when this influence is reciprocal, it is
+the relation of community or reciprocity. Consequently the coexistence
+of substances in space cannot be cognized in experience otherwise than
+under the precondition of their reciprocal action. This is therefore
+the condition of the possibility of things themselves as objects of
+experience.
+
+Things are coexistent, in so far as they exist in one and the same
+time. But how can we know that they exist in one and the same time?
+Only by observing that the order in the synthesis of apprehension of
+the manifold is arbitrary and a matter of indifference, that is to
+say, that it can proceed from A, through B, C, D, to E, or
+contrariwise from E to A. For if they were successive in time (and
+in the order, let us suppose, which begins with A), it is quite
+impossible for the apprehension in perception to begin with E and go
+backwards to A, inasmuch as A belongs to past time and, therefore,
+cannot be an object of apprehension.
+
+Let us assume that in a number of substances considered as phenomena
+each is completely isolated, that is, that no one acts upon another.
+Then I say that the coexistence of these cannot be an object of
+possible perception and that the existence of one cannot, by any
+mode of empirical synthesis, lead us to the existence of another.
+For we imagine them in this case to be separated by a completely
+void space, and thus perception, which proceeds from the one to the
+other in time, would indeed determine their existence by means of a
+following perception, but would be quite unable to distinguish whether
+the one phenomenon follows objectively upon the first, or is
+coexistent with it.
+
+Besides the mere fact of existence, then, there must be something by
+means of which A determines the position of B in time and, conversely,
+B the position of A; because only under this condition can
+substances be empirically represented as existing contemporaneously.
+Now that alone determines the position of another thing in time
+which is the cause of it or of its determinations. Consequently
+every substance (inasmuch as it can have succession predicated of it
+only in respect of its determinations) must contain the causality of
+certain determinations in another substance, and at the same time
+the effects of the causality of the other in itself. That is to say,
+substances must stand (mediately or immediately) in dynamical
+community with each other, if coexistence is to be cognized in any
+possible experience. But, in regard to objects of experience, that
+is absolutely necessary without which the experience of these
+objects would itself be impossible. Consequently it is absolutely
+necessary that all substances in the world of phenomena, in so far
+as they are coexistent, stand in a relation of complete community of
+reciprocal action to each other.
+
+The word community has in our language [Footnote: German] two meanings,
+and contains the two notions conveyed in the Latin communio and
+commercium. We employ it in this place in the latter sense--that of a
+dynamical community, without which even the community of place
+(communio spatii) could not be empirically cognized. In our experiences
+it is easy to observe that it is only the continuous influences in all
+parts of space that can conduct our senses from one object to another;
+that the light which plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies
+produces a mediating community between them and us, and thereby
+evidences their coexistence with us; that we cannot empirically change our
+position (perceive this change), unless the existence of matter throughout
+the whole of space rendered possible the perception of the positions
+we occupy; and that this perception can prove the contemporaneous
+existence of these places only through their reciprocal influence,
+and thereby also the coexistence of even the most remote objects--although
+in this case the proof is only mediate. Without community, every
+perception (of a phenomenon in space) is separated from every other
+and isolated, and the chain of empirical representations, that is,
+of experience, must, with the appearance of a new object, begin
+entirely de novo, without the least connection with preceding
+representations, and without standing towards these even in the
+relation of time. My intention here is by no means to combat the
+notion of empty space; for it may exist where our perceptions cannot
+exist, inasmuch as they cannot reach thereto, and where, therefore,
+no empirical perception of coexistence takes place. But in this case
+it is not an object of possible experience.
+
+The following remarks may be useful in the way of explanation. In
+the mind, all phenomena, as contents of a possible experience, must
+exist in community (communio) of apperception or consciousness, and
+in so far as it is requisite that objects be represented as coexistent
+and connected, in so far must they reciprocally determine the position
+in time of each other and thereby constitute a whole. If this
+subjective community is to rest upon an objective basis, or to be
+applied to substances as phenomena, the perception of one substance
+must render possible the perception of another, and conversely. For
+otherwise succession, which is always found in perceptions as
+apprehensions, would be predicated of external objects, and their
+representation of their coexistence be thus impossible. But this is
+a reciprocal influence, that is to say, a real community
+(commercium) of substances, without which therefore the empirical
+relation of coexistence would be a notion beyond the reach of our
+minds. By virtue of this commercium, phenomena, in so far as they
+are apart from, and nevertheless in connection with each other,
+constitute a compositum reale. Such composita are possible in many
+different ways. The three dynamical relations then, from which all
+others spring, are those of inherence, consequence, and composition.
+
+These, then, are the three analogies of experience. They are nothing
+more than principles of the determination of the existence of
+phenomena in time, according to the three modi of this
+determination; to wit, the relation to time itself as a quantity
+(the quantity of existence, that is, duration), the relation in time
+as a series or succession, finally, the relation in time as the
+complex of all existence (simultaneity). This unity of determination
+in regard to time is thoroughly dynamical; that is to say, time is
+not considered as that in which experience determines immediately to
+every existence its position; for this is impossible, inasmuch as absolute
+time is not an object of perception, by means of which phenomena can
+be connected with each other. On the contrary, the rule of the
+understanding, through which alone the existence of phenomena can
+receive synthetical unity as regards relations of time, determines
+for every phenomenon its position in time, and consequently a priori,
+and with validity for all and every time.
+
+By nature, in the empirical sense of the word, we understand the
+totality of phenomena connected, in respect of their existence,
+according to necessary rules, that is, laws. There are therefore
+certain laws (which are moreover a priori) which make nature possible;
+and all empirical laws can exist only by means of experience, and by
+virtue of those primitive laws through which experience itself becomes
+possible. The purpose of the analogies is therefore to represent to
+us the unity of nature in the connection of all phenomena under certain
+exponents, the only business of which is to express the relation of
+time (in so far as it contains all existence in itself) to the unity
+of apperception, which can exist in synthesis only according to rules.
+The combined expression of all is this: "All phenomena exist in one
+nature, and must so exist, inasmuch as without this a priori unity,
+no unity of experience, and consequently no determination of objects
+in experience, is possible."
+
+As regards the mode of proof which we have employed in treating of
+these transcendental laws of nature, and the peculiar character of
+we must make one remark, which will at the same time be important as
+a guide in every other attempt to demonstrate the truth of
+intellectual and likewise synthetical propositions a priori. Had we
+endeavoured to prove these analogies dogmatically, that is, from
+conceptions; that is to say, had we employed this method in attempting
+to show that everything which exists, exists only in that which is
+permanent--that every thing or event presupposes the existence of
+something in a preceding state, upon which it follows in conformity
+with a rule--lastly, that in the manifold, which is coexistent, the
+states coexist in connection with each other according to a rule,
+all our labour would have been utterly in vain. For more conceptions
+of things, analyse them as we may, cannot enable us to conclude from
+the existence of one object to the existence of another. What other
+course was left for us to pursue? This only, to demonstrate the
+possibility of experience as a cognition in which at last all
+objects must be capable of being presented to us, if the
+representation of them is to possess any objective reality. Now in
+this third, this mediating term, the essential form of which
+consists in the synthetical unity of the apperception of all
+phenomena, we found a priori conditions of the universal and necessary
+determination as to time of all existences in the world of
+phenomena, without which the empirical determination thereof as to
+time would itself be impossible, and we also discovered rules of
+synthetical unity a priori, by means of which we could anticipate
+experience. For want of this method, and from the fancy that it was
+possible to discover a dogmatical proof of the synthetical
+propositions which are requisite in the empirical employment of the
+understanding, has it happened that a proof of the principle of
+sufficient reason has been so often attempted, and always in vain.
+The other two analogies nobody has ever thought of, although they have
+always been silently employed by the mind,* because the guiding thread
+furnished by the categories was wanting, the guide which alone can
+enable us to discover every hiatus, both in the system of
+conceptions and of principles.
+
+[*Footnote: The unity of the universe, in which all phenomena to be
+connected, is evidently a mere consequence of the admitted principle
+of the community of all substances which are coexistent. For were
+substances isolated, they could not as parts constitute a whole, and
+were their connection (reciprocal action of the manifold) not
+necessary from the very fact of coexistence, we could not conclude
+from the fact of the latter as a merely ideal relation to the former
+as a real one. We have, however, shown in its place that community
+is the proper ground of the possibility of an empirical cognition of
+coexistence, and that we may therefore properly reason from the latter
+to the former as its condition.]
+
+
+
+4. THE POSTULATES OF EMPIRICAL THOUGHT.
+
+1. That which agrees with the formal conditions (intuition and
+conception) of experience, is possible.
+
+2. That which coheres with the material conditions of experience
+(sensation), is real.
+
+3. That whose coherence with the real is determined according to
+universal conditions of experience is (exists) necessary.
+
+
+Explanation.
+
+
+The categories of modality possess this peculiarity, that they do
+not in the least determine the object, or enlarge the conception to
+which they are annexed as predicates, but only express its relation
+to the faculty of cognition. Though my conception of a thing is in
+itself complete, I am still entitled to ask whether the object of it
+is merely possible, or whether it is also real, or, if the latter,
+whether it is also necessary. But hereby the object itself is not more
+definitely determined in thought, but the question is only in what
+relation it, including all its determinations, stands to the
+understanding and its employment in experience, to the empirical
+faculty of judgement, and to the reason of its application to
+experience.
+
+For this very reason, too, the categories of modality are nothing
+more than explanations of the conceptions of possibility, reality,
+and necessity, as employed in experience, and at the same time,
+restrictions of all the categories to empirical use alone, not
+authorizing the transcendental employment of them. For if they are
+to have something more than a merely logical significance, and to be
+something more than a mere analytical expression of the form of
+thought, and to have a relation to things and their possibility,
+reality, or necessity, they must concern possible experience and its
+synthetical unity, in which alone objects of cognition can be given.
+
+The postulate of the possibility of things requires also, that the
+conception of the things agree with the formal conditions of our
+experience in general. But this, that is to say, the objective form
+of experience, contains all the kinds of synthesis which are requisite
+for the cognition of objects. A conception which contains a
+synthesis must be regarded as empty and, without reference to an
+object, if its synthesis does not belong to experience--either as
+borrowed from it, and in this case it is called an empirical
+conception, or such as is the ground and a priori condition of
+experience (its form), and in this case it is a pure conception, a
+conception which nevertheless belongs to experience, inasmuch as its
+object can be found in this alone. For where shall we find the
+criterion or character of the possibility of an object which is
+cogitated by means of an a priori synthetical conception, if not in
+the synthesis which constitutes the form of empirical cognition of
+objects? That in such a conception no contradiction exists is indeed
+a necessary logical condition, but very far from being sufficient to
+establish the objective reality of the conception, that is, the
+possibility of such an object as is thought in the conception. Thus,
+in the conception of a figure which is contained within two straight
+lines, there is no contradiction, for the conceptions of two
+straight lines and of their junction contain no negation of a
+figure. The impossibility in such a case does not rest upon the
+conception in itself, but upon the construction of it in space, that
+is to say, upon the conditions of space and its determinations. But
+these have themselves objective reality, that is, they apply to
+possible things, because they contain a priori the form of
+experience in general.
+
+And now we shall proceed to point out the extensive utility and
+influence of this postulate of possibility. When I represent to myself
+a thing that is permanent, so that everything in it which changes
+belongs merely to its state or condition, from such a conception alone
+I never can cognize that such a thing is possible. Or, if I
+represent to myself something which is so constituted that, when it
+is posited, something else follows always and infallibly, my thought
+contains no self-contradiction; but whether such a property as
+causality is to be found in any possible thing, my thought alone
+affords no means of judging. Finally, I can represent to myself
+different things (substances) which are so constituted that the
+state or condition of one causes a change in the state of the other,
+and reciprocally; but whether such a relation is a property of
+things cannot be perceived from these conceptions, which contain a
+merely arbitrary synthesis. Only from the fact, therefore, that
+these conceptions express a priori the relations of perceptions in
+every experience, do we know that they possess objective reality, that
+is, transcendental truth; and that independent of experience, though
+not independent of all relation to form of an experience in general
+and its synthetical unity, in which alone objects can be empirically
+cognized.
+
+But when we fashion to ourselves new conceptions of substances,
+forces, action, and reaction, from the material presented to us by
+perception, without following the example of experience in their
+connection, we create mere chimeras, of the possibility of which we
+cannot discover any criterion, because we have not taken experience
+for our instructress, though we have borrowed the conceptions from
+her. Such fictitious conceptions derive their character of possibility
+not, like the categories, a priori, as conceptions on which all
+experience depends, but only, a posteriori, as conceptions given by
+means of experience itself, and their possibility must either be
+cognized a posteriori and empirically, or it cannot be cognized at
+all. A substance which is permanently present in space, yet without
+filling it (like that tertium quid between matter and the thinking
+subject which some have tried to introduce into metaphysics), or a
+peculiar fundamental power of the mind of intuiting the future by
+anticipation (instead of merely inferring from past and present
+events), or, finally, a power of the mind to place itself in community
+of thought with other men, however distant they may be--these are
+conceptions the possibility of which has no ground to rest upon. For
+they are not based upon experience and its known laws; and, without
+experience, they are a merely arbitrary conjunction of thoughts,
+which, though containing no internal contradiction, has no claim to
+objective reality, neither, consequently, to the possibility of such
+an object as is thought in these conceptions. As far as concerns
+reality, it is self-evident that we cannot cogitate such a possibility
+in concreto without the aid of experience; because reality is
+concerned only with sensation, as the matter of experience, and not
+with the form of thought, with which we can no doubt indulge in
+shaping fancies.
+
+But I pass by everything which derives its possibility from
+reality in experience, and I purpose treating here merely of the
+possibility of things by means of a priori conceptions. I maintain,
+then, that the possibility of things is not derived from such
+conceptions per se, but only when considered as formal and objective
+conditions of an experience in general.
+
+It seems, indeed, as if the possibility of a triangle could be
+cognized from the conception of it alone (which is certainly
+independent of experience); for we can certainly give to the
+conception a corresponding object completely a priori, that is to say,
+we can construct it. But as a triangle is only the form of an
+object, it must remain a mere product of the imagination, and the
+possibility of the existence of an object corresponding to it must
+remain doubtful, unless we can discover some other ground, unless we
+know that the figure can be cogitated under the conditions upon
+which all objects of experience rest. Now, the facts that space is
+a formal condition a priori of external experience, that the formative
+synthesis, by which we construct a triangle in imagination, is the
+very same as that we employ in the apprehension of a phenomenon for
+the purpose of making an empirical conception of it, are what alone
+connect the notion of the possibility of such a thing, with the
+conception of it. In the same manner, the possibility of continuous
+quantities, indeed of quantities in general, for the conceptions of
+them are without exception synthetical, is never evident from the
+conceptions in themselves, but only when they are considered as the
+formal conditions of the determination of objects in experience. And
+where, indeed, should we look for objects to correspond to our
+conceptions, if not in experience, by which alone objects are
+presented to us? It is, however, true that without antecedent
+experience we can cognize and characterize the possibility of
+things, relatively to the formal conditions, under which something
+is determined in experience as an object, consequently, completely
+a priori. But still this is possible only in relation to experience
+and within its limits.
+
+The postulate concerning the cognition of the reality of things
+requires perception, consequently conscious sensation, not indeed
+immediately, that is, of the object itself, whose existence is to be
+cognized, but still that the object have some connection with a real
+perception, in accordance with the analogies of experience, which
+exhibit all kinds of real connection in experience.
+
+From the mere conception of a thing it is impossible to conclude its
+existence. For, let the conception be ever so complete, and containing
+a statement of all the determinations of the thing, the existence of
+it has nothing to do with all this, but only with thew question
+whether such a thing is given, so that the perception of it can in
+every case precede the conception. For the fact that the conception
+of it precedes the perception, merely indicates the possibility of
+its existence; it is perception which presents matter to the conception,
+that is the sole criterion of reality. Prior to the perception of
+the thing, however, and therefore comparatively a priori, we are
+able to cognize its existence, provided it stands in connection with
+some perceptions according to the principles of the empirical
+conjunction of these, that is, in conformity with the analogies of
+perception. For, in this case, the existence of the supposed thing
+is connected with our perception in a possible experience, and we
+are able, with the guidance of these analogies, to reason in the
+series of possible perceptions from a thing which we do really
+perceive to the thing we do not perceive. Thus, we cognize the
+existence of a magnetic matter penetrating all bodies from the
+perception of the attraction of the steel-filings by the magnet,
+although the constitution of our organs renders an immediate
+perception of this matter impossible for us. For, according to the
+laws of sensibility and the connected context of our perceptions, we
+should in an experience come also on an immediate empirical
+intuition of this matter, if our senses were more acute--but this
+obtuseness has no influence upon and cannot alter the form of possible
+experience in general. Our knowledge of the existence of things
+reaches as far as our perceptions, and what may be inferred from
+them according to empirical laws, extend. If we do not set out from
+experience, or do not proceed according to the laws of the empirical
+connection of phenomena, our pretensions to discover the existence
+of a thing which we do not immediately perceive are vain. Idealism,
+however, brings forward powerful objections to these rules for proving
+existence mediately. This is, therefore, the proper place for its
+refutation.
+
+
+
+REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.
+
+Idealism--I mean material idealism--is the theory which declares the
+existence of objects in space without us to be either () doubtful
+and indemonstrable, or (2) false and impossible. The first is the
+problematical idealism of Descartes, who admits the undoubted
+certainty of only one empirical assertion (assertio), to wit, "I
+am." The second is the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley, who
+maintains that space, together with all the objects of which it is
+the inseparable condition, is a thing which is in itself impossible,
+and that consequently the objects in space are mere products of the
+imagination. The dogmatical theory of idealism is unavoidable, if we
+regard space as a property of things in themselves; for in that case
+it is, with all to which it serves as condition, a nonentity. But
+the foundation for this kind of idealism we have already destroyed
+in the transcendental aesthetic. Problematical idealism, which makes
+no such assertion, but only alleges our incapacity to prove the
+existence of anything besides ourselves by means of immediate
+experience, is a theory rational and evidencing a thorough and
+philosophical mode of thinking, for it observes the rule not to form
+a decisive judgement before sufficient proof be shown. The desired
+proof must therefore demonstrate that we have experience of external
+things, and not mere fancies. For this purpose, we must prove, that
+our internal and, to Descartes, indubitable experience is itself
+possible only under the previous assumption of external experience.
+
+
+
+THEOREM.
+
+The simple but empirically determined consciousness of
+my own existence proves the existence of external objects in space.
+
+
+PROOF
+
+
+I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All
+determination in regard to time presupposes the existence of something
+permanent in perception. But this permanent something cannot be
+something in me, for the very reason that my existence in time is
+itself determined by this permanent something. It follows that the
+perception of this permanent existence is possible only through a
+thing without me and not through the mere representation of a thing
+without me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time
+is possible only through the existence of real things external to me.
+Now, consciousness in time is necessarily connected with the
+consciousness of the possibility of this determination in time.
+Hence it follows that consciousness in time is necessarily connected
+also with the existence of things without me, inasmuch as the
+existence of these things is the condition of determination in time.
+That is to say, the consciousness of my own existence is at the same
+time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things
+without me.
+
+Remark I. The reader will observe, that in the foregoing proof the
+game which idealism plays is retorted upon itself, and with more
+justice. It assumed that the only immediate experience is internal
+and that from this we can only infer the existence of external things.
+But, as always happens, when we reason from given effects to
+determined causes, idealism has reasoned with too much haste and
+uncertainty, for it is quite possible that the cause of our
+representations may lie in ourselves, and that we ascribe it falsely
+to external things. But our proof shows that external experience is
+properly immediate,* that only by virtue of it--not, indeed, the
+consciousness of our own existence, but certainly the determination
+of our existence in time, that is, internal experience--is possible.
+It is true, that the representation "I am," which is the expression
+of the consciousness which can accompany all my thoughts, is that which
+immediately includes the existence of a subject. But in this
+representation we cannot find any knowledge of the subject, and
+therefore also no empirical knowledge, that is, experience. For
+experience contains, in addition to the thought of something existing,
+intuition, and in this case it must be internal intuition, that is,
+time, in relation to which the subject must be determined. But the
+existence of external things is absolutely requisite for this purpose,
+so that it follows that internal experience is itself possible only
+mediately and through external experience.
+
+[*Footnote: The immediate consciousness of the existence of external
+things is, in the preceding theorem, not presupposed, but proved, by
+the possibility of this consciousness understood by us or not. The
+question as to the possibility of it would stand thus: "Have we an
+internal sense, but no external sense, and is our belief in external
+perception a mere delusion?" But it is evident that, in order merely
+to fancy to ourselves anything as external, that is, to present it
+to the sense in intuition we must already possess an external sense,
+and must thereby distinguish immediately the mere receptivity of an
+external intuition from the spontaneity which characterizes every
+act of imagination. For merely to imagine also an external sense,
+would annihilate the faculty of intuition itself which is to be
+determined by the imagination.]
+
+Remark II. Now with this view all empirical use of our faculty of
+cognition in the determination of time is in perfect accordance. Its
+truth is supported by the fact that it is possible to perceive a
+determination of time only by means of a change in external
+relations (motion) to the permanent in space (for example, we become
+aware of the sun's motion by observing the changes of his relation
+to the objects of this earth). But this is not all. We find that we
+possess nothing permanent that can correspond and be submitted to
+the conception of a substance as intuition, except matter. This idea
+of permanence is not itself derived from external experience, but is
+an a priori necessary condition of all determination of time,
+consequently also of the internal sense in reference to our own
+existence, and that through the existence of external things. In the
+representation "I," the consciousness of myself is not an intuition,
+but a merely intellectual representation produced by the spontaneous
+activity of a thinking subject. It follows, that this "I" has not
+any predicate of intuition, which, in its character of permanence,
+could serve as correlate to the determination of time in the
+internal sense--in the same way as impenetrability is the correlate
+of matter as an empirical intuition.
+
+Remark III. From the fact that the existence of external things is
+a necessary condition of the possibility of a determined consciousness
+of ourselves, it does not follow that every intuitive representation
+of external things involves the existence of these things, for their
+representations may very well be the mere products of the
+imagination (in dreams as well as in madness); though, indeed, these
+are themselves created by the reproduction of previous external
+perceptions, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the
+reality of external objects. The sole aim of our remarks has, however,
+been to prove that internal experience in general is possible only
+through external experience in general. Whether this or that
+supposed experience be purely imaginary must be discovered from its
+particular determinations and by comparing these with the criteria
+of all real experience.
+
+Finally, as regards the third postulate, it applies to material
+necessity in existence, and not to merely formal and logical necessity
+in the connection of conceptions. Now as we cannot cognize completely a
+priori the existence of any object of sense, though we can do so
+comparatively a priori, that is, relatively to some other previously
+given existence--a cognition, however, which can only be of such an
+existence as must be contained in the complex of experience, of which
+the previously given perception is a part--the necessity of existence
+can never be cognized from conceptions, but always, on the contrary,
+from its connection with that which is an object of perception. But the
+only existence cognized, under the condition of other given phenomena,
+as necessary, is the existence of effects from given causes in
+conformity with the laws of causality. It is consequently not the
+necessity of the existence of things (as substances), but the necessity
+of the state of things that we cognize, and that not immediately, but
+by means of the existence of other states given in perception,
+according to empirical laws of causality. Hence it follows that the
+criterion of necessity is to be found only in the law of possible
+experience--that everything which happens is determined a priori in the
+phenomenon by its cause. Thus we cognize only the necessity of effects
+in nature, the causes of which are given us. Moreover, the criterion of
+necessity in existence possesses no application beyond the field of
+possible experience, and even in this it is not valid of the existence
+of things as substances, because these can never be considered as
+empirical effects, or as something that happens and has a beginning.
+Necessity, therefore, regards only the relations of phenomena according
+to the dynamical law of causality, and the possibility grounded
+thereon, of reasoning from some given existence (of a cause) a priori
+to another existence (of an effect). "Everything that happens is
+hypothetically necessary," is a principle which subjects the changes
+that take place in the world to a law, that is, to a rule of necessary
+existence, without which nature herself could not possibly exist. Hence
+the proposition, "Nothing happens by blind chance (in mundo non datur
+casus)," is an a priori law of nature. The case is the same with the
+proposition, "Necessity in nature is not blind," that is, it is
+conditioned, consequently intelligible necessity (non datur fatum).
+Both laws subject the play of change to "a nature of things (as
+phenomena)," or, which is the same thing, to the unity of the
+understanding, and through the understanding alone can changes belong
+to an experience, as the synthetical unity of phenomena. Both belong to
+the class of dynamical principles. The former is properly a consequence
+of the principle of causality--one of the analogies of experience. The
+latter belongs to the principles of modality, which to the
+determination of causality adds the conception of necessity, which is
+itself, however, subject to a rule of the understanding. The principle
+of continuity forbids any leap in the series of phenomena regarded as
+changes (in mundo non datur saltus); and likewise, in the complex of
+all empirical intuitions in space, any break or hiatus between two
+phenomena (non datur hiatus)--for we can so express the principle, that
+experience can admit nothing which proves the existence of a vacuum, or
+which even admits it as a part of an empirical synthesis. For, as
+regards a vacuum or void, which we may cogitate as out and beyond the
+field of possible experience (the world), such a question cannot come
+before the tribunal of mere understanding, which decides only upon
+questions that concern the employment of given phenomena for the
+construction of empirical cognition. It is rather a problem for ideal
+reason, which passes beyond the sphere of a possible experience and
+aims at forming a judgement of that which surrounds and circumscribes
+it, and the proper place for the consideration of it is the
+transcendental dialectic. These four propositions, "In mundo non datur
+hiatus, non datur saltus, non datur casus, non datur fatum," as well as
+all principles of transcendental origin, we could very easily exhibit
+in their proper order, that is, in conformity with the order of the
+categories, and assign to each its proper place. But the already
+practised reader will do this for himself, or discover the clue to such
+an arrangement. But the combined result of all is simply this, to admit
+into the empirical synthesis nothing which might cause a break in or be
+foreign to the understanding and the continuous connection of all
+phenomena, that is, the unity of the conceptions of the understanding.
+For in the understanding alone is the unity of experience, in which all
+perceptions must have their assigned place, possible.
+
+Whether the field of possibility be greater than that of reality, and
+whether the field of the latter be itself greater than that of
+necessity, are interesting enough questions, and quite capable of
+synthetic solution, questions, however, which come under the
+jurisdiction of reason alone. For they are tantamount to asking whether
+all things as phenomena do without exception belong to the complex and
+connected whole of a single experience, of which every given perception
+is a part which therefore cannot be conjoined with any other
+phenomena--or, whether my perceptions can belong to more than one
+possible experience? The understanding gives to experience, according
+to the subjective and formal conditions, of sensibility as well as of
+apperception, the rules which alone make this experience possible.
+Other forms of intuition besides those of space and time, other forms
+of understanding besides the discursive forms of thought, or of
+cognition by means of conceptions, we can neither imagine nor make
+intelligible to ourselves; and even if we could, they would still not
+belong to experience, which is the only mode of cognition by which
+objects are presented to us. Whether other perceptions besides those
+which belong to the total of our possible experience, and consequently
+whether some other sphere of matter exists, the understanding has no
+power to decide, its proper occupation being with the synthesis of that
+which is given. Moreover, the poverty of the usual arguments which go
+to prove the existence of a vast sphere of possibility, of which all
+that is real (every object of experience) is but a small part, is very
+remarkable. "All real is possible"; from this follows naturally,
+according to the logical laws of conversion, the particular
+proposition: "Some possible is real." Now this seems to be equivalent
+to: "Much is possible that is not real." No doubt it does seem as if we
+ought to consider the sum of the possible to be greater than that of
+the real, from the fact that something must be added to the former to
+constitute the latter. But this notion of adding to the possible is
+absurd. For that which is not in the sum of the possible, and
+consequently requires to be added to it, is manifestly impossible. In
+addition to accordance with the formal conditions of experience, the
+understanding requires a connection with some perception; but that
+which is connected with this perception is real, even although it is
+not immediately perceived. But that another series of phenomena, in
+complete coherence with that which is given in perception, consequently
+more than one all-embracing experience is possible, is an inference
+which cannot be concluded from the data given us by experience, and
+still less without any data at all. That which is possible only under
+conditions which are themselves merely possible, is not possible in any
+respect. And yet we can find no more certain ground on which to base
+the discussion of the question whether the sphere of possibility is
+wider than that of experience.
+
+I have merely mentioned these questions, that in treating of the
+conception of the understanding, there might be no omission of
+anything that, in the common opinion, belongs to them. In reality,
+however, the notion of absolute possibility (possibility which is
+valid in every respect) is not a mere conception of the understanding,
+which can be employed empirically, but belongs to reason alone,
+which passes the bounds of all empirical use of the understanding.
+We have, therefore, contented ourselves with a merely critical remark,
+leaving the subject to be explained in the sequel.
+
+Before concluding this fourth section, and at the same time the system
+of all principles of the pure understanding, it seems proper to mention
+the reasons which induced me to term the principles of modality
+postulates. This expression I do not here use in the sense which some
+more recent philosophers, contrary to its meaning with mathematicians,
+to whom the word properly belongs, attach to it--that of a
+proposition, namely, immediately certain, requiring neither deduction
+nor proof. For if, in the case of synthetical propositions, however
+evident they may be, we accord to them without deduction, and merely on
+the strength of their own pretensions, unqualified belief, all critique
+of the understanding is entirely lost; and, as there is no want of bold
+pretensions, which the common belief (though for the philosopher this
+is no credential) does not reject, the understanding lies exposed to
+every delusion and conceit, without the power of refusing its assent to
+those assertions, which, though illegitimate, demand acceptance as
+veritable axioms. When, therefore, to the conception of a thing an a
+priori determination is synthetically added, such a proposition must
+obtain, if not a proof, at least a deduction of the legitimacy of its
+assertion.
+
+The principles of modality are, however, not objectively
+synthetical, for the predicates of possibility, reality, and necessity
+do not in the least augment the conception of that of which they are
+affirmed, inasmuch as they contribute nothing to the representation
+of the object. But as they are, nevertheless, always synthetical, they
+are so merely subjectively. That is to say, they have a reflective
+power, and apply to the conception of a thing, of which, in other
+respects, they affirm nothing, the faculty of cognition in which the
+conception originates and has its seat. So that if the conception
+merely agree with the formal conditions of experience, its object is
+called possible; if it is in connection with perception, and
+determined thereby, the object is real; if it is determined
+according to conceptions by means of the connection of perceptions,
+the object is called necessary. The principles of modality therefore
+predicate of a conception nothing more than the procedure of the
+faculty of cognition which generated it. Now a postulate in
+mathematics is a practical proposition which contains nothing but
+the synthesis by which we present an object to ourselves, and
+produce the conception of it, for example--"With a given line, to
+describe a circle upon a plane, from a given point"; and such a
+proposition does not admit of proof, because the procedure, which it
+requires, is exactly that by which alone it is possible to generate
+the conception of such a figure. With the same right, accordingly,
+can we postulate the principles of modality, because they do not
+augment* the conception of a thing but merely indicate the manner in
+which it is connected with the faculty of cognition.
+
+[*Footnote: When I think the reality of a thing, I do really think
+more than the possibility, but not in the thing; for that can never
+contain more in reality than was contained in its complete possibility.
+But while the notion of possibility is merely the notion of a position
+of thing in relation to the understanding (its empirical use), reality
+is the conjunction of the thing with perception.]
+
+
+
+GENERAL REMARK ON THE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES.
+
+It is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a
+thing from the category alone, but must always have an intuition, by
+which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception
+of the understanding. Take, for example, the categories of relation.
+How (1) a thing can exist only as a subject, and not as a mere
+determination of other things, that is, can be substance; or how
+(2), because something exists, some other thing must exist,
+consequently how a thing can be a cause; or how (3), when several
+things exist, from the fact that one of these things exists, some
+consequence to the others follows, and reciprocally, and in this way
+a community of substances can be possible--are questions whose
+solution cannot be obtained from mere conceptions. The very same is
+the case with the other categories; for example, how a thing can be
+of the same sort with many others, that is, can be a quantity, and
+so on. So long as we have not intuition we cannot know whether we do
+really think an object by the categories, and where an object can anywhere
+be found to cohere with them, and thus the truth is established, that
+the categories are not in themselves cognitions, but mere forms of
+thought for the construction of cognitions from given intuitions. For
+the same reason is it true that from categories alone no synthetical
+proposition can be made. For example: "In every existence there is
+substance," that is, something that can exist only as a subject and
+not as mere predicate; or, "Everything is a quantity"--to construct
+propositions such as these, we require something to enable us to go
+out beyond the given conception and connect another with it. For the
+same reason the attempt to prove a synthetical proposition by means
+of mere conceptions, for example: "Everything that exists contingently
+has a cause," has never succeeded. We could never get further than
+proving that, without this relation to conceptions, we could not
+conceive the existence of the contingent, that is, could not a
+priori through the understanding cognize the existence of such a
+thing; but it does not hence follow that this is also the condition
+of the possibility of the thing itself that is said to be contingent.
+If, accordingly; we look back to our proof of the principle of
+causality, we shall find that we were able to prove it as valid only
+of objects of possible experience, and, indeed, only as itself the
+principle of the possibility of experience, Consequently of the
+cognition of an object given in empirical intuition, and not from mere
+conceptions. That, however, the proposition: "Everything that is
+contingent must have a cause," is evident to every one merely from
+conceptions, is not to be denied. But in this case the conception of
+the contingent is cogitated as involving not the category of
+modality (as that the non-existence of which can be conceived) but
+that of relation (as that which can exist only as the consequence of
+something else), and so it is really an identical proposition: "That
+which can exist only as a consequence, has a cause." In fact, when
+we have to give examples of contingent existence, we always refer to
+changes, and not merely to the possibility of conceiving the
+opposite.* But change is an event, which, as such, is possible only
+through a cause, and considered per se its non-existence is
+therefore possible, and we become cognizant of its contingency from
+the fact that it can exist only as the effect of a cause. Hence, if
+a thing is assumed to be contingent, it is an analytical proposition
+to say, it has a cause.
+
+[*Footnote: We can easily conceive the non-existence of matter; but
+the ancients did not thence infer its contingency. But even the
+alternation of the existence and non-existence of a given state in
+a thing, in which all change consists, by no means proves the
+contingency of that state--the ground of proof being the reality of
+its opposite. For example, a body is in a state of rest after
+motion, but we cannot infer the contingency of the motion from the
+fact that the former is the opposite of the latter. For this
+opposite is merely a logical and not a real opposite to the other.
+If we wish to demonstrate the contingency of the motion, what we ought
+to prove is that, instead of the motion which took place in the
+preceding point of time, it was possible for the body to have been
+then in rest, not, that it is afterwards in rest; for in this case,
+both opposites are perfectly consistent with each other.]
+
+But it is still more remarkable that, to understand the possibility of
+things according to the categories and thus to demonstrate the
+objective reality of the latter, we require not merely intuitions, but
+external intuitions. If, for example, we take the pure conceptions of
+relation, we find that (1) for the purpose of presenting to the
+conception of substance something permanent in intuition corresponding
+thereto and thus of demonstrating the objective reality of this
+conception, we require an intuition (of matter) in space, because space
+alone is permanent and determines things as such, while time, and with
+it all that is in the internal sense, is in a state of continual flow;
+(2) in order to represent change as the intuition corresponding to the
+conception of causality, we require the representation of motion as
+change in space; in fact, it is through it alone that changes, the
+possibility of which no pure understanding can perceive, are capable of
+being intuited. Change is the connection of determinations
+contradictorily opposed to each other in the existence of one and the
+same thing. Now, how it is possible that out of a given state one quite
+opposite to it in the same thing should follow, reason without an
+example can not only not conceive, but cannot even make intelligible
+without intuition; and this intuition is the motion of a point in
+space; the existence of which in different spaces (as a consequence of
+opposite determinations) alone makes the intuition of change possible.
+For, in order to make even internal change cognitable, we require to
+represent time, as the form of the internal sense, figuratively by a
+line, and the internal change by the drawing of that line (motion), and
+consequently are obliged to employ external intuition to be able to
+represent the successive existence of ourselves in different states.
+The proper ground of this fact is that all change to be perceived as
+change presupposes something permanent in intuition, while in the
+internal sense no permanent intuition is to be found. Lastly, the
+objective possibility of the category of community cannot be conceived
+by mere reason, and consequently its objective reality cannot be
+demonstrated without an intuition, and that external in space. For how
+can we conceive the possibility of community, that is, when several
+substances exist, that some effect on the existence of the one follows
+from the existence of the other, and reciprocally, and therefore that,
+because something exists in the latter, something else must exist in
+the former, which could not be understood from its own existence alone?
+For this is the very essence of community--which is inconceivable as a
+property of things which are perfectly isolated. Hence, Leibnitz, in
+attributing to the substances of the world--as cogitated by the
+understanding alone--a community, required the mediating aid of a
+divinity; for, from their existence, such a property seemed to him with
+justice inconceivable. But we can very easily conceive the possibility
+of community (of substances as phenomena) if we represent them to
+ourselves as in space, consequently in external intuition. For external
+intuition contains in itself a priori formal external relations, as the
+conditions of the possibility of the real relations of action and
+reaction, and therefore of the possibility of community. With the same
+ease can it be demonstrated, that the possibility of things as
+quantities, and consequently the objective reality of the category of
+quantity, can be grounded only in external intuition, and that by its
+means alone is the notion of quantity appropriated by the internal
+sense. But I must avoid prolixity, and leave the task of illustrating
+this by examples to the reader's own reflection.
+
+The above remarks are of the greatest importance, not only for the
+confirmation of our previous confutation of idealism, but still more
+when the subject of self-cognition by mere internal consciousness
+and the determination of our own nature without the aid of external
+empirical intuitions is under discussion, for the indication of the
+grounds of the possibility of such a cognition.
+
+The result of the whole of this part of the analytic of principles
+is, therefore: "All principles of the pure understanding are nothing
+more than a priori principles of the possibility of experience, and
+to experience alone do all a priori synthetical propositions apply
+and relate"; indeed, their possibility itself rests entirely on this
+relation.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III Of the Ground of the Division of all Objects into Phenomena
+ and Noumena.
+
+We have now not only traversed the region of the pure
+understanding and carefully surveyed every part of it, but we have
+also measured it, and assigned to everything therein its proper place.
+But this land is an island, and enclosed by nature herself within
+unchangeable limits. It is the land of truth (an attractive word),
+surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the region of illusion, where
+many a fog-bank, many an iceberg, seems to the mariner, on his
+voyage of discovery, a new country, and, while constantly deluding
+him with vain hopes, engages him in dangerous adventures, from which
+he never can desist, and which yet he never can bring to a termination.
+But before venturing upon this sea, in order to explore it in its
+whole extent, and to arrive at a certainty whether anything is to be
+discovered there, it will not be without advantage if we cast our eyes
+upon the chart of the land that we are about to leave, and to ask
+ourselves, firstly, whether we cannot rest perfectly contented with
+what it contains, or whether we must not of necessity be contented
+with it, if we can find nowhere else a solid foundation to build upon;
+and, secondly, by what title we possess this land itself, and how we
+hold it secure against all hostile claims? Although, in the course
+of our analytic, we have already given sufficient answers to these
+questions, yet a summary recapitulation of these solutions may be
+useful in strengthening our conviction, by uniting in one point the
+momenta of the arguments.
+
+We have seen that everything which the understanding draws from
+itself, without borrowing from experience, it nevertheless possesses
+only for the behoof and use of experience. The principles of the
+pure understanding, whether constitutive a priori (as the mathematical
+principles), or merely regulative (as the dynamical), contain
+nothing but the pure schema, as it were, of possible experience. For
+experience possesses its unity from the synthetical unity which the
+understanding, originally and from itself, imparts to the synthesis
+of the imagination in relation to apperception, and in a priori
+relation to and agreement with which phenomena, as data for a possible
+cognition, must stand. But although these rules of the understanding
+are not only a priori true, but the very source of all truth, that
+is, of the accordance of our cognition with objects, and on this ground,
+that they contain the basis of the possibility of experience, as the
+ensemble of all cognition, it seems to us not enough to propound
+what is true--we desire also to be told what we want to know. If,
+then, we learn nothing more by this critical examination than what
+we should have practised in the merely empirical use of the
+understanding, without any such subtle inquiry, the presumption is
+that the advantage we reap from it is not worth the labour bestowed
+upon it. It may certainly be answered that no rash curiosity is more
+prejudicial to the enlargement of our knowledge than that which must
+know beforehand the utility of this or that piece of information which
+we seek, before we have entered on the needful investigations, and
+before one could form the least conception of its utility, even though
+it were placed before our eyes. But there is one advantage in such
+transcendental inquiries which can be made comprehensible to the
+dullest and most reluctant learner--this, namely, that the
+understanding which is occupied merely with empirical exercise, and
+does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may exercise
+its functions very well and very successfully, but is quite unable
+to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to determine, namely,
+the bounds that limit its employment, and to know what lies within
+or without its own sphere. This purpose can be obtained only by such
+profound investigations as we have instituted. But if it cannot
+distinguish whether certain questions lie within its horizon or not,
+it can never be sure either as to its claims or possessions, but
+must lay its account with many humiliating corrections, when it
+transgresses, as it unavoidably will, the limits of its own territory,
+and loses itself in fanciful opinions and blinding illusions.
+
+That the understanding, therefore, cannot make of its a priori
+principles, or even of its conceptions, other than an empirical use,
+is a proposition which leads to the most important results. A
+transcendental use is made of a conception in a fundamental
+proposition or principle, when it is referred to things in general
+and considered as things in themselves; an empirical use, when it is
+referred merely to phenomena, that is, to objects of a possible
+experience. That the latter use of a conception is the only admissible
+one is evident from the reasons following. For every conception are
+requisite, firstly, the logical form of a conception (of thought)
+general; and, secondly, the possibility of presenting to this an
+object to which it may apply. Failing this latter, it has no sense,
+and utterly void of content, although it may contain the logical
+function for constructing a conception from certain data. Now,
+object cannot be given to a conception otherwise than by intuition,
+and, even if a pure intuition antecedent to the object is a priori
+possible, this pure intuition can itself obtain objective validity
+only from empirical intuition, of which it is itself but the form.
+All conceptions, therefore, and with them all principles, however high
+the degree of their a priori possibility, relate to empirical
+intuitions, that is, to data towards a possible experience. Without
+this they possess no objective validity, but are mere play of
+imagination or of understanding with images or notions. Let us take,
+for example, the conceptions of mathematics, and first in its pure
+intuitions. "Space has three dimensions"--"Between two points there
+can be only one straight line," etc. Although all these principles,
+and the representation of the object with which this science
+occupies itself, are generated in the mind entirely a priori, they
+would nevertheless have no significance if we were not always able
+to exhibit their significance in and by means of phenomena
+(empirical objects). Hence it is requisite that an abstract conception
+be made sensuous, that is, that an object corresponding to it in
+intuition be forthcoming, otherwise the conception remains, as we say,
+without sense, that is, without meaning. Mathematics fulfils this
+requirement by the construction of the figure, which is a phenomenon
+evident to the senses. The same science finds support and significance
+in number; this in its turn finds it in the fingers, or in counters,
+or in lines and points. The conception itself is always produced a
+priori, together with the synthetical principles or formulas from such
+conceptions; but the proper employment of them, and their
+application to objects, can exist nowhere but in experience, the
+possibility of which, as regards its form, they contain a priori.
+
+That this is also the case with all of the categories and the
+principles based upon them is evident from the fact that we cannot
+render intelligible the possibility of an object corresponding to them
+without having recourse to the conditions of sensibility,
+consequently, to the form of phenomena, to which, as their only proper
+objects, their use must therefore be confined, inasmuch as, if this
+condition is removed, all significance, that is, all relation to an
+object, disappears, and no example can be found to make it
+comprehensible what sort of things we ought to think under such
+conceptions.
+
+The conception of quantity cannot be explained except by saying that
+it is the determination of a thing whereby it can be cogitated how
+many times one is placed in it. But this "how many times" is based
+upon successive repetition, consequently upon time and the synthesis
+of the homogeneous therein. Reality, in contradistinction to negation,
+can be explained only by cogitating a time which is either filled
+therewith or is void. If I leave out the notion of permanence (which
+is existence in all time), there remains in the conception of
+substance nothing but the logical notion of subject, a notion of which
+I endeavour to realize by representing to myself something that can
+exist only as a subject. But not only am I perfectly ignorant of any
+conditions under which this logical prerogative can belong to a thing,
+I can make nothing out of the notion, and draw no inference from it,
+because no object to which to apply the conception is determined,
+and we consequently do not know whether it has any meaning at all.
+In like manner, if I leave out the notion of time, in which
+something follows upon some other thing in conformity with a rule,
+I can find nothing in the pure category, except that there is a
+something of such a sort that from it a conclusion may be drawn as
+to the existence of some other thing. But in this case it would not
+only be impossible to distinguish between a cause and an effect,
+but, as this power to draw conclusions requires conditions of which
+I am quite ignorant, the conception is not determined as to the mode
+in which it ought to apply to an object. The so-called principle:
+"Everything that is contingent has a cause," comes with a gravity
+and self-assumed authority that seems to require no support from
+without. But, I ask, what is meant by contingent? The answer is that
+the non-existence of which is possible. But I should like very well
+to know by what means this possibility of non-existence is to be
+cognized, if we do not represent to ourselves a succession in the
+series of phenomena, and in this succession an existence which follows
+a non-existence, or conversely, consequently, change. For to say, that
+the non-existence of a thing is not self-contradictory is a lame
+appeal to a logical condition, which is no doubt a necessary condition
+of the existence of the conception, but is far from being sufficient
+for the real objective possibility of non-existence. I can
+annihilate in thought every existing substance without
+self-contradiction, but I cannot infer from this their objective
+contingency in existence, that is to say, the possibility of their
+non-existence in itself. As regards the category of community, it
+may easily be inferred that, as the pure categories of substance and
+causality are incapable of a definition and explanation sufficient
+to determine their object without the aid of intuition, the category
+of reciprocal causality in the relation of substances to each other
+(commercium) is just as little susceptible thereof. Possibility,
+existence, and necessity nobody has ever yet been able to explain
+without being guilty of manifest tautology, when the definition has
+been drawn entirely from the pure understanding. For the
+substitution of the logical possibility of the conception--the
+condition of which is that it be not self-contradictory, for the
+transcendental possibility of things--the condition of which is that
+there be an object corresponding to the conception, is a trick which
+can only deceive the inexperienced.*
+
+[*Footnote: In one word, to none of these conceptions belongs a
+corresponding object, and consequently their real possibility cannot
+be demonstrated, if we take away sensuous intuition--the only intuition
+which we possess--and there then remains nothing but the logical
+possibility, that is, the fact that the conception or thought is
+possible--which, however, is not the question; what we want to know
+being, whether it relates to an object and thus possesses any meaning.]
+
+It follows incontestably, that the pure conceptions of the
+understanding are incapable of transcendental, and must always be of
+empirical use alone, and that the principles of the pure understanding
+relate only to the general conditions of a possible experience, to
+objects of the senses, and never to things in general, apart from
+the mode in which we intuite them.
+
+Transcendental analytic has accordingly this important result, to
+wit, that the understanding is competent' effect nothing a priori,
+except the anticipation of the form of a possible experience in
+general, and that, as that which is not phenomenon cannot be an object
+of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within
+which alone objects are presented to us. Its principles are merely
+principles of the exposition of phenomena, and the proud name of an
+ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions a priori
+of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to
+the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding.
+
+Thought is the act of referring a given intuition to an object. If
+the mode of this intuition is unknown to us, the object is merely
+transcendental, and the conception of the understanding is employed
+only transcendentally, that is, to produce unity in the thought of
+a manifold in general. Now a pure category, in which all conditions
+of sensuous intuition--as the only intuition we possess--are
+abstracted, does not determine an object, but merely expresses the
+thought of an object in general, according to different modes. Now,
+to employ a conception, the function of judgement is required, by which
+an object is subsumed under the conception, consequently the at
+least formal condition, under which something can be given in
+intuition. Failing this condition of judgement (schema), subsumption
+is impossible; for there is in such a case nothing given, which may
+be subsumed under the conception. The merely transcendental use of
+the categories is therefore, in fact, no use at all and has no determined,
+or even, as regards its form, determinable object. Hence it follows
+that the pure category is incompetent to establish a synthetical a
+priori principle, and that the principles of the pure understanding
+are only of empirical and never of transcendental use, and that beyond
+the sphere of possible experience no synthetical a priori principles
+are possible.
+
+It may be advisable, therefore, to express ourselves thus. The
+pure categories, apart from the formal conditions of sensibility, have
+a merely transcendental meaning, but are nevertheless not of
+transcendental use, because this is in itself impossible, inasmuch
+as all the conditions of any employment or use of them (in judgements)
+are absent, to wit, the formal conditions of the subsumption of an
+object under these conceptions. As, therefore, in the character of
+pure categories, they must be employed empirically, and cannot be
+employed transcendentally, they are of no use at all, when separated
+from sensibility, that is, they cannot be applied to an object. They
+are merely the pure form of the employment of the understanding in
+respect of objects in general and of thought, without its being at
+the same time possible to think or to determine any object by their
+means. But there lurks at the foundation of this subject an illusion
+which it is very difficult to avoid. The categories are not based,
+as regards their origin, upon sensibility, like the forms of
+intuition, space, and time; they seem, therefore, to be capable of
+an application beyond the sphere of sensuous objects. But this is
+not the case. They are nothing but mere forms of thought, which
+contain only the logical faculty of uniting a priori in
+consciousness the manifold given in intuition. Apart, then, from the
+only intuition possible for us, they have still less meaning than
+the pure sensuous forms, space and time, for through them an object
+is at least given, while a mode of connection of the manifold, when
+the intuition which alone gives the manifold is wanting, has no meaning
+at all. At the same time, when we designate certain objects as
+phenomena or sensuous existences, thus distinguishing our mode of
+intuiting them from their own nature as things in themselves, it is
+evident that by this very distinction we as it were place the
+latter, considered in this their own nature, although we do not so
+intuite them, in opposition to the former, or, on the other hand, we
+do so place other possible things, which are not objects of our
+senses, but are cogitated by the understanding alone, and call them
+intelligible existences (noumena). Now the question arises whether
+the pure conceptions of our understanding do possess significance in
+respect of these latter, and may possibly be a mode of cognizing them.
+
+But we are met at the very commencement with an ambiguity, which may
+easily occasion great misapprehension. The understanding, when it
+terms an object in a certain relation phenomenon, at the same time
+forms out of this relation a representation or notion of an object
+in itself, and hence believes that it can form also conceptions of
+such objects. Now as the understanding possesses no other
+fundamental conceptions besides the categories, it takes for granted
+that an object considered as a thing in itself must be capable of
+being thought by means of these pure conceptions, and is thereby led
+to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intelligible
+existence, a something out of the sphere of our sensibility, for a
+determinate conception of an existence which we can cognize in some
+way or other by means of the understanding.
+
+If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is
+not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making abstraction of
+our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense
+of the word. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous
+intuition, we in this case assume a peculiar mode of intuition, an
+intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to
+us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion--and this is
+a noumenon in the positive sense.
+
+The doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena in the
+negative sense, that is, of things which the understanding is
+obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of
+intuition, consequently not as mere phenomena, but as things in
+themselves. But the understanding at the same time comprehends that
+it cannot employ its categories for the consideration of things in
+themselves, because these possess significance only in relation to
+the unity of intuitions in space and time, and that they are competent
+to determine this unity by means of general a priori connecting
+conceptions only on account of the pure ideality of space and time.
+Where this unity of time is not to be met with, as is the case with
+noumena, the whole use, indeed the whole meaning of the categories
+is entirely lost, for even the possibility of things to correspond
+to the categories is in this case incomprehensible. On this point,
+I need only refer the reader to what I have said at the commencement
+of the General Remark appended to the foregoing chapter. Now, the
+possibility of a thing can never be proved from the fact that the
+conception of it is not self-contradictory, but only by means of an
+intuition corresponding to the conception. If, therefore, we wish to
+apply the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as phenomena,
+we must have an intuition different from the sensuous, and in this
+case the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense of the word.
+Now, as such an intuition, that is, an intellectual intuition, is no
+part of our faculty of cognition, it is absolutely impossible for
+the categories to possess any application beyond the limits of
+experience. It may be true that there are intelligible existences to
+which our faculty of sensuous intuition has no relation, and cannot
+be applied, but our conceptions of the understanding, as mere forms
+of thought for our sensuous intuition, do not extend to these. What,
+therefore, we call noumenon must be understood by us as such in a
+negative sense.
+
+If I take away from an empirical intuition all thought (by means of
+the categories), there remains no cognition of any object; for by
+means of mere intuition nothing is cogitated, and, from the
+existence of such or such an affection of sensibility in me, it does
+not follow that this affection or representation has any relation to
+an object without me. But if I take away all intuition, there still
+remains the form of thought, that is, the mode of determining an
+object for the manifold of a possible intuition. Thus the categories
+do in some measure really extend further than sensuous intuition,
+inasmuch as they think objects in general, without regard to the
+mode (of sensibility) in which these objects are given. But they do
+not for this reason apply to and determine a wider sphere of
+objects, because we cannot assume that such can be given, without
+presupposing the possibility of another than the sensuous mode of
+intuition, a supposition we are not justified in making.
+
+I call a conception problematical which contains in itself no
+contradiction, and which is connected with other cognitions as a
+limitation of given conceptions, but whose objective reality cannot
+be cognized in any manner. The conception of a noumenon, that is, of
+a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a
+thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not
+self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that
+sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this
+conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the
+bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of
+sensuous cognition; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its
+province, are called noumena for the very purpose of indicating that
+this cognition does not extend its application to all that the
+understanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such
+noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena,
+all is for us a mere void; that is to say, we possess an understanding
+whose province does problematically extend beyond this sphere, but
+we do not possess an intuition, indeed, not even the conception of
+a possible intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of
+sensibility could be given us, and in reference to which the
+understanding might be employed assertorically. The conception of a
+noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception and therefore
+only of negative use. But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion,
+but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however,
+being capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this
+sphere.
+
+The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world
+into a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis is therefore quite
+inadmissible in a positive sense, although conceptions do certainly
+admit of such a division; for the class of noumena have no determinate
+object corresponding to them, and cannot therefore possess objective
+validity. If we abandon the senses, how can it be made conceivable
+that the categories (which are the only conceptions that could serve
+as conceptions for noumena) have any sense or meaning at all, inasmuch
+as something more than the mere unity of thought, namely, a possible
+intuition, is requisite for their application to an object? The
+conception of a noumenon, considered as merely problematical, is,
+however, not only admissible, but, as a limitative conception of
+sensibility, absolutely necessary. But, in this case, a noumenon is
+not a particular intelligible object for our understanding; on the
+contrary, the kind of understanding to which it could belong is itself
+a problem, for we cannot form the most distant conception of the
+possibility of an understanding which should cognize an object, not
+discursively by means of categories, but intuitively in a non-sensuous
+intuition. Our understanding attains in this way a sort of negative
+extension. That is to say, it is not limited by, but rather limits,
+sensibility, by giving the name of noumena to things, not considered
+as phenomena, but as things in themselves. But it at the same time
+prescribes limits to itself, for it confesses itself unable to cognize
+these by means of the categories, and hence is compelled to cogitate
+them merely as an unknown something.
+
+I find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an entirely
+different use of the expressions, mundus sensibilis and
+intelligibilis, which quite departs from the meaning of the
+ancients--an acceptation in which, indeed, there is to be found no
+difficulty, but which at the same time depends on mere verbal
+quibbling. According to this meaning, some have chosen to call the
+complex of phenomena, in so far as it is intuited, mundus
+sensibilis, but in so far as the connection thereof is cogitated
+according to general laws of thought, mundus intelligibilis.
+Astronomy, in so far as we mean by the word the mere observation of
+the starry heaven, may represent the former; a system of astronomy,
+such as the Copernican or Newtonian, the latter. But such twisting
+of words is a mere sophistical subterfuge, to avoid a difficult
+question, by modifying its meaning to suit our own convenience. To
+be sure, understanding and reason are employed in the cognition of
+phenomena; but the question is, whether these can be applied when
+the object is not a phenomenon and in this sense we regard it if it
+is cogitated as given to the understanding alone, and not to the
+senses. The question therefore is whether, over and above the
+empirical use of the understanding, a transcendental use is
+possible, which applies to the noumenon as an object. This question
+we have answered in the negative.
+
+When therefore we say, the senses represent objects as they
+appear, the understanding as they are, the latter statement must not
+be understood in a transcendental, but only in an empirical
+signification, that is, as they must be represented in the complete
+connection of phenomena, and not according to what they may be,
+apart from their relation to possible experience, consequently not
+as objects of the pure understanding. For this must ever remain
+unknown to us. Nay, it is also quite unknown to us whether any such
+transcendental or extraordinary cognition is possible under any
+circumstances, at least, whether it is possible by means of our
+categories. Understanding and sensibility, with us, can determine
+objects only in conjunction. If we separate them, we have intuitions
+without conceptions, or conceptions without intuitions; in both cases,
+representations, which we cannot apply to any determinate object.
+
+If, after all our inquiries and explanations, any one still
+hesitates to abandon the mere transcendental use of the categories,
+let him attempt to construct with them a synthetical proposition. It
+would, of course, be unnecessary for this purpose to construct an
+analytical proposition, for that does not extend the sphere of the
+understanding, but, being concerned only about what is cogitated in
+the conception itself, it leaves it quite undecided whether the
+conception has any relation to objects, or merely indicates the
+unity of thought--complete abstraction being made of the modi in which
+an object may be given: in such a proposition, it is sufficient for
+the understanding to know what lies in the conception--to what it
+applies is to it indifferent. The attempt must therefore be made
+with a synthetical and so-called transcendental principle, for
+example: "Everything that exists, exists as substance," or,
+"Everything that is contingent exists as an effect of some other
+thing, viz., of its cause." Now I ask, whence can the understanding
+draw these synthetical propositions, when the conceptions contained
+therein do not relate to possible experience but to things in
+themselves (noumena)? Where is to be found the third term, which is
+always requisite PURE site in a synthetical proposition, which may
+connect in the same proposition conceptions which have no logical
+(analytical) connection with each other? The proposition never will
+be demonstrated, nay, more, the possibility of any such pure assertion
+never can be shown, without making reference to the empirical use of
+the understanding, and thus, ipso facto, completely renouncing pure
+and non-sensuous judgement. Thus the conception of pure and merely
+intelligible objects is completely void of all principles of its
+application, because we cannot imagine any mode in which they might
+be given, and the problematical thought which leaves a place open for
+them serves only, like a void space, to limit the use of empirical
+principles, without containing at the same time any other object of
+cognition beyond their sphere.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX.
+
+Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly of the Conceptions of
+Reflection from the Confusion of the Transcendental with
+the Empirical use of the Understanding.
+
+Reflection (reflexio) is not occupied about objects themselves,
+for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them, but is that
+state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective
+conditions under which we obtain conceptions. It is the
+consciousness of the relation of given representations to the
+different sources or faculties of cognition, by which alone their
+relation to each other can be rightly determined. The first question
+which occurs in considering our representations is to what faculty
+of cognition do they belong? To the understanding or to the senses?
+Many judgements are admitted to be true from mere habit or
+inclination; but, because reflection neither precedes nor follows,
+it is held to be a judgement that has its origin in the understanding.
+All judgements do not require examination, that is, investigation into
+the grounds of their truth. For, when they are immediately certain
+(for example: "Between two points there can be only one straight
+line"), no better or less mediate test of their truth can be found
+than that which they themselves contain and express. But all
+judgement, nay, all comparisons require reflection, that is, a
+distinction of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions
+belong. The act whereby I compare my representations with the
+faculty of cognition which originates them, and whereby I
+distinguish whether they are compared with each other as belonging
+to the pure understanding or to sensuous intuition, I term
+transcendental reflection. Now, the relations in which conceptions
+can stand to each other are those of identity and difference, agreement
+and opposition, of the internal and external, finally, of the
+determinable and the determining (matter and form). The proper
+determination of these relations rests on the question, to what
+faculty of cognition they subjectively belong, whether to
+sensibility or understanding? For, on the manner in which we solve
+this question depends the manner in which we must cogitate these
+relations.
+
+Before constructing any objective judgement, we compare the
+conceptions that are to be placed in the judgement, and observe
+whether there exists identity (of many representations in one
+conception), if a general judgement is to be constructed, or
+difference, if a particular; whether there is agreement when
+affirmative; and opposition when negative judgements are to be
+constructed, and so on. For this reason we ought to call these
+conceptions, conceptions of comparison (conceptus comparationis).
+But as, when the question is not as to the logical form, but as to
+the content of conceptions, that is to say, whether the things
+themselves are identical or different, in agreement or opposition,
+and so on, the things can have a twofold relation to our faculty of
+cognition, to wit, a relation either to sensibility or to the
+understanding, and as on this relation depends their relation to
+each other, transcendental reflection, that is, the relation of
+given representations to one or the other faculty of cognition, can
+alone determine this latter relation. Thus we shall not be able to
+discover whether the things are identical or different, in agreement
+or opposition, etc., from the mere conception of the things by means
+of comparison (comparatio), but only by distinguishing the mode of
+cognition to which they belong, in other words, by means of
+transcendental reflection. We may, therefore, with justice say, that
+logical reflection is mere comparison, for in it no account is taken
+of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong,
+and they are consequently, as far as regards their origin, to be treated
+as homogeneous; while transcendental reflection (which applies to
+the objects themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of
+objective comparison of representations with each other, and is
+therefore very different from the former, because the faculties of
+cognition to which they belong are not even the same. Transcendental
+reflection is a duty which no one can neglect who wishes to
+establish an a priori judgement upon things. We shall now proceed to
+fulfil this duty, and thereby throw not a little light on the question
+as to the determination of the proper business of the understanding.
+
+1. Identity and Difference. When an object is presented to us
+several times, but always with the same internal determinations
+(qualitas et quantitas), it, if an object of pure understanding, is
+always the same, not several things, but only one thing (numerica
+identitas); but if a phenomenon, we do not concern ourselves with
+comparing the conception of the thing with the conception of some
+other, but, although they may be in this respect perfectly the same,
+the difference of place at the same time is a sufficient ground for
+asserting the numerical difference of these objects (of sense).
+Thus, in the case of two drops of water, we may make complete
+abstraction of all internal difference (quality and quantity), and,
+the fact that they are intuited at the same time in different
+places, is sufficient to justify us in holding them to be
+numerically different. Leibnitz regarded phenomena as things in
+themselves, consequently as intelligibilia, that is, objects of pure
+understanding (although, on account of the confused nature of their
+representations, he gave them the name of phenomena), and in this case
+his principle of the indiscernible (principium identatis
+indiscernibilium) is not to be impugned. But, as phenomena are objects
+of sensibility, and, as the understanding, in respect of them, must
+be employed empirically and not purely or transcendentally, plurality
+and numerical difference are given by space itself as the condition
+of external phenomena. For one part of space, although it may be
+perfectly similar and equal to another part, is still without it,
+and for this reason alone is different from the latter, which is added
+to it in order to make up a greater space. It follows that this must
+hold good of all things that are in the different parts of space at
+the same time, however similar and equal one may be to another.
+
+2. Agreement and Opposition. When reality is represented by the pure
+understanding (realitas noumenon), opposition between realities is
+incogitable--such a relation, that is, that when these realities are
+connected in one subject, they annihilate the effects of each other
+and may be represented in the formula 3 - 3 = 0. On the other hand,
+the real in a phenomenon (realitas phaenomenon) may very well be in
+mutual opposition, and, when united in the same subject, the one may
+completely or in part annihilate the effect or consequence of the
+other; as in the case of two moving forces in the same straight line
+drawing or impelling a point in opposite directions, or in the case
+of a pleasure counterbalancing a certain amount of pain.
+
+3. The Internal and External. In an object of the pure
+understanding, only that is internal which has no relation (as regards
+its existence) to anything different from itself. On the other hand,
+the internal determinations of a substantia phaenomenon in space are
+nothing but relations, and it is itself nothing more than a complex
+of mere relations. Substance in space we are cognizant of only through
+forces operative in it, either drawing others towards itself
+(attraction), or preventing others from forcing into itself (repulsion
+and impenetrability). We know no other properties that make up the
+conception of substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter.
+On the other hand, as an object of the pure understanding, every
+substance must have internal determination and forces. But what
+other internal attributes of such an object can I think than those
+which my internal sense presents to me? That, to wit, which in
+either itself thought, or something analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz,
+who looked upon things as noumena, after denying them everything
+like external relation, and therefore also composition or combination,
+declared that all substances, even the component parts of matter, were
+simple substances with powers of representation, in one word, monads.
+
+4. Matter and Form. These two conceptions lie at the foundation of
+all other reflection, so inseparably are they connected with every
+mode of exercising the understanding. The former denotes the
+determinable in general, the second its determination, both in a
+transcendental sense, abstraction being made of every difference in
+that which is given, and of the mode in which it is determined.
+Logicians formerly termed the universal, matter, the specific
+difference of this or that part of the universal, form. In a judgement
+one may call the given conceptions logical matter (for the judgement),
+the relation of these to each other (by means of the copula), the form
+of the judgement. In an object, the composite parts thereof
+(essentialia) are the matter; the mode in which they are connected
+in the object, the form. In respect to things in general, unlimited
+reality was regarded as the matter of all possibility, the
+limitation thereof (negation) as the form, by which one thing is
+distinguished from another according to transcendental conceptions.
+The understanding demands that something be given (at least in the
+conception), in order to be able to determine it in a certain
+manner. Hence, in a conception of the pure understanding, the matter
+precedes the form, and for this reason Leibnitz first assumed the
+existence of things (monads) and of an internal power of
+representation in them, in order to found upon this their external
+relation and the community their state (that is, of their
+representations). Hence, with him, space and time were possible--the
+former through the relation of substances, the latter through the
+connection of their determinations with each other, as causes and
+effects. And so would it really be, if the pure understanding were
+capable of an immediate application to objects, and if space and
+time were determinations of things in themselves. But being merely
+sensuous intuitions, in which we determine all objects solely as
+phenomena, the form of intuition (as a subjective property of
+sensibility) must antecede all matter (sensations), consequently space
+and time must antecede all phenomena and all data of experience, and
+rather make experience itself possible. But the intellectual
+philosopher could not endure that the form should precede the things
+themselves and determine their possibility; an objection perfectly
+correct, if we assume that we intuite things as they are, although
+with confused representation. But as sensuous intuition is a
+peculiar subjective condition, which is a priori at the foundation
+of all perception, and the form of which is primitive, the form must
+be given per se, and so far from matter (or the things themselves
+which appear) lying at the foundation of experience (as we must
+conclude, if we judge by mere conceptions), the very possibility of
+itself presupposes, on the contrary, a given formal intuition (space
+and time).
+
+
+
+REMARK ON THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION.
+
+Let me be allowed to term the position which we assign to a
+conception either in the sensibility or in the pure understanding,
+the transcendental place. In this manner, the appointment of the
+position which must be taken by each conception according to the
+difference in its use, and the directions for determining this place
+to all conceptions according to rules, would be a transcendental
+topic, a doctrine which would thoroughly shield us from the
+surreptitious devices of the pure understanding and the delusions
+which thence arise, as it would always distinguish to what faculty
+of cognition each conception properly belonged. Every conception,
+every title, under which many cognitions rank together, may be
+called a logical place. Upon this is based the logical topic of
+Aristotle, of which teachers and rhetoricians could avail
+themselves, in order, under certain titles of thought, to observe what
+would best suit the matter they had to treat, and thus enable
+themselves to quibble and talk with fluency and an appearance of
+profundity.
+
+Transcendental topic, on the contrary, contains nothing more than
+the above-mentioned four titles of all comparison and distinction,
+which differ from categories in this respect, that they do not
+represent the object according to that which constitutes its
+conception (quantity, reality), but set forth merely the comparison
+of representations, which precedes our conceptions of things. But this
+comparison requires a previous reflection, that is, a determination
+of the place to which the representations of the things which are
+compared belong, whether, to wit, they are cogitated by the pure
+understanding, or given by sensibility.
+
+Conceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of
+inquiring to what faculty their objects belong, whether as noumena,
+to the understanding, or as phenomena, to sensibility. If, however,
+we wish to employ these conceptions in respect of objects, previous
+transcendental reflection is necessary. Without this reflection I
+should make a very unsafe use of these conceptions, and construct
+pretended synthetical propositions which critical reason cannot
+acknowledge and which are based solely upon a transcendental
+amphiboly, that is, upon a substitution of an object of pure
+understanding for a phenomenon.
+
+For want of this doctrine of transcendental topic, and
+consequently deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of
+reflection, the celebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual system
+of the world, or rather, believed himself competent to cognize the
+internal nature of things, by comparing all objects merely with the
+understanding and the abstract formal conceptions of thought. Our
+table of the conceptions of reflection gives us the unexpected
+advantage of being able to exhibit the distinctive peculiarities of
+his system in all its parts, and at the same time of exposing the
+fundamental principle of this peculiar mode of thought, which rested
+upon naught but a misconception. He compared all things with each
+other merely by means of conceptions, and naturally found no other
+differences than those by which the understanding distinguishes its
+pure conceptions one from another. The conditions of sensuous
+intuition, which contain in themselves their own means of distinction,
+he did not look upon as primitive, because sensibility was to him
+but a confused mode of representation and not any particular source
+of representations. A phenomenon was for him the representation of
+the thing in itself, although distinguished from cognition by the
+understanding only in respect of the logical form--the former with
+its usual want of analysis containing, according to him, a certain
+mixture of collateral representations in its conception of a thing,
+which it is the duty of the understanding to separate and distinguish.
+In one word, Leibnitz intellectualized phenomena, just as Locke, in
+his system of noogony (if I may be allowed to make use of such
+expressions), sensualized the conceptions of the understanding, that
+is to say, declared them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract
+conceptions of reflection. Instead of seeking in the understanding
+and sensibility two different sources of representations, which,
+however, can present us with objective judgements of things only in
+conjunction, each of these great men recognized but one of these
+faculties, which, in their opinion, applied immediately to things in
+themselves, the other having no duty but that of confusing or
+arranging the representations of the former.
+
+Accordingly, the objects of sense were compared by Leibnitz as
+things in general merely in the understanding.
+
+1st. He compares them in regard to their identity or difference
+--as judged by the understanding. As, therefore, he considered merely
+the conceptions of objects, and not their position in intuition, in
+which alone objects can be given, and left quite out of sight the
+transcendental locale of these conceptions--whether, that is, their
+object ought to be classed among phenomena, or among things in
+themselves, it was to be expected that he should extend the
+application of the principle of indiscernibles, which is valid
+solely of conceptions of things in general, to objects of sense
+(mundus phaenomenon), and that he should believe that he had thereby
+contributed in no small degree to extend our knowledge of nature. In
+truth, if I cognize in all its inner determinations a drop of water
+as a thing in itself, I cannot look upon one drop as different from
+another, if the conception of the one is completely identical with
+that of the other. But if it is a phenomenon in space, it has a
+place not merely in the understanding (among conceptions), but also
+in sensuous external intuition (in space), and in this case, the physical
+locale is a matter of indifference in regard to the internal
+determinations of things, and one place, B, may contain a thing
+which is perfectly similar and equal to another in a place, A, just
+as well as if the two things were in every respect different from each
+other. Difference of place without any other conditions, makes the
+plurality and distinction of objects as phenomena, not only possible
+in itself, but even necessary. Consequently, the above so-called law
+is not a law of nature. It is merely an analytical rule for the
+comparison of things by means of mere conceptions.
+
+2nd. The principle: "Realities (as simple affirmations) never
+logically contradict each other," is a proposition perfectly true
+respecting the relation of conceptions, but, whether as regards
+nature, or things in themselves (of which we have not the slightest
+conception), is without any the least meaning. For real opposition,
+in which A - B is = 0, exists everywhere, an opposition, that is, in
+which one reality united with another in the same subject
+annihilates the effects of the other--a fact which is constantly
+brought before our eyes by the different antagonistic actions and
+operations in nature, which, nevertheless, as depending on real
+forces, must be called realitates phaenomena. General mechanics can
+even present us with the empirical condition of this opposition in
+an a priori rule, as it directs its attention to the opposition in
+the direction of forces--a condition of which the transcendental
+conception of reality can tell us nothing. Although M. Leibnitz did
+not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of a new
+principle, he yet employed it for the establishment of new
+propositions, and his followers introduced it into their
+Leibnitzio-Wolfian system of philosophy. According to this
+principle, for example, all evils are but consequences of the
+limited nature of created beings, that is, negations, because these
+are the only opposite of reality. (In the mere conception of a thing
+in general this is really the case, but not in things as phenomena.)
+In like manner, the upholders of this system deem it not only
+possible, but natural also, to connect and unite all reality in one
+being, because they acknowledge no other sort of opposition than
+that of contradiction (by which the conception itself of a thing is
+annihilated), and find themselves unable to conceive an opposition
+of reciprocal destruction, so to speak, in which one real cause
+destroys the effect of another, and the conditions of whose
+representation we meet with only in sensibility.
+
+3rd. The Leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation than
+on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of
+the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding.
+Substances, in general, must have something inward, which is therefore
+free from external relations, consequently from that of composition
+also. The simple--that which can be represented by a unit--is
+therefore the foundation of that which is internal in things in
+themselves. The internal state of substances cannot therefore
+consist in place, shape, contact, or motion, determinations which
+are all external relations, and we can ascribe to them no other than
+that whereby we internally determine our faculty of sense itself, that
+is to say, the state of representation. Thus, then, were constructed
+the monads, which were to form the elements of the universe, the
+active force of which consists in representation, the effects of
+this force being thus entirely confined to themselves.
+
+For the same reason, his view of the possible community of
+substances could not represent it but as a predetermined harmony,
+and by no means as a physical influence. For inasmuch as everything
+is occupied only internally, that is, with its own representations,
+the state of the representations of one substance could not stand in
+active and living connection with that of another, but some third
+cause operating on all without exception was necessary to make the
+different states correspond with one another. And this did not
+happen by means of assistance applied in each particular case (systema
+assistentiae), but through the unity of the idea of a cause occupied
+and connected with all substances, in which they necessarily
+receive, according to the Leibnitzian school, their existence and
+permanence, consequently also reciprocal correspondence, according
+to universal laws.
+
+4th. This philosopher's celebrated doctrine of space and time, in
+which he intellectualized these forms of sensibility, originated in
+the same delusion of transcendental reflection. If I attempt to
+represent by the mere understanding, the external relations of things,
+I can do so only by employing the conception of their reciprocal
+action, and if I wish to connect one state of the same thing with
+another state, I must avail myself of the notion of the order of cause
+and effect. And thus Leibnitz regarded space as a certain order in
+the community of substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of
+their states. That which space and time possess proper to themselves
+and independent of things, he ascribed to a necessary confusion in
+our conceptions of them, whereby that which is a mere form of dynamical
+relations is held to be a self-existent intuition, antecedent even
+to things themselves. Thus space and time were the intelligible form
+of the connection of things (substances and their states) in
+themselves. But things were intelligible substances (substantiae
+noumena). At the same time, he made these conceptions valid of
+phenomena, because he did not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode
+of intuition, but sought all, even the empirical representation of
+objects, in the understanding, and left to sense naught but the
+despicable task of confusing and disarranging the representations of
+the former.
+
+But even if we could frame any synthetical proposition concerning
+things in themselves by means of the pure understanding (which is
+impossible), it could not apply to phenomena, which do not represent
+things in themselves. In such a case I should be obliged in
+transcendental reflection to compare my conceptions only under the
+conditions of sensibility, and so space and time would not be
+determinations of things in themselves, but of phenomena. What
+things may be in themselves, I know not and need not know, because
+a thing is never presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon.
+
+I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other conceptions
+of reflection. Matter is substantia phaenomenon. That in it which is
+internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies,
+and in all the functions and operations it performs, and which are
+indeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense. I cannot
+therefore find anything that is absolutely, but only what is
+comparatively internal, and which itself consists of external
+relations. The absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be
+according to the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter
+is not an object for the pure understanding. But the transcendental
+object, which is the foundation of the phenomenon which we call
+matter, is a mere nescio quid, the nature of which we could not
+understand, even though someone were found able to tell us. For we
+can understand nothing that does not bring with it something in
+intuition corresponding to the expressions employed. If, by the
+complaint of being unable to perceive the internal nature of things,
+it is meant that we do not comprehend by the pure understanding what
+the things which appear to us may be in themselves, it is a silly
+and unreasonable complaint; for those who talk thus really desire that
+we should be able to cognize, consequently to intuite, things
+without senses, and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty of
+cognition perfectly different from the human faculty, not merely in
+degree, but even as regards intuition and the mode thereof, so that
+thus we should not be men, but belong to a class of beings, the
+possibility of whose existence, much less their nature and
+constitution, we have no means of cognizing. By observation and
+analysis of phenomena we penetrate into the interior of nature, and
+no one can say what progress this knowledge may make in time. But those
+transcendental questions which pass beyond the limits of nature, we
+could never answer, even although all nature were laid open to us,
+because we have not the power of observing our own mind with any other
+intuition than that of our internal sense. For herein lies the mystery
+of the origin and source of our faculty of sensibility. Its
+application to an object, and the transcendental ground of this
+unity of subjective and objective, lie too deeply concealed for us,
+who cognize ourselves only through the internal sense, consequently
+as phenomena, to be able to discover in our existence anything but
+phenomena, the non-sensuous cause of which we at the same time
+earnestly desire to penetrate to.
+
+The great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at by
+the processes of mere reflection consists in its clear demonstration
+of the nullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are
+compared with each other in the understanding alone, while it at the
+same time confirms what we particularly insisted on, namely, that,
+although phenomena are not included as things in themselves among
+the objects of the pure understanding, they are nevertheless the
+only things by which our cognition can possess objective reality, that
+is to say, which give us intuitions to correspond with our
+conceptions.
+
+When we reflect in a purely logical manner, we do nothing more
+than compare conceptions in our understanding, to discover whether
+both have the same content, whether they are self-contradictory or
+not, whether anything is contained in either conception, which of
+the two is given, and which is merely a mode of thinking that given.
+But if I apply these conceptions to an object in general (in the
+transcendental sense), without first determining whether it is an
+object of sensuous or intellectual intuition, certain limitations
+present themselves, which forbid us to pass beyond the conceptions
+and render all empirical use of them impossible. And thus these
+limitations prove that the representation of an object as a thing in
+general is not only insufficient, but, without sensuous
+determination and independently of empirical conditions,
+self-contradictory; that we must therefore make abstraction of all
+objects, as in logic, or, admitting them, must think them under
+conditions of sensuous intuition; that, consequently, the intelligible
+requires an altogether peculiar intuition, which we do not possess,
+and in the absence of which it is for us nothing; while, on the
+other hand phenomena cannot be objects in themselves. For, when I
+merely think things in general, the difference in their external
+relations cannot constitute a difference in the things themselves;
+on the contrary, the former presupposes the latter, and if the
+conception of one of two things is not internally different from
+that of the other, I am merely thinking the same thing in different
+relations. Further, by the addition of one affirmation (reality) to
+the other, the positive therein is really augmented, and nothing is
+abstracted or withdrawn from it; hence the real in things cannot be
+in contradiction with or opposition to itself--and so on.
+
+The true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employment of
+the understanding has, as we have shown, been so misconceived by
+Leibnitz, one of the most acute philosophers of either ancient or
+modern times, that he has been misled into the construction of a
+baseless system of intellectual cognition, which professes to
+determine its objects without the intervention of the senses. For this
+reason, the exposition of the cause of the amphiboly of these
+conceptions, as the origin of these false principles, is of great
+utility in determining with certainty the proper limits of the
+understanding.
+
+It is right to say whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of
+a conception can be affirmed or denied of any part of it (dictum de
+omni et nullo); but it would be absurd so to alter this logical
+proposition as to say whatever is not contained in a general
+conception is likewise not contained in the particular conceptions
+which rank under it; for the latter are particular conceptions, for
+the very reason that their content is greater than that which is
+cogitated in the general conception. And yet the whole intellectual
+system of Leibnitz is based upon this false principle, and with it
+must necessarily fall to the ground, together with all the ambiguous
+principles in reference to the employment of the understanding which
+have thence originated.
+
+Leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles or
+indistinguishables is really based on the presupposition that, if in
+the conception of a thing a certain distinction is not to be found,
+it is also not to be met with in things themselves; that, consequently,
+all things are completely identical (numero eadem) which are not
+distinguishable from each other (as to quality or quantity) in our
+conceptions of them. But, as in the mere conception of anything
+abstraction has been made of many necessary conditions of intuition,
+that of which abstraction has been made is rashly held to be
+non-existent, and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is
+contained in its conception.
+
+The conception of a cubic foot of space, however I may think it,
+is in itself completely identical. But two cubic feet in space are
+nevertheless distinct from each other from the sole fact of their
+being in different places (they are numero diversa); and these
+places are conditions of intuition, wherein the object of this
+conception is given, and which do not belong to the conception, but
+to the faculty of sensibility. In like manner, there is in the conception
+of a thing no contradiction when a negative is not connected with an
+affirmative; and merely affirmative conceptions cannot, in
+conjunction, produce any negation. But in sensuous intuition,
+wherein reality (take for example, motion) is given, we find
+conditions (opposite directions)--of which abstraction has been made
+in the conception of motion in general--which render possible a
+contradiction or opposition (not indeed of a logical kind)--and
+which from pure positives produce zero = 0. We are therefore not
+justified in saying that all reality is in perfect agreement and
+harmony, because no contradiction is discoverable among its
+conceptions.* According to mere conceptions, that which is internal
+is the substratum of all relations or external determinations. When,
+therefore, I abstract all conditions of intuition, and confine
+myself solely to the conception of a thing in general, I can make
+abstraction of all external relations, and there must nevertheless
+remain a conception of that which indicates no relation, but merely
+internal determinations. Now it seems to follow that in everything
+(substance) there is something which is absolutely internal and
+which antecedes all external determinations, inasmuch as it renders
+them possible; and that therefore this substratum is something which
+does not contain any external relations and is consequently simple
+(for corporeal things are never anything but relations, at least of
+their parts external to each other); and, inasmuch as we know of no
+other absolutely internal determinations than those of the internal
+sense, this substratum is not only simple, but also, analogously
+with our internal sense, determined through representations, that is
+to say, all things are properly monads, or simple beings endowed
+with the power of representation. Now all this would be perfectly
+correct, if the conception of a thing were the only necessary
+condition of the presentation of objects of external intuition. It
+is, on the contrary, manifest that a permanent phenomenon in space
+(impenetrable extension) can contain mere relations, and nothing
+that is absolutely internal, and yet be the primary substratum of
+all external perception. By mere conceptions I cannot think anything
+external, without, at the same time, thinking something internal,
+for the reason that conceptions of relations presuppose given
+things, and without these are impossible. But, as an intuition there
+is something (that is, space, which, with all it contains, consists
+of purely formal, or, indeed, real relations) which is not found in
+the mere conception of a thing in general, and this presents to us
+the substratum which could not be cognized through conceptions alone,
+I cannot say: because a thing cannot be represented by mere
+conceptions without something absolutely internal, there is also, in
+the things themselves which are contained under these conceptions,
+and in their intuition nothing external to which something absolutely
+internal does not serve as the foundation. For, when we have made
+abstraction of all the conditions of intuition, there certainly
+remains in the mere conception nothing but the internal in general,
+through which alone the external is possible. But this necessity,
+which is grounded upon abstraction alone, does not obtain in the
+case of things themselves, in so far as they are given in intuition
+with such determinations as express mere relations, without having
+anything internal as their foundation; for they are not things of a
+thing of which we can neither for they are not things in themselves,
+but only phenomena. What we cognize in matter is nothing but relations
+(what we call its internal determinations are but comparatively
+internal). But there are some self-subsistent and permanent, through
+which a determined object is given. That I, when abstraction is made
+of these relations, have nothing more to think, does not destroy the
+conception of a thing as phenomenon, nor the conception of an object
+in abstracto, but it does away with the possibility of an object
+that is determinable according to mere conceptions, that is, of a
+noumenon. It is certainly startling to hear that a thing consists
+solely of relations; but this thing is simply a phenomenon, and cannot
+be cogitated by means of the mere categories: it does itself consist
+in the mere relation of something in general to the senses. In the
+same way, we cannot cogitate relations of things in abstracto, if we
+commence with conceptions alone, in any other manner than that one
+is the cause of determinations in the other; for that is itself the
+conception of the understanding or category of relation. But, as in
+this case we make abstraction of all intuition, we lose altogether
+the mode in which the manifold determines to each of its parts its
+place, that is, the form of sensibility (space); and yet this mode
+antecedes all empirical causality.
+
+
+[*Footnote: If any one wishes here to have recourse to the usual
+subterfuge, and to say, that at least realitates noumena cannot be
+in opposition to each other, it will be requisite for him to adduce
+an example of this pure and non-sensuous reality, that it may be understood
+whether the notion represents something or nothing. But an example
+cannot be found except in experience, which never presents to us
+anything more than phenomena; and thus the proposition means nothing
+more than that the conception which contains only affirmatives does
+not contain anything negative--a proposition nobody ever doubted.]
+
+
+If by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought
+by means of the pure categories, without the need of the schemata of
+sensibility, such objects are impossible. For the condition of the
+objective use of all our conceptions of understanding is the mode of
+our sensuous intuition, whereby objects are given; and, if we make
+abstraction of the latter, the former can have no relation to an
+object. And even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition
+from our own, still our functions of thought would have no use or
+signification in respect thereof. But if we understand by the term,
+objects of a non-sensuous intuition, in respect of which our
+categories are not valid, and of which we can accordingly have no
+knowledge (neither intuition nor conception), in this merely
+negative sense noumena must be admitted. For this is no more than
+saying that our mode of intuition is not applicable to all things,
+but only to objects of our senses, that consequently its objective
+validity is limited, and that room is therefore left for another
+kind of intuition, and thus also for things that may be objects of
+it. But in this sense the conception of a noumenon is problematical,
+that is to say, it is the notion of that it that it is possible, nor
+that it is impossible, inasmuch as we do not know of any mode of
+intuition besides the sensuous, or of any other sort of conceptions
+than the categories--a mode of intuition and a kind of conception
+neither of which is applicable to a non-sensuous object. We are on
+this account incompetent to extend the sphere of our objects of
+thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and to assume the
+existence of objects of pure thought, that is, of noumena, inasmuch
+as these have no true positive signification. For it must be confessed
+of the categories that they are not of themselves sufficient for the
+cognition of things in themselves and, without the data of
+sensibility, are mere subjective forms of the unity of the
+understanding. Thought is certainly not a product of the senses, and
+in so far is not limited by them, but it does not therefore follow
+that it may be employed purely and without the intervention of
+sensibility, for it would then be without reference to an object.
+And we cannot call a noumenon an object of pure thought; for the
+representation thereof is but the problematical conception of an
+object for a perfectly different intuition and a perfectly different
+understanding from ours, both of which are consequently themselves
+problematical. The conception of a noumenon is therefore not the
+conception of an object, but merely a problematical conception
+inseparably connected with the limitation of our sensibility. That
+is to say, this conception contains the answer to the question: "Are
+there objects quite unconnected with, and independent of, our
+intuition?"--a question to which only an indeterminate answer can be
+given. That answer is: "Inasmuch as sensuous intuition does not
+apply to all things without distinction, there remains room for
+other and different objects." The existence of these problematical
+objects is therefore not absolutely denied, in the absence of a
+determinate conception of them, but, as no category is valid in
+respect of them, neither must they be admitted as objects for our
+understanding.
+
+Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same
+time enlarging its own field. While, moreover, it forbids
+sensibility to apply its forms and modes to things in themselves and
+restricts it to the sphere of phenomena, it cogitates an object in
+itself, only, however, as a transcendental object, which is the
+cause of a phenomenon (consequently not itself a phenomenon), and
+which cannot be thought either as a quantity or as reality, or as
+substance (because these conceptions always require sensuous forms
+in which to determine an object)--an object, therefore, of which we
+are quite unable to say whether it can be met with in ourselves or
+out of us, whether it would be annihilated together with sensibility,
+or, if this were taken away, would continue to exist. If we wish to
+call this object a noumenon, because the representation of it is
+non-sensuous, we are at liberty to do so. But as we can apply to it
+none of the conceptions of our understanding, the representation is
+for us quite void, and is available only for the indication of the
+limits of our sensuous intuition, thereby leaving at the same time
+an empty space, which we are competent to fill by the aid neither of
+possible experience, nor of the pure understanding.
+
+The critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit
+us to create for ourselves a new field of objects beyond those which
+are presented to us as phenomena, and to stray into intelligible
+worlds; nay, it does not even allow us to endeavour to form so much
+as a conception of them. The specious error which leads to this--and
+which is a perfectly excusable one--lies in the fact that the
+employment of the understanding, contrary to its proper purpose and
+destination, is made transcendental, and objects, that is, possible
+intuitions, are made to regulate themselves according to
+conceptions, instead of the conceptions arranging themselves according
+to the intuitions, on which alone their own objective validity
+rests. Now the reason of this again is that apperception, and with
+it thought, antecedes all possible determinate arrangement of
+representations. Accordingly we think something in general and
+determine it on the one hand sensuously, but, on the other,
+distinguish the general and in abstracto represented object from
+this particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there remains a
+mode of determining the object by mere thought, which is really but
+a logical form without content, which, however, seems to us to be a
+mode of the existence of the object in itself (noumenon), without
+regard to intuition which is limited to our senses.
+
+Before ending this transcendental analytic, we must make an
+addition, which, although in itself of no particular importance, seems
+to be necessary to the completeness of the system. The highest
+conception, with which a transcendental philosophy commonly begins,
+is the division into possible and impossible. But as all division
+presupposes a divided conception, a still higher one must exist, and
+this is the conception of an object in general--problematically
+understood and without its being decided whether it is something or
+nothing. As the categories are the only conceptions which apply to
+objects in general, the distinguishing of an object, whether it is
+something or nothing, must proceed according to the order and
+direction of the categories.
+
+1. To the categories of quantity, that is, the conceptions of all,
+many, and one, the conception which annihilates all, that is, the
+conception of none, is opposed. And thus the object of a conception,
+to which no intuition can be found to correspond, is = nothing. That
+is, it is a conception without an object (ens rationis), like noumena,
+which cannot be considered possible in the sphere of reality, though
+they must not therefore be held to be impossible--or like certain
+new fundamental forces in matter, the existence of which is
+cogitable without contradiction, though, as examples from experience
+are not forthcoming, they must not be regarded as possible.
+
+2. Reality is something; negation is nothing, that is, a
+conception of the absence of an object, as cold, a shadow (nihil
+privativum).
+
+3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no
+object, but the merely formal condition of an object (as
+phenomenon), as pure space and pure time. These are certainly
+something, as forms of intuition, but are not themselves objects which
+are intuited (ens imaginarium).
+
+4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is
+nothing, because the conception is nothing--is impossible, as a figure
+composed of two straight lines (nihil negativum).
+
+The table of this division of the conception of nothing (the
+corresponding division of the conception of something does not require
+special description) must therefore be arranged as follows:
+
+
+ NOTHING
+ AS
+
+ 1
+ As Empty Conception
+ without object,
+ ens rationis
+ 2 3
+ Empty object of Empty intuition
+ a conception, without object,
+ nihil privativum ens imaginarium
+ 4
+ Empty object
+ without conception,
+ nihil negativum
+
+
+We see that the ens rationis is distinguished from the nihil
+negativum or pure nothing by the consideration that the former must
+not be reckoned among possibilities, because it is a mere fiction-
+though not self-contradictory, while the latter is completely
+opposed to all possibility, inasmuch as the conception annihilates
+itself. Both, however, are empty conceptions. On the other hand,
+the nihil privativum and ens imaginarium are empty data for
+conceptions. If light be not given to the senses, we cannot
+represent to ourselves darkness, and if extended objects are not
+perceived, we cannot represent space. Neither the negation, nor the
+mere form of intuition can, without something real, be an object.
+
+
+
+
+TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. SECOND DIVISION.
+
+TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION.
+
+I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.
+
+We termed dialectic in general a logic of appearance. This does
+not signify a doctrine of probability; for probability is truth,
+only cognized upon insufficient grounds, and though the information
+it gives us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful. Hence it must
+not be separated from the analytical part of logic. Still less must
+phenomenon and appearance be held to be identical. For truth or
+illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it
+is intuited, but in the judgement upon the object, in so far as it
+is thought. It is, therefore, quite correct to say that the senses
+do not err, not because they always judge correctly, but because
+they do not judge at all. Hence truth and error, consequently also,
+illusory appearance as the cause of error, are only to be found in
+a judgement, that is, in the relation of an object to our understanding.
+In a cognition which completely harmonizes with the laws of the
+understanding, no error can exist. In a representation of the
+senses--as not containing any judgement--there is also no error. But
+no power of nature can of itself deviate from its own laws. Hence
+neither the understanding per se (without the influence of another
+cause), nor the senses per se, would fall into error; the former could
+not, because, if it acts only according to its own laws, the effect
+(the judgement) must necessarily accord with these laws. But in
+accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal
+element in all truth. In the senses there is no judgement--neither
+a true nor a false one. But, as we have no source of cognition besides
+these two, it follows that error is caused solely by the unobserved
+influence of the sensibility upon the understanding. And thus it
+happens that the subjective grounds of a judgement and are
+confounded with the objective, and cause them to deviate from their
+proper determination,* just as a body in motion would always of itself
+proceed in a straight line, but if another impetus gives to it a
+different direction, it will then start off into a curvilinear line
+of motion. To distinguish the peculiar action of the understanding
+from the power which mingles with it, it is necessary to consider an
+erroneous judgement as the diagonal between two forces, that determine
+the judgement in two different directions, which, as it were, form
+an angle, and to resolve this composite operation into the simple ones
+of the understanding and the sensibility. In pure a priori
+judgements this must be done by means of transcendental reflection,
+whereby, as has been already shown, each representation has its
+place appointed in the corresponding faculty of cognition, and
+consequently the influence of the one faculty upon the other is made
+apparent.
+
+[*Footnote: Sensibility, subjected to the understanding, as the object
+upon which the understanding employs its functions, is the source of
+real cognitions. But, in so far as it exercises an influence upon the
+action of the understanding and determines it to judgement,
+sensibility is itself the cause of error.]
+
+It is not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory
+appearance (for example, optical illusion), which occurs in the
+empirical application of otherwise correct rules of the understanding,
+and in which the judgement is misled by the influence of
+imagination. Our purpose is to speak of transcendental illusory
+appearance, which influences principles--that are not even applied
+to experience, for in this case we should possess a sure test of their
+correctness--but which leads us, in disregard of all the warnings of
+criticism, completely beyond the empirical employment of the
+categories and deludes us with the chimera of an extension of the
+sphere of the pure understanding. We shall term those principles the
+application of which is confined entirely within the limits of
+possible experience, immanent; those, on the other hand, which
+transgress these limits, we shall call transcendent principles. But
+by these latter I do not understand principles of the transcendental
+use or misuse of the categories, which is in reality a mere fault of
+the judgement when not under due restraint from criticism, and
+therefore not paying sufficient attention to the limits of the
+sphere in which the pure understanding is allowed to exercise its
+functions; but real principles which exhort us to break down all those
+barriers, and to lay claim to a perfectly new field of cognition,
+which recognizes no line of demarcation. Thus transcendental and
+transcendent are not identical terms. The principles of the pure
+understanding, which we have already propounded, ought to be of
+empirical and not of transcendental use, that is, they are not
+applicable to any object beyond the sphere of experience. A
+principle which removes these limits, nay, which authorizes us to
+overstep them, is called transcendent. If our criticism can succeed
+in exposing the illusion in these pretended principles, those which
+are limited in their employment to the sphere of experience may be
+called, in opposition to the others, immanent principles of the pure
+understanding.
+
+Logical illusion, which consists merely in the imitation of the form
+of reason (the illusion in sophistical syllogisms), arises entirely
+from a want of due attention to logical rules. So soon as the
+attention is awakened to the case before us, this illusion totally
+disappears. Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does not cease
+to exist, even after it has been exposed, and its nothingness
+clearly perceived by means of transcendental criticism. Take, for
+example, the illusion in the proposition: "The world must have a
+beginning in time." The cause of this is as follows. In our reason,
+subjectively considered as a faculty of human cognition, there exist
+fundamental rules and maxims of its exercise, which have completely
+the appearance of objective principles. Now from this cause it happens
+that the subjective necessity of a certain connection of our
+conceptions, is regarded as an objective necessity of the
+determination of things in themselves. This illusion it is
+impossible to avoid, just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea
+appears to be higher at a distance than it is near the shore,
+because we see the former by means of higher rays than the latter,
+or, which is a still stronger case, as even the astronomer cannot
+prevent himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than some
+time afterwards, although he is not deceived by this illusion.
+
+Transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing
+the illusory appearance in transcendental judgements, and guarding
+us against it; but to make it, as in the case of logical illusion,
+entirely disappear and cease to be illusion is utterly beyond its
+power. For we have here to do with a natural and unavoidable illusion,
+which rests upon subjective principles and imposes these upon us as
+objective, while logical dialectic, in the detection of sophisms,
+has to do merely with an error in the logical consequence of the
+propositions, or with an artificially constructed illusion, in
+imitation of the natural error. There is, therefore, a natural and
+unavoidable dialectic of pure reason--not that in which the bungler,
+from want of the requisite knowledge, involves himself, nor that which
+the sophist devises for the purpose of misleading, but that which is
+an inseparable adjunct of human reason, and which, even after its
+illusions have been exposed, does not cease to deceive, and
+continually to lead reason into momentary errors, which it becomes
+necessary continually to remove.
+
+
+
+II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.
+
+A. OF REASON IN GENERAL.
+
+All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to
+understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can
+be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of
+intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of thought. At this
+stage of our inquiry it is my duty to give an explanation of this,
+the highest faculty of cognition, and I confess I find myself here
+in some difficulty. Of reason, as of the understanding, there is a
+merely formal, that is, logical use, in which it makes abstraction
+of all content of cognition; but there is also a real use, inasmuch
+as it contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and principles,
+which it does not borrow either from the senses or the
+understanding. The former faculty has been long defined by logicians
+as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to immediate
+conclusions (consequentiae immediatae); but the nature of the
+latter, which itself generates conceptions, is not to be understood
+from this definition. Now as a division of reason into a logical and
+a transcendental faculty presents itself here, it becomes necessary
+to seek for a higher conception of this source of cognition which shall
+comprehend both conceptions. In this we may expect, according to the
+analogy of the conceptions of the understanding, that the logical
+conception will give us the key to the transcendental, and that the
+table of the functions of the former will present us with the clue
+to the conceptions of reason.
+
+In the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined the
+understanding to be the faculty of rules; reason may be
+distinguished from understanding as the faculty of principles.
+
+The term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies merely a
+cognition that may be employed as a principle, although it is not in
+itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled to the distinction.
+Every general proposition, even if derived from experience by the
+process of induction, may serve as the major in a syllogism; but it
+is not for that reason a principle. Mathematical axioms (for example,
+there can be only one straight line between two points) are general
+a priori cognitions, and are therefore rightly denominated principles,
+relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot
+for this reason say that I cognize this property of a straight line
+from principles--I cognize it only in pure intuition.
+
+Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in which I
+cognize the particular in the general by means of conceptions. Thus
+every syllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from a
+principle. For the major always gives a conception, through which
+everything that is subsumed under the condition thereof is cognized
+according to a principle. Now as every general cognition may serve
+as the major in a syllogism, and the understanding presents us with
+such general a priori propositions, they may be termed principles,
+in respect of their possible use.
+
+But if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in
+relation to their origin, we shall find them to be anything rather
+than cognitions from conceptions. For they would not even be
+possible a priori, if we could not rely on the assistance of pure
+intuition (in mathematics), or on that of the conditions of a possible
+experience. That everything that happens has a cause, cannot be
+concluded from the general conception of that which happens; on the
+contrary the principle of causality instructs us as to the mode of
+obtaining from that which happens a determinate empirical conception.
+
+Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot
+supply, and they alone are entitled to be called principles. At the
+same time, all general propositions may be termed comparative
+principles.
+
+It has been a long-cherished wish--that (who knows how late), may
+one day, be happily accomplished--that the principles of the endless
+variety of civil laws should be investigated and exposed; for in
+this way alone can we find the secret of simplifying legislation.
+But in this case, laws are nothing more than limitations of our
+freedom upon conditions under which it subsists in perfect harmony
+with itself; they consequently have for their object that which is
+completely our own work, and of which we ourselves may be the cause
+by means of these conceptions. But how objects as things in themselves-
+how the nature of things is subordinated to principles and is to be
+determined, according to conceptions, is a question which it seems
+well nigh impossible to answer. Be this, however, as it may--for on
+this point our investigation is yet to be made--it is at least
+manifest from what we have said that cognition from principles is
+something very different from cognition by means of the understanding,
+which may indeed precede other cognitions in the form of a
+principle, but in itself--in so far as it is synthetical--is neither
+based upon mere thought, nor contains a general proposition drawn from
+conceptions alone.
+
+The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of
+phenomena by virtue of rules; the reason is a faculty for the
+production of unity of rules (of the understanding) under
+principles. Reason, therefore, never applies directly to experience,
+or to any sensuous object; its object is, on the contrary, the
+understanding, to the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity
+a priori by means of conceptions--a unity which may be called rational
+unity, and which is of a nature very different from that of the
+unity produced by the understanding.
+
+The above is the general conception of the faculty of reason, in
+so far as it has been possible to make it comprehensible in the
+absence of examples. These will be given in the sequel.
+
+
+
+B. OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON.
+
+A distinction is commonly made between that which is immediately
+cognized and that which is inferred or concluded. That in a figure
+which is bounded by three straight lines there are three angles, is
+an immediate cognition; but that these angles are together equal to
+two right angles, is an inference or conclusion. Now, as we are constantly
+employing this mode of thought and have thus become quite accustomed
+to it, we no longer remark the above distinction, and, as in the
+case of the so-called deceptions of sense, consider as immediately
+perceived, what has really been inferred. In every reasoning or
+syllogism, there is a fundamental proposition, afterwards a second
+drawn from it, and finally the conclusion, which connects the truth
+in the first with the truth in the second--and that infallibly. If
+the judgement concluded is so contained in the first proposition that
+it can be deduced from it without the meditation of a third notion,
+the conclusion is called immediate (consequentia immediata); I prefer
+the term conclusion of the understanding. But if, in addition to the
+fundamental cognition, a second judgement is necessary for the
+production of the conclusion, it is called a conclusion of the reason.
+In the proposition: All men are mortal, are contained the
+propositions: Some men are mortal, Nothing that is not mortal is a
+man, and these are therefore immediate conclusions from the first.
+On the other hand, the proposition: all the learned are mortal, is
+not contained in the main proposition (for the conception of a learned
+man does not occur in it), and it can be deduced from the main proposition
+only by means of a mediating judgement.
+
+In every syllogism I first cogitate a rule (the major) by means of
+the understanding. In the next place I subsume a cognition under the
+condition of the rule (and this is the minor) by means of the
+judgement. And finally I determine my cognition by means of the
+predicate of the rule (this is the conclusio), consequently, I
+determine it a priori by means of the reason. The relations,
+therefore, which the major proposition, as the rule, represents
+between a cognition and its condition, constitute the different
+kinds of syllogisms. These are just threefold--analogously with all
+judgements, in so far as they differ in the mode of expressing the
+relation of a cognition in the understanding--namely, categorical,
+hypothetical, and disjunctive.
+
+When as often happens, the conclusion is a judgement which may
+follow from other given judgements, through which a perfectly
+different object is cogitated, I endeavour to discover in the
+understanding whether the assertion in this conclusion does not
+stand under certain conditions according to a general rule. If I
+find such a condition, and if the object mentioned in the conclusion
+can be subsumed under the given condition, then this conclusion
+follows from a rule which is also valid for other objects of
+cognition. From this we see that reason endeavours to subject the
+great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to the smallest
+possible number of principles (general conditions), and thus to
+produce in it the highest unity.
+
+
+
+C. OF THE PURE USE OF REASON.
+
+Can we isolate reason, and, if so, is it in this case a peculiar
+source of conceptions and judgements which spring from it alone, and
+through which it can be applied to objects; or is it merely a
+subordinate faculty, whose duty it is to give a certain form to
+given cognitions--a form which is called logical, and through which
+the cognitions of the understanding are subordinated to each other,
+and lower rules to higher (those, to wit, whose condition comprises
+in its sphere the condition of the others), in so far as this can be
+done by comparison? This is the question which we have at present to
+answer. Manifold variety of rules and unity of principles is a
+requirement of reason, for the purpose of bringing the understanding
+into complete accordance with itself, just as understanding subjects
+the manifold content of intuition to conceptions, and thereby
+introduces connection into it. But this principle prescribes no law
+to objects, and does not contain any ground of the possibility of
+cognizing or of determining them as such, but is merely a subjective
+law for the proper arrangement of the content of the understanding.
+The purpose of this law is, by a comparison of the conceptions of
+the understanding, to reduce them to the smallest possible number,
+although, at the same time, it does not justify us in demanding from
+objects themselves such a uniformity as might contribute to the
+convenience and the enlargement of the sphere of the understanding,
+or in expecting that it will itself thus receive from them objective
+validity. In one word, the question is: "does reason in itself, that
+is, does pure reason contain a priori synthetical principles and
+rules, and what are those principles?"
+
+The formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms gives us
+sufficient information in regard to the ground on which the
+transcendental principle of reason in its pure synthetical cognition
+will rest.
+
+1. Reason, as observed in the syllogistic process, is not applicable
+to intuitions, for the purpose of subjecting them to rules--for this
+is the province of the understanding with its categories--but to
+conceptions and judgements. If pure reason does apply to objects and
+the intuition of them, it does so not immediately, but mediately-
+through the understanding and its judgements, which have a direct
+relation to the senses and their intuition, for the purpose of
+determining their objects. The unity of reason is therefore not the
+unity of a possible experience, but is essentially different from this
+unity, which is that of the understanding. That everything which
+happens has a cause, is not a principle cognized and prescribed by
+reason. This principle makes the unity of experience possible and
+borrows nothing from reason, which, without a reference to possible
+experience, could never have produced by means of mere conceptions
+any such synthetical unity.
+
+2. Reason, in its logical use, endeavours to discover the general
+condition of its judgement (the conclusion), and a syllogism is itself
+nothing but a judgement by means of the subsumption of its condition
+under a general rule (the major). Now as this rule may itself be
+subjected to the same process of reason, and thus the condition of
+the condition be sought (by means of a prosyllogism) as long as the
+process can be continued, it is very manifest that the peculiar
+principle of reason in its logical use is to find for the
+conditioned cognition of the understanding the unconditioned whereby
+the unity of the former is completed.
+
+But this logical maxim cannot be a principle of pure reason,
+unless we admit that, if the conditioned is given, the whole series
+of conditions subordinated to one another--a series which is consequently
+itself unconditioned--is also given, that is, contained in the
+object and its connection.
+
+But this principle of pure reason is evidently synthetical; for,
+analytically, the conditioned certainly relates to some condition,
+but not to the unconditioned. From this principle also there must
+originate different synthetical propositions, of which the pure
+understanding is perfectly ignorant, for it has to do only with
+objects of a possible experience, the cognition and synthesis of which
+is always conditioned. The unconditioned, if it does really exist,
+must be especially considered in regard to the determinations which
+distinguish it from whatever is conditioned, and will thus afford us
+material for many a priori synthetical propositions.
+
+The principles resulting from this highest principle of pure
+reason will, however, be transcendent in relation to phenomena, that
+is to say, it will be impossible to make any adequate empirical use
+of this principle. It is therefore completely different from all
+principles of the understanding, the use made of which is entirely
+immanent, their object and purpose being merely the possibility of
+experience. Now our duty in the transcendental dialectic is as
+follows. To discover whether the principle that the series of
+conditions (in the synthesis of phenomena, or of thought in general)
+extends to the unconditioned is objectively true, or not; what
+consequences result therefrom affecting the empirical use of the
+understanding, or rather whether there exists any such objectively
+valid proposition of reason, and whether it is not, on the contrary,
+a merely logical precept which directs us to ascend perpetually to
+still higher conditions, to approach completeness in the series of
+them, and thus to introduce into our cognition the highest possible
+unity of reason. We must ascertain, I say, whether this requirement
+of reason has not been regarded, by a misunderstanding, as a transcendental
+principle of pure reason, which postulates a thorough completeness
+in the series of conditions in objects themselves. We must show,
+moreover, the misconceptions and illusions that intrude into
+syllogisms, the major proposition of which pure reason has supplied--a
+proposition which has perhaps more of the character of a petitio
+than of a postulatum--and that proceed from experience upwards to
+its conditions. The solution of these problems is our task in
+transcendental dialectic, which we are about to expose even at its
+source, that lies deep in human reason. We shall divide it into two
+parts, the first of which will treat of the transcendent conceptions
+of pure reason, the second of transcendent and dialectical syllogisms.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK I.
+
+OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON.
+
+The conceptions of pure reason--we do not here speak of the
+possibility of them--are not obtained by reflection, but by
+inference or conclusion. The conceptions of understanding are also
+cogitated a priori antecedently to experience, and render it possible;
+but they contain nothing but the unity of reflection upon phenomena,
+in so far as these must necessarily belong to a possible empirical
+consciousness. Through them alone are cognition and the
+determination of an object possible. It is from them, accordingly,
+that we receive material for reasoning, and antecedently to them we
+possess no a priori conceptions of objects from which they might be
+deduced, On the other hand, the sole basis of their objective
+reality consists in the necessity imposed on them, as containing the
+intellectual form of all experience, of restricting their
+application and influence to the sphere of experience.
+
+But the term, conception of reason, or rational conception, itself
+indicates that it does not confine itself within the limits of
+experience, because its object-matter is a cognition, of which every
+empirical cognition is but a part--nay, the whole of possible
+experience may be itself but a part of it--a cognition to which no
+actual experience ever fully attains, although it does always
+pertain to it. The aim of rational conceptions is the comprehension,
+as that of the conceptions of understanding is the understanding of
+perceptions. If they contain the unconditioned, they relate to that
+to which all experience is subordinate, but which is never itself an
+object of experience--that towards which reason tends in all its
+conclusions from experience, and by the standard of which it estimates
+the degree of their empirical use, but which is never itself an
+element in an empirical synthesis. If, notwithstanding, such
+conceptions possess objective validity, they may be called conceptus
+ratiocinati (conceptions legitimately concluded); in cases where
+they do not, they have been admitted on account of having the
+appearance of being correctly concluded, and may be called conceptus
+ratiocinantes (sophistical conceptions). But as this can only be
+sufficiently demonstrated in that part of our treatise which relates
+to the dialectical conclusions of reason, we shall omit any
+consideration of it in this place. As we called the pure conceptions
+of the understanding categories, we shall also distinguish those of
+pure reason by a new name and call them transcendental ideas. These
+terms, however, we must in the first place explain and justify.
+
+
+
+SECTION I--Of Ideas in General.
+
+Despite the great wealth of words which European languages
+possess, the thinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression
+exactly suited to his conception, for want of which he is unable to
+make himself intelligible either to others or to himself. To coin
+new words is a pretension to legislation in language which is seldom
+successful; and, before recourse is taken to so desperate an
+expedient, it is advisable to examine the dead and learned
+languages, with the hope and the probability that we may there meet
+with some adequate expression of the notion we have in our minds. In
+this case, even if the original meaning of the word has become
+somewhat uncertain, from carelessness or want of caution on the part
+of the authors of it, it is always better to adhere to and confirm
+its proper meaning--even although it may be doubtful whether it was
+formerly used in exactly this sense--than to make our labour vain by
+want of sufficient care to render ourselves intelligible.
+
+For this reason, when it happens that there exists only a single
+word to express a certain conception, and this word, in its usual
+acceptation, is thoroughly adequate to the conception, the accurate
+distinction of which from related conceptions is of great
+importance, we ought not to employ the expression improvidently, or,
+for the sake of variety and elegance of style, use it as a synonym
+for other cognate words. It is our duty, on the contrary, carefully
+to preserve its peculiar signification, as otherwise it easily happens
+that when the attention of the reader is no longer particularly
+attracted to the expression, and it is lost amid the multitude of
+other words of very different import, the thought which it conveyed,
+and which it alone conveyed, is lost with it.
+
+Plato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he
+meant by it something which is never derived from the senses, but
+which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding (with
+which Aristotle occupied himself), inasmuch as in experience nothing
+perfectly corresponding to them could be found. Ideas are, according
+to him, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to
+possible experiences, like the categories. In his view they flow
+from the highest reason, by which they have been imparted to human
+reason, which, however, exists no longer in its original state, but
+is obliged with great labour to recall by reminiscence--which is called
+philosophy--the old but now sadly obscured ideas. I will not here
+enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this
+sublime philosopher attached to this expression. I shall content
+myself with remarking that it is nothing unusual, in common
+conversation as well as in written works, by comparing the thoughts
+which an author has delivered upon a subject, to understand him better
+than he understood himself inasmuch as he may not have sufficiently
+determined his conception, and thus have sometimes spoken, nay even
+thought, in opposition to his own opinions.
+
+Plato perceived very clearly that our faculty of cognition has the
+feeling of a much higher vocation than that of merely spelling out
+phenomena according to synthetical unity, for the purpose of being
+able to read them as experience, and that our reason naturally
+raises itself to cognitions far too elevated to admit of the
+possibility of an object given by experience corresponding to them-
+cognitions which are nevertheless real, and are not mere phantoms of
+the brain.
+
+This philosopher found his ideas especially in all that is
+practical,* that is, which rests upon freedom, which in its turn ranks
+under cognitions that are the peculiar product of reason. He who would
+derive from experience the conceptions of virtue, who would make (as
+many have really done) that, which at best can but serve as an
+imperfectly illustrative example, a model for or the formation of a
+perfectly adequate idea on the subject, would in fact transform virtue
+into a nonentity changeable according to time and circumstance and
+utterly incapable of being employed as a rule. On the contrary,
+every one is conscious that, when any one is held up to him as a model
+of virtue, he compares this so-called model with the true original
+which he possesses in his own mind and values him according to this
+standard. But this standard is the idea of virtue, in relation to
+which all possible objects of experience are indeed serviceable as
+examples--proofs of the practicability in a certain degree of that
+which the conception of virtue demands--but certainly not as
+archetypes. That the actions of man will never be in perfect
+accordance with all the requirements of the pure ideas of reason, does
+not prove the thought to be chimerical. For only through this idea
+are all judgements as to moral merit or demerit possible; it
+consequently lies at the foundation of every approach to moral
+perfection, however far removed from it the obstacles in human nature-
+indeterminable as to degree--may keep us.
+
+[*Footnote: He certainly extended the application of his conception
+to speculative cognitions also, provided they were given pure and
+completely a priori, nay, even to mathematics, although this science
+cannot possess an object otherwhere than in Possible experience. I
+cannot follow him in this, and as little can I follow him in his
+mystical deduction of these ideas, or in his hypostatization of
+them; although, in truth, the elevated and exaggerated language
+which he employed in describing them is quite capable of an
+interpretation more subdued and more in accordance with fact and the
+nature of things.]
+
+The Platonic Republic has become proverbial as an example--and a
+striking one--of imaginary perfection, such as can exist only in the
+brain of the idle thinker; and Brucker ridicules the philosopher for
+maintaining that a prince can never govern well, unless he is
+participant in the ideas. But we should do better to follow up this
+thought and, where this admirable thinker leaves us without
+assistance, employ new efforts to place it in clearer light, rather
+than carelessly fling it aside as useless, under the very miserable
+and pernicious pretext of impracticability. A constitution of the
+greatest possible human freedom according to laws, by which the
+liberty of every individual can consist with the liberty of every
+other (not of the greatest possible happiness, for this follows
+necessarily from the former), is, to say the least, a necessary
+idea, which must be placed at the foundation not only of the first
+plan of the constitution of a state, but of all its laws. And, in
+this, it not necessary at the outset to take account of the
+obstacles which lie in our way--obstacles which perhaps do not
+necessarily arise from the character of human nature, but rather
+from the previous neglect of true ideas in legislation. For there is
+nothing more pernicious and more unworthy of a philosopher, than the
+vulgar appeal to a so-called adverse experience, which indeed would
+not have existed, if those institutions had been established at the
+proper time and in accordance with ideas; while, instead of this,
+conceptions, crude for the very reason that they have been drawn
+from experience, have marred and frustrated all our better views and
+intentions. The more legislation and government are in harmony with
+this idea, the more rare do punishments become and thus it is quite
+reasonable to maintain, as Plato did, that in a perfect state no
+punishments at all would be necessary. Now although a perfect state
+may never exist, the idea is not on that account the less just,
+which holds up this maximum as the archetype or standard of a
+constitution, in order to bring legislative government always nearer
+and nearer to the greatest possible perfection. For at what precise
+degree human nature must stop in its progress, and how wide must be
+the chasm which must necessarily exist between the idea and its
+realization, are problems which no one can or ought to determine-
+and for this reason, that it is the destination of freedom to overstep
+all assigned limits between itself and the idea.
+
+But not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and
+where ideas are operative causes (of actions and their objects),
+that is to say, in the region of ethics, but also in regard to
+nature herself, Plato saw clear proofs of an origin from ideas. A
+plant, and animal, the regular order of nature--probably also the
+disposition of the whole universe--give manifest evidence that they
+are possible only by means of and according to ideas; that, indeed,
+no one creature, under the individual conditions of its existence,
+perfectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its kind-
+just as little as man with the idea of humanity, which nevertheless
+he bears in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions; that,
+notwithstanding, these ideas are in the highest sense individually,
+unchangeably, and completely determined, and are the original causes
+of things; and that the totality of connected objects in the
+universe is alone fully adequate to that idea. Setting aside the
+exaggerations of expression in the writings of this philosopher, the
+mental power exhibited in this ascent from the ectypal mode of
+regarding the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof
+according to ends, that is, ideas, is an effort which deserves
+imitation and claims respect. But as regards the principles of ethics,
+of legislation, and of religion, spheres in which ideas alone render
+experience possible, although they never attain to full expression
+therein, he has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar merit,
+which is not appreciated only because it is judged by the very
+empirical rules, the validity of which as principles is destroyed by
+ideas. For as regards nature, experience presents us with rules and
+is the source of truth, but in relation to ethical laws experience
+is the parent of illusion, and it is in the highest degree reprehensible
+to limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what I ought to do, from
+what is done.
+
+We must, however, omit the consideration of these important
+subjects, the development of which is in reality the peculiar duty
+and dignity of philosophy, and confine ourselves for the present to
+the more humble but not less useful task of preparing a firm foundation
+for those majestic edifices of moral science. For this foundation
+has been hitherto insecure from the many subterranean passages which
+reason in its confident but vain search for treasures has made in
+all directions. Our present duty is to make ourselves perfectly
+acquainted with the transcendental use made of pure reason, its
+principles and ideas, that we may be able properly to determine and
+value its influence and real worth. But before bringing these
+introductory remarks to a close, I beg those who really have
+philosophy at heart--and their number is but small--if they shall find
+themselves convinced by the considerations following as well as by
+those above, to exert themselves to preserve to the expression idea
+its original signification, and to take care that it be not lost among
+those other expressions by which all sorts of representations are
+loosely designated--that the interests of science may not thereby
+suffer. We are in no want of words to denominate adequately every mode
+of representation, without the necessity of encroaching upon terms
+which are proper to others. The following is a graduated list of them.
+The genus is representation in general (representatio). Under it
+stands representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception
+which relates solely to the subject as a modification of its state,
+is a sensation (sensatio), an objective perception is a cognition
+(cognitio). A cognition is either an intuition or a conception
+(intuitus vel conceptus). The former has an immediate relation to
+the object and is singular and individual; the latter has but a
+mediate relation, by means of a characteristic mark which may be
+common to several things. A conception is either empirical or pure.
+A pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding
+alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image, is called
+notio. A conception formed from notions, which transcends the
+possibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception of reason. To
+one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions, it must be quite
+intolerable to hear the representation of the colour red called an
+idea. It ought not even to be called a notion or conception of
+understanding.
+
+
+
+SECTION II. Of Transcendental Ideas.
+
+Transcendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our
+cognition can contain the origin of pure conceptions a priori,
+conceptions which represent objects antecedently to all experience,
+or rather, indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible
+an empirical cognition of objects. The form of judgements--converted
+into a conception of the synthesis of intuitions--produced the categories
+which direct the employment of the understanding in experience. This
+consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms,
+when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions, following the rule
+of the categories, will contain the origin of particular a priori
+conceptions, which we may call pure conceptions of reason or
+transcendental ideas, and which will determine the use of the
+understanding in the totality of experience according to principles.
+
+The function of reason in arguments consists in the universality
+of a cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is
+a judgement which is determined a priori in the whole extent of its
+condition. The proposition: "Caius is mortal," is one which may be
+obtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone; but
+my wish is to find a conception which contains the condition under
+which the predicate of this judgement is given--in this case, the
+conception of man--and after subsuming under this condition, taken
+in its whole extent (all men are mortal), I determine according to
+it the cognition of the object thought, and say: "Caius is mortal."
+
+Hence, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a predicate to
+a certain object, after having thought it in the major in its whole
+extent under a certain condition. This complete quantity of the extent
+in relation to such a condition is called universality
+(universalitas). To this corresponds totality (universitas) of
+conditions in the synthesis of intuitions. The transcendental
+conception of reason is therefore nothing else than the conception
+of the totality of the conditions of a given conditioned. Now as the
+unconditioned alone renders possible totality of conditions, and,
+conversely, the totality of conditions is itself always unconditioned;
+a pure rational conception in general can be defined and explained
+by means of the conception of the unconditioned, in so far as it
+contains a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned.
+
+To the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates
+by means of the categories, the number of pure rational conceptions
+will correspond. We must therefore seek for, first, an unconditioned
+of the categorical synthesis in a subject; secondly, of the
+hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series; thirdly, of the
+disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system.
+
+There are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms, each of
+which proceeds through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned--one to
+the subject which cannot be employed as predicate, another to the
+presupposition which supposes nothing higher than itself, and the
+third to an aggregate of the members of the complete division of a
+conception. Hence the pure rational conceptions of totality in the
+synthesis of conditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of
+human reason--at least as modes of elevating the unity of the
+understanding to the unconditioned. They may have no valid
+application, corresponding to their transcendental employment, in
+concreto, and be thus of no greater utility than to direct the
+understanding how, while extending them as widely as possible, to
+maintain its exercise and application in perfect consistence and
+harmony.
+
+But, while speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the
+unconditioned as the common title of all conceptions of reason, we
+again light upon an expression which we find it impossible to dispense
+with, and which nevertheless, owing to the ambiguity attaching to it
+from long abuse, we cannot employ with safety. The word absolute is
+one of the few words which, in its original signification, was
+perfectly adequate to the conception it was intended to convey--a
+conception which no other word in the same language exactly suits,
+and the loss--or, which is the same thing, the incautious and loose
+employment--of which must be followed by the loss of the conception
+itself. And, as it is a conception which occupies much of the
+attention of reason, its loss would be greatly to the detriment of
+all transcendental philosophy. The word absolute is at present
+frequently used to denote that something can be predicated of a
+thing considered in itself and intrinsically. In this sense absolutely
+possible would signify that which is possible in itself (interne)-
+which is, in fact, the least that one can predicate of an object. On
+the other hand, it is sometimes employed to indicate that a thing is
+valid in all respects--for example, absolute sovereignty. Absolutely
+possible would in this sense signify that which is possible in all
+relations and in every respect; and this is the most that can be
+predicated of the possibility of a thing. Now these significations
+do in truth frequently coincide. Thus, for example, that which is
+intrinsically impossible, is also impossible in all relations, that
+is, absolutely impossible. But in most cases they differ from each
+other toto caelo, and I can by no means conclude that, because a thing
+is in itself possible, it is also possible in all relations, and
+therefore absolutely. Nay, more, I shall in the sequel show that
+absolute necessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity,
+and that, therefore, it must not be considered as synonymous with
+it. Of an opposite which is intrinsically impossible, we may affirm
+that it is in all respects impossible, and that, consequently, the
+thing itself, of which this is the opposite, is absolutely
+necessary; but I cannot reason conversely and say, the opposite of
+that which is absolutely necessary is intrinsically impossible, that
+is, that the absolute necessity of things is an internal necessity.
+For this internal necessity is in certain cases a mere empty word with
+which the least conception cannot be connected, while the conception
+of the necessity of a thing in all relations possesses very peculiar
+determinations. Now as the loss of a conception of great utility in
+speculative science cannot be a matter of indifference to the
+philosopher, I trust that the proper determination and careful
+preservation of the expression on which the conception depends will
+likewise be not indifferent to him.
+
+In this enlarged signification, then, shall I employ the word
+absolute, in opposition to that which is valid only in some particular
+respect; for the latter is restricted by conditions, the former is
+valid without any restriction whatever.
+
+Now the transcendental conception of reason has for its object
+nothing else than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions
+and does not rest satisfied till it has attained to the absolutely,
+that is, in all respects and relations, unconditioned. For pure reason
+leaves to the understanding everything that immediately relates to
+the object of intuition or rather to their synthesis in imagination.
+The former restricts itself to the absolute totality in the employment
+of the conceptions of the understanding and aims at carrying out the
+synthetical unity which is cogitated in the category, even to the
+unconditioned. This unity may hence be called the rational unity of
+phenomena, as the other, which the category expresses, may be termed
+the unity of the understanding. Reason, therefore, has an immediate
+relation to the use of the understanding, not indeed in so far as
+the latter contains the ground of possible experience (for the
+conception of the absolute totality of conditions is not a
+conception that can be employed in experience, because no experience
+is unconditioned), but solely for the purpose of directing it to a
+certain unity, of which the understanding has no conception, and the
+aim of which is to collect into an absolute whole all acts of the
+understanding. Hence the objective employment of the pure
+conceptions of reason is always transcendent, while that of the pure
+conceptions of the understanding must, according to their nature, be
+always immanent, inasmuch as they are limited to possible experience.
+
+I understand by idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no
+corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense.
+Accordingly, the pure conceptions of reason at present under
+consideration are transcendental ideas. They are conceptions of pure
+reason, for they regard all empirical cognition as determined by means
+of an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fictions,
+but natural and necessary products of reason, and have hence a necessary
+relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understanding.
+And, finally, they are transcendent, and overstep the limits of all
+experiences, in which, consequently, no object can ever be presented
+that would be perfectly adequate to a transcendental idea. When we
+use the word idea, we say, as regards its object (an object of the
+pure understanding), a great deal, but as regards its subject (that
+is, in respect of its reality under conditions of experience), exceedingly
+little, because the idea, as the conception of a maximum, can never
+be completely and adequately presented in concreto. Now, as in the
+merely speculative employment of reason the latter is properly the
+sole aim, and as in this case the approximation to a conception, which
+is never attained in practice, is the same thing as if the conception
+were non-existent--it is commonly said of the conception of this kind,
+"it is only an idea." So we might very well say, "the absolute
+totality of all phenomena is only an idea," for, as we never can
+present an adequate representation of it, it remains for us a
+problem incapable of solution. On the other hand, as in the
+practical use of the understanding we have only to do with action
+and practice according to rules, an idea of pure reason can always
+be given really in concreto, although only partially, nay, it is the
+indispensable condition of all practical employment of reason. The
+practice or execution of the idea is always limited and defective,
+but nevertheless within indeterminable boundaries, consequently always
+under the influence of the conception of an absolute perfection. And
+thus the practical idea is always in the highest degree fruitful,
+and in relation to real actions indispensably necessary. In the
+idea, pure reason possesses even causality and the power of
+producing that which its conception contains. Hence we cannot say of
+wisdom, in a disparaging way, "it is only an idea." For, for the
+very reason that it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible
+aims, it must be for all practical exertions and endeavours the
+primitive condition and rule--a rule which, if not constitutive, is
+at least limitative.
+
+Now, although we must say of the transcendental conceptions of
+reason, "they are only ideas," we must not, on this account, look upon
+them as superfluous and nugatory. For, although no object can be
+determined by them, they can be of great utility, unobserved and at
+the basis of the edifice of the understanding, as the canon for its
+extended and self-consistent exercise--a canon which, indeed, does
+not enable it to cognize more in an object than it would cognize by
+the help of its own conceptions, but which guides it more securely
+in its cognition. Not to mention that they perhaps render possible
+a transition from our conceptions of nature and the non-ego to the
+practical conceptions, and thus produce for even ethical ideas
+keeping, so to speak, and connection with the speculative cognitions
+of reason. The explication of all this must be looked for in the
+sequel.
+
+But setting aside, in conformity with our original purpose, the
+consideration of the practical ideas, we proceed to contemplate reason
+in its speculative use alone, nay, in a still more restricted
+sphere, to wit, in the transcendental use; and here must strike into
+the same path which we followed in our deduction of the categories.
+That is to say, we shall consider the logical form of the cognition
+of reason, that we may see whether reason may not be thereby a source
+of conceptions which enables us to regard objects in themselves as
+determined synthetically a priori, in relation to one or other of
+the functions of reason.
+
+Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of
+cognition, is the faculty of conclusion, that is, of mediate
+judgement--by means of the subsumption of the condition of a possible
+judgement under the condition of a given judgement. The given judgement
+is the general rule (major). The subsumption of the condition of
+another possible judgement under the condition of the rule is the
+minor. The actual judgement, which enounces the assertion of the rule
+in the subsumed case, is the conclusion (conclusio). The rule
+predicates something generally under a certain condition. The condition
+of the rule is satisfied in some particular case. It follows that what
+was valid in general under that condition must also be considered as
+valid in the particular case which satisfies this condition. It is very
+plain that reason attains to a cognition, by means of acts of the
+understanding which constitute a series of conditions. When I arrive at
+the proposition, "All bodies are changeable," by beginning with the
+more remote cognition (in which the conception of body does not appear,
+but which nevertheless contains the condition of that conception), "All
+compound is changeable," by proceeding from this to a less remote
+cognition, which stands under the condition of the former, "Bodies are
+compound," and hence to a third, which at length connects for me the
+remote cognition (changeable) with the one before me, "Consequently,
+bodies are changeable"--I have arrived at a cognition (conclusion)
+through a series of conditions (premisses). Now every series, whose
+exponent (of the categorical or hypothetical judgement) is given, can
+be continued; consequently the same procedure of reason conducts us to
+the ratiocinatio polysyllogistica, which is a series of syllogisms,
+that can be continued either on the side of the conditions (per
+prosyllogismos) or of the conditioned (per episyllogismos) to an
+indefinite extent.
+
+But we very soon perceive that the chain or series of prosyllogisms,
+that is, of deduced cognitions on the side of the grounds or
+conditions of a given cognition, in other words, the ascending
+series of syllogisms must have a very different relation to the
+faculty of reason from that of the descending series, that is, the
+progressive procedure of reason on the side of the conditioned by
+means of episyllogisms. For, as in the former case the cognition
+(conclusio) is given only as conditioned, reason can attain to this
+cognition only under the presupposition that all the members of the
+series on the side of the conditions are given (totality in the series
+of premisses), because only under this supposition is the judgement
+we may be considering possible a priori; while on the side of the
+conditioned or the inferences, only an incomplete and becoming, and
+not a presupposed or given series, consequently only a potential
+progression, is cogitated. Hence, when a cognition is contemplated
+as conditioned, reason is compelled to consider the series of
+conditions in an ascending line as completed and given in their
+totality. But if the very same condition is considered at the same
+time as the condition of other cognitions, which together constitute
+a series of inferences or consequences in a descending line, reason
+may preserve a perfect indifference, as to how far this progression
+may extend a parte posteriori, and whether the totality of this series
+is possible, because it stands in no need of such a series for the
+purpose of arriving at the conclusion before it, inasmuch as this
+conclusion is sufficiently guaranteed and determined on grounds a
+parte priori. It may be the case, that upon the side of the conditions
+the series of premisses has a first or highest condition, or it may
+not possess this, and so be a parte priori unlimited; but it must,
+nevertheless, contain totality of conditions, even admitting that we
+never could succeed in completely apprehending it; and the whole
+series must be unconditionally true, if the conditioned, which is
+considered as an inference resulting from it, is to be held as true.
+This is a requirement of reason, which announces its cognition as
+determined a priori and as necessary, either in itself--and in this
+case it needs no grounds to rest upon--or, if it is deduced, as a
+member of a series of grounds, which is itself unconditionally true.
+
+
+
+SECTION III. System of Transcendental Ideas.
+
+We are not at present engaged with a logical dialectic, which
+makes complete abstraction of the content of cognition and aims only
+at unveiling the illusory appearance in the form of syllogisms. Our
+subject is transcendental dialectic, which must contain, completely
+a priori, the origin of certain cognitions drawn from pure reason,
+and the origin of certain deduced conceptions, the object of which
+cannot be given empirically and which therefore lie beyond the
+sphere of the faculty of understanding. We have observed, from the
+natural relation which the transcendental use of our cognition, in
+syllogisms as well as in judgements, must have to the logical, that
+there are three kinds of dialectical arguments, corresponding to the
+three modes of conclusion, by which reason attains to cognitions on
+principles; and that in all it is the business of reason to ascend
+from the conditioned synthesis, beyond which the understanding never
+proceeds, to the unconditioned which the understanding never can
+reach.
+
+Now the most general relations which can exist in our
+representations are: 1st, the relation to the subject; 2nd, the
+relation to objects, either as phenomena, or as objects of thought
+in general. If we connect this subdivision with the main division,
+all the relations of our representations, of which we can form either
+a conception or an idea, are threefold: 1. The relation to the
+subject; 2. The relation to the manifold of the object as a
+phenomenon; 3. The relation to all things in general.
+
+Now all pure conceptions have to do in general with the
+synthetical unity of representations; conceptions of pure reason
+(transcendental ideas), on the other hand, with the unconditional
+synthetical unity of all conditions. It follows that all
+transcendental ideas arrange themselves in three classes, the first
+of which contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking
+subject, the second the absolute unity of the series of the conditions
+of a phenomenon, the third the absolute unity of the condition of
+all objects of thought in general.
+
+The thinking subject is the object-matter of Psychology; the sum
+total of all phenomena (the world) is the object-matter of
+Cosmology; and the thing which contains the highest condition of the
+possibility of all that is cogitable (the being of all beings) is
+the object-matter of all Theology. Thus pure reason presents us with
+the idea of a transcendental doctrine of the soul (psychologia
+rationalis), of a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia
+rationalis), and finally of a transcendental doctrine of God
+(theologia transcendentalis). Understanding cannot originate even
+the outline of any of these sciences, even when connected with the
+highest logical use of reason, that is, all cogitable syllogisms-
+for the purpose of proceeding from one object (phenomenon) to all
+others, even to the utmost limits of the empirical synthesis. They
+are, on the contrary, pure and genuine products, or problems, of
+pure reason.
+
+What modi of the pure conceptions of reason these transcendental
+ideas are will be fully exposed in the following chapter. They
+follow the guiding thread of the categories. For pure reason never
+relates immediately to objects, but to the conceptions of these
+contained in the understanding. In like manner, it will be made
+manifest in the detailed explanation of these ideas--how reason,
+merely through the synthetical use of the same function which it
+employs in a categorical syllogism, necessarily attains to the
+conception of the absolute unity of the thinking subject--how the
+logical procedure in hypothetical ideas necessarily produces the
+idea of the absolutely unconditioned in a series of given
+conditions, and finally--how the mere form of the disjunctive
+syllogism involves the highest conception of a being of all beings:
+a thought which at first sight seems in the highest degree
+paradoxical.
+
+An objective deduction, such as we were able to present in the
+case of the categories, is impossible as regards these
+transcendental ideas. For they have, in truth, no relation to any
+object, in experience, for the very reason that they are only ideas.
+But a subjective deduction of them from the nature of our reason is
+possible, and has been given in the present chapter.
+
+It is easy to perceive that the sole aim of pure reason is the
+absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the conditions,
+and that it does not concern itself with the absolute completeness
+on the Part of the conditioned. For of the former alone does she stand
+in need, in order to preposit the whole series of conditions, and thus
+present them to the understanding a priori. But if we once have a
+completely (and unconditionally) given condition, there is no
+further necessity, in proceeding with the series, for a conception
+of reason; for the understanding takes of itself every step
+downward, from the condition to the conditioned. Thus the
+transcendental ideas are available only for ascending in the series
+of conditions, till we reach the unconditioned, that is, principles.
+As regards descending to the conditioned, on the other hand, we find
+that there is a widely extensive logical use which reason makes of
+the laws of the understanding, but that a transcendental use thereof
+is impossible; and that when we form an idea of the absolute totality
+of such a synthesis, for example, of the whole series of all future
+changes in the world, this idea is a mere ens rationis, an arbitrary
+fiction of thought, and not a necessary presupposition of reason.
+For the possibility of the conditioned presupposes the totality of
+its conditions, but not of its consequences. Consequently, this conception
+is not a transcendental idea--and it is with these alone that we are
+at present occupied.
+
+Finally, it is obvious that there exists among the transcendental
+ideas a certain connection and unity, and that pure reason, by means
+of them, collects all its cognitions into one system. From the
+cognition of self to the cognition of the world, and through these
+to the supreme being, the progression is so natural, that it seems
+to resemble the logical march of reason from the premisses to the
+conclusion.* Now whether there lies unobserved at the foundation of
+these ideas an analogy of the same kind as exists between the
+logical and transcendental procedure of reason, is another of those
+questions, the answer to which we must not expect till we arrive at
+a more advanced stage in our inquiries. In this cursory and
+preliminary view, we have, meanwhile, reached our aim. For we have
+dispelled the ambiguity which attached to the transcendental
+conceptions of reason, from their being commonly mixed up with other
+conceptions in the systems of philosophers, and not properly
+distinguished from the conceptions of the understanding; we have
+exposed their origin and, thereby, at the same time their
+determinate number, and presented them in a systematic connection,
+and have thus marked out and enclosed a definite sphere for pure reason.
+
+
+[*Footnote: The science of Metaphysics has for the proper object of
+its inquiries only three grand ideas: GOD, FREEDOM, and IMMORTALITY,
+and it aims at showing, that the second conception, conjoined with
+the first, must lead to the third, as a necessary conclusion. All the
+other subjects with which it occupies itself, are merely means for
+the attainment and realization of these ideas. It does not require
+these ideas for the construction of a science of nature, but, on the
+contrary, for the purpose of passing beyond the sphere of nature. A
+complete insight into and comprehension of them would render Theology,
+Ethics, and, through the conjunction of both, Religion, solely
+dependent on the speculative faculty of reason. In a systematic
+representation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrangement--the
+synthetical one--would be the most suitable; but in the
+investigation which must necessarily precede it, the analytical, which
+reverses this arrangement, would be better adapted to our purpose,
+as in it we should proceed from that which experience immediately
+presents to us--psychology, to cosmology, and thence to theology.]
+
+
+
+BOOK II.
+
+OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE REASON.
+
+It may be said that the object of a merely transcendental idea is
+something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be
+a necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For,
+in fact, a conception of an object that is adequate to the idea given
+by reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of
+being presented and intuited in a Possible experience. But we should
+express our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood,
+if we said that we can have no knowledge of an object, which perfectly
+corresponds to an idea, although we may possess a problematical
+conception thereof.
+
+Now the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure
+conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such
+ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be
+syllogisms which contain no empirical premisses, and by means of which
+we conclude from something that we do know, to something of which we
+do not even possess a conception, to which we, nevertheless, by an
+unavoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are,
+as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms,
+although indeed, as regards their origin, they are very well
+entitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or
+accidental products of reason, but are necessitated by its very
+nature. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself,
+from which the Wisest cannot free himself. After long labour he may
+be able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly
+rid of the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him.
+
+Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds,
+corresponding to the number of the ideas which their conclusions
+present. In the argument or syllogism of the first class, I
+conclude, from the transcendental conception of the subject contains
+no manifold, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I
+cannot in this manner attain to a conception. This dialectical
+argument I shall call the transcendental paralogism. The second
+class of sophistical arguments is occupied with the transcendental
+conception of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for
+a given phenomenon, and I conclude, from the fact that I have always
+a self-contradictory conception of the unconditioned synthetical unity
+of the series upon one side, the truth of the opposite unity, of which
+I have nevertheless no conception. The condition of reason in these
+dialectical arguments, I shall term the antinomy of pure reason.
+Finally, according to the third kind of sophistical argument, I
+conclude, from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in
+general, in so far as they can be given, the absolute synthetical
+unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general;
+that is, from things which I do not know in their mere
+transcendental conception, I conclude a being of all beings which I
+know still less by means of a transcendental conception, and of
+whose unconditioned necessity I can form no conception whatever.
+This dialectical argument I shall call the ideal of pure reason.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.
+
+The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in
+respect of its form, be the content what it may. But a
+transcendental paralogism has a transcendental foundation, and
+concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexceptionable. In
+this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human
+reason, and is the parent of an unavoidable, though not insoluble,
+mental illusion.
+
+We now come to a conception which was not inserted in the general
+list of transcendental conceptions, and yet must be reckoned with
+them, but at the same time without in the least altering, or
+indicating a deficiency in that table. This is the conception, or,
+if the term is preferred, the judgement, "I think." But it is
+readily perceived that this thought is as it were the vehicle of all
+conceptions in general, and consequently of transcendental conceptions
+also, and that it is therefore regarded as a transcendental
+conception, although it can have no peculiar claim to be so ranked,
+inasmuch as its only use is to indicate that all thought is
+accompanied by consciousness. At the same time, pure as this
+conception is from empirical content (impressions of the senses), it
+enables us to distinguish two different kinds of objects. "I," as
+thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That
+which is an object of the external senses is called body. Thus the
+expression, "I," as a thinking being, designates the object-matter
+of psychology, which may be called "the rational doctrine of the
+soul," inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing of the
+soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me
+in concreto), may be concluded from this conception "I," in so far
+as it appears in all thought.
+
+Now, the rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of
+this kind. For if the smallest empirical element of thought, if any
+particular perception of my internal state, were to be introduced
+among the grounds of cognition of this science, it would not be a
+rational, but an empirical doctrine of the soul. We have thus before
+us a pretended science, raised upon the single proposition, "I think,"
+whose foundation or want of foundation we may very properly, and
+agreeably with the nature of a transcendental philosophy, here
+examine. It ought not to be objected that in this proposition, which
+expresses the perception of one's self, an internal experience is
+asserted, and that consequently the rational doctrine of the soul
+which is founded upon it, is not pure, but partly founded upon an
+empirical principle. For this internal perception is nothing more than
+the mere apperception, "I think," which in fact renders all
+transcendental conceptions possible, in which we say, "I think
+substance, cause, etc." For internal experience in general and its
+possibility, or perception in general, and its relation to other
+perceptions, unless some particular distinction or determination
+thereof is empirically given, cannot be regarded as empirical
+cognition, but as cognition of the empirical, and belongs to the
+investigation of the possibility of every experience, which is
+certainly transcendental. The smallest object of experience (for
+example, only pleasure or pain), that should be included in the
+general representation of self-consciousness, would immediately change
+the rational into an empirical psychology.
+
+"I think" is therefore the only text of rational psychology, from
+which it must develop its whole system. It is manifest that this
+thought, when applied to an object (myself), can contain nothing but
+transcendental predicates thereof; because the least empirical
+predicate would destroy the purity of the science and its independence
+of all experience.
+
+But we shall have to follow here the guidance of the categories-
+only, as in the present case a thing, "I," as thinking being, is at
+first given, we shall--not indeed change the order of the categories
+as it stands in the table--but begin at the category of substance,
+by which at the a thing in itself is represented and proceeds
+backwards through the series. The topic of the rational doctrine of
+the soul, from which everything else it may contain must be deduced,
+is accordingly as follows:
+
+
+ 1 2
+ The Soul is SUBSTANCE As regards its quality
+ it is SIMPLE
+
+ 3
+ As regards the different
+ times in which it exists,
+ it is numerically identical,
+ that is UNITY, not Plurality.
+
+ 4
+ It is in relation to possible objects in space*
+
+
+[*Footnote: The reader, who may not so easily perceive the
+psychological sense of these expressions, taken here in their
+transcendental abstraction, and cannot guess why the latter attribute
+of the soul belongs to the category of existence, will find the
+expressions sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. I have,
+moreover, to apologize for the Latin terms which have been employed,
+instead of their German synonyms, contrary to the rules of correct
+writing. But I judged it better to sacrifice elegance to perspicuity.]
+
+From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure
+psychology, by combination alone, without the aid of any other
+principle. This substance, merely as an object of the internal
+sense, gives the conception of Immateriality; as simple substance,
+that of Incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance,
+gives the conception of Personality; all these three together,
+Spirituality. Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception
+of connection (commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking
+substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as a soul
+(anima), and as the ground of Animality; and this, limited and
+determined by the conception of spirituality, gives us that of
+Immortality.
+
+Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a transcendental
+psychology, which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason,
+touching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at
+the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself
+perfectly contentless representation "I" which cannot even be called
+a conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all
+conceptions. By this "I," or "He," or "It," who or which thinks,
+nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought
+= x, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its
+predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least
+conception. Hence in a perpetual circle, inasmuch as we must always
+employ it, in order to frame any judgement respecting it. And this
+inconvenience we find it impossible to rid ourselves of, because
+consciousness in itself is not so much a representation distinguishing
+a particular object, as a form of representation in general, in so
+far as it may be termed cognition; for in and by cognition alone do
+I think anything.
+
+It must, however, appear extraordinary at first sight that the
+condition under which I think, and which is consequently a property
+of my subject, should be held to be likewise valid for every existence
+which thinks, and that we can presume to base upon a seemingly
+empirical proposition a judgement which is apodeictic and universal,
+to wit, that everything which thinks is constituted as the voice of
+my consciousness declares it to be, that is, as a self-conscious being.
+The cause of this belief is to be found in the fact that we
+necessarily attribute to things a priori all the properties which
+constitute conditions under which alone we can cogitate them. Now I
+cannot obtain the least representation of a thinking being by means
+of external experience, but solely through self-consciousness. Such
+objects are consequently nothing more than the transference of this
+consciousness of mine to other things which can only thus be
+represented as thinking beings. The proposition, "I think," is, in
+the present case, understood in a problematical sense, not in so far
+as it contains a perception of an existence (like the Cartesian "Cogito,
+ergo sum"),[Footnote: "I think, therefore I am."] but in regard to
+its mere possibility--for the purpose of discovering what properties
+may be inferred from so simple a proposition and predicated of the
+subject of it.
+
+If at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of thinking
+beings there lay more than the mere Cogito--if we could likewise
+call in aid observations on the play of our thoughts, and the thence
+derived natural laws of the thinking self, there would arise an
+empirical psychology which would be a kind of physiology of the
+internal sense and might possibly be capable of explaining the
+phenomena of that sense. But it could never be available for
+discovering those properties which do not belong to possible
+experience (such as the quality of simplicity), nor could it make
+any apodeictic enunciation on the nature of thinking beings: it
+would therefore not be a rational psychology.
+
+Now, as the proposition "I think" (in the problematical sense)
+contains the form of every judgement in general and is the constant
+accompaniment of all the categories, it is manifest that conclusions
+are drawn from it only by a transcendental employment of the
+understanding. This use of the understanding excludes all empirical
+elements; and we cannot, as has been shown above, have any
+favourable conception beforehand of its procedure. We shall
+therefore follow with a critical eye this proposition through all
+the predicaments of pure psychology; but we shall, for brevity's sake,
+allow this examination to proceed in an uninterrupted connection.
+
+Before entering on this task, however, the following general
+remark may help to quicken our attention to this mode of argument.
+It is not merely through my thinking that I cognize an object, but
+only through my determining a given intuition in relation to the unity
+of consciousness in which all thinking consists. It follows that I
+cognize myself, not through my being conscious of myself as
+thinking, but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as
+determined in relation to the function of thought. All the modi of
+self-consciousness in thought are hence not conceptions of objects
+(conceptions of the understanding--categories); they are mere
+logical functions, which do not present to thought an object to be
+cognized, and cannot therefore present my Self as an object. Not the
+consciousness of the determining, but only that of the determinable
+self, that is, of my internal intuition (in so far as the manifold
+contained in it can be connected conformably with the general
+condition of the unity of apperception in thought), is the object.
+
+1. In all judgements I am the determining subject of that relation
+which constitutes a judgement. But that the I which thinks, must be
+considered as in thought always a subject, and as a thing which cannot
+be a predicate to thought, is an apodeictic and identical proposition.
+But this proposition does not signify that I, as an object, am, for
+myself, a self-subsistent being or substance. This latter statement-
+an ambitious one--requires to be supported by data which are not to
+be discovered in thought; and are perhaps (in so far as I consider
+the thinking self merely as such) not to be discovered in the thinking
+self at all.
+
+2. That the I or Ego of apperception, and consequently in all
+thought, is singular or simple, and cannot be resolved into a
+plurality of subjects, and therefore indicates a logically simple
+subject--this is self-evident from the very conception of an Ego,
+and is consequently an analytical proposition. But this is not
+tantamount to declaring that the thinking Ego is a simple substance-
+for this would be a synthetical proposition. The conception of
+substance always relates to intuitions, which with me cannot be
+other than sensuous, and which consequently lie completely out of
+the sphere of the understanding and its thought: but to this sphere
+belongs the affirmation that the Ego is simple in thought. It would
+indeed be surprising, if the conception of "substance," which in other
+cases requires so much labour to distinguish from the other elements
+presented by intuition--so much trouble, too, to discover whether it
+can be simple (as in the case of the parts of matter)--should be
+presented immediately to me, as if by revelation, in the poorest
+mental representation of all.
+
+3. The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the
+manifold representations of which I am conscious, is likewise a
+proposition lying in the conceptions themselves, and is consequently
+analytical. But this identity of the subject, of which I am
+conscious in all its representations, does not relate to or concern
+the intuition of the subject, by which it is given as an object.
+This proposition cannot therefore enounce the identity of the
+person, by which is understood the consciousness of the identity of
+its own substance as a thinking being in all change and variation of
+circumstances. To prove this, we should require not a mere analysis
+of the proposition, but synthetical judgements based upon a given
+intuition.
+
+4. I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from
+that of other things external to me--among which my body also is
+reckoned. This is also an analytical proposition, for other things
+are exactly those which I think as different or distinguished from
+myself. But whether this consciousness of myself is possible without
+things external to me; and whether therefore I can exist merely as
+a thinking being (without being man)--cannot be known or inferred from
+this proposition.
+
+Thus we have gained nothing as regards the cognition of myself as
+object, by the analysis of the consciousness of my Self in thought.
+The logical exposition of thought in general is mistaken for a
+metaphysical determination of the object.
+
+Our Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous, if there
+existed a possibility of proving a priori, that all thinking beings
+are in themselves simple substances, as such, therefore, possess the
+inseparable attribute of personality, and are conscious of their
+existence apart from and unconnected with matter. For we should thus
+have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have penetrated
+into the sphere of noumena; and in this case the right could not be
+denied us of extending our knowledge in this sphere, of establishing
+ourselves, and, under a favouring star, appropriating to ourselves
+possessions in it. For the proposition: "Every thinking being, as
+such, is simple substance," is an a priori synthetical proposition;
+because in the first place it goes beyond the conception which is
+the subject of it, and adds to the mere notion of a thinking being
+the mode of its existence, and in the second place annexes a predicate
+(that of simplicity) to the latter conception--a predicate which it
+could not have discovered in the sphere of experience. It would follow
+that a priori synthetical propositions are possible and legitimate,
+not only, as we have maintained, in relation to objects of possible
+experience, and as principles of the possibility of this experience
+itself, but are applicable to things in themselves--an inference which
+makes an end of the whole of this Critique, and obliges us to fall
+back on the old mode of metaphysical procedure. But indeed the
+danger is not so great, if we look a little closer into the question.
+
+There lurks in the procedure of rational Psychology a paralogism,
+which is represented in the following syllogism:
+
+That which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject, does not
+exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance.
+
+A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be cogitated
+otherwise than as subject.
+
+Therefore it exists also as such, that is, as substance.
+
+In the major we speak of a being that can be cogitated generally and
+in every relation, consequently as it may be given in intuition. But
+in the minor we speak of the same being only in so far as it regards
+itself as subject, relatively to thought and the unity of
+consciousness, but not in relation to intuition, by which it is
+presented as an object to thought. Thus the conclusion is here arrived
+at by a Sophisma figurae dictionis.*
+
+[*Footnote: Thought is taken in the two premisses in two totally
+different senses. In the major it is considered as relating and applying
+to objects in general, consequently to objects of intuition also. In the
+minor, we understand it as relating merely to self-consciousness. In
+this sense, we do not cogitate an object, but merely the relation to the
+self-consciousness of the subject, as the form of thought. In the former
+premiss we speak of things which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as
+subjects. In the second, we do not speak of things, but of thought (all
+objects being abstracted), in which the Ego is always the subject of
+consciousness. Hence the conclusion cannot be, "I cannot exist otherwise
+than as subject"; but only "I can, in cogitating my existence, employ my
+Ego only as the subject of the judgement." But this is an identical
+proposition, and throws no light on the mode of my existence.]
+
+That this famous argument is a mere paralogism, will be plain to any
+one who will consider the general remark which precedes our exposition
+of the principles of the pure understanding, and the section on
+noumena. For it was there proved that the conception of a thing, which
+can exist per se--only as a subject and never as a predicate,
+possesses no objective reality; that is to say, we can never know
+whether there exists any object to correspond to the conception;
+consequently, the conception is nothing more than a conception, and
+from it we derive no proper knowledge. If this conception is to
+indicate by the term substance, an object that can be given, if it
+is to become a cognition, we must have at the foundation of the
+cognition a permanent intuition, as the indispensable condition of
+its objective reality. For through intuition alone can an object be
+given. But in internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the
+Ego is but the consciousness of my thought. If then, we appeal merely
+to thought, we cannot discover the necessary condition of the application
+of the conception of substance--that is, of a subject existing per
+se--to the subject as a thinking being. And thus the conception of
+the simple nature of substance, which is connected with the objective
+reality of this conception, is shown to be also invalid, and to be,
+in fact, nothing more than the logical qualitative unity of
+self-consciousness in thought; whilst we remain perfectly ignorant
+whether the subject is composite or not.
+
+
+
+Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the
+Substantiality or Permanence of the Soul.
+
+This acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the
+common argument which attempts to prove that the soul--it being
+granted that it is a simple being--cannot perish by dissolution or
+decomposition; he saw it is not impossible for it to cease to be by
+extinction, or disappearance. He endeavoured to prove in his Phaedo,
+that the soul cannot be annihilated, by showing that a simple being
+cannot cease to exist. Inasmuch as, he said, a simple existence cannot
+diminish, nor gradually lose portions of its being, and thus be by
+degrees reduced to nothing (for it possesses no parts, and therefore
+no multiplicity), between the moment in which it is, and the moment
+in which it is not, no time can be discovered--which is impossible.
+But this philosopher did not consider that, granting the soul to possess
+this simple nature, which contains no parts external to each other
+and consequently no extensive quantity, we cannot refuse to it any
+less than to any other being, intensive quantity, that is, a degree
+of reality in regard to all its faculties, nay, to all that constitutes
+its existence. But this degree of reality can become less and less
+through an infinite series of smaller degrees. It follows,
+therefore, that this supposed substance--this thing, the permanence
+of which is not assured in any other way, may, if not by decomposition,
+by gradual loss (remissio) of its powers (consequently by
+elanguescence, if I may employ this expression), be changed into
+nothing. For consciousness itself has always a degree, which may be
+lessened.* Consequently the faculty of being conscious may be
+diminished; and so with all other faculties. The permanence of the
+soul, therefore, as an object of the internal sense, remains
+undemonstrated, nay, even indemonstrable. Its permanence in life is
+evident, per se, inasmuch as the thinking being (as man) is to itself,
+at the same time, an object of the external senses. But this does
+not authorize the rational psychologist to affirm, from mere
+conceptions, its permanence beyond life.*[2]
+
+[*Footnote: Clearness is not, as logicians maintain, the consciousness
+of a representation. For a certain degree of consciousness, which may
+not, however, be sufficient for recollection, is to be met with in
+many dim representations. For without any consciousness at all, we
+should not be able to recognize any difference in the obscure
+representations we connect; as we really can do with many conceptions,
+such as those of right and justice, and those of the musician, who
+strikes at once several notes in improvising a piece of music. But
+a representation is clear, in which our consciousness is sufficient
+for the consciousness of the difference of this representation from
+others. If we are only conscious that there is a difference, but are
+not conscious of the difference--that is, what the difference is-
+the representation must be termed obscure. There is, consequently,
+an infinite series of degrees of consciousness down to its entire
+disappearance.]
+
+[*[2]Footnote: There are some who think they have done enough to establish
+a new possibility in the mode of the existence of souls, when they
+have shown that there is no contradiction in their hypotheses on
+this subject. Such are those who affirm the possibility of thought--of
+which they have no other knowledge than what they derive from its
+use in connecting empirical intuitions presented in this our human
+life--after this life has ceased. But it is very easy to embarrass
+them by the introduction of counter-possibilities, which rest upon
+quite as good a foundation. Such, for example, is the possibility of
+the division of a simple substance into several substances; and
+conversely, of the coalition of several into one simple substance.
+For, although divisibility presupposes composition, it does not
+necessarily require a composition of substances, but only of the
+degrees (of the several faculties) of one and the same substance.
+Now we can cogitate all the powers and faculties of the soul--even
+that of consciousness--as diminished by one half, the substance
+still remaining. In the same way we can represent to ourselves without
+contradiction, this obliterated half as preserved, not in the soul,
+but without it; and we can believe that, as in this case every
+thing that is real in the soul, and has a degree--consequently its
+entire existence--has been halved, a particular substance would
+arise out of the soul. For the multiplicity, which has been divided,
+formerly existed, but not as a multiplicity of substances, but of
+every reality as the quantum of existence in it; and the unity of
+substance was merely a mode of existence, which by this division alone
+has been transformed into a plurality of subsistence. In the same
+manner several simple substances might coalesce into one, without
+anything being lost except the plurality of subsistence, inasmuch as
+the one substance would contain the degree of reality of all the
+former substances. Perhaps, indeed, the simple substances, which
+appear under the form of matter, might (not indeed by a mechanical
+or chemical influence upon each other, but by an unknown influence,
+of which the former would be but the phenomenal appearance), by means
+of such a dynamical division of the parent-souls, as intensive
+quantities, produce other souls, while the former repaired the loss
+thus sustained with new matter of the same sort. I am far from
+allowing any value to such chimeras; and the principles of our
+analytic have clearly proved that no other than an empirical use of
+the categories--that of substance, for example--is possible. But if
+the rationalist is bold enough to construct, on the mere authority
+of the faculty of thought--without any intuition, whereby an object
+is given--a self-subsistent being, merely because the unity of
+apperception in thought cannot allow him to believe it a composite
+being, instead of declaring, as he ought to do, that he is unable to
+explain the possibility of a thinking nature; what ought to hinder
+the materialist, with as complete an independence of experience, to
+employ the principle of the rationalist in a directly opposite manner--
+still preserving the formal unity required by his opponent?]
+
+If, now, we take the above propositions--as they must be accepted as
+valid for all thinking beings in the system of rational psychology--in
+synthetical connection, and proceed, from the category of relation,
+with the proposition: "All thinking beings are, as such, substances,"
+backwards through the series, till the circle is completed; we come at
+last to their existence, of which, in this system of rational
+psychology, substances are held to be conscious, independently of
+external things; nay, it is asserted that, in relation to the
+permanence which is a necessary characteristic of substance, they can
+of themselves determine external things. It follows that idealism--at
+least problematical idealism, is perfectly unavoidable in this
+rationalistic system. And, if the existence of outward things is not
+held to be requisite to the determination of the existence of a
+substance in time, the existence of these outward things at all, is a
+gratuitous assumption which remains without the possibility of a proof.
+
+But if we proceed analytically--the "I think" as a proposition
+containing in itself an existence as given, consequently modality
+being the principle--and dissect this proposition, in order to
+ascertain its content, and discover whether and how this Ego
+determines its existence in time and space without the aid of anything
+external; the propositions of rationalistic psychology would not begin
+with the conception of a thinking being, but with a reality, and the
+properties of a thinking being in general would be deduced from the
+mode in which this reality is cogitated, after everything empirical
+had been abstracted; as is shown in the following table:
+
+
+ 1
+ I think,
+
+ 2 3
+ as Subject, as simple Subject,
+
+ 4
+ as identical Subject,
+ in every state of my thought.
+
+
+Now, inasmuch as it is not determined in this second proposition,
+whether I can exist and be cogitated only as subject, and not also
+as a predicate of another being, the conception of a subject is here
+taken in a merely logical sense; and it remains undetermined,
+whether substance is to be cogitated under the conception or not.
+But in the third proposition, the absolute unity of apperception-
+the simple Ego in the representation to which all connection and
+separation, which constitute thought, relate, is of itself
+important; even although it presents us with no information about
+the constitution or subsistence of the subject. Apperception is
+something real, and the simplicity of its nature is given in the
+very fact of its possibility. Now in space there is nothing real
+that is at the same time simple; for points, which are the only simple
+things in space, are merely limits, but not constituent parts of
+space. From this follows the impossibility of a definition on the
+basis of materialism of the constitution of my Ego as a merely
+thinking subject. But, because my existence is considered in the first
+proposition as given, for it does not mean, "Every thinking being
+exists" (for this would be predicating of them absolute necessity),
+but only, "I exist thinking"; the proposition is quite empirical,
+and contains the determinability of my existence merely in relation
+to my representations in time. But as I require for this purpose
+something that is permanent, such as is not given in internal
+intuition; the mode of my existence, whether as substance or as
+accident, cannot be determined by means of this simple
+self-consciousness. Thus, if materialism is inadequate to explain
+the mode in which I exist, spiritualism is likewise as insufficient;
+and the conclusion is that we are utterly unable to attain to any
+knowledge of the constitution of the soul, in so far as relates to
+the possibility of its existence apart from external objects.
+
+And, indeed, how should it be possible, merely by the aid of the
+unity of consciousness--which we cognize only for the reason that it
+is indispensable to the possibility of experience--to pass the
+bounds of experience (our existence in this life); and to extend our
+cognition to the nature of all thinking beings by means of the
+empirical--but in relation to every sort of intuition, perfectly
+undetermined--proposition, "I think"?
+
+There does not then exist any rational psychology as a doctrine
+furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves. It is nothing
+more than a discipline, which sets impassable limits to speculative
+reason in this region of thought, to prevent it, on the one hand, from
+throwing itself into the arms of a soulless materialism, and, on the
+other, from losing itself in the mazes of a baseless spiritualism.
+It teaches us to consider this refusal of our reason to give any
+satisfactory answer to questions which reach beyond the limits of this
+our human life, as a hint to abandon fruitless speculation; and to
+direct, to a practical use, our knowledge of ourselves--which,
+although applicable only to objects of experience, receives its
+principles from a higher source, and regulates its procedure as if
+our destiny reached far beyond the boundaries of experience and life.
+
+From all this it is evident that rational psychology has its
+origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which
+lies at the basis of the categories, is considered to be an
+intuition of the subject as an object; and the category of substance
+is applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than the
+unity in thought, by which no object is given; to which therefore
+the category of substance--which always presupposes a given intuition-
+cannot be applied. Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The
+subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason
+that it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object
+of the categories; for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the
+foundation its own pure self-consciousness--the very thing that it
+wishes to explain and describe. In like manner, the subject, in
+which the representation of time has its basis, cannot determine,
+for this very reason, its own existence in time. Now, if the latter
+is impossible, the former, as an attempt to determine itself by means
+of the categories as a thinking being in general, is no less so.*
+
+[*Footnote: The "I think" is, as has been already stated, an empirical
+proposition, and contains the proposition, "I exist." But I cannot say,
+"Everything, which thinks, exists"; for in this case the property of
+thought would constitute all beings possessing it, necessary beings. Hence
+my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition,
+"I think," as Descartes maintained--because in this case the major
+premiss, "Everything, which thinks, exists," must precede--but the two
+propositions are identical. The proposition, "I think," expresses an
+undetermined empirical intuition, that perception (proving consequently
+that sensation, which must belong to sensibility, lies at the foundation
+of this proposition); but it precedes experience, whose province it is
+to determine an object of perception by means of the categories in
+relation to time; and existence in this proposition is not a category,
+as it does not apply to an undetermined given object, but only to one of
+which we have a conception, and about which we wish to know whether it
+does or does not exist, out of, and apart from this conception. An
+undetermined perception signifies here merely something real that has
+been given, only, however, to thought in general--but not as a
+phenomenon, nor as a thing in itself (noumenon), but only as something
+that really exists, and is designated as such in the proposition, "I
+think." For it must be remarked that, when I call the proposition, "I
+think," an empirical proposition, I do not thereby mean that the Ego in
+the proposition is an empirical representation; on the contrary, it is
+purely intellectual, because it belongs to thought in general. But
+without some empirical representation, which presents to the mind
+material for thought, the mental act, "I think," would not take place;
+and the empirical is only the condition of the application or employment
+of the pure intellectual faculty.]
+
+Thus, then, appears the vanity of the hope of establishing a cognition
+which is to extend its rule beyond the limits of experience--a
+cognition which is one of the highest interests of humanity; and thus is
+proved the futility of the attempt of speculative philosophy in this
+region of thought. But, in this interest of thought, the severity of
+criticism has rendered to reason a not unimportant service, by the
+demonstration of the impossibility of making any dogmatical affirmation
+concerning an object of experience beyond the boundaries of experience.
+She has thus fortified reason against all affirmations of the contrary.
+Now, this can be accomplished in only two ways. Either our proposition
+must be proved apodeictically; or, if this is unsuccessful, the sources
+of this inability must be sought for, and, if these are discovered to
+exist in the natural and necessary limitation of our reason, our
+opponents must submit to the same law of renunciation and refrain from
+advancing claims to dogmatic assertion.
+
+But the right, say rather the necessity to admit a future life, upon
+principles of the practical conjoined with the speculative use of
+reason, has lost nothing by this renunciation; for the merely
+speculative proof has never had any influence upon the common reason of
+men. It stands upon the point of a hair, so that even the schools have
+been able to preserve it from falling only by incessantly discussing it
+and spinning it like a top; and even in their eyes it has never been
+able to present any safe foundation for the erection of a theory. The
+proofs which have been current among men, preserve their value
+undiminished; nay, rather gain in clearness and unsophisticated power,
+by the rejection of the dogmatical assumptions of speculative reason.
+For reason is thus confined within her own peculiar province--the
+arrangement of ends or aims, which is at the same time the arrangement
+of nature; and, as a practical faculty, without limiting itself to the
+latter, it is justified in extending the former, and with it our own
+existence, beyond the boundaries of experience and life. If we turn our
+attention to the analogy of the nature of living beings in this world,
+in the consideration of which reason is obliged to accept as a
+principle that no organ, no faculty, no appetite is useless, and that
+nothing is superfluous, nothing disproportionate to its use, nothing
+unsuited to its end; but that, on the contrary, everything is perfectly
+conformed to its destination in life--we shall find that man, who alone
+is the final end and aim of this order, is still the only animal that
+seems to be excepted from it. For his natural gifts--not merely as
+regards the talents and motives that may incite him to employ them, but
+especially the moral law in him--stretch so far beyond all mere earthly
+utility and advantage, that he feels himself bound to prize the mere
+consciousness of probity, apart from all advantageous consequences--
+even the shadowy gift of posthumous fame--above everything; and he is
+conscious of an inward call to constitute himself, by his conduct in
+this world--without regard to mere sublunary interests--the citizen of
+a better. This mighty, irresistible proof--accompanied by an
+ever-increasing knowledge of the conformability to a purpose in
+everything we see around us, by the conviction of the boundless
+immensity of creation, by the consciousness of a certain
+illimitableness in the possible extension of our knowledge, and by a
+desire commensurate therewith--remains to humanity, even after the
+theoretical cognition of ourselves has failed to establish the
+necessity of an existence after death.
+
+
+
+Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralogism.
+
+The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our
+confounding an idea of reason (of a pure intelligence) with the
+conception--in every respect undetermined--of a thinking being in
+general. I cogitate myself in behalf of a possible experience, at
+the same time making abstraction of all actual experience; and infer
+therefrom that I can be conscious of myself apart from experience
+and its empirical conditions. I consequently confound the possible
+abstraction of my empirically determined existence with the supposed
+consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self;
+and I believe that I cognize what is substantial in myself as a
+transcendental subject, when I have nothing more in thought than the
+unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of all determination
+of cognition.
+
+The task of explaining the community of the soul with the body
+does not properly belong to the psychology of which we are here
+speaking; because it proposes to prove the personality of the soul
+apart from this communion (after death), and is therefore transcendent
+in the proper sense of the word, although occupying itself with an
+object of experience--only in so far, however, as it ceases to be an
+object of experience. But a sufficient answer may be found to the
+question in our system. The difficulty which lies in the execution
+of this task consists, as is well known, in the presupposed
+heterogeneity of the object of the internal sense (the soul) and the
+objects of the external senses; inasmuch as the formal condition of
+the intuition of the one is time, and of that of the other space also.
+But if we consider that both kinds of objects do not differ
+internally, but only in so far as the one appears externally to the
+other--consequently, that what lies at the basis of phenomena, as a
+thing in itself, may not be heterogeneous; this difficulty disappears.
+There then remains no other difficulty than is to be found in the
+question--how a community of substances is possible; a question
+which lies out of the region of psychology, and which the reader,
+after what in our analytic has been said of primitive forces and
+faculties, will easily judge to be also beyond the region of human
+cognition.
+
+
+
+GENERAL REMARK
+
+On the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology.
+
+The proposition, "I think," or, "I exist thinking," is an
+empirical proposition. But such a proposition must be based on
+empirical intuition, and the object cogitated as a phenomenon; and
+thus our theory appears to maintain that the soul, even in thought,
+is merely a phenomenon; and in this way our consciousness itself, in
+fact, abuts upon nothing.
+
+Thought, per se, is merely the purely spontaneous logical function
+which operates to connect the manifold of a possible intuition; and
+it does not represent the subject of consciousness as a phenomenon--for
+this reason alone, that it pays no attention to the question whether
+the mode of intuiting it is sensuous or intellectual. I therefore do
+not represent myself in thought either as I am, or as I appear to
+myself; I merely cogitate myself as an object in general, of the
+mode of intuiting which I make abstraction. When I represent myself
+as the subject of thought, or as the ground of thought, these modes
+of representation are not related to the categories of substance or
+of cause; for these are functions of thought applicable only to our
+sensuous intuition. The application of these categories to the Ego
+would, however, be necessary, if I wished to make myself an object
+of knowledge. But I wish to be conscious of myself only as thinking;
+in what mode my Self is given in intuition, I do not consider, and
+it may be that I, who think, am a phenomenon--although not in so far
+as I am a thinking being; but in the consciousness of myself in mere
+thought I am a being, though this consciousness does not present to
+me any property of this being as material for thought.
+
+But the proposition, "I think," in so far as it declares, "I exist
+thinking," is not the mere representation of a logical function. It
+determines the subject (which is in this case an object also) in
+relation to existence; and it cannot be given without the aid of the
+internal sense, whose intuition presents to us an object, not as a
+thing in itself, but always as a phenomenon. In this proposition there
+is therefore something more to be found than the mere spontaneity of
+thought; there is also the receptivity of intuition, that is, my
+thought of myself applied to the empirical intuition of myself. Now,
+in this intuition the thinking self must seek the conditions of the
+employment of its logical functions as categories of substance, cause,
+and so forth; not merely for the purpose of distinguishing itself as
+an object in itself by means of the representation "I," but also for
+the purpose of determining the mode of its existence, that is, of
+cognizing itself as noumenon. But this is impossible, for the internal
+empirical intuition is sensuous, and presents us with nothing but
+phenomenal data, which do not assist the object of pure
+consciousness in its attempt to cognize itself as a separate
+existence, but are useful only as contributions to experience.
+
+But, let it be granted that we could discover, not in experience, but
+in certain firmly-established a priori laws of the use of pure reason--
+laws relating to our existence, authority to consider ourselves as
+legislating a priori in relation to our own existence and as
+determining this existence; we should, on this supposition, find
+ourselves possessed of a spontaneity, by which our actual existence
+would be determinable, without the aid of the conditions of empirical
+intuition. We should also become aware that in the consciousness of
+our existence there was an a priori content, which would serve to
+determine our own existence--an existence only sensuously
+determinable--relatively, however, to a certain internal faculty
+in relation to an intelligible world.
+
+But this would not give the least help to the attempts of rational
+psychology. For this wonderful faculty, which the consciousness of
+the moral law in me reveals, would present me with a principle of the
+determination of my own existence which is purely intellectual--but
+by what predicates? By none other than those which are given in
+sensuous intuition. Thus I should find myself in the same position
+in rational psychology which I formerly occupied, that is to say, I
+should find myself still in need of sensuous intuitions, in order to
+give significance to my conceptions of substance and cause, by means
+of which alone I can possess a knowledge of myself: but these
+intuitions can never raise me above the sphere of experience. I should
+be justified, however, in applying these conceptions, in regard to
+their practical use, which is always directed to objects of
+experience--in conformity with their analogical significance when
+employed theoretically--to freedom and its subject. At the same
+time, I should understand by them merely the logical functions of
+subject and predicate, of principle and consequence, in conformity
+with which all actions are so determined, that they are capable of
+being explained along with the laws of nature, conformably to the
+categories of substance and cause, although they originate from a very
+different principle. We have made these observations for the purpose
+of guarding against misunderstanding, to which the doctrine of our
+intuition of self as a phenomenon is exposed. We shall have occasion
+to perceive their utility in the sequel.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason.
+
+We showed in the introduction to this part of our work, that all
+transcendental illusion of pure reason arose from dialectical
+arguments, the schema of which logic gives us in its three formal
+species of syllogisms--just as the categories find their logical
+schema in the four functions of all judgements. The first kind of
+these sophistical arguments related to the unconditioned unity of
+the subjective conditions of all representations in general (of the
+subject or soul), in correspondence with the categorical syllogisms,
+the major of which, as the principle, enounces the relation of a
+predicate to a subject. The second kind of dialectical argument will
+therefore be concerned, following the analogy with hypothetical
+syllogisms, with the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions
+in the phenomenon; and, in this way, the theme of the third kind to
+be treated of in the following chapter will be the unconditioned unity
+of the objective conditions of the possibility of objects in general.
+
+But it is worthy of remark that the transcendental paralogism
+produced in the mind only a one-third illusion, in regard to the
+idea of the subject of our thought; and the conceptions of reason gave
+no ground to maintain the contrary proposition. The advantage is
+completely on the side of Pneumatism; although this theory itself
+passes into naught, in the crucible of pure reason.
+
+Very different is the case when we apply reason to the objective
+synthesis of phenomena. Here, certainly, reason establishes, with much
+plausibility, its principle of unconditioned unity; but it very soon
+falls into such contradictions that it is compelled, in relation to
+cosmology, to renounce its pretensions.
+
+For here a new phenomenon of human reason meets us--a perfectly
+natural antithetic, which does not require to be sought for by
+subtle sophistry, but into which reason of itself unavoidably falls.
+It is thereby preserved, to be sure, from the slumber of a fancied
+conviction--which a merely one-sided illusion produces; but it is at
+the same time compelled, either, on the one hand, to abandon itself
+to a despairing scepticism, or, on the other, to assume a dogmatical
+confidence and obstinate persistence in certain assertions, without
+granting a fair hearing to the other side of the question. Either is
+the death of a sound philosophy, although the former might perhaps
+deserve the title of the euthanasia of pure reason.
+
+Before entering this region of discord and confusion, which the
+conflict of the laws of pure reason (antinomy) produces, we shall
+present the reader with some considerations, in explanation and
+justification of the method we intend to follow in our treatment of
+this subject. I term all transcendental ideas, in so far as they
+relate to the absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena,
+cosmical conceptions; partly on account of this unconditioned
+totality, on which the conception of the world-whole is based--a
+conception, which is itself an idea--partly because they relate solely
+to the synthesis of phenomena--the empirical synthesis; while, on
+the other hand, the absolute totality in the synthesis of the
+conditions of all possible things gives rise to an ideal of pure
+reason, which is quite distinct from the cosmical conception, although
+it stands in relation with it. Hence, as the paralogisms of pure
+reason laid the foundation for a dialectical psychology, the
+antinomy of pure reason will present us with the transcendental
+principles of a pretended pure (rational) cosmology--not, however,
+to declare it valid and to appropriate it, but--as the very term of
+a conflict of reason sufficiently indicates, to present it as an
+idea which cannot be reconciled with phenomena and experience.
+
+
+
+SECTION I. System of Cosmological Ideas.
+
+That We may be able to enumerate with systematic precision these
+ideas according to a principle, we must remark, in the first place,
+that it is from the understanding alone that pure and transcendental
+conceptions take their origin; that the reason does not properly
+give birth to any conception, but only frees the conception of the
+understanding from the unavoidable limitation of a possible
+experience, and thus endeavours to raise it above the empirical,
+though it must still be in connection with it. This happens from the
+fact that, for a given conditioned, reason demands absolute totality
+on the side of the conditions (to which the understanding submits
+all phenomena), and thus makes of the category a transcendental
+idea. This it does that it may be able to give absolute completeness
+to the empirical synthesis, by continuing it to the unconditioned
+(which is not to be found in experience, but only in the idea). Reason
+requires this according to the principle: If the conditioned is
+given the whole of the conditions, and consequently the absolutely
+unconditioned, is also given, whereby alone the former was possible.
+First, then, the transcendental ideas are properly nothing but
+categories elevated to the unconditioned; and they may be arranged
+in a table according to the titles of the latter. But, secondly, all
+the categories are not available for this purpose, but only those in
+which the synthesis constitutes a series--of conditions subordinated
+to, not co-ordinated with, each other. Absolute totality is required
+of reason only in so far as concerns the ascending series of the
+conditions of a conditioned; not, consequently, when the question
+relates to the descending series of consequences, or to the
+aggregate of the co-ordinated conditions of these consequences. For,
+in relation to a given conditioned, conditions are presupposed and
+considered to be given along with it. On the other hand, as the
+consequences do not render possible their conditions, but rather
+presuppose them--in the consideration of the procession of
+consequences (or in the descent from the given condition to the
+conditioned), we may be quite unconcerned whether the series ceases
+or not; and their totality is not a necessary demand of reason.
+
+Thus we cogitate--and necessarily--a given time completely elapsed
+up to a given moment, although that time is not determinable by us.
+But as regards time future, which is not the condition of arriving
+at the present, in order to conceive it; it is quite indifferent
+whether we consider future time as ceasing at some point, or as
+prolonging itself to infinity. Take, for example, the series m, n,
+o, in which n is given as conditioned in relation to m, but at the
+same time as the condition of o, and let the series proceed upwards
+from the conditioned n to m (l, k, i, etc.), and also downwards from
+the condition n to the conditioned o (p, q, r, etc.)--I must
+presuppose the former series, to be able to consider n as given, and
+n is according to reason (the totality of conditions) possible only
+by means of that series. But its possibility does not rest on the
+following series o, p, q, r, which for this reason cannot be
+regarded as given, but only as capable of being given (dabilis).
+
+I shall term the synthesis of the series on the side of the
+conditions--from that nearest to the given phenomenon up to the more
+remote--regressive; that which proceeds on the side of the
+conditioned, from the immediate consequence to the more remote, I
+shall call the progressive synthesis. The former proceeds in
+antecedentia, the latter in consequentia. The cosmological ideas are
+therefore occupied with the totality of the regressive synthesis,
+and proceed in antecedentia, not in consequentia. When the latter
+takes place, it is an arbitrary and not a necessary problem of pure
+reason; for we require, for the complete understanding of what is
+given in a phenomenon, not the consequences which succeed, but the
+grounds or principles which precede.
+
+In order to construct the table of ideas in correspondence with
+the table of categories, we take first the two primitive quanta of
+all our intuitions, time and space. Time is in itself a series (and
+the formal condition of all series), and hence, in relation to a given
+present, we must distinguish a priori in it the antecedentia as
+conditions (time past) from the consequentia (time future).
+Consequently, the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of
+the series of the conditions of a given conditioned, relates merely
+to all past time. According to the idea of reason, the whole past time,
+as the condition of the given moment, is necessarily cogitated as
+given. But, as regards space, there exists in it no distinction
+between progressus and regressus; for it is an aggregate and not a
+series--its parts existing together at the same time. I can consider
+a given point of time in relation to past time only as conditioned,
+because this given moment comes into existence only through the past
+time rather through the passing of the preceding time. But as the
+parts of space are not subordinated, but co-ordinated to each other,
+one part cannot be the condition of the possibility of the other;
+and space is not in itself, like time, a series. But the synthesis
+of the manifold parts of space--(the syntheses whereby we apprehend
+space)--is nevertheless successive; it takes place, therefore, in
+time, and contains a series. And as in this series of aggregated
+spaces (for example, the feet in a rood), beginning with a given
+portion of space, those which continue to be annexed form the
+condition of the limits of the former--the measurement of a space must
+also be regarded as a synthesis of the series of the conditions of
+a given conditioned. It differs, however, in this respect from that
+of time, that the side of the conditioned is not in itself
+distinguishable from the side of the condition; and, consequently,
+regressus and progressus in space seem to be identical. But,
+inasmuch as one part of space is not given, but only limited, by and
+through another, we must also consider every limited space as
+conditioned, in so far as it presupposes some other space as the
+condition of its limitation, and so on. As regards limitation,
+therefore, our procedure in space is also a regressus, and the
+transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in a
+series of conditions applies to space also; and I am entitled to
+demand the absolute totality of the phenomenal synthesis in space as
+well as in time. Whether my demand can be satisfied is a question to
+be answered in the sequel.
+
+Secondly, the real in space--that is, matter--is conditioned. Its
+internal conditions are its parts, and the parts of parts its remote
+conditions; so that in this case we find a regressive synthesis, the
+absolute totality of which is a demand of reason. But this cannot be
+obtained otherwise than by a complete division of parts, whereby the
+real in matter becomes either nothing or that which is not matter,
+that is to say, the simple. Consequently we find here also a series
+of conditions and a progress to the unconditioned.
+
+Thirdly, as regards the categories of a real relation between
+phenomena, the category of substance and its accidents is not suitable
+for the formation of a transcendental idea; that is to say, reason has
+no ground, in regard to it, to proceed regressively with conditions.
+For accidents (in so far as they inhere in a substance) are
+co-ordinated with each other, and do not constitute a series. And, in
+relation to substance, they are not properly subordinated to it, but
+are the mode of existence of the substance itself. The conception of
+the substantial might nevertheless seem to be an idea of the
+transcendental reason. But, as this signifies nothing more than the
+conception of an object in general, which subsists in so far as we
+cogitate in it merely a transcendental subject without any predicates;
+and as the question here is of an unconditioned in the series of
+phenomena--it is clear that the substantial can form no member thereof.
+The same holds good of substances in community, which are mere
+aggregates and do not form a series. For they are not subordinated to
+each other as conditions of the possibility of each other; which,
+however, may be affirmed of spaces, the limits of which are never
+determined in themselves, but always by some other space. It is,
+therefore, only in the category of causality that we can find a series
+of causes to a given effect, and in which we ascend from the latter, as
+the conditioned, to the former as the conditions, and thus answer the
+question of reason.
+
+Fourthly, the conceptions of the possible, the actual, and the
+necessary do not conduct us to any series--excepting only in so far
+as the contingent in existence must always be regarded as conditioned,
+and as indicating, according to a law of the understanding, a
+condition, under which it is necessary to rise to a higher, till in
+the totality of the series, reason arrives at unconditioned necessity.
+
+There are, accordingly, only four cosmological ideas, corresponding
+with the four titles of the categories. For we can select only such as
+necessarily furnish us with a series in the synthesis of the manifold.
+
+ 1
+ The absolute Completeness
+ of the
+ COMPOSITION
+ of the given totality of all phenomena.
+
+ 2
+ The absolute Completeness
+ of the
+ DIVISION
+ of given totality in a phenomenon.
+
+ 3
+ The absolute Completeness
+ of the
+ ORIGINATION
+ of a phenomenon.
+
+ 4
+ The absolute Completeness
+ of the DEPENDENCE of the EXISTENCE
+ of what is changeable in a phenomenon.
+
+
+We must here remark, in the first place, that the idea of absolute
+totality relates to nothing but the exposition of phenomena, and
+therefore not to the pure conception of a totality of things.
+Phenomena are here, therefore, regarded as given, and reason
+requires the absolute completeness of the conditions of their
+possibility, in so far as these conditions constitute a series-
+consequently an absolutely (that is, in every respect) complete
+synthesis, whereby a phenomenon can be explained according to the laws
+of the understanding.
+
+Secondly, it is properly the unconditioned alone that reason seeks
+in this serially and regressively conducted synthesis of conditions.
+It wishes, to speak in another way, to attain to completeness in the
+series of premisses, so as to render it unnecessary to presuppose
+others. This unconditioned is always contained in the absolute
+totality of the series, when we endeavour to form a representation
+of it in thought. But this absolutely complete synthesis is itself
+but an idea; for it is impossible, at least before hand, to know whether
+any such synthesis is possible in the case of phenomena. When we
+represent all existence in thought by means of pure conceptions of
+the understanding, without any conditions of sensuous intuition, we
+may say with justice that for a given conditioned the whole series
+of conditions subordinated to each other is also given; for the former
+is only given through the latter. But we find in the case of phenomena
+a particular limitation of the mode in which conditions are given,
+that is, through the successive synthesis of the manifold of
+intuition, which must be complete in the regress. Now whether this
+completeness is sensuously possible, is a problem. But the idea of
+it lies in the reason--be it possible or impossible to connect with
+the idea adequate empirical conceptions. Therefore, as in the absolute
+totality of the regressive synthesis of the manifold in a phenomenon
+(following the guidance of the categories, which represent it as a
+series of conditions to a given conditioned) the unconditioned is
+necessarily contained--it being still left unascertained whether and
+how this totality exists; reason sets out from the idea of totality,
+although its proper and final aim is the unconditioned--of the whole
+series, or of a part thereof.
+
+This unconditioned may be cogitated--either as existing only in
+the entire series, all the members of which therefore would be without
+exception conditioned and only the totality absolutely
+unconditioned--and in this case the regressus is called infinite; or
+the absolutely unconditioned is only a part of the series, to which
+the other members are subordinated, but which Is not itself
+submitted to any other condition.* In the former case the series is
+a parte priori unlimited (without beginning), that is, infinite, and
+nevertheless completely given. But the regress in it is never
+completed, and can only be called potentially infinite. In the
+second case there exists a first in the series. This first is
+called, in relation to past time, the beginning of the world; in
+relation to space, the limit of the world; in relation to the parts
+of a given limited whole, the simple; in relation to causes, absolute
+spontaneity (liberty); and in relation to the existence of
+changeable things, absolute physical necessity.
+
+[*Footnote: The absolute totality of the series of conditions to a
+given conditioned is always unconditioned; because beyond it there
+exist no other conditions, on which it might depend. But the absolute
+totality of such a series is only an idea, or rather a problematical
+conception, the possibility of which must be investigated-
+particularly in relation to the mode in which the unconditioned, as
+the transcendental idea which is the real subject of inquiry, may be
+contained therein.]
+
+We possess two expressions, world and nature, which are generally
+interchanged. The first denotes the mathematical total of all
+phenomena and the totality of their synthesis--in its progress by
+means of composition, as well as by division. And the world is
+termed nature,* when it is regarded as a dynamical whole--when our
+attention is not directed to the aggregation in space and time, for
+the purpose of cogitating it as a quantity, but to the unity in the
+existence of phenomena. In this case the condition of that which
+happens is called a cause; the unconditioned causality of the cause
+in a phenomenon is termed liberty; the conditioned cause is called
+in a more limited sense a natural cause. The conditioned in existence
+is termed contingent, and the unconditioned necessary. The
+unconditioned necessity of phenomena may be called natural necessity.
+
+[*Footnote: Nature, understood adjective (formaliter), signifies the
+complex of the determinations of a thing, connected according to an
+internal principle of causality. On the other hand, we understand by
+nature, substantive (materialiter), the sum total of phenomena, in
+so far as they, by virtue of an internal principle of causality, are
+connected with each other throughout. In the former sense we speak
+of the nature of liquid matter, of fire, etc., and employ the word
+only adjective; while, if speaking of the objects of nature, we have
+in our minds the idea of a subsisting whole.]
+
+The ideas which we are at present engaged in discussing I have
+called cosmological ideas; partly because by the term world is
+understood the entire content of all phenomena, and our ideas are
+directed solely to the unconditioned among phenomena; partly also,
+because world, in the transcendental sense, signifies the absolute
+totality of the content of existing things, and we are directing our
+attention only to the completeness of the synthesis--although,
+properly, only in regression. In regard to the fact that these ideas
+are all transcendent, and, although they do not transcend phenomena
+as regards their mode, but are concerned solely with the world of sense
+(and not with noumena), nevertheless carry their synthesis to a degree
+far above all possible experience--it still seems to me that we can,
+with perfect propriety, designate them cosmical conceptions. As
+regards the distinction between the mathematically and the dynamically
+unconditioned which is the aim of the regression of the synthesis,
+I should call the two former, in a more limited signification,
+cosmical conceptions, the remaining two transcendent physical
+conceptions. This distinction does not at present seem to be of
+particular importance, but we shall afterwards find it to be of some
+value.
+
+
+
+SECTION II. Antithetic of Pure Reason.
+
+Thetic is the term applied to every collection of dogmatical
+propositions. By antithetic I do not understand dogmatical
+assertions of the opposite, but the self-contradiction of seemingly
+dogmatical cognitions (thesis cum antithesis), in none of which we
+can discover any decided superiority. Antithetic is not, therefore,
+occupied with one-sided statements, but is engaged in considering
+the contradictory nature of the general cognitions of reason and its
+causes. Transcendental antithetic is an investigation into the
+antinomy of pure reason, its causes and result. If we employ our
+reason not merely in the application of the principles of the
+understanding to objects of experience, but venture with it beyond
+these boundaries, there arise certain sophistical propositions or
+theorems. These assertions have the following peculiarities: They
+can find neither confirmation nor confutation in experience; and
+each is in itself not only self-consistent, but possesses conditions
+of its necessity in the very nature of reason--only that, unluckily,
+there exist just as valid and necessary grounds for maintaining the
+contrary proposition.
+
+The questions which naturally arise in the consideration of this
+dialectic of pure reason, are therefore: 1st. In what propositions
+is pure reason unavoidably subject to an antinomy? 2nd. What are the
+causes of this antinomy? 3rd. Whether and in what way can reason
+free itself from this self-contradiction?
+
+A dialectical proposition or theorem of pure reason must,
+according to what has been said, be distinguishable from all
+sophistical propositions, by the fact that it is not an answer to an
+arbitrary question, which may be raised at the mere pleasure of any
+person, but to one which human reason must necessarily encounter in
+its progress. In the second place, a dialectical proposition, with
+its opposite, does not carry the appearance of a merely artificial
+illusion, which disappears as soon as it is investigated, but a
+natural and unavoidable illusion, which, even when we are no longer
+deceived by it, continues to mock us and, although rendered
+harmless, can never be completely removed.
+
+This dialectical doctrine will not relate to the unity of
+understanding in empirical conceptions, but to the unity of reason
+in pure ideas. The conditions of this doctrine are--inasmuch as it
+must, as a synthesis according to rules, be conformable to the
+understanding, and at the same time as the absolute unity of the
+synthesis, to the reason--that, if it is adequate to the unity of
+reason, it is too great for the understanding, if according with the
+understanding, it is too small for the reason. Hence arises a mutual
+opposition, which cannot be avoided, do what we will.
+
+These sophistical assertions of dialectic open, as it were, a
+battle-field, where that side obtains the victory which has been
+permitted to make the attack, and he is compelled to yield who has
+been unfortunately obliged to stand on the defensive. And hence,
+champions of ability, whether on the right or on the wrong side, are
+certain to carry away the crown of victory, if they only take care
+to have the right to make the last attack, and are not obliged to
+sustain another onset from their opponent. We can easily believe
+that this arena has been often trampled by the feet of combatants,
+that many victories have been obtained on both sides, but that the
+last victory, decisive of the affair between the contending parties,
+was won by him who fought for the right, only if his adversary was
+forbidden to continue the tourney. As impartial umpires, we must lay
+aside entirely the consideration whether the combatants are fighting
+for the right or for the wrong side, for the true or for the false,
+and allow the combat to be first decided. Perhaps, after they have
+wearied more than injured each other, they will discover the
+nothingness of their cause of quarrel and part good friends.
+
+This method of watching, or rather of originating, a conflict of
+assertions, not for the purpose of finally deciding in favour of
+either side, but to discover whether the object of the struggle is
+not a mere illusion, which each strives in vain to reach, but which
+would be no gain even when reached--this procedure, I say, may be
+termed the sceptical method. It is thoroughly distinct from
+scepticism--the principle of a technical and scientific ignorance,
+which undermines the foundations of all knowledge, in order, if
+possible, to destroy our belief and confidence therein. For the
+sceptical method aims at certainty, by endeavouring to discover in
+a conflict of this kind, conducted honestly and intelligently on both
+sides, the point of misunderstanding; just as wise legislators derive,
+from the embarrassment of judges in lawsuits, information in regard
+to the defective and ill-defined parts of their statutes. The antinomy
+which reveals itself in the application of laws, is for our limited
+wisdom the best criterion of legislation. For the attention of reason,
+which in abstract speculation does not easily become conscious of
+its errors, is thus roused to the momenta in the determination of
+its principles.
+
+But this sceptical method is essentially peculiar to
+transcendental philosophy, and can perhaps be dispensed with in
+every other field of investigation. In mathematics its use would be
+absurd; because in it no false assertions can long remain hidden,
+inasmuch as its demonstrations must always proceed under the
+guidance of pure intuition, and by means of an always evident
+synthesis. In experimental philosophy, doubt and delay may be very
+useful; but no misunderstanding is possible, which cannot be easily
+removed; and in experience means of solving the difficulty and putting
+an end to the dissension must at last be found, whether sooner or
+later. Moral philosophy can always exhibit its principles, with
+their practical consequences, in concreto--at least in possible
+experiences, and thus escape the mistakes and ambiguities of
+abstraction. But transcendental propositions, which lay claim to
+insight beyond the region of possible experience, cannot, on the one
+hand, exhibit their abstract synthesis in any a priori intuition, nor,
+on the other, expose a lurking error by the help of experience.
+Transcendental reason, therefore, presents us with no other
+criterion than that of an attempt to reconcile such assertions, and
+for this purpose to permit a free and unrestrained conflict between
+them. And this we now proceed to arrange.*
+
+
+[*Footnote: The antinomies stand in the order of the four
+transcendental ideas above detailed.]
+
+
+
+FIRST CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.
+
+THESIS.
+
+The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited in
+regard to space.
+
+
+PROOF.
+
+Granted that the world has no beginning in time; up to every given
+moment of time, an eternity must have elapsed, and therewith passed
+away an infinite series of successive conditions or states of things
+in the world. Now the infinity of a series consists in the fact that
+it never can be completed by means of a successive synthesis. It
+follows that an infinite series already elapsed is impossible and
+that, consequently, a beginning of the world is a necessary
+condition of its existence. And this was the first thing to be proved.
+
+As regards the second, let us take the opposite for granted. In this
+case, the world must be an infinite given total of coexistent
+things. Now we cannot cogitate the dimensions of a quantity, which
+is not given within certain limits of an intuition,* in any other
+way than by means of the synthesis of its parts, and the total of such
+a quantity only by means of a completed synthesis, or the repeated
+addition of unity to itself. Accordingly, to cogitate the world, which
+fills all spaces, as a whole, the successive synthesis of the parts
+of an infinite world must be looked upon as completed, that is to say,
+an infinite time must be regarded as having elapsed in the enumeration
+of all co-existing things; which is impossible. For this reason an
+infinite aggregate of actual things cannot be considered as a given
+whole, consequently, not as a contemporaneously given whole. The world
+is consequently, as regards extension in space, not infinite, but
+enclosed in limits. And this was the second thing to be proved.
+
+[*Footnote: We may consider an undetermined quantity as a whole, when
+it is enclosed within limits, although we cannot construct or ascertain
+its totality by measurement, that is, by the successive synthesis of
+its parts. For its limits of themselves determine its completeness
+as a whole.]
+
+
+ANTITHESIS.
+
+The world has no beginning, and no limits in space, but is, in
+relation both to time and space, infinite.
+
+
+PROOF.
+
+For let it be granted that it has a beginning. A beginning is an
+existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing does not
+exist. On the above supposition, it follows that there must have
+been a time in which the world did not exist, that is, a void time.
+But in a void time the origination of a thing is impossible; because
+no part of any such time contains a distinctive condition of being,
+in preference to that of non-being (whether the supposed thing
+originate of itself, or by means of some other cause). Consequently,
+many series of things may have a beginning in the world, but the world
+itself cannot have a beginning, and is, therefore, in relation to past
+time, infinite.
+
+As regards the second statement, let us first take the opposite
+for granted--that the world is finite and limited in space; it follows
+that it must exist in a void space, which is not limited. We should
+therefore meet not only with a relation of things in space, but also
+a relation of things to space. Now, as the world is an absolute whole,
+out of and beyond which no object of intuition, and consequently no
+correlate to which can be discovered, this relation of the world to
+a void space is merely a relation to no object. But such a relation,
+and consequently the limitation of the world by void space, is
+nothing. Consequently, the world, as regards space, is not limited,
+that is, it is infinite in regard to extension.*
+
+
+[*Footnote: Space is merely the form of external intuition (formal
+intuition), and not a real object which can be externally perceived.
+Space, prior to all things which determine it (fill or limit it),
+or, rather, which present an empirical intuition conformable to it,
+is, under the title of absolute space, nothing but the mere
+possibility of external phenomena, in so far as they either exist in
+themselves, or can annex themselves to given intuitions. Empirical
+intuition is therefore not a composition of phenomena and space (of
+perception and empty intuition). The one is not the correlate of the
+other in a synthesis, but they are vitally connected in the same
+empirical intuition, as matter and form. If we wish to set one of
+these two apart from the other--space from phenomena--there arise
+all sorts of empty determinations of external intuition, which are
+very far from being possible perceptions. For example, motion or
+rest of the world in an infinite empty space, or a determination of
+the mutual relation of both, cannot possibly be perceived, and is
+therefore merely the predicate of a notional entity.]
+
+
+
+OBSERVATIONS ON THE FIRST ANTINOMY.
+
+ON THE THESIS.
+
+In bringing forward these conflicting arguments, I have not been
+on the search for sophisms, for the purpose of availing myself of
+special pleading, which takes advantage of the carelessness of the
+opposite party, appeals to a misunderstood statute, and erects its
+unrighteous claims upon an unfair interpretation. Both proofs
+originate fairly from the nature of the case, and the advantage
+presented by the mistakes of the dogmatists of both parties has been
+completely set aside.
+
+The thesis might also have been unfairly demonstrated, by the
+introduction of an erroneous conception of the infinity of a given
+quantity. A quantity is infinite, if a greater than itself cannot
+possibly exist. The quantity is measured by the number of given units-
+which are taken as a standard--contained in it. Now no number can be
+the greatest, because one or more units can always be added. It
+follows that an infinite given quantity, consequently an infinite
+world (both as regards time and extension) is impossible. It is,
+therefore, limited in both respects. In this manner I might have
+conducted my proof; but the conception given in it does not agree with
+the true conception of an infinite whole. In this there is no
+representation of its quantity, it is not said how large it is;
+consequently its conception is not the conception of a maximum. We
+cogitate in it merely its relation to an arbitrarily assumed unit,
+in relation to which it is greater than any number. Now, just as the
+unit which is taken is greater or smaller, the infinite will be
+greater or smaller; but the infinity, which consists merely in the
+relation to this given unit, must remain always the same, although
+the absolute quantity of the whole is not thereby cognized.
+
+The true (transcendental) conception of infinity is: that the
+successive synthesis of unity in the measurement of a given quantum
+can never be completed.* Hence it follows, without possibility of
+mistake, that an eternity of actual successive states up to a given
+(the present) moment cannot have elapsed, and that the world must
+therefore have a beginning.
+
+[*Footnote: The quantum in this sense contains a congeries of given
+units, which is greater than any number--and this is the mathematical
+conception of the infinite.]
+
+In regard to the second part of the thesis, the difficulty as to
+an infinite and yet elapsed series disappears; for the manifold of
+a world infinite in extension is contemporaneously given. But, in
+order to cogitate the total of this manifold, as we cannot have the
+aid of limits constituting by themselves this total in intuition, we
+are obliged to give some account of our conception, which in this case
+cannot proceed from the whole to the determined quantity of the parts,
+but must demonstrate the possibility of a whole by means of a
+successive synthesis of the parts. But as this synthesis must
+constitute a series that cannot be completed, it is impossible for
+us to cogitate prior to it, and consequently not by means of it, a
+totality. For the conception of totality itself is in the present case
+the representation of a completed synthesis of the parts; and this
+completion, and consequently its conception, is impossible.
+
+
+
+ON THE ANTITHESIS.
+
+The proof in favour of the infinity of the cosmical succession and
+the cosmical content is based upon the consideration that, in the
+opposite case, a void time and a void space must constitute the limits
+of the world. Now I am not unaware, that there are some ways of
+escaping this conclusion. It may, for example, be alleged, that a
+limit to the world, as regards both space and time, is quite possible,
+without at the same time holding the existence of an absolute time
+before the beginning of the world, or an absolute space extending
+beyond the actual world--which is impossible. I am quite well
+satisfied with the latter part of this opinion of the philosophers
+of the Leibnitzian school. Space is merely the form of external
+intuition, but not a real object which can itself be externally
+intuited; it is not a correlate of phenomena, it is the form of
+phenomena itself. Space, therefore, cannot be regarded as absolutely
+and in itself something determinative of the existence of things,
+because it is not itself an object, but only the form of possible
+objects. Consequently, things, as phenomena, determine space; that
+is to say, they render it possible that, of all the possible
+predicates of space (size and relation), certain may belong to
+reality. But we cannot affirm the converse, that space, as something
+self-subsistent, can determine real things in regard to size or shape,
+for it is in itself not a real thing. Space (filled or void)* may
+therefore be limited by phenomena, but phenomena cannot be limited
+by an empty space without them. This is true of time also. All this
+being granted, it is nevertheless indisputable, that we must assume
+these two nonentities, void space without and void time before the
+world, if we assume the existence of cosmical limits, relatively to
+space or time.
+
+[*Footnote: It is evident that what is meant here is, that empty space,
+in so far as it is limited by phenomena--space, that is, within the
+world--does not at least contradict transcendental principles, and
+may therefore, as regards them, be admitted, although its possibility
+cannot on that account be affirmed.]
+
+For, as regards the subterfuge adopted by those who endeavour to
+evade the consequence--that, if the world is limited as to space and
+time, the infinite void must determine the existence of actual
+things in regard to their dimensions--it arises solely from the fact
+that instead of a sensuous world, an intelligible world--of which
+nothing is known--is cogitated; instead of a real beginning (an
+existence, which is preceded by a period in which nothing exists),
+an existence which presupposes no other condition than that of time;
+and, instead of limits of extension, boundaries of the universe. But
+the question relates to the mundus phaenomenon, and its quantity;
+and in this case we cannot make abstraction of the conditions of
+sensibility, without doing away with the essential reality of this
+world itself. The world of sense, if it is limited, must necessarily
+lie in the infinite void. If this, and with it space as the a priori
+condition of the possibility of phenomena, is left out of view, the
+whole world of sense disappears. In our problem is this alone
+considered as given. The mundus intelligibilis is nothing but the
+general conception of a world, in which abstraction has been made of
+all conditions of intuition, and in relation to which no synthetical
+proposition--either affirmative or negative--is possible.
+
+
+
+SECOND CONFLICT OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.
+
+THESIS.
+
+Every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts; and
+there exists nothing that is not either itself simple, or composed
+of simple parts.
+
+
+PROOF.
+
+For, grant that composite substances do not consist of simple parts;
+in this case, if all combination or composition were annihilated in
+thought, no composite part, and (as, by the supposition, there do
+not exist simple parts) no simple part would exist. Consequently, no
+substance; consequently, nothing would exist. Either, then, it is
+impossible to annihilate composition in thought; or, after such
+annihilation, there must remain something that subsists without
+composition, that is, something that is simple. But in the former case
+the composite could not itself consist of substances, because with
+substances composition is merely a contingent relation, apart from
+which they must still exist as self-subsistent beings. Now, as this
+case contradicts the supposition, the second must contain the truth-
+that the substantial composite in the world consists of simple parts.
+
+It follows, as an immediate inference, that the things in the
+world are all, without exception, simple beings--that composition is
+merely an external condition pertaining to them--and that, although
+we never can separate and isolate the elementary substances from the
+state of composition, reason must cogitate these as the primary
+subjects of all composition, and consequently, as prior thereto--and
+as simple substances.
+
+
+ANTITHESIS.
+
+No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts; and
+there does not exist in the world any simple substance.
+
+
+PROOF.
+
+Let it be supposed that a composite thing (as substance) consists of
+simple parts. Inasmuch as all external relation, consequently all
+composition of substances, is possible only in space; the space,
+occupied by that which is composite, must consist of the same number
+of parts as is contained in the composite. But space does not
+consist of simple parts, but of spaces. Therefore, every part of the
+composite must occupy a space. But the absolutely primary parts of
+what is composite are simple. It follows that what is simple
+occupies a space. Now, as everything real that occupies a space,
+contains a manifold the parts of which are external to each other,
+and is consequently composite--and a real composite, not of accidents
+(for these cannot exist external to each other apart from substance),
+but of substances--it follows that the simple must be a substantial
+composite, which is self-contradictory.
+
+The second proposition of the antithesis--that there exists in the
+world nothing that is simple--is here equivalent to the following:
+The existence of the absolutely simple cannot be demonstrated from
+any experience or perception either external or internal; and the
+absolutely simple is a mere idea, the objective reality of which
+cannot be demonstrated in any possible experience; it is consequently,
+in the exposition of phenomena, without application and object. For,
+let us take for granted that an object may be found in experience
+for this transcendental idea; the empirical intuition of such an
+object must then be recognized to contain absolutely no manifold
+with its parts external to each other, and connected into unity.
+Now, as we cannot reason from the non-consciousness of such a manifold
+to the impossibility of its existence in the intuition of an object,
+and as the proof of this impossibility is necessary for the
+establishment and proof of absolute simplicity; it follows that this
+simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception whatever. As,
+therefore, an absolutely simple object cannot be given in any
+experience, and the world of sense must be considered as the sum total
+of all possible experiences: nothing simple exists in the world.
+
+This second proposition in the antithesis has a more extended aim
+than the first. The first merely banishes the simple from the
+intuition of the composite; while the second drives it entirely out
+of nature. Hence we were unable to demonstrate it from the conception
+of a given object of external intuition (of the composite), but we
+were obliged to prove it from the relation of a given object to a
+possible experience in general.
+
+
+
+OBSERVATIONS ON THE SECOND ANTINOMY.
+
+THESIS.
+
+When I speak of a whole, which necessarily consists of simple parts,
+I understand thereby only a substantial whole, as the true
+composite; that is to say, I understand that contingent unity of the
+manifold which is given as perfectly isolated (at least in thought),
+placed in reciprocal connection, and thus constituted a unity. Space
+ought not to be called a compositum but a totum, for its parts are
+possible in the whole, and not the whole by means of the parts. It
+might perhaps be called a compositum ideale, but not a compositum
+reale. But this is of no importance. As space is not a composite of
+substances (and not even of real accidents), if I abstract all
+composition therein--nothing, not even a point, remains; for a point
+is possible only as the limit of a space--consequently of a composite.
+Space and time, therefore, do not consist of simple parts. That
+which belongs only to the condition or state of a substance, even
+although it possesses a quantity (motion or change, for example),
+likewise does not consist of simple parts. That is to say, a certain
+degree of change does not originate from the addition of many simple
+changes. Our inference of the simple from the composite is valid
+only of self-subsisting things. But the accidents of a state are not
+self-subsistent. The proof, then, for the necessity of the simple,
+as the component part of all that is substantial and composite, may
+prove a failure, and the whole case of this thesis be lost, if we
+carry the proposition too far, and wish to make it valid of everything
+that is composite without distinction--as indeed has really now and
+then happened. Besides, I am here speaking only of the simple, in so
+far as it is necessarily given in the composite--the latter being
+capable of solution into the former as its component parts. The proper
+signification of the word monas (as employed by Leibnitz) ought to
+relate to the simple, given immediately as simple substance (for
+example, in consciousness), and not as an element of the composite.
+As an clement, the term atomus would be more appropriate. And as I
+wish to prove the existence of simple substances, only in relation
+to, and as the elements of, the composite, I might term the antithesis
+of the second Antinomy, transcendental Atomistic. But as this word
+has long been employed to designate a particular theory of corporeal
+phenomena (moleculae), and thus presupposes a basis of empirical
+conceptions, I prefer calling it the dialectical principle of
+Monadology.
+
+
+ANTITHESIS.
+
+Against the assertion of the infinite subdivisibility of matter
+whose ground of proof is purely mathematical, objections have been
+alleged by the Monadists. These objections lay themselves open, at
+first sight, to suspicion, from the fact that they do not recognize
+the clearest mathematical proofs as propositions relating to the
+constitution of space, in so far as it is really the formal
+condition of the possibility of all matter, but regard them merely
+as inferences from abstract but arbitrary conceptions, which cannot
+have any application to real things. Just as if it were possible to
+imagine another mode of intuition than that given in the primitive
+intuition of space; and just as if its a priori determinations did
+not apply to everything, the existence of which is possible, from the
+fact alone of its filling space. If we listen to them, we shall find
+ourselves required to cogitate, in addition to the mathematical point,
+which is simple--not, however, a part, but a mere limit of space-
+physical points, which are indeed likewise simple, but possess the
+peculiar property, as parts of space, of filling it merely by their
+aggregation. I shall not repeat here the common and clear
+refutations of this absurdity, which are to be found everywhere in
+numbers: every one knows that it is impossible to undermine the
+evidence of mathematics by mere discursive conceptions; I shall only
+remark that, if in this case philosophy endeavours to gain an
+advantage over mathematics by sophistical artifices, it is because
+it forgets that the discussion relates solely to Phenomena and their
+conditions. It is not sufficient to find the conception of the
+simple for the pure conception of the composite, but we must
+discover for the intuition of the composite (matter), the intuition
+of the simple. Now this, according to the laws of sensibility, and
+consequently in the case of objects of sense, is utterly impossible.
+In the case of a whole composed of substances, which is cogitated
+solely by the pure understanding, it may be necessary to be in
+possession of the simple before composition is possible. But this does
+not hold good of the Totum substantiale phaenomenon, which, as an
+empirical intuition in space, possesses the necessary property of
+containing no simple part, for the very reason that no part of space
+is simple. Meanwhile, the Monadists have been subtle enough to
+escape from this difficulty, by presupposing intuition and the
+dynamical relation of substances as the condition of the possibility
+of space, instead of regarding space as the condition of the
+possibility of the objects of external intuition, that is, of
+bodies. Now we have a conception of bodies only as phenomena, and,
+as such, they necessarily presuppose space as the condition of all
+external phenomena. The evasion is therefore in vain; as, indeed, we
+have sufficiently shown in our Aesthetic. If bodies were things in
+themselves, the proof of the Monadists would be unexceptionable.
+
+The second dialectical assertion possesses the peculiarity of having
+opposed to it a dogmatical proposition, which, among all such
+sophistical statements, is the only one that undertakes to prove in
+the case of an object of experience, that which is properly a
+transcendental idea--the absolute simplicity of substance. The
+proposition is that the object of the internal sense, the thinking
+Ego, is an absolute simple substance. Without at present entering upon
+this subject--as it has been considered at length in a former chapter-
+I shall merely remark that, if something is cogitated merely as an
+object, without the addition of any synthetical determination of its
+intuition--as happens in the case of the bare representation, I--it
+is certain that no manifold and no composition can be perceived in
+such a representation. As, moreover, the predicates whereby I cogitate
+this object are merely intuitions of the internal sense, there cannot
+be discovered in them anything to prove the existence of a manifold
+whose parts are external to each other, and, consequently, nothing
+to prove the existence of real composition. Consciousness, therefore,
+is so constituted that, inasmuch as the thinking subject is at the
+same time its own object, it cannot divide itself--although it can
+divide its inhering determinations. For every object in relation to
+itself is absolute unity. Nevertheless, if the subject is regarded
+externally, as an object of intuition, it must, in its character of
+phenomenon, possess the property of composition. And it must always
+be regarded in this manner, if we wish to know whether there is or
+is not contained in it a manifold whose parts are external to each
+other.
+
+
+
+THIRD CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.
+
+THESIS.
+
+Causality according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality
+operating to originate the phenomena of the world. A causality of
+freedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena.
+
+
+PROOF.
+
+Let it be supposed, that there is no other kind of causality than
+that according to the laws of nature. Consequently, everything that
+happens presupposes a previous condition, which it follows with
+absolute certainty, in conformity with a rule. But this previous
+condition must itself be something that has happened (that has
+arisen in time, as it did not exist before), for, if it has always
+been in existence, its consequence or effect would not thus
+originate for the first time, but would likewise have always
+existed. The causality, therefore, of a cause, whereby something
+happens, is itself a thing that has happened. Now this again
+presupposes, in conformity with the law of nature, a previous
+condition and its causality, and this another anterior to the
+former, and so on. If, then, everything happens solely in accordance
+with the laws of nature, there cannot be any real first beginning of
+things, but only a subaltern or comparative beginning. There cannot,
+therefore, be a completeness of series on the side of the causes which
+originate the one from the other. But the law of nature is that
+nothing can happen without a sufficient a priori determined cause.
+The proposition therefore--if all causality is possible only in accordance
+with the laws of nature--is, when stated in this unlimited and general
+manner, self-contradictory. It follows that this cannot be the only
+kind of causality.
+
+From what has been said, it follows that a causality must be
+admitted, by means of which something happens, without its cause being
+determined according to necessary laws by some other cause
+preceding. That is to say, there must exist an absolute spontaneity
+of cause, which of itself originates a series of phenomena which proceeds
+according to natural laws--consequently transcendental freedom,
+without which even in the course of nature the succession of phenomena
+on the side of causes is never complete.
+
+
+ANTITHESIS.
+
+There is no such thing as freedom, but everything in the world
+happens solely according to the laws of nature.
+
+
+PROOF.
+
+Granted, that there does exist freedom in the transcendental
+sense, as a peculiar kind of causality, operating to produce events
+in the world--a faculty, that is to say, of originating a state, and
+consequently a series of consequences from that state. In this case,
+not only the series originated by this spontaneity, but the
+determination of this spontaneity itself to the production of the
+series, that is to say, the causality itself must have an absolute
+commencement, such that nothing can precede to determine this action
+according to unvarying laws. But every beginning of action presupposes
+in the acting cause a state of inaction; and a dynamically primal
+beginning of action presupposes a state, which has no connection--as
+regards causality--with the preceding state of the cause--which does
+not, that is, in any wise result from it. Transcendental freedom is
+therefore opposed to the natural law of cause and effect, and such
+a conjunction of successive states in effective causes is destructive
+of the possibility of unity in experience and for that reason not to
+be found in experience--is consequently a mere fiction of thought.
+
+We have, therefore, nothing but nature to which we must look for
+connection and order in cosmical events. Freedom--independence of
+the laws of nature--is certainly a deliverance from restraint, but
+it is also a relinquishing of the guidance of law and rule. For it
+cannot be alleged that, instead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom
+may be introduced into the causality of the course of nature. For,
+if freedom were determined according to laws, it would be no longer
+freedom, but merely nature. Nature, therefore, and transcendental
+freedom are distinguishable as conformity to law and lawlessness.
+The former imposes upon understanding the difficulty of seeking the
+origin of events ever higher and higher in the series of causes,
+inasmuch as causality is always conditioned thereby; while it
+compensates this labour by the guarantee of a unity complete and in
+conformity with law. The latter, on the contrary, holds out to the
+understanding the promise of a point of rest in the chain of causes,
+by conducting it to an unconditioned causality, which professes to
+have the power of spontaneous origination, but which, in its own utter
+blindness, deprives it of the guidance of rules, by which alone a
+completely connected experience is possible.
+
+
+
+OBSERVATIONS ON THE THIRD ANTINOMY.
+
+ON THE THESIS.
+
+The transcendental idea of freedom is far from constituting the
+entire content of the psychological conception so termed, which is
+for the most part empirical. It merely presents us with the conception
+of spontaneity of action, as the proper ground for imputing freedom
+to the cause of a certain class of objects. It is, however, the true
+stumbling-stone to philosophy, which meets with unconquerable
+difficulties in the way of its admitting this kind of unconditioned
+causality. That element in the question of the freedom of the will,
+which has for so long a time placed speculative reason in such
+perplexity, is properly only transcendental, and concerns the
+question, whether there must be held to exist a faculty of spontaneous
+origination of a series of successive things or states. How such a
+faculty is possible is not a necessary inquiry; for in the case of
+natural causality itself, we are obliged to content ourselves with
+the a priori knowledge that such a causality must be presupposed, although
+we are quite incapable of comprehending how the being of one thing
+is possible through the being of another, but must for this
+information look entirely to experience. Now we have demonstrated this
+necessity of a free first beginning of a series of phenomena, only
+in so far as it is required for the comprehension of an origin of
+the world, all following states being regarded as a succession
+according to laws of nature alone. But, as there has thus been
+proved the existence of a faculty which can of itself originate a
+series in time--although we are unable to explain how it can exist--we
+feel ourselves authorized to admit, even in the midst of the natural
+course of events, a beginning, as regards causality, of different
+successions of phenomena, and at the same time to attribute to all
+substances a faculty of free action. But we ought in this case not
+to allow ourselves to fall into a common misunderstanding, and to
+suppose that, because a successive series in the world can only have
+a comparatively first beginning--another state or condition of things
+always preceding--an absolutely first beginning of a series in the
+course of nature is impossible. For we are not speaking here of an
+absolutely first beginning in relation to time, but as regards
+causality alone. When, for example, I, completely of my own free will,
+and independently of the necessarily determinative influence of
+natural causes, rise from my chair, there commences with this event,
+including its material consequences in infinitum, an absolutely new
+series; although, in relation to time, this event is merely the
+continuation of a preceding series. For this resolution and act of
+mine do not form part of the succession of effects in nature, and
+are not mere continuations of it; on the contrary, the determining
+causes of nature cease to operate in reference to this event, which
+certainly succeeds the acts of nature, but does not proceed from them.
+For these reasons, the action of a free agent must be termed, in
+regard to causality, if not in relation to time, an absolutely
+primal beginning of a series of phenomena.
+
+The justification of this need of reason to rest upon a free act
+as the first beginning of the series of natural causes is evident from
+the fact, that all philosophers of antiquity (with the exception of
+the Epicurean school) felt themselves obliged, when constructing a
+theory of the motions of the universe, to accept a prime mover, that
+is, a freely acting cause, which spontaneously and prior to all
+other causes evolved this series of states. They always felt the
+need of going beyond mere nature, for the purpose of making a first
+beginning comprehensible.
+
+
+
+ON THE ANTITHESIS.
+
+The assertor of the all-sufficiency of nature in regard to causality
+(transcendental Physiocracy), in opposition to the doctrine of
+freedom, would defend his view of the question somewhat in the
+following manner. He would say, in answer to the sophistical arguments
+of the opposite party: If you do not accept a mathematical first, in
+relation to time, you have no need to seek a dynamical first, in
+regard to causality. Who compelled you to imagine an absolutely primal
+condition of the world, and therewith an absolute beginning of the
+gradually progressing successions of phenomena--and, as some
+foundation for this fancy of yours, to set bounds to unlimited nature?
+Inasmuch as the substances in the world have always existed--at
+least the unity of experience renders such a supposition quite
+necessary--there is no difficulty in believing also, that the
+changes in the conditions of these substances have always existed;
+and, consequently, that a first beginning, mathematical or
+dynamical, is by no means required. The possibility of such an
+infinite derivation, without any initial member from which all the
+others result, is certainly quite incomprehensible. But, if you are
+rash enough to deny the enigmatical secrets of nature for this reason,
+you will find yourselves obliged to deny also the existence of many
+fundamental properties of natural objects (such as fundamental
+forces), which you can just as little comprehend; and even the
+possibility of so simple a conception as that of change must present
+to you insuperable difficulties. For if experience did not teach you
+that it was real, you never could conceive a priori the possibility
+of this ceaseless sequence of being and non-being.
+
+But if the existence of a transcendental faculty of freedom is
+granted--a faculty of originating changes in the world--this faculty
+must at least exist out of and apart from the world; although it is
+certainly a bold assumption, that, over and above the complete content
+of all possible intuitions, there still exists an object which
+cannot be presented in any possible perception. But, to attribute to
+substances in the world itself such a faculty, is quite
+inadmissible; for, in this case; the connection of phenomena
+reciprocally determining and determined according to general laws,
+which is termed nature, and along with it the criteria of empirical
+truth, which enable us to distinguish experience from mere visionary
+dreaming, would almost entirely disappear. In proximity with such a
+lawless faculty of freedom, a system of nature is hardly cogitable;
+for the laws of the latter would be continually subject to the
+intrusive influences of the former, and the course of phenomena, which
+would otherwise proceed regularly and uniformly, would become
+thereby confused and disconnected.
+
+
+
+FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.
+
+THESIS.
+
+There exists either in, or in connection with the world--either as
+a part of it, or as the cause of it--an absolutely necessary being.
+
+
+PROOF.
+
+The world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena, contains a
+series of changes. For, without such a series, the mental
+representation of the series of time itself, as the condition of the
+possibility of the sensuous world, could not be presented to us.*
+But every change stands under its condition, which precedes it in time
+and renders it necessary. Now the existence of a given condition
+presupposes a complete series of conditions up to the absolutely
+unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. It follows that
+something that is absolutely necessary must exist, if change exists
+as its consequence. But this necessary thing itself belongs to the
+sensuous world. For suppose it to exist out of and apart from it,
+the series of cosmical changes would receive from it a beginning,
+and yet this necessary cause would not itself belong to the world of
+sense. But this is impossible. For, as the beginning of a series in
+time is determined only by that which precedes it in time, the supreme
+condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the
+time in which this series itself did not exist; for a beginning
+supposes a time preceding, in which the thing that begins to be was
+not in existence. The causality of the necessary cause of changes,
+and consequently the cause itself, must for these reasons belong to
+time--and to phenomena, time being possible only as the form of
+phenomena. Consequently, it cannot be cogitated as separated from
+the world of sense--the sum total of all phenomena. There is,
+therefore, contained in the world, something that is absolutely
+necessary--whether it be the whole cosmical series itself, or only
+a part of it.
+
+[*Footnote: Objectively, time, as the formal condition of the possibility
+of change, precedes all changes; but subjectively, and in
+consciousness, the representation of time, like every other, is
+given solely by occasion of perception.]
+
+
+ANTITHESIS.
+
+An absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world,
+or out of it--as its cause.
+
+
+PROOF.
+
+Grant that either the world itself is necessary, or that there is
+contained in it a necessary existence. Two cases are possible.
+First, there must either be in the series of cosmical changes a
+beginning, which is unconditionally necessary, and therefore uncaused-
+which is at variance with the dynamical law of the determination of
+all phenomena in time; or, secondly, the series itself is without
+beginning, and, although contingent and conditioned in all its
+parts, is nevertheless absolutely necessary and unconditioned as a
+whole--which is self-contradictory. For the existence of an
+aggregate cannot be necessary, if no single part of it possesses
+necessary existence.
+
+Grant, on the other band, that an absolutely necessary cause
+exists out of and apart from the world. This cause, as the highest
+member in the series of the causes of cosmical changes, must originate
+or begin* the existence of the latter and their series. In this case
+it must also begin to act, and its causality would therefore belong
+to time, and consequently to the sum total of phenomena, that is, to
+the world. It follows that the cause cannot be out of the world; which
+is contradictory to the hypothesis. Therefore, neither in the world,
+nor out of it (but in causal connection with it), does there exist
+any absolutely necessary being.
+
+[*Footnote: The word begin is taken in two senses. The first is active--
+the cause being regarded as beginning a series of conditions as its
+effect (infit). The second is passive--the causality in the cause itself
+beginning to operate (fit). I reason here from the first to the second.]
+
+
+
+OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOURTH ANTINOMY.
+
+ON THE THESIS.
+
+To demonstrate the existence of a necessary being, I cannot be
+permitted in this place to employ any other than the cosmological
+argument, which ascends from the conditioned in phenomena to the
+unconditioned in conception--the unconditioned being considered the
+necessary condition of the absolute totality of the series. The proof,
+from the mere idea of a supreme being, belongs to another principle
+of reason and requires separate discussion.
+
+The pure cosmological proof demonstrates the existence of a
+necessary being, but at the same time leaves it quite unsettled,
+whether this being is the world itself, or quite distinct from it.
+To establish the truth of the latter view, principles are requisite,
+which are not cosmological and do not proceed in the series of
+phenomena. We should require to introduce into our proof conceptions
+of contingent beings--regarded merely as objects of the understanding,
+and also a principle which enables us to connect these, by means of
+mere conceptions, with a necessary being. But the proper place for
+all such arguments is a transcendent philosophy, which has unhappily
+not yet been established.
+
+But, if we begin our proof cosmologically, by laying at the
+foundation of it the series of phenomena, and the regress in it
+according to empirical laws of causality, we are not at liberty to
+break off from this mode of demonstration and to pass over to
+something which is not itself a member of the series. The condition
+must be taken in exactly the same signification as the relation of
+the conditioned to its condition in the series has been taken, for
+the series must conduct us in an unbroken regress to this supreme
+condition. But if this relation is sensuous, and belongs to the
+possible empirical employment of understanding, the supreme
+condition or cause must close the regressive series according to the
+laws of sensibility and consequently, must belong to the series of
+time. It follows that this necessary existence must be regarded as
+the highest member of the cosmical series.
+
+Certain philosophers have, nevertheless, allowed themselves the
+liberty of making such a saltus (metabasis eis allo gonos). From the
+changes in the world they have concluded their empirical
+contingency, that is, their dependence on empirically-determined
+causes, and they thus admitted an ascending series of empirical
+conditions: and in this they are quite right. But as they could not
+find in this series any primal beginning or any highest member, they
+passed suddenly from the empirical conception of contingency to the
+pure category, which presents us with a series--not sensuous, but
+intellectual--whose completeness does certainly rest upon the
+existence of an absolutely necessary cause. Nay, more, this
+intellectual series is not tied to any sensuous conditions; and is
+therefore free from the condition of time, which requires it
+spontaneously to begin its causality in time. But such a procedure
+is perfectly inadmissible, as will be made plain from what follows.
+
+In the pure sense of the categories, that is contingent the
+contradictory opposite of which is possible. Now we cannot reason from
+empirical contingency to intellectual. The opposite of that which is
+changed--the opposite of its state--is actual at another time, and
+is therefore possible. Consequently, it is not the contradictory
+opposite of the former state. To be that, it is necessary that, in
+the same time in which the preceding state existed, its opposite could
+have existed in its place; but such a cognition is not given us in
+the mere phenomenon of change. A body that was in motion = A, comes
+into a state of rest = non-A. Now it cannot be concluded from the fact
+that a state opposite to the state A follows it, that the contradictory
+opposite of A is possible; and that A is therefore contingent. To
+prove this, we should require to know that the state of rest could
+have existed in the very same time in which the motion took place.
+Now we know nothing more than that the state of rest was actual in
+the time that followed the state of motion; consequently, that it was
+also possible. But motion at one time, and rest at another time, are
+not contradictorily opposed to each other. It follows from what has
+been said that the succession of opposite determinations, that is,
+change, does not demonstrate the fact of contingency as represented
+in the conceptions of the pure understanding; and that it cannot,
+therefore, conduct us to the fact of the existence of a necessary
+being. Change proves merely empirical contingency, that is to say,
+that the new state could not have existed without a cause, which
+belongs to the preceding time. This cause--even although it is
+regarded as absolutely necessary--must be presented to us in time,
+and must belong to the series of phenomena.
+
+
+ON THE ANTITHESIS.
+
+The difficulties which meet us, in our attempt to rise through the
+series of phenomena to the existence of an absolutely necessary
+supreme cause, must not originate from our inability to establish
+the truth of our mere conceptions of the necessary existence of a
+thing. That is to say, our objections not be ontological, but must
+be directed against the causal connection with a series of phenomena
+of a condition which is itself unconditioned. In one word, they must
+be cosmological and relate to empirical laws. We must show that the
+regress in the series of causes (in the world of sense) cannot
+conclude with an empirically unconditioned condition, and that the
+cosmological argument from the contingency of the cosmical state--a
+contingency alleged to arise from change--does not justify us in
+accepting a first cause, that is, a prime originator of the cosmical
+series.
+
+The reader will observe in this antinomy a very remarkable contrast.
+The very same grounds of proof which established in the thesis the
+existence of a supreme being, demonstrated in the antithesis--and with
+equal strictness--the non-existence of such a being. We found,
+first, that a necessary being exists, because the whole time past
+contains the series of all conditions, and with it, therefore, the
+unconditioned (the necessary); secondly, that there does not exist
+any necessary being, for the same reason, that the whole time past
+contains the series of all conditions--which are themselves,
+therefore, in the aggregate, conditioned. The cause of this seeming
+incongruity is as follows. We attend, in the first argument, solely
+to the absolute totality of the series of conditions, the one of which
+determines the other in time, and thus arrive at a necessary
+unconditioned. In the second, we consider, on the contrary, the
+contingency of everything that is determined in the series of time-
+for every event is preceded by a time, in which the condition itself
+must be determined as conditioned--and thus everything that is
+unconditioned or absolutely necessary disappears. In both, the mode
+of proof is quite in accordance with the common procedure of human
+reason, which often falls into discord with itself, from considering
+an object from two different points of view. Herr von Mairan
+regarded the controversy between two celebrated astronomers, which
+arose from a similar difficulty as to the choice of a proper
+standpoint, as a phenomenon of sufficient importance to warrant a
+separate treatise on the subject. The one concluded: the moon revolves
+on its own axis, because it constantly presents the same side to the
+earth; the other declared that the moon does not revolve on its own
+axis, for the same reason. Both conclusions were perfectly correct,
+according to the point of view from which the motions of the moon were
+considered.
+
+
+
+SECTION III. Of the Interest of Reason in these Self-contradictions.
+
+We have thus completely before us the dialectical procedure of the
+cosmological ideas. No possible experience can present us with an
+object adequate to them in extent. Nay, more, reason itself cannot
+cogitate them as according with the general laws of experience. And
+yet they are not arbitrary fictions of thought. On the contrary,
+reason, in its uninterrupted progress in the empirical synthesis, is
+necessarily conducted to them, when it endeavours to free from all
+conditions and to comprehend in its unconditioned totality that
+which can only be determined conditionally in accordance with the laws
+of experience. These dialectical propositions are so many attempts
+to solve four natural and unavoidable problems of reason. There are
+neither more, nor can there be less, than this number, because there
+are no other series of synthetical hypotheses, limiting a priori the
+empirical synthesis.
+
+The brilliant claims of reason striving to extend its dominion
+beyond the limits of experience, have been represented above only in
+dry formulae, which contain merely the grounds of its pretensions.
+They have, besides, in conformity with the character of a
+transcendental philosophy, been freed from every empirical element;
+although the full splendour of the promises they hold out, and the
+anticipations they excite, manifests itself only when in connection
+with empirical cognitions. In the application of them, however, and
+in the advancing enlargement of the employment of reason, while
+struggling to rise from the region of experience and to soar to
+those sublime ideas, philosophy discovers a value and a dignity,
+which, if it could but make good its assertions, would raise it far
+above all other departments of human knowledge--professing, as it
+does, to present a sure foundation for our highest hopes and the
+ultimate aims of all the exertions of reason. The questions: whether
+the world has a beginning and a limit to its extension in space;
+whether there exists anywhere, or perhaps, in my own thinking Self,
+an indivisible and indestructible unity--or whether nothing but what
+is divisible and transitory exists; whether I am a free agent, or,
+like other beings, am bound in the chains of nature and fate; whether,
+finally, there is a supreme cause of the world, or all our thought
+and speculation must end with nature and the order of external things--are
+questions for the solution of which the mathematician would
+willingly exchange his whole science; for in it there is no
+satisfaction for the highest aspirations and most ardent desires of
+humanity. Nay, it may even be said that the true value of mathematics-
+that pride of human reason--consists in this: that she guides reason
+to the knowledge of nature--in her greater as well as in her less
+manifestations--in her beautiful order and regularity--guides her,
+moreover, to an insight into the wonderful unity of the moving
+forces in the operations of nature, far beyond the expectations of
+a philosophy building only on experience; and that she thus encourages
+philosophy to extend the province of reason beyond all experience,
+and at the same time provides it with the most excellent materials
+for supporting its investigations, in so far as their nature admits,
+by adequate and accordant intuitions.
+
+Unfortunately for speculation--but perhaps fortunately for the
+practical interests of humanity--reason, in the midst of her highest
+anticipations, finds herself hemmed in by a press of opposite and
+contradictory conclusions, from which neither her honour nor her
+safety will permit her to draw back. Nor can she regard these
+conflicting trains of reasoning with indifference as mere passages
+at arms, still less can she command peace; for in the subject of the
+conflict she has a deep interest. There is no other course left open
+to her than to reflect with herself upon the origin of this disunion
+in reason--whether it may not arise from a mere misunderstanding.
+After such an inquiry, arrogant claims would have to be given up on
+both sides; but the sovereignty of reason over understanding and sense
+would be based upon a sure foundation.
+
+We shall at present defer this radical inquiry and, in the meantime,
+consider for a little what side in the controversy we should most
+willingly take, if we were obliged to become partisans at all. As,
+in this case, we leave out of sight altogether the logical criterion
+of truth, and merely consult our own interest in reference to the
+question, these considerations, although inadequate to settle the
+question of right in either party, will enable us to comprehend how
+those who have taken part in the struggle, adopt the one view rather
+than the other--no special insight into the subject, however, having
+influenced their choice. They will, at the same time, explain to us
+many other things by the way--for example, the fiery zeal on the one
+side and the cold maintenance of their cause on the other; why the
+one party has met with the warmest approbations, and the other has
+always been repulsed by irreconcilable prejudices.
+
+There is one thing, however, that determines the proper point of
+view, from which alone this preliminary inquiry can be instituted
+and carried on with the proper completeness--and that is the
+comparison of the principles from which both sides, thesis and
+antithesis, proceed. My readers would remark in the propositions of
+the antithesis a complete uniformity in the mode of thought and a
+perfect unity of principle. Its principle was that of pure empiricism,
+not only in the explication of the phenomena in the world, but also
+in the solution of the transcendental ideas, even of that of the universe
+itself. The affirmations of the thesis, on the contrary, were based,
+in addition to the empirical mode of explanation employed in the
+series of phenomena, on intellectual propositions; and its
+principles were in so far not simple. I shall term the thesis, in view
+of its essential characteristic, the dogmatism of pure reason.
+
+On the side of Dogmatism, or of the thesis, therefore, in the
+determination of the cosmological ideas, we find:
+
+1. A practical interest, which must be very dear to every
+right-thinking man. That the word has a beginning--that the nature
+of my thinking self is simple, and therefore indestructible--that I
+am a free agent, and raised above the compulsion of nature and her
+laws--and, finally, that the entire order of things, which form the
+world, is dependent upon a Supreme Being, from whom the whole receives
+unity and connection--these are so many foundation-stones of
+morality and religion. The antithesis deprives us of all these
+supports--or, at least, seems so to deprive us.
+
+2. A speculative interest of reason manifests itself on this side.
+For, if we take the transcendental ideas and employ them in the manner
+which the thesis directs, we can exhibit completely a priori the
+entire chain of conditions, and understand the derivation of the
+conditioned--beginning from the unconditioned. This the antithesis
+does not do; and for this reason does not meet with so welcome a
+reception. For it can give no answer to our question respecting the
+conditions of its synthesis--except such as must be supplemented by
+another question, and so on to infinity. According to it, we must rise
+from a given beginning to one still higher; every part conducts us
+to a still smaller one; every event is preceded by another event which
+is its cause; and the conditions of existence rest always upon other
+and still higher conditions, and find neither end nor basis in some
+self-subsistent thing as the primal being.
+
+3. This side has also the advantage of popularity; and this
+constitutes no small part of its claim to favour. The common
+understanding does not find the least difficulty in the idea of the
+unconditioned beginning of all synthesis--accustomed, as it is, rather
+to follow our consequences than to seek for a proper basis for
+cognition. In the conception of an absolute first, moreover--the
+possibility of which it does not inquire into--it is highly
+gratified to find a firmly-established point of departure for its
+attempts at theory; while in the restless and continuous ascent from
+the conditioned to the condition, always with one foot in the air,
+it can find no satisfaction.
+
+On the side of the antithesis, or Empiricism, in the determination
+of the cosmological ideas:
+
+1. We cannot discover any such practical interest arising from
+pure principles of reason as morality and religion present. On the
+contrary, pure empiricism seems to empty them of all their power and
+influence. If there does not exist a Supreme Being distinct from the
+world--if the world is without beginning, consequently without a
+Creator--if our wills are not free, and the soul is divisible and
+subject to corruption just like matter--the ideas and principles of
+morality lose all validity and fall with the transcendental ideas
+which constituted their theoretical support.
+
+2. But empiricism, in compensation, holds out to reason, in its
+speculative interests, certain important advantages, far exceeding
+any that the dogmatist can promise us. For, when employed by the
+empiricist, understanding is always upon its proper ground of
+investigation--the field of possible experience, the laws of which
+it can explore, and thus extend its cognition securely and with
+clear intelligence without being stopped by limits in any direction.
+Here can it and ought it to find and present to intuition its proper
+object--not only in itself, but in all its relations; or, if it employ
+conceptions, upon this ground it can always present the
+corresponding images in clear and unmistakable intuitions. It is quite
+unnecessary for it to renounce the guidance of nature, to attach
+itself to ideas, the objects of which it cannot know; because, as mere
+intellectual entities, they cannot be presented in any intuition. On
+the contrary, it is not even permitted to abandon its proper
+occupation, under the pretence that it has been brought to a
+conclusion (for it never can be), and to pass into the region of
+idealizing reason and transcendent conceptions, which it is not
+required to observe and explore the laws of nature, but merely to
+think and to imagine--secure from being contradicted by facts, because
+they have not been called as witnesses, but passed by, or perhaps
+subordinated to the so-called higher interests and considerations of
+pure reason.
+
+Hence the empiricist will never allow himself to accept any epoch of
+nature for the first--the absolutely primal state; he will not believe
+that there can be limits to his outlook into her wide domains, nor
+pass from the objects of nature, which he can satisfactorily explain
+by means of observation and mathematical thought--which he can
+determine synthetically in intuition, to those which neither sense
+nor imagination can ever present in concreto; he will not concede the
+existence of a faculty in nature, operating independently of the
+laws of nature--a concession which would introduce uncertainty into
+the procedure of the understanding, which is guided by necessary
+laws to the observation of phenomena; nor, finally, will he permit
+himself to seek a cause beyond nature, inasmuch as we know nothing
+but it, and from it alone receive an objective basis for all our
+conceptions and instruction in the unvarying laws of things.
+
+In truth, if the empirical philosopher had no other purpose in the
+establishment of his antithesis than to check the presumption of a
+reason which mistakes its true destination, which boasts of its
+insight and its knowledge, just where all insight and knowledge
+cease to exist, and regards that which is valid only in relation to
+a practical interest, as an advancement of the speculative interests
+of the mind (in order, when it is convenient for itself, to break
+the thread of our physical investigations, and, under pretence of
+extending our cognition, connect them with transcendental ideas, by
+means of which we really know only that we know nothing)--if, I say,
+the empiricist rested satisfied with this benefit, the principle
+advanced by him would be a maxim recommending moderation in the
+pretensions of reason and modesty in its affirmations, and at the same
+time would direct us to the right mode of extending the province of
+the understanding, by the help of the only true teacher, experience.
+In obedience to this advice, intellectual hypotheses and faith would
+not be called in aid of our practical interests; nor should we
+introduce them under the pompous titles of science and insight. For
+speculative cognition cannot find an objective basis any other where
+than in experience; and, when we overstep its limits our synthesis,
+which requires ever new cognitions independent of experience, has no
+substratum of intuition upon which to build.
+
+But if--as often happens--empiricism, in relation to ideas,
+becomes itself dogmatic and boldly denies that which is above the
+sphere of its phenomenal cognition, it falls itself into the error
+of intemperance--an error which is here all the more reprehensible,
+as thereby the practical interest of reason receives an irreparable
+injury.
+
+And this constitutes the opposition between Epicureanism* and
+Platonism.
+
+[*Footnote: It is, however, still a matter of doubt whether Epicurus
+ever propounded these principles as directions for the objective employment
+of the understanding. If, indeed, they were nothing more than maxims
+for the speculative exercise of reason, he gives evidence therein a
+more genuine philosophic spirit than any of the philosophers of
+antiquity. That, in the explanation of phenomena, we must proceed as
+if the field of inquiry had neither limits in space nor commencement
+in time; that we must be satisfied with the teaching of experience
+in reference to the material of which the world is posed; that we must
+not look for any other mode of the origination of events than that
+which is determined by the unalterable laws of nature; and finally,
+that we not employ the hypothesis of a cause distinct from the world
+to account for a phenomenon or for the world itself--are principles
+for the extension of speculative philosophy, and the discovery of
+the true sources of the principles of morals, which, however little
+conformed to in the present day, are undoubtedly correct. At the
+same time, any one desirous of ignoring, in mere speculation, these
+dogmatical propositions, need not for that reason be accused of
+denying them.]
+
+Both Epicurus and Plato assert more in their systems than they know.
+The former encourages and advances science--although to the
+prejudice of the practical; the latter presents us with excellent
+principles for the investigation of the practical, but, in relation
+to everything regarding which we can attain to speculative cognition,
+permits reason to append idealistic explanations of natural phenomena,
+to the great injury of physical investigation.
+
+3. In regard to the third motive for the preliminary choice of a
+party in this war of assertions, it seems very extraordinary that
+empiricism should be utterly unpopular. We should be inclined to
+believe that the common understanding would receive it with
+pleasure--promising as it does to satisfy it without passing the
+bounds of experience and its connected order; while transcendental
+dogmatism obliges it to rise to conceptions which far surpass the
+intelligence and ability of the most practised thinkers. But in
+this, in truth, is to be found its real motive. For the common
+understanding thus finds itself in a situation where not even the most
+learned can have the advantage of it. If it understands little or
+nothing about these transcendental conceptions, no one can boast of
+understanding any more; and although it may not express itself in so
+scholastically correct a manner as others, it can busy itself with
+reasoning and arguments without end, wandering among mere ideas, about
+which one can always be very eloquent, because we know nothing about
+them; while, in the observation and investigation of nature, it
+would be forced to remain dumb and to confess its utter ignorance.
+Thus indolence and vanity form of themselves strong recommendations
+of these principles. Besides, although it is a hard thing for a
+philosopher to assume a principle, of which he can give to himself
+no reasonable account, and still more to employ conceptions, the
+objective reality of which cannot be established, nothing is more
+usual with the common understanding. It wants something which will
+allow it to go to work with confidence. The difficulty of even
+comprehending a supposition does not disquiet it, because--not knowing
+what comprehending means--it never even thinks of the supposition it
+may be adopting as a principle; and regards as known that with which
+it has become familiar from constant use. And, at last, all
+speculative interests disappear before the practical interests which
+it holds dear; and it fancies that it understands and knows what its
+necessities and hopes incite it to assume or to believe. Thus the
+empiricism of transcendentally idealizing reason is robbed of all
+popularity; and, however prejudicial it may be to the highest
+practical principles, there is no fear that it will ever pass the
+limits of the schools, or acquire any favour or influence in society
+or with the multitude.
+
+Human reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, it
+regards all cognitions as parts of a possible system, and hence
+accepts only such principles as at least do not incapacitate a
+cognition to which we may have attained from being placed along with
+others in a general system. But the propositions of the antithesis
+are of a character which renders the completion of an edifice of
+cognitions impossible. According to these, beyond one state or epoch
+of the world there is always to be found one more ancient; in every
+part always other parts themselves divisible; preceding every event
+another, the origin of which must itself be sought still higher; and
+everything in existence is conditioned, and still not dependent on
+an unconditioned and primal existence. As, therefore, the antithesis
+will not concede the existence of a first beginning which might be
+available as a foundation, a complete edifice of cognition, in the
+presence of such hypothesis, is utterly impossible. Thus the
+architectonic interest of reason, which requires a unity--not
+empirical, but a priori and rational--forms a natural recommendation
+for the assertions of the thesis in our antinomy.
+
+But if any one could free himself entirely from all considerations
+of interest, and weigh without partiality the assertions of reason,
+attending only to their content, irrespective of the consequences
+which follow from them; such a person, on the supposition that he knew
+no other way out of the confusion than to settle the truth of one or
+other of the conflicting doctrines, would live in a state of continual
+hesitation. Today, he would feel convinced that the human will is
+free; to-morrow, considering the indissoluble chain of nature, he
+would look on freedom as a mere illusion and declare nature to be
+all-in-all. But, if he were called to action, the play of the merely
+speculative reason would disappear like the shapes of a dream, and
+practical interest would dictate his choice of principles. But, as
+it well befits a reflective and inquiring being to devote certain
+periods of time to the examination of its own reason--to divest itself
+of all partiality, and frankly to communicate its observations for
+the judgement and opinion of others; so no one can be blamed for, much
+less prevented from, placing both parties on their trial, with
+permission to end themselves, free from intimidation, before
+intimidation, before a sworn jury of equal condition with
+themselves--the condition of weak and fallible men.
+
+
+
+SECTION IV. Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason of
+ presenting a Solution of its Transcendental Problems.
+
+To avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all questions
+would be a profession certain to convict any philosopher of
+extravagant boasting and self-conceit, and at once to destroy the
+confidence that might otherwise have been reposed in him. There are,
+however, sciences so constituted that every question arising within
+their sphere must necessarily be capable of receiving an answer from
+the knowledge already possessed, for the answer must be received
+from the same sources whence the question arose. In such sciences it
+is not allowable to excuse ourselves on the plea of necessary and
+unavoidable ignorance; a solution is absolutely requisite. The rule
+of right and wrong must help us to the knowledge of what is right or
+wrong in all possible cases; otherwise, the idea of obligation or duty
+would be utterly null, for we cannot have any obligation to that which
+we cannot know. On the other hand, in our investigations of the
+phenomena of nature, much must remain uncertain, and many questions
+continue insoluble; because what we know of nature is far from being
+sufficient to explain all the phenomena that are presented to our
+observation. Now the question is: Whether there is in
+transcendental philosophy any question, relating to an object
+presented to pure reason, which is unanswerable by this reason; and
+whether we must regard the subject of the question as quite uncertain,
+so far as our knowledge extends, and must give it a place among
+those subjects, of which we have just so much conception as is
+sufficient to enable us to raise a question--faculty or materials
+failing us, however, when we attempt an answer.
+
+Now I maintain that, among all speculative cognition, the
+peculiarity of transcendental philosophy is that there is no question,
+relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is insoluble
+by this reason; and that the profession of unavoidable ignorance-
+the problem being alleged to be beyond the reach of our faculties-
+cannot free us from the obligation to present a complete and
+satisfactory answer. For the very conception which enables us to raise
+the question must give us the power of answering it; inasmuch as the
+object, as in the case of right and wrong, is not to be discovered
+out of the conception.
+
+But, in transcendental philosophy, it is only the cosmological
+questions to which we can demand a satisfactory answer in relation
+to the constitution of their object; and the philosopher is not
+permitted to avail himself of the pretext of necessary ignorance and
+impenetrable obscurity. These questions relate solely to the
+cosmological ideas. For the object must be given in experience, and
+the question relates to the adequateness of the object to an idea.
+If the object is transcendental and therefore itself unknown; if the
+question, for example, is whether the object--the something, the
+phenomenon of which (internal--in ourselves) is thought--that is to
+say, the soul, is in itself a simple being; or whether there is a
+cause of all things, which is absolutely necessary--in such cases we
+are seeking for our idea an object, of which we may confess that it
+is unknown to us, though we must not on that account assert that it
+is impossible.* The cosmological ideas alone posses the peculiarity
+that we can presuppose the object of them and the empirical
+synthesis requisite for the conception of that object to be given;
+and the question, which arises from these ideas, relates merely to
+the progress of this synthesis, in so far as it must contain absolute
+totality--which, however, is not empirical, as it cannot be given in
+any experience. Now, as the question here is solely in regard to a
+thing as the object of a possible experience and not as a thing in
+itself, the answer to the transcendental cosmological question need
+not be sought out of the idea, for the question does not regard an
+object in itself. The question in relation to a possible experience
+is not, "What can be given in an experience in concreto" but "what
+is contained in the idea, to which the empirical synthesis must
+approximate." The question must therefore be capable of solution
+from the idea alone. For the idea is a creation of reason itself,
+which therefore cannot disclaim the obligation to answer or refer us
+to the unknown object.
+
+[*Footnote: The question, "What is the constitution of a transcendental
+object?" is unanswerable--we are unable to say what it is; but we
+can perceive that the question itself is nothing; because it does
+not relate to any object that can be presented to us. For this reason,
+we must consider all the questions raised in transcendental psychology
+as answerable and as really answered; for they relate to the
+transcendental subject of all internal phenomena, which is not
+itself phenomenon and consequently not given as an object, in which,
+moreover, none of the categories--and it is to them that the
+question is properly directed--find any conditions of its application.
+Here, therefore, is a case where no answer is the only proper
+answer. For a question regarding the constitution of a something which
+cannot be cogitated by any determined predicate, being completely
+beyond the sphere of objects and experience, is perfectly null and
+void.]
+
+It is not so extraordinary, as it at first sight appears, that a
+science should demand and expect satisfactory answers to all the
+questions that may arise within its own sphere (questiones
+domesticae), although, up to a certain time, these answers may not
+have been discovered. There are, in addition to transcendental
+philosophy, only two pure sciences of reason; the one with a
+speculative, the other with a practical content--pure mathematics
+and pure ethics. Has any one ever heard it alleged that, from our
+complete and necessary ignorance of the conditions, it is uncertain
+what exact relation the diameter of a circle bears to the circle in
+rational or irrational numbers? By the former the sum cannot be
+given exactly, by the latter only approximately; and therefore we
+decide that the impossibility of a solution of the question is
+evident. Lambert presented us with a demonstration of this. In the
+general principles of morals there can be nothing uncertain, for the
+propositions are either utterly without meaning, or must originate
+solely in our rational conceptions. On the other hand, there must be
+in physical science an infinite number of conjectures, which can never
+become certainties; because the phenomena of nature are not given as
+objects dependent on our conceptions. The key to the solution of
+such questions cannot, therefore, be found in our conceptions, or in
+pure thought, but must lie without us and for that reason is in many
+cases not to be discovered; and consequently a satisfactory
+explanation cannot be expected. The questions of transcendental
+analytic, which relate to the deduction of our pure cognition, are
+not to be regarded as of the same kind as those mentioned above; for
+we are not at present treating of the certainty of judgements in relation
+to the origin of our conceptions, but only of that certainty in
+relation to objects.
+
+We cannot, therefore, escape the responsibility of at least a
+critical solution of the questions of reason, by complaints of the
+limited nature of our faculties, and the seemingly humble confession
+that it is beyond the power of our reason to decide, whether the world
+has existed from all eternity or had a beginning--whether it is
+infinitely extended, or enclosed within certain limits--whether
+anything in the world is simple, or whether everything must be capable
+of infinite divisibility--whether freedom can originate phenomena,
+or whether everything is absolutely dependent on the laws and order
+of nature--and, finally, whether there exists a being that is
+completely unconditioned and necessary, or whether the existence of
+everything is conditioned and consequently dependent on something
+external to itself, and therefore in its own nature contingent. For
+all these questions relate to an object, which can be given nowhere
+else than in thought. This object is the absolutely unconditioned
+totality of the synthesis of phenomena. If the conceptions in our
+minds do not assist us to some certain result in regard to these
+problems, we must not defend ourselves on the plea that the object
+itself remains hidden from and unknown to us. For no such thing or
+object can be given--it is not to be found out of the idea in our
+minds. We must seek the cause of our failure in our idea itself, which
+is an insoluble problem and in regard to which we obstinately assume
+that there exists a real object corresponding and adequate to it. A
+clear explanation of the dialectic which lies in our conception,
+will very soon enable us to come to a satisfactory decision in
+regard to such a question.
+
+The pretext that we are unable to arrive at certainty in regard to
+these problems may be met with this question, which requires at
+least a plain answer: "From what source do the ideas originate, the
+solution of which involves you in such difficulties? Are you seeking
+for an explanation of certain phenomena; and do you expect these ideas
+to give you the principles or the rules of this explanation?" Let it
+be granted, that all nature was laid open before you; that nothing
+was hid from your senses and your consciousness. Still, you could not
+cognize in concreto the object of your ideas in any experience. For
+what is demanded is not only this full and complete intuition, but
+also a complete synthesis and the consciousness of its absolute
+totality; and this is not possible by means of any empirical
+cognition. It follows that your question--your idea--is by no means
+necessary for the explanation of any phenomenon; and the idea cannot
+have been in any sense given by the object itself. For such an
+object can never be presented to us, because it cannot be given by
+any possible experience. Whatever perceptions you may attain to, you
+are still surrounded by conditions--in space, or in time--and you cannot
+discover anything unconditioned; nor can you decide whether this
+unconditioned is to be placed in an absolute beginning of the
+synthesis, or in an absolute totality of the series without beginning.
+A whole, in the empirical signification of the term, is always
+merely comparative. The absolute whole of quantity (the universe),
+of division, of derivation, of the condition of existence, with the
+question--whether it is to be produced by finite or infinite
+synthesis, no possible experience can instruct us concerning. You will
+not, for example, be able to explain the phenomena of a body in the
+least degree better, whether you believe it to consist of simple, or
+of composite parts; for a simple phenomenon--and just as little an
+infinite series of composition--can never be presented to your
+perception. Phenomena require and admit of explanation, only in so
+far as the conditions of that explanation are given in perception;
+but the sum total of that which is given in phenomena, considered as
+an absolute whole, is itself a perception--and we cannot therefore
+seek for explanations of this whole beyond itself, in other perceptions.
+The explanation of this whole is the proper object of the
+transcendental problems of pure reason.
+
+Although, therefore, the solution of these problems is
+unattainable through experience, we must not permit ourselves to say
+that it is uncertain how the object of our inquiries is constituted.
+For the object is in our own mind and cannot be discovered in
+experience; and we have only to take care that our thoughts are
+consistent with each other, and to avoid falling into the amphiboly
+of regarding our idea as a representation of an object empirically
+given, and therefore to be cognized according to the laws of experience.
+A dogmatical solution is therefore not only unsatisfactory but
+impossible. The critical solution, which may be a perfectly certain
+one, does not consider the question objectively, but proceeds by
+inquiring into the basis of the cognition upon which the question
+rests.
+
+
+
+SECTION V. Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems
+ presented in the four Transcendental Ideas.
+
+We should be quite willing to desist from the demand of a dogmatical
+answer to our questions, if we understood beforehand that, be the
+answer what it may, it would only serve to increase our ignorance,
+to throw us from one incomprehensibility into another, from one
+obscurity into another still greater, and perhaps lead us into
+irreconcilable contradictions. If a dogmatical affirmative or negative
+answer is demanded, is it at all prudent to set aside the probable
+grounds of a solution which lie before us and to take into
+consideration what advantage we shall gain, if the answer is to favour
+the one side or the other? If it happens that in both cases the answer
+is mere nonsense, we have in this an irresistible summons to institute
+a critical investigation of the question, for the purpose of
+discovering whether it is based on a groundless presupposition and
+relates to an idea, the falsity of which would be more easily
+exposed in its application and consequences than in the mere
+representation of its content. This is the great utility of the
+sceptical mode of treating the questions addressed by pure reason to
+itself. By this method we easily rid ourselves of the confusions of
+dogmatism, and establish in its place a temperate criticism, which,
+as a genuine cathartic, will successfully remove the presumptuous notions
+of philosophy and their consequence--the vain pretension to
+universal science.
+
+If, then, I could understand the nature of a cosmological idea and
+perceive, before I entered on the discussion of the subject at all,
+that, whatever side of the question regarding the unconditioned of
+the regressive synthesis of phenomena it favoured--it must either be
+too great or too small for every conception of the understanding--I
+would be able to comprehend how the idea, which relates to an object
+of experience--an experience which must be adequate to and in
+accordance with a possible conception of the understanding--must be
+completely void and without significance, inasmuch as its object is
+inadequate, consider it as we may. And this is actually the case
+with all cosmological conceptions, which, for the reason above
+mentioned, involve reason, so long as it remains attached to them,
+in an unavoidable antinomy. For suppose:
+
+First, that the world has no beginning--in this case it is too large
+for our conception; for this conception, which consists in a
+successive regress, cannot overtake the whole eternity that has
+elapsed. Grant that it has a beginning, it is then too small for the
+conception of the understanding. For, as a beginning presupposes a
+time preceding, it cannot be unconditioned; and the law of the
+empirical employment of the understanding imposes the necessity of
+looking for a higher condition of time; and the world is, therefore,
+evidently too small for this law.
+
+The same is the case with the double answer to the question
+regarding the extent, in space, of the world. For, if it is infinite
+and unlimited, it must be too large for every possible empirical
+conception. If it is finite and limited, we have a right to ask: "What
+determines these limits?" Void space is not a self-subsistent
+correlate of things, and cannot be a final condition--and still less
+an empirical condition, forming a part of a possible experience. For
+how can we have any experience or perception of an absolute void?
+But the absolute totality of the empirical synthesis requires that
+the unconditioned be an empirical conception. Consequently, a finite
+world is too small for our conception.
+
+Secondly, if every phenomenon (matter) in space consists of an
+infinite number of parts, the regress of the division is always too
+great for our conception; and if the division of space must cease with
+some member of the division (the simple), it is too small for the idea
+of the unconditioned. For the member at which we have discontinued
+our division still admits a regress to many more parts contained in
+the object.
+
+Thirdly, suppose that every event in the world happens in accordance
+with the laws of nature; the causality of a cause must itself be an
+event and necessitates a regress to a still higher cause, and
+consequently the unceasing prolongation of the series of conditions
+a parte priori. Operative nature is therefore too large for every
+conception we can form in the synthesis of cosmical events.
+
+If we admit the existence of spontaneously produced events, that is,
+of free agency, we are driven, in our search for sufficient reasons,
+on an unavoidable law of nature and are compelled to appeal to the
+empirical law of causality, and we find that any such totality of
+connection in our synthesis is too small for our necessary empirical
+conception.
+
+Fourthly, if we assume the existence of an absolutely necessary
+being--whether it be the world or something in the world, or the cause
+of the world--we must place it in a time at an infinite distance
+from any given moment; for, otherwise, it must be dependent on some
+other and higher existence. Such an existence is, in this case, too
+large for our empirical conception, and unattainable by the
+continued regress of any synthesis.
+
+But if we believe that everything in the world--be it condition or
+conditioned--is contingent; every given existence is too small for
+our conception. For in this case we are compelled to seek for some
+other existence upon which the former depends.
+
+We have said that in all these cases the cosmological idea is either
+too great or too small for the empirical regress in a synthesis, and
+consequently for every possible conception of the understanding. Why
+did we not express ourselves in a manner exactly the reverse of this
+and, instead of accusing the cosmological idea of over stepping or
+of falling short of its true aim, possible experience, say that, in
+the first case, the empirical conception is always too small for the
+idea, and in the second too great, and thus attach the blame of
+these contradictions to the empirical regress? The reason is this.
+Possible experience can alone give reality to our conceptions; without
+it a conception is merely an idea, without truth or relation to an
+object. Hence a possible empirical conception must be the standard
+by which we are to judge whether an idea is anything more than an idea
+and fiction of thought, or whether it relates to an object in the
+world. If we say of a thing that in relation to some other thing it
+is too large or too small, the former is considered as existing for
+the sake of the latter, and requiring to be adapted to it. Among the
+trivial subjects of discussion in the old schools of dialectics was
+this question: "If a ball cannot pass through a hole, shall we say
+that the ball is too large or the hole too small?" In this case it
+is indifferent what expression we employ; for we do not know which
+exists for the sake of the other. On the other hand, we cannot say:
+"The man is too long for his coat"; but: "The coat is too short for
+the man."
+
+We are thus led to the well-founded suspicion that the
+cosmological ideas, and all the conflicting sophistical assertions
+connected with them, are based upon a false and fictitious
+conception of the mode in which the object of these ideas is presented
+to us; and this suspicion will probably direct us how to expose the
+illusion that has so long led us astray from the truth.
+
+
+
+SECTION VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the
+ Solution of Pure Cosmological Dialectic.
+
+In the transcendental aesthetic we proved that everything intuited
+in space and time, all objects of a possible experience, are nothing
+but phenomena, that is, mere representations; and that these, as
+presented to us--as extended bodies, or as series of changes--have
+no self-subsistent existence apart from human thought. This doctrine
+I call Transcendental Idealism.* The realist in the transcendental
+sense regards these modifications of our sensibility, these mere
+representations, as things subsisting in themselves.
+
+[*Footnote: I have elsewhere termed this theory formal idealism, to
+distinguish it from material idealism, which doubts or denies the
+existence of external things. To avoid ambiguity, it seems advisable
+in many cases to employ this term instead of that mentioned in the text.]
+
+It would be unjust to accuse us of holding the long-decried theory
+of empirical idealism, which, while admitting the reality of space,
+denies, or at least doubts, the existence of bodies extended in it,
+and thus leaves us without a sufficient criterion of reality and
+illusion. The supporters of this theory find no difficulty in
+admitting the reality of the phenomena of the internal sense in
+time; nay, they go the length of maintaining that this internal
+experience is of itself a sufficient proof of the real existence of
+its object as a thing in itself.
+
+Transcendental idealism allows that the objects of external
+intuition--as intuited in space, and all changes in time--as
+represented by the internal sense, are real. For, as space is the form
+of that intuition which we call external, and, without objects in
+space, no empirical representation could be given us, we can and ought
+to regard extended bodies in it as real. The case is the same with
+representations in time. But time and space, with all phenomena
+therein, are not in themselves things. They are nothing but
+representations and cannot exist out of and apart from the mind.
+Nay, the sensuous internal intuition of the mind (as the object of
+consciousness), the determination of which is represented by the
+succession of different states in time, is not the real, proper
+self, as it exists in itself--not the transcendental subject--but only
+a phenomenon, which is presented to the sensibility of this, to us,
+unknown being. This internal phenomenon cannot be admitted to be a
+self-subsisting thing; for its condition is time, and time cannot be
+the condition of a thing in itself. But the empirical truth of
+phenomena in space and time is guaranteed beyond the possibility of
+doubt, and sufficiently distinguished from the illusion of dreams or
+fancy--although both have a proper and thorough connection in an
+experience according to empirical laws. The objects of experience then
+are not things in themselves, but are given only in experience, and
+have no existence apart from and independently of experience. That
+there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one has ever
+observed them, must certainly be admitted; but this assertion means
+only, that we may in the possible progress of experience discover them
+at some future time. For that which stands in connection with a
+perception according to the laws of the progress of experience is
+real. They are therefore really existent, if they stand in empirical
+connection with my actual or real consciousness, although they are
+not in themselves real, that is, apart from the progress of experience.
+
+There is nothing actually given--we can be conscious of nothing as
+real, except a perception and the empirical progression from it to
+other possible perceptions. For phenomena, as mere representations,
+are real only in perception; and perception is, in fact, nothing but
+the reality of an empirical representation, that is, a phenomenon.
+To call a phenomenon a real thing prior to perception means either
+that we must meet with this phenomenon in the progress of
+experience, or it means nothing at all. For I can say only of a
+thing in itself that it exists without relation to the senses and
+experience. But we are speaking here merely of phenomena in space
+and time, both of which are determinations of sensibility, and not
+of things in themselves. It follows that phenomena are not things in
+themselves, but are mere representations, which if not given in us--in
+perception--are non-existent.
+
+The faculty of sensuous intuition is properly a receptivity--a
+capacity of being affected in a certain manner by representations,
+the relation of which to each other is a pure intuition of space and
+time--the pure forms of sensibility. These representations, in so far
+as they are connected and determinable in this relation (in space and
+time) according to laws of the unity of experience, are called
+objects. The non-sensuous cause of these representations is completely
+unknown to us and hence cannot be intuited as an object. For such an
+object could not be represented either in space or in time; and
+without these conditions intuition or representation is impossible.
+We may, at the same time, term the non-sensuous cause of phenomena
+the transcendental object--but merely as a mental correlate to
+sensibility, considered as a receptivity. To this transcendental
+object we may attribute the whole connection and extent of our
+possible perceptions, and say that it is given and exists in itself
+prior to all experience. But the phenomena, corresponding to it, are
+not given as things in themselves, but in experience alone. For they
+are mere representations, receiving from perceptions alone
+significance and relation to a real object, under the condition that
+this or that perception--indicating an object--is in complete
+connection with all others in accordance with the rules of the unity
+of experience. Thus we can say: "The things that really existed in
+past time are given in the transcendental object of experience." But
+these are to me real objects, only in so far as I can represent to
+my own mind, that a regressive series of possible perceptions-
+following the indications of history, or the footsteps of cause and
+effect--in accordance with empirical laws--that, in one word, the
+course of the world conducts us to an elapsed series of time as the
+condition of the present time. This series in past time is represented
+as real, not in itself, but only in connection with a possible
+experience. Thus, when I say that certain events occurred in past
+time, I merely assert the possibility of prolonging the chain of
+experience, from the present perception, upwards to the conditions
+that determine it according to time.
+
+If I represent to myself all objects existing in all space and time,
+I do not thereby place these in space and time prior to all
+experience; on the contrary, such a representation is nothing more
+than the notion of a possible experience, in its absolute
+completeness. In experience alone are those objects, which are nothing
+but representations, given. But, when I say they existed prior to my
+experience, this means only that I must begin with the perception
+present to me and follow the track indicated until I discover them
+in some part or region of experience. The cause of the empirical
+condition of this progression--and consequently at what member therein
+I must stop, and at what point in the regress I am to find this
+member--is transcendental, and hence necessarily incognizable. But
+with this we have not to do; our concern is only with the law of
+progression in experience, in which objects, that is, phenomena, are
+given. It is a matter of indifference, whether I say, "I may in the
+progress of experience discover stars, at a hundred times greater
+distance than the most distant of those now visible," or, "Stars at
+this distance may be met in space, although no one has, or ever will
+discover them." For, if they are given as things in themselves,
+without any relation to possible experience, they are for me
+non-existent, consequently, are not objects, for they are not
+contained in the regressive series of experience. But, if these
+phenomena must be employed in the construction or support of the
+cosmological idea of an absolute whole, and when we are discussing
+a question that oversteps the limits of possible experience, the
+proper distinction of the different theories of the reality of
+sensuous objects is of great importance, in order to avoid the
+illusion which must necessarily arise from the misinterpretation of
+our empirical conceptions.
+
+
+
+SECTION VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem.
+
+The antinomy of pure reason is based upon the following
+dialectical argument: "If that which is conditioned is given, the
+whole series of its conditions is also given; but sensuous objects
+are given as conditioned; consequently..." This syllogism, the major
+of which seems so natural and evident, introduces as many cosmological
+ideas as there are different kinds of conditions in the synthesis of
+phenomena, in so far as these conditions constitute a series. These
+ideas require absolute totality in the series, and thus place reason
+in inextricable embarrassment. Before proceeding to expose the fallacy
+in this dialectical argument, it will be necessary to have a correct
+understanding of certain conceptions that appear in it.
+
+In the first place, the following proposition is evident, and
+indubitably certain: "If the conditioned is given, a regress in the
+series of all its conditions is thereby imperatively required." For
+the very conception of a conditioned is a conception of something
+related to a condition, and, if this condition is itself
+conditioned, to another condition--and so on through all the members
+of the series. This proposition is, therefore, analytical and has
+nothing to fear from transcendental criticism. It is a logical
+postulate of reason: to pursue, as far as possible, the connection
+of a conception with its conditions.
+
+If, in the second place, both the conditioned and the condition
+are things in themselves, and if the former is given, not only is
+the regress to the latter requisite, but the latter is really given
+with the former. Now, as this is true of all the members of the
+series, the entire series of conditions, and with them the
+unconditioned, is at the same time given in the very fact of the
+conditioned, the existence of which is possible only in and through
+that series, being given. In this case, the synthesis of the
+conditioned with its condition, is a synthesis of the understanding
+merely, which represents things as they are, without regarding whether
+and how we can cognize them. But if I have to do with phenomena,
+which, in their character of mere representations, are not given, if
+I do not attain to a cognition of them (in other words, to themselves,
+for they are nothing more than empirical cognitions), I am not
+entitled to say: "If the conditioned is given, all its conditions
+(as phenomena) are also given." I cannot, therefore, from the fact
+of a conditioned being given, infer the absolute totality of the
+series of its conditions. For phenomena are nothing but an empirical
+synthesis in apprehension or perception, and are therefore given
+only in it. Now, in speaking of phenomena it does not follow that,
+if the conditioned is given, the synthesis which constitutes its
+empirical condition is also thereby given and presupposed; such a
+synthesis can be established only by an actual regress in the series
+of conditions. But we are entitled to say in this case that a
+regress to the conditions of a conditioned, in other words, that a
+continuous empirical synthesis is enjoined; that, if the conditions
+are not given, they are at least required; and that we are certain
+to discover the conditions in this regress.
+
+We can now see that the major, in the above cosmological
+syllogism, takes the conditioned in the transcendental signification
+which it has in the pure category, while the minor speaks of it in
+the empirical signification which it has in the category as applied
+to phenomena. There is, therefore, a dialectical fallacy in the
+syllogism--a sophisma figurae dictionis. But this fallacy is not a
+consciously devised one, but a perfectly natural illusion of the
+common reason of man. For, when a thing is given as conditioned, we
+presuppose in the major its conditions and their series,
+unperceived, as it were, and unseen; because this is nothing more than
+the logical requirement of complete and satisfactory premisses for
+a given conclusion. In this case, time is altogether left out in the
+connection of the conditioned with the condition; they are supposed
+to be given in themselves, and contemporaneously. It is, moreover,
+just as natural to regard phenomena (in the minor) as things in
+themselves and as objects presented to the pure understanding, as in
+the major, in which complete abstraction was made of all conditions
+of intuition. But it is under these conditions alone that objects are
+given. Now we overlooked a remarkable distinction between the
+conceptions. The synthesis of the conditioned with its condition,
+and the complete series of the latter (in the major) are not limited
+by time, and do not contain the conception of succession. On the
+contrary, the empirical synthesis and the series of conditions in
+the phenomenal world--subsumed in the minor--are necessarily
+successive and given in time alone. It follows that I cannot
+presuppose in the minor, as I did in the major, the absolute
+totality of the synthesis and of the series therein represented; for
+in the major all the members of the series are given as things in
+themselves--without any limitations or conditions of time, while in
+the minor they are possible only in and through a successive
+regress, which cannot exist, except it be actually carried into
+execution in the world of phenomena.
+
+After this proof of the viciousness of the argument commonly
+employed in maintaining cosmological assertions, both parties may
+now be justly dismissed, as advancing claims without grounds or title.
+But the process has not been ended by convincing them that one or both
+were in the wrong and had maintained an assertion which was without
+valid grounds of proof. Nothing seems to be clearer than that, if
+one maintains: "The world has a beginning," and another: "The world
+has no beginning," one of the two must be right. But it is likewise
+clear that, if the evidence on both sides is equal, it is impossible
+to discover on what side the truth lies; and the controversy
+continues, although the parties have been recommended to peace
+before the tribunal of reason. There remains, then, no other means
+of settling the question than to convince the parties, who refute each
+other with such conclusiveness and ability, that they are disputing
+about nothing, and that a transcendental illusion has been mocking
+them with visions of reality where there is none. The mode of
+adjusting a dispute which cannot be decided upon its own merits, we
+shall now proceed to lay before our readers.
+
+Zeno of Elea, a subtle dialectician, was severely reprimanded by
+Plato as a sophist, who, merely from the base motive of exhibiting
+his skill in discussion, maintained and subverted the same proposition
+by arguments as powerful and convincing on the one side as on the
+other. He maintained, for example, that God (who was probably
+nothing more, in his view, than the world) is neither finite nor
+infinite, neither in motion nor in rest, neither similar nor
+dissimilar to any other thing. It seemed to those philosophers who
+criticized his mode of discussion that his purpose was to deny
+completely both of two self-contradictory propositions--which is
+absurd. But I cannot believe that there is any justice in this
+accusation. The first of these propositions I shall presently consider
+in a more detailed manner. With regard to the others, if by the word
+of God he understood merely the Universe, his meaning must have
+been--that it cannot be permanently present in one place--that is,
+at rest--nor be capable of changing its place--that is, of moving-
+because all places are in the universe, and the universe itself is,
+therefore, in no place. Again, if the universe contains in itself
+everything that exists, it cannot be similar or dissimilar to any
+other thing, because there is, in fact, no other thing with which it
+can be compared. If two opposite judgements presuppose a contingent
+impossible, or arbitrary condition, both--in spite of their opposition
+(which is, however, not properly or really a contradiction)--fall
+away; because the condition, which ensured the validity of both, has
+itself disappeared.
+
+If we say: "Everybody has either a good or a bad smell," we have
+omitted a third possible judgement--it has no smell at all; and thus
+both conflicting statements may be false. If we say: "It is either
+good-smelling or not good-smelling (vel suaveolens vel
+non-suaveolens)," both judgements are contradictorily opposed; and
+the contradictory opposite of the former judgement--some bodies are
+not good-smelling--embraces also those bodies which have no smell at
+all. In the preceding pair of opposed judgements (per disparata),
+the contingent condition of the conception of body (smell) attached
+to both conflicting statements, instead of having been omitted in the
+latter, which is consequently not the contradictory opposite of the
+former.
+
+If, accordingly, we say: "The world is either infinite in extension,
+or it is not infinite (non est infinitus)"; and if the former
+proposition is false, its contradictory opposite--the world is not
+infinite--must be true. And thus I should deny the existence of an
+infinite, without, however affirming the existence of a finite
+world. But if we construct our proposition thus: "The world is
+either infinite or finite (non-infinite)," both statements may be
+false. For, in this case, we consider the world as per se determined
+in regard to quantity, and while, in the one judgement, we deny its
+infinite and consequently, perhaps, its independent existence; in
+the other, we append to the world, regarded as a thing in itself, a
+certain determination--that of finitude; and the latter may be false
+as well as the former, if the world is not given as a thing in itself,
+and thus neither as finite nor as infinite in quantity. This kind of
+opposition I may be allowed to term dialectical; that of
+contradictories may be called analytical opposition. Thus then, of
+two dialectically opposed judgements both may be false, from the fact,
+that the one is not a mere contradictory of the other, but actually
+enounces more than is requisite for a full and complete contradiction.
+
+When we regard the two propositions--"The world is infinite in
+quantity," and, "The world is finite in quantity," as contradictory
+opposites, we are assuming that the world--the complete series of
+phenomena--is a thing in itself. For it remains as a permanent
+quantity, whether I deny the infinite or the finite regress in the
+series of its phenomena. But if we dismiss this assumption--this
+transcendental illusion--and deny that it is a thing in itself, the
+contradictory opposition is metamorphosed into a merely dialectical
+one; and the world, as not existing in itself--independently of the
+regressive series of my representations--exists in like manner neither
+as a whole which is infinite nor as a whole which is finite in itself.
+The universe exists for me only in the empirical regress of the series
+of phenomena and not per se. If, then, it is always conditioned, it
+is never completely or as a whole; and it is, therefore, not an
+unconditioned whole and does not exist as such, either with an
+infinite, or with a finite quantity.
+
+What we have here said of the first cosmological idea--that of the
+absolute totality of quantity in phenomena--applies also to the
+others. The series of conditions is discoverable only in the
+regressive synthesis itself, and not in the phenomenon considered as
+a thing in itself--given prior to all regress. Hence I am compelled
+to say: "The aggregate of parts in a given phenomenon is in itself
+neither finite nor infinite; and these parts are given only in the
+regressive synthesis of decomposition--a synthesis which is never
+given in absolute completeness, either as finite, or as infinite."
+The same is the case with the series of subordinated causes, or of
+the conditioned up to the unconditioned and necessary existence, which
+can never be regarded as in itself, ind in its totality, either as
+finite or as infinite; because, as a series of subordinate
+representations, it subsists only in the dynamical regress and
+cannot be regarded as existing previously to this regress, or as a
+self-subsistent series of things.
+
+Thus the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas
+disappears. For the above demonstration has established the fact
+that it is merely the product of a dialectical and illusory
+opposition, which arises from the application of the idea of
+absolute totality--admissible only as a condition of things in
+themselves--to phenomena, which exist only in our representations,
+and--when constituting a series--in a successive regress. This
+antinomy of reason may, however, be really profitable to our
+speculative interests, not in the way of contributing any dogmatical
+addition, but as presenting to us another material support in our
+critical investigations. For it furnishes us with an indirect proof
+of the transcendental ideality of phenomena, if our minds were not
+completely satisfied with the direct proof set forth in the
+Trancendental Aesthetic. The proof would proceed in the following
+dilemma. If the world is a whole existing in itself, it must be either
+finite or infinite. But it is neither finite nor infinite--as has been
+shown, on the one side, by the thesis, on the other, by the
+antithesis. Therefore the world--the content of all phenomena--is
+not a whole existing in itself. It follows that phenomena are nothing,
+apart from our representations. And this is what we mean by
+transcendental ideality.
+
+This remark is of some importance. It enables us to see that the
+proofs of the fourfold antinomy are not mere sophistries--are not
+fallacious, but grounded on the nature of reason, and valid--under
+the supposition that phenomena are things in themselves. The opposition
+of the judgements which follow makes it evident that a fallacy lay
+in the initial supposition, and thus helps us to discover the true
+constitution of objects of sense. This transcendental dialectic does
+not favour scepticism, although it presents us with a triumphant
+demonstration of the advantages of the sceptical method, the great
+utility of which is apparent in the antinomy, where the arguments of
+reason were allowed to confront each other in undiminished force.
+And although the result of these conflicts of reason is not what we
+expected--although we have obtained no positive dogmatical addition
+to metaphysical science--we have still reaped a great advantage in
+the correction of our judgements on these subjects of thought.
+
+
+
+SECTION VIII. Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation
+ to the Cosmological Ideas.
+
+The cosmological principle of totality could not give us any certain
+knowledge in regard to the maximum in the series of conditions in
+the world of sense, considered as a thing in itself. The actual
+regress in the series is the only means of approaching this maximum.
+This principle of pure reason, therefore, may still be considered as
+valid--not as an axiom enabling us to cogitate totality in the
+object as actual, but as a problem for the understanding, which
+requires it to institute and to continue, in conformity with the
+idea of totality in the mind, the regress in the series of the
+conditions of a given conditioned. For in the world of sense, that
+is, in space and time, every condition which we discover in our
+investigation of phenomena is itself conditioned; because sensuous
+objects are not things in themselves (in which case an absolutely
+unconditioned might be reached in the progress of cognition), but
+are merely empirical representations the conditions of which must
+always be found in intuition. The principle of reason is therefore
+properly a mere rule--prescribing a regress in the series of
+conditions for given phenomena, and prohibiting any pause or rest on
+an absolutely unconditioned. It is, therefore, not a principle of
+the possibility of experience or of the empirical cognition of
+sensuous objects--consequently not a principle of the understanding;
+for every experience is confined within certain proper limits
+determined by the given intuition. Still less is it a constitutive
+principle of reason authorizing us to extend our conception of the
+sensuous world beyond all possible experience. It is merely a
+principle for the enlargement and extension of experience as far as
+is possible for human faculties. It forbids us to consider any
+empirical limits as absolute. It is, hence, a principle of reason,
+which, as a rule, dictates how we ought to proceed in our empirical
+regress, but is unable to anticipate or indicate prior to the
+empirical regress what is given in the object itself. I have termed
+it for this reason a regulative principle of reason; while the
+principle of the absolute totality of the series of conditions, as
+existing in itself and given in the object, is a constitutive
+cosmological principle. This distinction will at once demonstrate
+the falsehood of the constitutive principle, and prevent us from
+attributing (by a transcendental subreptio) objective reality to an
+idea, which is valid only as a rule.
+
+In order to understand the proper meaning of this rule of pure
+reason, we must notice first that it cannot tell us what the object
+is, but only how the empirical regress is to be proceeded with in
+order to attain to the complete conception of the object. If it gave
+us any information in respect to the former statement, it would be
+a constitutive principle--a principle impossible from the nature of
+pure reason. It will not therefore enable us to establish any such
+conclusions as: "The series of conditions for a given conditioned is
+in itself finite," or, "It is infinite." For, in this case, we
+should be cogitating in the mere idea of absolute totality, an
+object which is not and cannot be given in experience; inasmuch as
+we should be attributing a reality objective and independent of the
+empirical synthesis, to a series of phenomena. This idea of reason
+cannot then be regarded as valid--except as a rule for the
+regressive synthesis in the series of conditions, according to which
+we must proceed from the conditioned, through all intermediate and
+subordinate conditions, up to the unconditioned; although this goal
+is unattained and unattainable. For the absolutely unconditioned cannot
+be discovered in the sphere of experience.
+
+We now proceed to determine clearly our notion of a synthesis
+which can never be complete. There are two terms commonly employed
+for this purpose. These terms are regarded as expressions of different
+and distinguishable notions, although the ground of the distinction
+has never been clearly exposed. The term employed by the mathematicians
+is progressus in infinitum. The philosophers prefer the expression
+progressus in indefinitum. Without detaining the reader with an
+examination of the reasons for such a distinction, or with remarks
+on the right or wrong use of the terms, I shall endeavour clearly to
+determine these conceptions, so far as is necessary for the purpose
+in this Critique.
+
+We may, with propriety, say of a straight line, that it may be
+produced to infinity. In this case the distinction between a
+progressus in infinitum and a progressus in indefinitum is a mere
+piece of subtlety. For, although when we say, "Produce a straight
+line," it is more correct to say in indefinitum than in infinitum;
+because the former means, "Produce it as far as you please," the
+second, "You must not cease to produce it"; the expression in
+infinitum is, when we are speaking of the power to do it, perfectly
+correct, for we can always make it longer if we please--on to
+infinity. And this remark holds good in all cases, when we speak of
+a progressus, that is, an advancement from the condition to the
+conditioned; this possible advancement always proceeds to infinity.
+We may proceed from a given pair in the descending line of generation
+from father to son, and cogitate a never-ending line of descendants
+from it. For in such a case reason does not demand absolute totality
+in the series, because it does not presuppose it as a condition and
+as given (datum), but merely as conditioned, and as capable of being
+given (dabile).
+
+Very different is the case with the problem: "How far the regress,
+which ascends from the given conditioned to the conditions, must
+extend"; whether I can say: "It is a regress in infinitum," or only
+"in indefinitum"; and whether, for example, setting out from the human
+beings at present alive in the world, I may ascend in the series of
+their ancestors, in infinitum--mr whether all that can be said is,
+that so far as I have proceeded, I have discovered no empirical ground
+for considering the series limited, so that I am justified, and
+indeed, compelled to search for ancestors still further back, although
+I am not obliged by the idea of reason to presuppose them.
+
+My answer to this question is: "If the series is given in
+empirical intuition as a whole, the regress in the series of its
+internal conditions proceeds in infinitum; but, if only one member
+of the series is given, from which the regress is to proceed to
+absolute totality, the regress is possible only in indefinitum." For
+example, the division of a portion of matter given within certain
+limits--of a body, that is--proceeds in infinitum. For, as the
+condition of this whole is its part, and the condition of the part
+a part of the part, and so on, and as in this regress of decomposition
+an unconditioned indivisible member of the series of conditions is
+not to be found; there are no reasons or grounds in experience for
+stopping in the division, but, on the contrary, the more remote
+members of the division are actually and empirically given prior to
+this division. That is to say, the division proceeds to infinity. On
+the other hand, the series of ancestors of any given human being is
+not given, in its absolute totality, in any experience, and yet the
+regress proceeds from every genealogical member of this series to
+one still higher, and does not meet with any empirical limit
+presenting an absolutely unconditioned member of the series. But as
+the members of such a series are not contained in the empirical
+intuition of the whole, prior to the regress, this regress does not
+proceed to infinity, but only in indefinitum, that is, we are called
+upon to discover other and higher members, which are themselves always
+conditioned.
+
+In neither case--the regressus in infinitum, nor the regressus in
+indefinitum, is the series of conditions to be considered as
+actually infinite in the object itself. This might be true of things
+in themselves, but it cannot be asserted of phenomena, which, as
+conditions of each other, are only given in the empirical regress
+itself. Hence, the question no longer is, "What is the quantity of
+this series of conditions in itself--is it finite or infinite?" for
+it is nothing in itself; but, "How is the empirical regress to be
+commenced, and how far ought we to proceed with it?" And here a signal
+distinction in the application of this rule becomes apparent. If the
+whole is given empirically, it is possible to recede in the series
+of its internal conditions to infinity. But if the whole is not given,
+and can only be given by and through the empirical regress, I can only
+say: "It is possible to infinity, to proceed to still higher
+conditions in the series." In the first case, I am justified in
+asserting that more members are empirically given in the object than
+I attain to in the regress (of decomposition). In the second case,
+I am justified only in saying, that I can always proceed further in
+the regress, because no member of the series is given as absolutely
+conditioned, and thus a higher member is possible, and an inquiry with
+regard to it is necessary. In the one case it is necessary to find
+other members of the series, in the other it is necessary to inquire
+for others, inasmuch as experience presents no absolute limitation
+of the regress. For, either you do not possess a perception which
+absolutely limits your empirical regress, and in this case the regress
+cannot be regarded as complete; or, you do possess such a limitative
+perception, in which case it is not a part of your series (for that
+which limits must be distinct from that which is limited by it), and
+it is incumbent you to continue your regress up to this condition,
+and so on.
+
+These remarks will be placed in their proper light by their
+application in the following section.
+
+
+
+SECTION IX. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle
+ of Reason with regard to the Cosmological Ideas.
+
+We have shown that no transcendental use can be made either of the
+conceptions of reason or of understanding. We have shown, likewise,
+that the demand of absolute totality in the series of conditions in
+the world of sense arises from a transcendental employment of
+reason, resting on the opinion that phenomena are to be regarded as
+things in themselves. It follows that we are not required to answer
+the question respecting the absolute quantity of a series--whether
+it is in itself limited or unlimited. We are only called upon to
+determine how far we must proceed in the empirical regress from
+condition to condition, in order to discover, in conformity with the
+rule of reason, a full and correct answer to the questions proposed
+by reason itself.
+
+This principle of reason is hence valid only as a rule for the
+extension of a possible experience--its invalidity as a principle
+constitutive of phenomena in themselves having been sufficiently
+demonstrated. And thus, too, the antinomial conflict of reason with
+itself is completely put an end to; inasmuch as we have not only
+presented a critical solution of the fallacy lurking in the opposite
+statements of reason, but have shown the true meaning of the ideas
+which gave rise to these statements. The dialectical principle of
+reason has, therefore, been changed into a doctrinal principle. But
+in fact, if this principle, in the subjective signification which we
+have shown to be its only true sense, may be guaranteed as a principle
+of the unceasing extension of the employment of our understanding,
+its influence and value are just as great as if it were an axiom for
+the a priori determination of objects. For such an axiom could not
+exert a stronger influence on the extension and rectification of our
+knowledge, otherwise than by procuring for the principles of the
+understanding the most widely expanded employment in the field of
+experience.
+
+
+
+I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the
+ Composition of Phenomena in the Universe.
+
+Here, as well as in the case of the other cosmological problems, the
+ground of the regulative principle of reason is the proposition that
+in our empirical regress no experience of an absolute limit, and
+consequently no experience of a condition, which is itself
+absolutely unconditioned, is discoverable. And the truth of this
+proposition itself rests upon the consideration that such an
+experience must represent to us phenomena as limited by nothing or
+the mere void, on which our continued regress by means of perception
+must abut--which is impossible.
+
+Now this proposition, which declares that every condition attained
+in the empirical regress must itself be considered empirically
+conditioned, contains the rule in terminis, which requires me, to
+whatever extent I may have proceeded in the ascending series, always
+to look for some higher member in the series--whether this member is
+to become known to me through experience, or not.
+
+Nothing further is necessary, then, for the solution of the first
+cosmological problem, than to decide, whether, in the regress to the
+unconditioned quantity of the universe (as regards space and time),
+this never limited ascent ought to be called a regressus in
+infinitum or indefinitum.
+
+The general representation which we form in our minds of the
+series of all past states or conditions of the world, or of all the
+things which at present exist in it, is itself nothing more than a
+possible empirical regress, which is cogitated--although in an
+undetermined manner--in the mind, and which gives rise to the
+conception of a series of conditions for a given object.* Now I have
+a conception of the universe, but not an intuition--that is, not an
+intuition of it as a whole. Thus I cannot infer the magnitude of the
+regress from the quantity or magnitude of the world, and determine
+the former by means of the latter; on the contrary, I must first of
+all form a conception of the quantity or magnitude of the world from
+the magnitude of the empirical regress. But of this regress I know
+nothing more than that I ought to proceed from every given member of
+the series of conditions to one still higher. But the quantity of the
+universe is not thereby determined, and we cannot affirm that this
+regress proceeds in infinitum. Such an affirmation would anticipate
+the members of the series which have not yet been reached, and
+represent the number of them as beyond the grasp of any empirical
+synthesis; it would consequently determine the cosmical quantity prior
+to the regress (although only in a negative manner)--which is
+impossible. For the world is not given in its totality in any
+intuition: consequently, its quantity cannot be given prior to the
+regress. It follows that we are unable to make any declaration
+respecting the cosmical quantity in itself--not even that the
+regress in it is a regress in infinitum; we must only endeavour to
+attain to a conception of the quantity of the universe, in
+conformity with the rule which determines the empirical regress in
+it. But this rule merely requires us never to admit an absolute limit
+to our series--how far soever we may have proceeded in it, but always,
+on the contrary, to subordinate every phenomenon to some other as its
+condition, and consequently to proceed to this higher phenomenon. Such
+a regress is, therefore, the regressus in indefinitum, which, as not
+determining a quantity in the object, is clearly distinguishable
+from the regressus in infinitum.
+
+[*Footnote: The cosmical series can neither be greater nor smaller
+than the possible empirical regress, upon which its conception is based.
+And as this regress cannot be a determinate infinite regress, still
+less a determinate finite (absolutely limited), it is evident that
+we cannot regard the world as either finite or infinite, because the
+regress, which gives us the representation of the world, is neither
+finite nor infinite.]
+
+It follows from what we have said that we are not justified in
+declaring the world to be infinite in space, or as regards past
+time. For this conception of an infinite given quantity is
+empirical; but we cannot apply the conception of an infinite
+quantity to the world as an object of the senses. I cannot say, "The
+regress from a given perception to everything limited either in
+space or time, proceeds in infinitum," for this presupposes an
+infinite cosmical quantity; neither can I say, "It is finite," for
+an absolute limit is likewise impossible in experience. It follows
+that I am not entitled to make any assertion at all respecting the
+whole object of experience--the world of sense; I must limit my
+declarations to the rule according to which experience or empirical
+knowledge is to be attained.
+
+To the question, therefore, respecting the cosmical quantity, the
+first and negative answer is: "The world has no beginning in time,
+and no absolute limit in space."
+
+For, in the contrary case, it would be limited by a void time on the
+one hand, and by a void space on the other. Now, since the world, as
+a phenomenon, cannot be thus limited in itself for a phenomenon is
+not a thing in itself; it must be possible for us to have a perception
+of this limitation by a void time and a void space. But such a
+perception--such an experience is impossible; because it has no
+content. Consequently, an absolute cosmical limit is empirically,
+and therefore absolutely, impossible.*
+
+[*Footnote: The reader will remark that the proof presented above is
+very different from the dogmatical demonstration given in the antithesis
+of the first antinomy. In that demonstration, it was taken for granted
+that the world is a thing in itself--given in its totality prior to
+all regress, and a determined position in space and time was denied
+to it--if it was not considered as occupying all time and all space.
+Hence our conclusion differed from that given above; for we inferred
+in the antithesis the actual infinity of the world.]
+
+From this follows the affirmative answer: "The regress in the series
+of phenomena--as a determination of the cosmical quantity, proceeds
+in indefinitum." This is equivalent to saying: "The world of sense
+has no absolute quantity, but the empirical regress (through which
+alone the world of sense is presented to us on the side of its conditions)
+rests upon a rule, which requires it to proceed from every member of
+the series, as conditioned, to one still more remote (whether
+through personal experience, or by means of history, or the chain of
+cause and effect), and not to cease at any point in this extension
+of the possible empirical employment of the understanding." And this
+is the proper and only use which reason can make of its principles.
+
+The above rule does not prescribe an unceasing regress in one kind
+of phenomena. It does not, for example, forbid us, in our ascent
+from an individual human being through the line of his ancestors, to
+expect that we shall discover at some point of the regress a
+primeval pair, or to admit, in the series of heavenly bodies, a sun
+at the farthest possible distance from some centre. All that it demands
+is a perpetual progress from phenomena to phenomena, even although
+an actual perception is not presented by them (as in the case of our
+perceptions being so weak as that we are unable to become conscious
+of them), since they, nevertheless, belong to possible experience.
+
+Every beginning is in time, and all limits to extension are in
+space. But space and time are in the world of sense. Consequently
+phenomena in the world are conditionally limited, but the world itself
+is not limited, either conditionally or unconditionally.
+
+For this reason, and because neither the world nor the cosmical
+series of conditions to a given conditioned can be completely given,
+our conception of the cosmical quantity is given only in and through
+the regress and not prior to it--in a collective intuition. But the
+regress itself is really nothing more than the determining of the
+cosmical quantity, and cannot therefore give us any determined
+conception of it--still less a conception of a quantity which is, in
+relation to a certain standard, infinite. The regress does not,
+therefore, proceed to infinity (an infinity given), but only to an
+indefinite extent, for or the of presenting to us a quantity--realized
+only in and through the regress itself.
+
+
+
+II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of
+ the Division of a Whole given in Intuition.
+
+When I divide a whole which is given in intuition, I proceed from
+a conditioned to its conditions. The division of the parts of the
+whole (subdivisio or decompositio) is a regress in the series of these
+conditions. The absolute totality of this series would be actually
+attained and given to the mind, if the regress could arrive at
+simple parts. But if all the parts in a continuous decomposition are
+themselves divisible, the division, that is to say, the regress,
+proceeds from the conditioned to its conditions in infinitum;
+because the conditions (the parts) are themselves contained in the
+conditioned, and, as the latter is given in a limited intuition, the
+former are all given along with it. This regress cannot, therefore,
+be called a regressus in indefinitum, as happened in the case of the
+preceding cosmological idea, the regress in which proceeded from the
+conditioned to the conditions not given contemporaneously and along
+with it, but discoverable only through the empirical regress. We are
+not, however, entitled to affirm of a whole of this kind, which is
+divisible in infinitum, that it consists of an infinite number of
+parts. For, although all the parts are contained in the intuition of
+the whole, the whole division is not contained therein. The division
+is contained only in the progressing decomposition--in the regress
+itself, which is the condition of the possibility and actuality of
+the series. Now, as this regress is infinite, all the members (parts)
+to which it attains must be contained in the given whole as an aggregate.
+But the complete series of division is not contained therein. For this
+series, being infinite in succession and always incomplete, cannot
+represent an infinite number of members, and still less a
+composition of these members into a whole.
+
+To apply this remark to space. Every limited part of space presented
+to intuition is a whole, the parts of which are always spaces--to
+whatever extent subdivided. Every limited space is hence divisible
+to infinity.
+
+Let us again apply the remark to an external phenomenon enclosed
+in limits, that is, a body. The divisibility of a body rests upon
+the divisibility of space, which is the condition of the possibility
+of the body as an extended whole. A body is consequently divisible
+to infinity, though it does not, for that reason, consist of an
+infinite number of parts.
+
+It certainly seems that, as a body must be cogitated as substance in
+space, the law of divisibility would not be applicable to it as
+substance. For we may and ought to grant, in the case of space, that
+division or decomposition, to any extent, never can utterly annihilate
+composition (that is to say, the smallest part of space must still
+consist of spaces); otherwise space would entirely cease to exist-
+which is impossible. But, the assertion on the other band that when
+all composition in matter is annihilated in thought, nothing
+remains, does not seem to harmonize with the conception of
+substance, which must be properly the subject of all composition and
+must remain, even after the conjunction of its attributes in space-
+which constituted a body--is annihilated in thought. But this is not
+the case with substance in the phenomenal world, which is not a
+thing in itself cogitated by the pure category. Phenomenal substance
+is not an absolute subject; it is merely a permanent sensuous image,
+and nothing more than an intuition, in which the unconditioned is
+not to be found.
+
+But, although this rule of progress to infinity is legitimate and
+applicable to the subdivision of a phenomenon, as a mere occupation
+or filling of space, it is not applicable to a whole consisting of
+a number of distinct parts and constituting a quantum discretum--that
+is to say, an organized body. It cannot be admitted that every part
+in an organized whole is itself organized, and that, in analysing it
+to infinity, we must always meet with organized parts; although we
+may allow that the parts of the matter which we decompose in infinitum,
+may be organized. For the infinity of the division of a phenomenon
+in space rests altogether on the fact that the divisibility of a
+phenomenon is given only in and through this infinity, that is, an
+undetermined number of parts is given, while the parts themselves
+are given and determined only in and through the subdivision; in a
+word, the infinity of the division necessarily presupposes that the
+whole is not already divided in se. Hence our division determines a
+number of parts in the whole--a number which extends just as far as
+the actual regress in the division; while, on the other hand, the very
+notion of a body organized to infinity represents the whole as already
+and in itself divided. We expect, therefore, to find in it a
+determinate, but at the same time, infinite, number of parts--which
+is self-contradictory. For we should thus have a whole containing a
+series of members which could not be completed in any regress--which
+is infinite, and at the same time complete in an organized
+composite. Infinite divisibility is applicable only to a quantum
+continuum, and is based entirely on the infinite divisibility of
+space, But in a quantum discretum the multitude of parts or units is
+always determined, and hence always equal to some number. To what
+extent a body may be organized, experience alone can inform us; and
+although, so far as our experience of this or that body has
+extended, we may not have discovered any inorganic part, such parts
+must exist in possible experience. But how far the transcendental
+division of a phenomenon must extend, we cannot know from
+experience--it is a question which experience cannot answer; it is
+answered only by the principle of reason which forbids us to
+consider the empirical regress, in the analysis of extended body, as
+ever absolutely complete.
+
+
+
+Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcendental
+Mathematical Ideas--and Introductory to the
+Solution of the Dynamical Ideas.
+
+We presented the antinomy of pure reason in a tabular form, and we
+endeavoured to show the ground of this self-contradiction on the
+part of reason, and the only means of bringing it to a conclusion--
+namely, by declaring both contradictory statements to be false. We
+represented in these antinomies the conditions of phenomena as
+belonging to the conditioned according to relations of space and time-
+which is the usual supposition of the common understanding. In this
+respect, all dialectical representations of totality, in the series
+of conditions to a given conditioned, were perfectly homogeneous. The
+condition was always a member of the series along with the
+conditioned, and thus the homogeneity of the whole series was assured.
+In this case the regress could never be cogitated as complete; or,
+if this was the case, a member really conditioned was falsely regarded
+as a primal member, consequently as unconditioned. In such an
+antinomy, therefore, we did not consider the object, that is, the
+conditioned, but the series of conditions belonging to the object,
+and the magnitude of that series. And thus arose the difficulty--a
+difficulty not to be settled by any decision regarding the claims of
+the two parties, but simply by cutting the knot--by declaring the
+series proposed by reason to be either too long or too short for the
+understanding, which could in neither case make its conceptions
+adequate with the ideas.
+
+But we have overlooked, up to this point, an essential difference
+existing between the conceptions of the understanding which reason
+endeavours to raise to the rank of ideas--two of these indicating a
+mathematical, and two a dynamical synthesis of phenomena. Hitherto,
+it was necessary to signalize this distinction; for, just as in our
+general representation of all transcendental ideas, we considered them
+under phenomenal conditions, so, in the two mathematical ideas, our
+discussion is concerned solely with an object in the world of
+phenomena. But as we are now about to proceed to the consideration
+of the dynamical conceptions of the understanding, and their
+adequateness with ideas, we must not lose sight of this distinction.
+We shall find that it opens up to us an entirely new view of the
+conflict in which reason is involved. For, while in the first two
+antinomies, both parties were dismissed, on the ground of having
+advanced statements based upon false hypothesis; in the present case
+the hope appears of discovering a hypothesis which may be consistent
+with the demands of reason, and, the judge completing the statement
+of the grounds of claim, which both parties had left in an unsatisfactory
+state, the question may be settled on its own merits, not by
+dismissing the claimants, but by a comparison of the arguments on both
+sides. If we consider merely their extension, and whether they are
+adequate with ideas, the series of conditions may be regarded as all
+homogeneous. But the conception of the understanding which lies at
+the basis of these ideas, contains either a synthesis of the homogeneous
+(presupposed in every quantity--in its composition as well as in its
+division) or of the heterogeneous, which is the case in the
+dynamical synthesis of cause and effect, as well as of the necessary
+and the contingent.
+
+Thus it happens that in the mathematical series of phenomena no
+other than a sensuous condition is admissible--a condition which is
+itself a member of the series; while the dynamical series of
+sensuous conditions admits a heterogeneous condition, which is not
+a member of the series, but, as purely intelligible, lies out of and
+beyond it. And thus reason is satisfied, and an unconditioned placed
+at the head of the series of phenomena, without introducing
+confusion into or discontinuing it, contrary to the principles of
+the understanding.
+
+Now, from the fact that the dynamical ideas admit a condition of
+phenomena which does not form a part of the series of phenomena,
+arises a result which we should not have expected from an antinomy.
+In former cases, the result was that both contradictory dialectical
+statements were declared to be false. In the present case, we find
+the conditioned in the dynamical series connected with an empirically
+unconditioned, but non-sensuous condition; and thus satisfaction is
+done to the understanding on the one hand and to the reason on the
+other.* While, moreover, the dialectical arguments for unconditioned
+totality in mere phenomena fall to the ground, both propositions of
+reason may be shown to be true in their proper signification. This
+could not happen in the case of the cosmological ideas which
+demanded a mathematically unconditioned unity; for no condition
+could be placed at the head of the series of phenomena, except one
+which was itself a phenomenon and consequently a member of the series.
+
+[*Footnote: For the understanding cannot admit among phenomena a condition
+which is itself empirically unconditioned. But if it is possible to
+cogitate an intelligible condition--one which is not a member of the
+series of phenomena--for a conditioned phenomenon, without breaking
+the series of empirical conditions, such a condition may be admissible
+as empirically unconditioned, and the empirical regress continue
+regular, unceasing, and intact.]
+
+
+
+III. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of
+ the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes.
+
+There are only two modes of causality cogitable--the causality of
+nature or of freedom. The first is the conjunction of a particular
+state with another preceding it in the world of sense, the former
+following the latter by virtue of a law. Now, as the causality of
+phenomena is subject to conditions of time, and the preceding state,
+if it had always existed, could not have produced an effect which
+would make its first appearance at a particular time, the causality
+of a cause must itself be an effect--must itself have begun to be,
+and therefore, according to the principle of the understanding, itself
+requires a cause.
+
+We must understand, on the contrary, by the term freedom, in the
+cosmological sense, a faculty of the spontaneous origination of a
+state; the causality of which, therefore, is not subordinated to
+another cause determining it in time. Freedom is in this sense a
+pure transcendental idea, which, in the first place, contains no
+empirical element; the object of which, in the second place, cannot
+be given or determined in any experience, because it is a universal
+law of the very possibility of experience, that everything which happens
+must have a cause, that consequently the causality of a cause, being
+itself something that has happened, must also have a cause. In this
+view of the case, the whole field of experience, how far soever it
+may extend, contains nothing that is not subject to the laws of nature.
+But, as we cannot by this means attain to an absolute totality of
+conditions in reference to the series of causes and effects, reason
+creates the idea of a spontaneity, which can begin to act of itself,
+and without any external cause determining it to action, according
+to the natural law of causality.
+
+It is especially remarkable that the practical conception of freedom
+is based upon the transcendental idea, and that the question of the
+possibility of the former is difficult only as it involves the
+consideration of the truth of the latter. Freedom, in the practical
+sense, is the independence of the will of coercion by sensuous
+impulses. A will is sensuous, in so far as it is pathologically
+affected (by sensuous impulses); it is termed animal (arbitrium
+brutum), when it is pathologically necessitated. The human will is
+certainly an arbitrium sensitivum, not brutum, but liberum; because
+sensuousness does not necessitate its action, a faculty existing in
+man of self-determination, independently of all sensuous coercion.
+
+It is plain that, if all causality in the world of sense were
+natural--and natural only--every event would be determined by
+another according to necessary laws, and that, consequently,
+phenomena, in so far as they determine the will, must necessitate
+every action as a natural effect from themselves; and thus all
+practical freedom would fall to the ground with the transcendental
+idea. For the latter presupposes that although a certain thing has
+not happened, it ought to have happened, and that, consequently, its
+phenomenal cause was not so powerful and determinative as to exclude
+the causality of our will--a causality capable of producing effects
+independently of and even in opposition to the power of natural
+causes, and capable, consequently, of spontaneously originating a
+series of events.
+
+Here, too, we find it to be the case, as we generally found in the
+self-contradictions and perplexities of a reason which strives to pass
+the bounds of possible experience, that the problem is properly not
+physiological, but transcendental. The question of the possibility
+of freedom does indeed concern psychology; but, as it rests upon
+dialectical arguments of pure reason, its solution must engage the
+attention of transcendental philosophy. Before attempting this
+solution, a task which transcendental philosophy cannot decline, it
+will be advisable to make a remark with regard to its procedure in
+the settlement of the question.
+
+If phenomena were things in themselves, and time and space forms
+of the existence of things, condition and conditioned would always
+be members of the same series; and thus would arise in the present
+case the antinomy common to all transcendental ideas--that their
+series is either too great or too small for the understanding. The
+dynamical ideas, which we are about to discuss in this and the
+following section, possess the peculiarity of relating to an object,
+not considered as a quantity, but as an existence; and thus, in the
+discussion of the present question, we may make abstraction of the
+quantity of the series of conditions, and consider merely the
+dynamical relation of the condition to the conditioned. The
+question, then, suggests itself, whether freedom is possible; and,
+if it is, whether it can consist with the universality of the
+natural law of causality; and, consequently, whether we enounce a
+proper disjunctive proposition when we say: "Every effect must have
+its origin either in nature or in freedom," or whether both cannot
+exist together in the same event in different relations. The principle
+of an unbroken connection between all events in the phenomenal
+world, in accordance with the unchangeable laws of nature, is a
+well-established principle of transcendental analytic which admits
+of no exception. The question, therefore, is: "Whether an effect,
+determined according to the laws of nature, can at the same time be
+produced by a free agent, or whether freedom and nature mutually
+exclude each other?" And here, the common but fallacious hypothesis
+of the absolute reality of phenomena manifests its injurious influence
+in embarrassing the procedure of reason. For if phenomena are things
+in themselves, freedom is impossible. In this case, nature is the
+complete and all-sufficient cause of every event; and condition and
+conditioned, cause and effect are contained in the same series, and
+necessitated by the same law. If, on the contrary, phenomena are
+held to be, as they are in fact, nothing more than mere
+representations, connected with each other in accordance with
+empirical laws, they must have a ground which is not phenomenal. But
+the causality of such an intelligible cause is not determined or
+determinable by phenomena; although its effects, as phenomena, must
+be determined by other phenomenal existences. This cause and its
+causality exist therefore out of and apart from the series of
+phenomena; while its effects do exist and are discoverable in the
+series of empirical conditions. Such an effect may therefore be
+considered to be free in relation to its intelligible cause, and
+necessary in relation to the phenomena from which it is a necessary
+consequence--a distinction which, stated in this perfectly general
+and abstract manner, must appear in the highest degree subtle and obscure.
+The sequel will explain. It is sufficient, at present, to remark that,
+as the complete and unbroken connection of phenomena is an unalterable
+law of nature, freedom is impossible--on the supposition that
+phenomena are absolutely real. Hence those philosophers who adhere
+to the common opinion on this subject can never succeed in reconciling
+the ideas of nature and freedom.
+
+
+
+Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal Law
+of Natural Necessity.
+
+That element in a sensuous object which is not itself sensuous, I
+may be allowed to term intelligible. If, accordingly, an object
+which must be regarded as a sensuous phenomenon possesses a faculty
+which is not an object of sensuous intuition, but by means of which
+it is capable of being the cause of phenomena, the causality of an
+object or existence of this kind may be regarded from two different
+points of view. It may be considered to be intelligible, as regards
+its action--the action of a thing which is a thing in itself, and
+sensuous, as regards its effects--the effects of a phenomenon
+belonging to the sensuous world. We should accordingly, have to form
+both an empirical and an intellectual conception of the causality of
+such a faculty or power--both, however, having reference to the same
+effect. This twofold manner of cogitating a power residing in a
+sensuous object does not run counter to any of the conceptions which
+we ought to form of the world of phenomena or of a possible
+experience. Phenomena--not being things in themselves--must have a
+transcendental object as a foundation, which determines them as mere
+representations; and there seems to be no reason why we should not
+ascribe to this transcendental object, in addition to the property
+of self-phenomenization, a causality whose effects are to be met
+with in the world of phenomena, although it is not itself a
+phenomenon. But every effective cause must possess a character, that
+is to say, a law of its causality, without which it would cease to
+be a cause. In the above case, then, every sensuous object would
+possess an empirical character, which guaranteed that its actions,
+as phenomena, stand in complete and harmonious connection, conformably
+to unvarying natural laws, with all other phenomena, and can be
+deduced from these, as conditions, and that they do thus, in
+connection with these, constitute a series in the order of nature.
+This sensuous object must, in the second place, possess an
+intelligible character, which guarantees it to be the cause of those
+actions, as phenomena, although it is not itself a phenomenon nor
+subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense. The former may
+be termed the character of the thing as a phenomenon, the latter the
+character of the thing as a thing in itself.
+
+Now this active subject would, in its character of intelligible
+subject, be subordinate to no conditions of time, for time is only
+a condition of phenomena, and not of things in themselves. No action
+would begin or cease to be in this subject; it would consequently be
+free from the law of all determination of time--the law of change,
+namely, that everything which happens must have a cause in the
+phenomena of a preceding state. In one word, the causality of the
+subject, in so far as it is intelligible, would not form part of the
+series of empirical conditions which determine and necessitate an
+event in the world of sense. Again, this intelligible character of
+a thing cannot be immediately cognized, because we can perceive
+nothing but phenomena, but it must be capable of being cogitated in
+harmony with the empirical character; for we always find ourselves
+compelled to place, in thought, a transcendental object at the basis
+of phenomena although we can never know what this object is in itself.
+
+In virtue of its empirical character, this subject would at the same
+time be subordinate to all the empirical laws of causality, and, as
+a phenomenon and member of the sensuous world, its effects would
+have to be accounted for by a reference to preceding phenomena.
+Eternal phenomena must be capable of influencing it; and its
+actions, in accordance with natural laws, must explain to us how its
+empirical character, that is, the law of its causality, is to be
+cognized in and by means of experience. In a word, all requisites
+for a complete and necessary determination of these actions must be
+presented to us by experience.
+
+In virtue of its intelligible character, on the other hand (although
+we possess only a general conception of this character), the subject
+must be regarded as free from all sensuous influences, and from all
+phenomenal determination. Moreover, as nothing happens in this
+subject--for it is a noumenon, and there does not consequently exist
+in it any change, demanding the dynamical determination of time, and
+for the same reason no connection with phenomena as causes--this
+active existence must in its actions be free from and independent of
+natural necessity, for or necessity exists only in the world of
+phenomena. It would be quite correct to say that it originates or
+begins its effects in the world of sense from itself, although the
+action productive of these effects does not begin in itself. We should
+not be in this case affirming that these sensuous effects began to
+exist of themselves, because they are always determined by prior
+empirical conditions--by virtue of the empirical character, which is
+the phenomenon of the intelligible character--and are possible only
+as constituting a continuation of the series of natural causes. And
+thus nature and freedom, each in the complete and absolute
+signification of these terms, can exist, without contradiction or
+disagreement, in the same action.
+
+
+
+Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony
+with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity.
+
+I have thought it advisable to lay before the reader at first merely
+a sketch of the solution of this transcendental problem, in order to
+enable him to form with greater ease a clear conception of the
+course which reason must adopt in the solution. I shall now proceed
+to exhibit the several momenta of this solution, and to consider them
+in their order.
+
+The natural law that everything which happens must have a cause,
+that the causality of this cause, that is, the action of the cause
+(which cannot always have existed, but must be itself an event, for
+it precedes in time some effect which it has originated), must have
+itself a phenomenal cause, by which it is determined and, and,
+consequently, all events are empirically determined in an order of
+nature--this law, I say, which lies at the foundation of the
+possibility of experience, and of a connected system of phenomena or
+nature is a law of the understanding, from which no departure, and
+to which no exception, can be admitted. For to except even a single
+phenomenon from its operation is to exclude it from the sphere of
+possible experience and thus to admit it to be a mere fiction of
+thought or phantom of the brain.
+
+Thus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of
+causes, in which, however, absolute totality cannot be found. But we
+need not detain ourselves with this question, for it has already
+been sufficiently answered in our discussion of the antinomies into
+which reason falls, when it attempts to reach the unconditioned in
+the series of phenomena. If we permit ourselves to be deceived by the
+illusion of transcendental idealism, we shall find that neither nature
+nor freedom exists. Now the question is: "Whether, admitting the
+existence of natural necessity in the world of phenomena, it is
+possible to consider an effect as at the same time an effect of nature
+and an effect of freedom--or, whether these two modes of causality
+are contradictory and incompatible?"
+
+No phenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a series.
+Every action, in so far as it is productive of an event, is itself
+an event or occurrence, and presupposes another preceding state, in
+which its cause existed. Thus everything that happens is but a
+continuation of a series, and an absolute beginning is impossible in
+the sensuous world. The actions of natural causes are, accordingly,
+themselves effects, and presuppose causes preceding them in time. A
+primal action which forms an absolute beginning, is beyond the
+causal power of phenomena.
+
+Now, is it absolutely necessary that, granting that all effects
+are phenomena, the causality of the cause of these effects must also
+be a phenomenon and belong to the empirical world? Is it not rather
+possible that, although every effect in the phenomenal world must be
+connected with an empirical cause, according to the universal law of
+nature, this empirical causality may be itself the effect of a
+non-empirical and intelligible causality--its connection with
+natural causes remaining nevertheless intact? Such a causality would
+be considered, in reference to phenomena, as the primal action of a
+cause, which is in so far, therefore, not phenomenal, but, by reason
+of this faculty or power, intelligible; although it must, at the
+same time, as a link in the chain of nature, be regarded as
+belonging to the sensuous world.
+
+A belief in the reciprocal causality of phenomena is necessary, if
+we are required to look for and to present the natural conditions of
+natural events, that is to say, their causes. This being admitted as
+unexceptionably valid, the requirements of the understanding, which
+recognizes nothing but nature in the region of phenomena, are
+satisfied, and our physical explanations of physical phenomena may
+proceed in their regular course, without hindrance and without
+opposition. But it is no stumbling-block in the way, even assuming
+the idea to be a pure fiction, to admit that there are some natural
+causes in the possession of a faculty which is not empirical, but
+intelligible, inasmuch as it is not determined to action by
+empirical conditions, but purely and solely upon grounds brought
+forward by the understanding--this action being still, when the
+cause is phenomenized, in perfect accordance with the laws of
+empirical causality. Thus the acting subject, as a causal
+phenomenon, would continue to preserve a complete connection with
+nature and natural conditions; and the phenomenon only of the
+subject (with all its phenomenal causality) would contain certain
+conditions, which, if we ascend from the empirical to the
+transcendental object, must necessarily be regarded as intelligible.
+For, if we attend, in our inquiries with regard to causes in the world
+of phenomena, to the directions of nature alone, we need not trouble
+ourselves about the relation in which the transcendental subject,
+which is completely unknown to us, stands to these phenomena and their
+connection in nature. The intelligible ground of phenomena in this
+subject does not concern empirical questions. It has to do only with
+pure thought; and, although the effects of this thought and action
+of the pure understanding are discoverable in phenomena, these
+phenomena must nevertheless be capable of a full and complete
+explanation, upon purely physical grounds and in accordance with
+natural laws. And in this case we attend solely to their empirical
+and omit all consideration of their intelligible character (which is
+the transcendental cause of the former) as completely unknown, except
+in so far as it is exhibited by the latter as its empirical symbol.
+Now let us apply this to experience. Man is a phenomenon of the sensuous
+world and, at the same time, therefore, a natural cause, the causality
+of which must be regulated by empirical laws. As such, he must possess
+an empirical character, like all other natural phenomena. We remark
+this empirical character in his actions, which reveal the presence
+of certain powers and faculties. If we consider inanimate or merely
+animal nature, we can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves
+any other than a faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous
+manner. But man, to whom nature reveals herself only through sense,
+cognizes himself not only by his senses, but also through pure
+apperception; and this in actions and internal determinations, which
+he cannot regard as sensuous impressions. He is thus to himself, on
+the one hand, a phenomenon, but on the other hand, in respect of
+certain faculties, a purely intelligible object--intelligible, because
+its action cannot be ascribed to sensuous receptivity. These faculties
+are understanding and reason. The latter, especially, is in a peculiar
+manner distinct from all empirically-conditioned faculties, for it
+employs ideas alone in the consideration of its objects, and by
+means of these determines the understanding, which then proceeds to
+make an empirical use of its own conceptions, which, like the ideas
+of reason, are pure and non-empirical.
+
+That reason possesses the faculty of causality, or that at least
+we are compelled so to represent it, is evident from the
+imperatives, which in the sphere of the practical we impose on many
+of our executive powers. The words I ought express a species of
+necessity, and imply a connection with grounds which nature does not
+and cannot present to the mind of man. Understanding knows nothing
+in nature but that which is, or has been, or will be. It would be
+absurd to say that anything in nature ought to be other than it is
+in the relations of time in which it stands; indeed, the ought, when
+we consider merely the course of nature, has neither application nor
+meaning. The question, "What ought to happen in the sphere of nature?"
+is just as absurd as the question, "What ought to be the properties
+of a circle?" All that we are entitled to ask is, "What takes place
+in nature?" or, in the latter case, "What are the properties of a
+circle?"
+
+But the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action, the
+ground of which is a pure conception; while the ground of a merely
+natural action is, on the contrary, always a phenomenon. This action
+must certainly be possible under physical conditions, if it is
+prescribed by the moral imperative ought; but these physical or
+natural conditions do not concern the determination of the will
+itself, they relate to its effects alone, and the consequences of
+the effect in the world of phenomena. Whatever number of motives
+nature may present to my will, whatever sensuous impulses--the moral
+ought it is beyond their power to produce. They may produce a
+volition, which, so far from being necessary, is always conditioned--a
+volition to which the ought enunciated by reason, sets an aim and a
+standard, gives permission or prohibition. Be the object what it
+may, purely sensuous--as pleasure, or presented by pure reason--as
+good, reason will not yield to grounds which have an empirical origin.
+Reason will not follow the order of things presented by experience,
+but, with perfect spontaneity, rearranges them according to ideas,
+with which it compels empirical conditions to agree. It declares, in
+the name of these ideas, certain actions to be necessary which
+nevertheless have not taken place and which perhaps never will take
+place; and yet presupposes that it possesses the faculty of
+causality in relation to these actions. For, in the absence of this
+supposition, it could not expect its ideas to produce certain
+effects in the world of experience.
+
+Now, let us stop here and admit it to be at least possible that
+reason does stand in a really causal relation to phenomena. In this
+case it must--pure reason as it is--exhibit an empirical character.
+For every cause supposes a rule, according to which certain
+phenomena follow as effects from the cause, and every rule requires
+uniformity in these effects; and this is the proper ground of the
+conception of a cause--as a faculty or power. Now this conception
+(of a cause) may be termed the empirical character of reason; and this
+character is a permanent one, while the effects produced appear, in
+conformity with the various conditions which accompany and partly
+limit them, in various forms.
+
+Thus the volition of every man has an empirical character, which
+is nothing more than the causality of his reason, in so far as its
+effects in the phenomenal world manifest the presence of a rule,
+according to which we are enabled to examine, in their several kinds
+and degrees, the actions of this causality and the rational grounds
+for these actions, and in this way to decide upon the subjective
+principles of the volition. Now we learn what this empirical character
+is only from phenomenal effects, and from the rule of these which is
+presented by experience; and for this reason all the actions of man
+in the world of phenomena are determined by his empirical character,
+and the co-operative causes of nature. If, then, we could
+investigate all the phenomena of human volition to their lowest
+foundation in the mind, there would be no action which we could not
+anticipate with certainty, and recognize to be absolutely necessary
+from its preceding conditions. So far as relates to this empirical
+character, therefore, there can be no freedom; and it is only in the
+light of this character that we can consider the human will, when we
+confine ourselves to simple observation and, as is the case in
+anthropology, institute a physiological investigation of the motive
+causes of human actions.
+
+But when we consider the same actions in relation to reason--not for
+the purpose of explaining their origin, that is, in relation to
+speculative reason, but to practical reason, as the producing cause
+of these actions--we shall discover a rule and an order very different
+from those of nature and experience. For the declaration of this
+mental faculty may be that what has and could not but take place in
+the course of nature, ought not to have taken place. Sometimes, too,
+we discover, or believe that we discover, that the ideas of reason
+did actually stand in a causal relation to certain actions of man;
+and that these actions have taken place because they were determined,
+not by empirical causes, but by the act of the will upon grounds of
+reason.
+
+Now, granting that reason stands in a causal relation to
+phenomena; can an action of reason be called free, when we know
+that, sensuously, in its empirical character, it is completely
+determined and absolutely necessary? But this empirical character is
+itself determined by the intelligible character. The latter we
+cannot cognize; we can only indicate it by means of phenomena, which
+enable us to have an immediate cognition only of the empirical
+character.* An action, then, in so far as it is to be ascribed to an
+intelligible cause, does not result from it in accordance with
+empirical laws. That is to say, not the conditions of pure reason,
+but only their effects in the internal sense, precede the act. Pure
+reason, as a purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the
+conditions of time. The causality of reason in its intelligible
+character does not begin to be; it does not make its appearance at
+a certain time, for the purpose of producing an effect. If this were
+not the case, the causality of reason would be subservient to the
+natural law of phenomena, which determines them according to time,
+and as a series of causes and effects in time; it would consequently
+cease to be freedom and become a part of nature. We are therefore
+justified in saying: "If reason stands in a causal relation to
+phenomena, it is a faculty which originates the sensuous condition
+of an empirical series of effects." For the condition, which resides
+in the reason, is non-sensuous, and therefore cannot be originated,
+or begin to be. And thus we find--what we could not discover in any
+empirical series--a condition of a successive series of events
+itself empirically unconditioned. For, in the present case, the
+condition stands out of and beyond the series of phenomena--it is
+intelligible, and it consequently cannot be subjected to any
+sensuous condition, or to any time-determination by a preceding cause.
+
+[*Footnote: The real morality of actions--their merit or demerit, and
+even that of our own conduct, is completely unknown to us. Our estimates
+can relate only to their empirical character. How much is the result
+of the action of free will, how much is to be ascribed to nature and
+to blameless error, or to a happy constitution of temperament (merito
+fortunae), no one can discover, nor, for this reason, determine with
+perfect justice.]
+
+But, in another respect, the same cause belongs also to the series
+of phenomena. Man is himself a phenomenon. His will has an empirical
+character, which is the empirical cause of all his actions. There is
+no condition--determining man and his volition in conformity with this
+character--which does not itself form part of the series of effects
+in nature, and is subject to their law--the law according to which
+an empirically undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist.
+For this reason no given action can have an absolute and spontaneous
+origination, all actions being phenomena, and belonging to the world
+of experience. But it cannot be said of reason, that the state in
+which it determines the will is always preceded by some other state
+determining it. For reason is not a phenomenon, and therefore not
+subject to sensuous conditions; and, consequently, even in relation
+to its causality, the sequence or conditions of time do not influence
+reason, nor can the dynamical law of nature, which determines the
+sequence of time according to certain rules, be applied to it.
+
+Reason is consequently the permanent condition of all actions of the
+human will. Each of these is determined in the empirical character
+of the man, even before it has taken place. The intelligible
+character, of which the former is but the sensuous schema, knows no
+before or after; and every action, irrespective of the time-relation
+in which it stands with other phenomena, is the immediate effect of
+the intelligible character of pure reason, which, consequently, enjoys
+freedom of action, and is not dynamically determined either by
+internal or external preceding conditions. This freedom must not be
+described, in a merely negative manner, as independence of empirical
+conditions, for in this case the faculty of reason would cease to be
+a cause of phenomena; but it must be regarded, positively, as a
+faculty which can spontaneously originate a series of events. At the
+same time, it must not be supposed that any beginning can take place
+in reason; on the contrary, reason, as the unconditioned condition
+of all action of the will, admits of no time-conditions, although
+its effect does really begin in a series of phenomena--a beginning
+which is not, however, absolutely primal.
+
+I shall illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an
+example, from its employment in the world of experience; proved it
+cannot be by any amount of experience, or by any number of facts,
+for such arguments cannot establish the truth of transcendental
+propositions. Let us take a voluntary action--for example, a
+falsehood--by means of which a man has introduced a certain degree
+of confusion into the social life of humanity, which is judged
+according to the motives from which it originated, and the blame of
+which and of the evil consequences arising from it, is imputed to
+the offender. We at first proceed to examine the empirical character
+of the offence, and for this purpose we endeavour to penetrate to
+the sources of that character, such as a defective education, bad
+company, a shameless and wicked disposition, frivolity, and want of
+reflection--not forgetting also the occasioning causes which prevailed
+at the moment of the transgression. In this the procedure is exactly
+the same as that pursued in the investigation of the series of
+causes which determine a given physical effect. Now, although we
+believe the action to have been determined by all these circumstances,
+we do not the less blame the offender. We do not blame him for his
+unhappy disposition, nor for the circumstances which influenced him,
+nay, not even for his former course of life; for we presuppose that
+all these considerations may be set aside, that the series of
+preceding conditions may be regarded as having never existed, and that
+the action may be considered as completely unconditioned in relation
+to any state preceding, just as if the agent commenced with it an
+entirely new series of effects. Our blame of the offender is
+grounded upon a law of reason, which requires us to regard this
+faculty as a cause, which could have and ought to have otherwise
+determined the behaviour of the culprit, independently of all
+empirical conditions. This causality of reason we do not regard as
+a co-operating agency, but as complete in itself. It matters not whether
+the sensuous impulses favoured or opposed the action of this
+causality, the offence is estimated according to its intelligible
+character--the offender is decidedly worthy of blame, the moment he
+utters a falsehood. It follows that we regard reason, in spite of
+the empirical conditions of the act, as completely free, and
+therefore, therefore, as in the present case, culpable.
+
+The above judgement is complete evidence that we are accustomed to
+think that reason is not affected by sensuous conditions, that in it
+no change takes place--although its phenomena, in other words, the
+mode in which it appears in its effects, are subject to change--that
+in it no preceding state determines the following, and,
+consequently, that it does not form a member of the series of sensuous
+conditions which necessitate phenomena according to natural laws.
+Reason is present and the same in all human actions and at all
+times; but it does not itself exist in time, and therefore does not
+enter upon any state in which it did not formerly exist. It is,
+relatively to new states or conditions, determining, but not
+determinable. Hence we cannot ask: "Why did not reason determine
+itself in a different manner?" The question ought to be thus stated:
+"Why did not reason employ its power of causality to determine certain
+phenomena in a different manner?" But this is a question which admits
+of no answer. For a different intelligible character would have
+exhibited a different empirical character; and, when we say that, in
+spite of the course which his whole former life has taken, the
+offender could have refrained from uttering the falsehood, this
+means merely that the act was subject to the power and authority-
+permissive or prohibitive--of reason. Now, reason is not subject in
+its causality to any conditions of phenomena or of time; and a
+difference in time may produce a difference in the relation of
+phenomena to each other--for these are not things and therefore not
+causes in themselves--but it cannot produce any difference in the
+relation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason.
+
+Thus, then, in our investigation into free actions and the causal
+power which produced them, we arrive at an intelligible cause,
+beyond which, however, we cannot go; although we can recognize that
+it is free, that is, independent of all sensuous conditions, and that,
+in this way, it may be the sensuously unconditioned condition of
+phenomena. But for what reason the intelligible character generates
+such and such phenomena and exhibits such and such an empirical
+character under certain circumstances, it is beyond the power of our
+reason to decide. The question is as much above the power and the
+sphere of reason as the following would be: "Why does the
+transcendental object of our external sensuous intuition allow of no
+other form than that of intuition in space?" But the problem, which
+we were called upon to solve, does not require us to entertain any
+such questions. The problem was merely this--whether freedom and natural
+necessity can exist without opposition in the same action. To this
+question we have given a sufficient answer; for we have shown that,
+as the former stands in a relation to a different kind of condition
+from those of the latter, the law of the one does not affect the law
+of the other and that, consequently, both can exist together in
+independence of and without interference with each other.
+
+The reader must be careful to remark that my intention in the
+above remarks has not been to prove the actual existence of freedom,
+as a faculty in which resides the cause of certain sensuous phenomena.
+For, not to mention that such an argument would not have a
+transcendental character, nor have been limited to the discussion of
+pure conceptions--all attempts at inferring from experience what
+cannot be cogitated in accordance with its laws, must ever be
+unsuccessful. Nay, more, I have not even aimed at demonstrating the
+possibility of freedom; for this too would have been a vain endeavour,
+inasmuch as it is beyond the power of the mind to cognize the
+possibility of a reality or of a causal power by the aid of mere a
+priori conceptions. Freedom has been considered in the foregoing
+remarks only as a transcendental idea, by means of which reason aims
+at originating a series of conditions in the world of phenomena with
+the help of that which is sensuously unconditioned, involving
+itself, however, in an antinomy with the laws which itself
+prescribes for the conduct of the understanding. That this antinomy
+is based upon a mere illusion, and that nature and freedom are at least
+not opposed--this was the only thing in our power to prove, and the
+question which it was our task to solve.
+
+
+
+IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of
+ the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences.
+
+In the preceding remarks, we considered the changes in the world
+of sense as constituting a dynamical series, in which each member is
+subordinated to another--as its cause. Our present purpose is to avail
+ourselves of this series of states or conditions as a guide to an
+existence which may be the highest condition of all changeable
+phenomena, that is, to a necessary being. Our endeavour to reach,
+not the unconditioned causality, but the unconditioned existence, of
+substance. The series before us is therefore a series of
+conceptions, and not of intuitions (in which the one intuition is
+the condition of the other).
+
+But it is evident that, as all phenomena are subject to change and
+conditioned in their existence, the series of dependent existences
+cannot embrace an unconditioned member, the existence of which would
+be absolutely necessary. It follows that, if phenomena were things
+in themselves, and--as an immediate consequence from this supposition-
+condition and conditioned belonged to the same series of phenomena,
+the existence of a necessary being, as the condition of the
+existence of sensuous phenomena, would be perfectly impossible.
+
+An important distinction, however, exists between the dynamical
+and the mathematical regress. The latter is engaged solely with the
+combination of parts into a whole, or with the division of a whole
+into its parts; and therefore are the conditions of its series parts
+of the series, and to be consequently regarded as homogeneous, and
+for this reason, as consisting, without exception, of phenomena. If
+the former regress, on the contrary, the aim of which is not to
+establish the possibility of an unconditioned whole consisting of
+given parts, or of an unconditioned part of a given whole, but to
+demonstrate the possibility of the deduction of a certain state from
+its cause, or of the contingent existence of substance from that which
+exists necessarily, it is not requisite that the condition should form
+part of an empirical series along with the conditioned.
+
+In the case of the apparent antinomy with which we are at present
+dealing, there exists a way of escape from the difficulty; for it is
+not impossible that both of the contradictory statements may be true
+in different relations. All sensuous phenomena may be contingent,
+and consequently possess only an empirically conditioned existence,
+and yet there may also exist a non-empirical condition of the whole
+series, or, in other words, a necessary being. For this necessary
+being, as an intelligible condition, would not form a member--not even
+the highest member--of the series; the whole world of sense would be
+left in its empirically determined existence uninterfered with and
+uninfluenced. This would also form a ground of distinction between
+the modes of solution employed for the third and fourth antinomies.
+For, while in the consideration of freedom in the former antinomy,
+the thing itself--the cause (substantia phaenomenon)--was regarded
+as belonging to the series of conditions, and only its causality to
+the intelligible world--we are obliged in the present case to cogitate
+this necessary being as purely intelligible and as existing entirely
+apart from the world of sense (as an ens extramundanum); for otherwise
+it would be subject to the phenomenal law of contingency and
+dependence.
+
+In relation to the present problem, therefore, the regulative
+principle of reason is that everything in the sensuous world possesses
+an empirically conditioned existence--that no property of the sensuous
+world possesses unconditioned necessity--that we are bound to
+expect, and, so far as is possible, to seek for the empirical
+condition of every member in the series of conditions--and that
+there is no sufficient reason to justify us in deducing any
+existence from a condition which lies out of and beyond the
+empirical series, or in regarding any existence as independent and
+self-subsistent; although this should not prevent us from
+recognizing the possibility of the whole series being based upon a
+being which is intelligible, and for this reason free from all
+empirical conditions.
+
+But it has been far from my intention, in these remarks, to prove
+the existence of this unconditioned and necessary being, or even to
+evidence the possibility of a purely intelligible condition of the
+existence or all sensuous phenomena. As bounds were set to reason,
+to prevent it from leaving the guiding thread of empirical
+conditions and losing itself in transcendent theories which are
+incapable of concrete presentation; so it was my purpose, on the other
+band, to set bounds to the law of the purely empirical
+understanding, and to protest against any attempts on its part at
+deciding on the possibility of things, or declaring the existence of
+the intelligible to be impossible, merely on the ground that it is
+not available for the explanation and exposition of phenomena. It has
+been shown, at the same time, that the contingency of all the phenomena
+of nature and their empirical conditions is quite consistent with
+the arbitrary hypothesis of a necessary, although purely
+intelligible condition, that no real contradiction exists between them
+and that, consequently, both may be true. The existence of such an
+absolutely necessary being may be impossible; but this can never be
+demonstrated from the universal contingency and dependence of sensuous
+phenomena, nor from the principle which forbids us to discontinue
+the series at some member of it, or to seek for its cause in some
+sphere of existence beyond the world of nature. Reason goes its way
+in the empirical world, and follows, too, its peculiar path in the
+sphere of the transcendental.
+
+The sensuous world contains nothing but phenomena, which are mere
+representations, and always sensuously conditioned; things in
+themselves are not, and cannot be, objects to us. It is not to be
+wondered at, therefore, that we are not justified in leaping from some
+member of an empirical series beyond the world of sense, as if
+empirical representations were things in themselves, existing apart
+from their transcendental ground in the human mind, and the cause of
+whose existence may be sought out of the empirical series. This
+would certainly be the case with contingent things; but it cannot be
+with mere representations of things, the contingency of which is
+itself merely a phenomenon and can relate to no other regress than
+that which determines phenomena, that is, the empirical. But to
+cogitate an intelligible ground of phenomena, as free, moreover,
+from the contingency of the latter, conflicts neither with the
+unlimited nature of the empirical regress, nor with the complete
+contingency of phenomena. And the demonstration of this was the only
+thing necessary for the solution of this apparent antinomy. For if
+the condition of every conditioned--as regards its existence--is sensuous,
+and for this reason a part of the same series, it must be itself
+conditioned, as was shown in the antithesis of the fourth antinomy.
+The embarrassments into which a reason, which postulates the
+unconditioned, necessarily falls, must, therefore, continue to
+exist; or the unconditioned must be placed in the sphere of the
+intelligible. In this way, its necessity does not require, nor does
+it even permit, the presence of an empirical condition: and it is,
+consequently, unconditionally necessary.
+
+The empirical employment of reason is not affected by the assumption
+of a purely intelligible being; it continues its operations on the
+principle of the contingency of all phenomena, proceeding from
+empirical conditions to still higher and higher conditions, themselves
+empirical. Just as little does this regulative principle exclude the
+assumption of an intelligible cause, when the question regards
+merely the pure employment of reason--in relation to ends or aims.
+For, in this case, an intelligible cause signifies merely the
+transcendental and to us unknown ground of the possibility of sensuous
+phenomena, and its existence, necessary and independent of all
+sensuous conditions, is not inconsistent with the contingency of
+phenomena, or with the unlimited possibility of regress which exists
+in the series of empirical conditions.
+
+
+
+Concluding Remarks on the Antinomy of Pure Reason.
+
+So long as the object of our rational conceptions is the totality of
+conditions in the world of phenomena, and the satisfaction, from
+this source, of the requirements of reason, so long are our ideas
+transcendental and cosmological. But when we set the unconditioned-
+which is the aim of all our inquiries--in a sphere which lies out of
+the world of sense and possible experience, our ideas become
+transcendent. They are then not merely serviceable towards the
+completion of the exercise of reason (which remains an idea, never
+executed, but always to be pursued); they detach themselves completely
+from experience and construct for themselves objects, the material
+of which has not been presented by experience, and the objective
+reality of which is not based upon the completion of the empirical
+series, but upon pure a priori conceptions. The intelligible object
+of these transcendent ideas may be conceded, as a transcendental
+object. But we cannot cogitate it as a thing determinable by certain
+distinct predicates relating to its internal nature, for it has no
+connection with empirical conceptions; nor are we justified in
+affirming the existence of any such object. It is, consequently, a
+mere product of the mind alone. Of all the cosmological ideas,
+however, it is that occasioning the fourth antinomy which compels us
+to venture upon this step. For the existence of phenomena, always
+conditioned and never self-subsistent, requires us to look for an
+object different from phenomena--an intelligible object, with which
+all contingency must cease. But, as we have allowed ourselves to
+assume the existence of a self-subsistent reality out of the field
+of experience, and are therefore obliged to regard phenomena as merely
+a contingent mode of representing intelligible objects employed by
+beings which are themselves intelligences--no other course remains
+for us than to follow analogy and employ the same mode in forming
+some conception of intelligible things, of which we have not the least
+knowledge, which nature taught us to use in the formation of empirical
+conceptions. Experience made us acquainted with the contingent. But
+we are at present engaged in the discussion of things which are not
+objects of experience; and must, therefore, deduce our knowledge of
+them from that which is necessary absolutely and in itself, that is,
+from pure conceptions. Hence the first step which we take out of the
+world of sense obliges us to begin our system of new cognition with
+the investigation of a necessary being, and to deduce from our
+conceptions of it all our conceptions of intelligible things. This
+we propose to attempt in the following chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III. The Ideal of Pure Reason.
+
+SECTION I. Of the Ideal in General.
+
+We have seen that pure conceptions do not present objects to the
+mind, except under sensuous conditions; because the conditions of
+objective reality do not exist in these conceptions, which contain,
+in fact, nothing but the mere form of thought. They may, however, when
+applied to phenomena, be presented in concreto; for it is phenomena
+that present to them the materials for the formation of empirical
+conceptions, which are nothing more than concrete forms of the
+conceptions of the understanding. But ideas are still further
+removed from objective reality than categories; for no phenomenon
+can ever present them to the human mind in concreto. They contain a
+certain perfection, attainable by no possible empirical cognition;
+and they give to reason a systematic unity, to which the unity of
+experience attempts to approximate, but can never completely attain.
+
+But still further removed than the idea from objective reality is
+the Ideal, by which term I understand the idea, not in concreto, but
+in individuo--as an individual thing, determinable or determined by
+the idea alone. The idea of humanity in its complete perfection
+supposes not only the advancement of all the powers and faculties,
+which constitute our conception of human nature, to a complete
+attainment of their final aims, but also everything which is requisite
+for the complete determination of the idea; for of all contradictory
+predicates, only one can conform with the idea of the perfect man.
+What I have termed an ideal was in Plato's philosophy an idea of the
+divine mind--an individual object present to its pure intuition, the
+most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of
+all phenomenal existences.
+
+Without rising to these speculative heights, we are bound to confess
+that human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals, which
+possess, not, like those of Plato, creative, but certainly practical
+power--as regulative principles, and form the basis of the
+perfectibility of certain actions. Moral conceptions are not perfectly
+pure conceptions of reason, because an empirical element--of
+pleasure or pain--lies at the foundation of them. In relation,
+however, to the principle, whereby reason sets bounds to a freedom
+which is in itself without law, and consequently when we attend merely
+to their form, they may be considered as pure conceptions of reason.
+Virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity are ideas. But the wise
+man of the Stoics is an ideal, that is to say, a human being
+existing only in thought and in complete conformity with the idea of
+wisdom. As the idea provides a rule, so the ideal serves as an
+archetype for the perfect and complete determination of the copy. Thus
+the conduct of this wise and divine man serves us as a standard of
+action, with which we may compare and judge ourselves, which may
+help us to reform ourselves, although the perfection it demands can
+never be attained by us. Although we cannot concede objective
+reality to these ideals, they are not to be considered as chimeras;
+on the contrary, they provide reason with a standard, which enables
+it to estimate, by comparison, the degree of incompleteness in the
+objects presented to it. But to aim at realizing the ideal in an example
+in the world of experience--to describe, for instance, the character
+of the perfectly wise man in a romance--is impracticable. Nay more,
+there is something absurd in the attempt; and the result must be little
+edifying, as the natural limitations, which are continually breaking
+in upon the perfection and completeness of the idea, destroy the
+illusion in the story and throw an air of suspicion even on what is
+good in the idea, which hence appears fictitious and unreal.
+
+Such is the constitution of the ideal of reason, which is always
+based upon determinate conceptions, and serves as a rule and a model
+for limitation or of criticism. Very different is the nature of the
+ideals of the imagination. Of these it is impossible to present an
+intelligible conception; they are a kind of monogram, drawn
+according to no determinate rule, and forming rather a vague
+picture--the production of many diverse experiences--than a
+determinate image. Such are the ideals which painters and
+physiognomists profess to have in their minds, and which can serve
+neither as a model for production nor as a standard for
+appreciation. They may be termed, though improperly, sensuous
+ideals, as they are declared to be models of certain possible
+empirical intuitions. They cannot, however, furnish rules or standards
+for explanation or examination.
+
+In its ideals, reason aims at complete and perfect determination
+according to a priori rules; and hence it cogitates an object, which
+must be completely determinable in conformity with principles,
+although all empirical conditions are absent, and the conception of
+the object is on this account transcendent.
+
+
+
+SECTION II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon Trancendentale).
+
+Every conception is, in relation to that which is not contained in
+it, undetermined and subject to the principle of determinability. This
+principle is that, of every two contradictorily opposed predicates,
+only one can belong to a conception. It is a purely logical principle,
+itself based upon the principle of contradiction; inasmuch as it makes
+complete abstraction of the content and attends merely to the
+logical form of the cognition.
+
+But again, everything, as regards its possibility, is also subject
+to the principle of complete determination, according to which one
+of all the possible contradictory predicates of things must belong
+to it. This principle is not based merely upon that of
+contradiction; for, in addition to the relation between two
+contradictory predicates, it regards everything as standing in a
+relation to the sum of possibilities, as the sum total of all
+predicates of things, and, while presupposing this sum as an a
+priori condition, presents to the mind everything as receiving the
+possibility of its individual existence from the relation it bears
+to, and the share it possesses in, the aforesaid sum of possibilities.*
+The principle of complete determination relates the content and not
+to the logical form. It is the principle of the synthesis of all the
+predicates which are required to constitute the complete conception
+of a thing, and not a mere principle analytical representation, which
+enounces that one of two contradictory predicates must belong to a
+conception. It contains, moreover, a transcendental presupposition--
+that, namely, of the material for all possibility, which must
+contain a priori the data for this or that particular possibility.
+
+[*Footnote: Thus this principle declares everything to possess a
+relation to a common correlate--the sum-total of possibility, which, if
+discovered to exist in the idea of one individual thing, would
+establish the affinity of all possible things, from the identity of the
+ground of their complete determination. The determinability of every
+conception is subordinate to the universality (Allgemeinheit,
+universalitas) of the principle of excluded middle; the determination
+of a thing to the totality (Allheit, universitas) of all possible
+predicates.]
+
+The proposition, everything which exists is completely determined,
+means not only that one of every pair of given contradictory
+attributes, but that one of all possible attributes, is always
+predicable of the thing; in it the predicates are not merely
+compared logically with each other, but the thing itself is
+transcendentally compared with the sum-total of all possible
+predicates. The proposition is equivalent to saying: "To attain to
+a complete knowledge of a thing, it is necessary to possess a
+knowledge of everything that is possible, and to determine it
+thereby in a positive or negative manner." The conception of
+complete determination is consequently a conception which cannot be
+presented in its totality in concreto, and is therefore based upon
+an idea, which has its seat in the reason--the faculty which
+prescribes to the understanding the laws of its harmonious and perfect
+exercise.
+
+Now, although this idea of the sum-total of all possibility, in so
+far as it forms the condition of the complete determination of
+everything, is itself undetermined in relation to the predicates which
+may constitute this sum-total, and we cogitate in it merely the
+sum-total of all possible predicates--we nevertheless find, upon
+closer examination, that this idea, as a primitive conception of the
+mind, excludes a large number of predicates--those deduced and those
+irreconcilable with others, and that it is evolved as a conception
+completely determined a priori. Thus it becomes the conception of an
+individual object, which is completely determined by and through the
+mere idea, and must consequently be termed an ideal of pure reason.
+
+When we consider all possible predicates, not merely logically,
+but transcendentally, that is to say, with reference to the content
+which may be cogitated as existing in them a priori, we shall find
+that some indicate a being, others merely a non-being. The logical
+negation expressed in the word not does not properly belong to a
+conception, but only to the relation of one conception to another in
+a judgement, and is consequently quite insufficient to present to the
+mind the content of a conception. The expression not mortal does not
+indicate that a non-being is cogitated in the object; it does not
+concern the content at all. A transcendental negation, on the
+contrary, indicates non-being in itself, and is opposed to
+transcendental affirmation, the conception of which of itself
+expresses a being. Hence this affirmation indicates a reality, because
+in and through it objects are considered to be something--to be
+things; while the opposite negation, on the other band, indicates a
+mere want, or privation, or absence, and, where such negations alone
+are attached to a representation, the non-existence of anything
+corresponding to the representation.
+
+Now a negation cannot be cogitated as determined, without cogitating
+at the same time the opposite affirmation. The man born blind has
+not the least notion of darkness, because he has none of light; the
+vagabond knows nothing of poverty, because he has never known what
+it is to be in comfort;* the ignorant man has no conception of his
+ignorance, because he has no conception of knowledge. All
+conceptions of negatives are accordingly derived or deduced
+conceptions; and realities contain the data, and, so to speak, the
+material or transcendental content of the possibility and complete
+determination of all things.
+
+[*Footnote: The investigations and calculations of astronomers have
+taught us much that is wonderful; but the most important lesson we
+have received from them is the discovery of the abyss of our ignorance
+in relation to the universe--an ignorance the magnitude of which reason,
+without the information thus derived, could never have conceived. This
+discovery of our deficiencies must produce a great change in the
+determination of the aims of human reason.]
+
+If, therefore, a transcendental substratum lies at the foundation of
+the complete determination of things--a substratum which is to form
+the fund from which all possible predicates of things are to be
+supplied, this substratum cannot be anything else than the idea of
+a sum-total of reality (omnitudo realitatis). In this view, negations
+are nothing but limitations--a term which could not, with propriety,
+be applied to them, if the unlimited (the all) did not form the true
+basis of our conception.
+
+This conception of a sum-total of reality is the conception of a
+thing in itself, regarded as completely determined; and the conception
+of an ens realissimum is the conception of an individual being,
+inasmuch as it is determined by that predicate of all possible
+contradictory predicates, which indicates and belongs to being. It
+is, therefore, a transcendental ideal which forms the basis of the
+complete determination of everything that exists, and is the highest
+material condition of its possibility--a condition on which must
+rest the cogitation of all objects with respect to their content. Nay,
+more, this ideal is the only proper ideal of which the human mind is
+capable; because in this case alone a general conception of a thing
+is completely determined by and through itself, and cognized as the
+representation of an individuum.
+
+The logical determination of a conception is based upon a
+disjunctive syllogism, the major of which contains the logical
+division of the extent of a general conception, the minor limits
+this extent to a certain part, while the conclusion determines the
+conception by this part. The general conception of a reality cannot
+be divided a priori, because, without the aid of experience, we cannot
+know any determinate kinds of reality, standing under the former as
+the genus. The transcendental principle of the complete
+determination of all things is therefore merely the representation
+of the sum-total of all reality; it is not a conception which is the
+genus of all predicates under itself, but one which comprehends them
+all within itself. The complete determination of a thing is
+consequently based upon the limitation of this total of reality, so
+much being predicated of the thing, while all that remains over is
+excluded--a procedure which is in exact agreement with that of the
+disjunctive syllogism and the determination of the objects in the
+conclusion by one of the members of the division. It follows that
+reason, in laying the transcendental ideal at the foundation of its
+determination of all possible things, takes a course in exact
+analogy with that which it pursues in disjunctive syllogisms--a
+proposition which formed the basis of the systematic division of all
+transcendental ideas, according to which they are produced in complete
+parallelism with the three modes of syllogistic reasoning employed
+by the human mind.
+
+It is self-evident that reason, in cogitating the necessary complete
+determination of things, does not presuppose the existence of a
+being corresponding to its ideal, but merely the idea of the ideal-
+for the purpose of deducing from the unconditional totality of
+complete determination, The ideal is therefore the prototype of all
+things, which, as defective copies (ectypa), receive from it the
+material of their possibility, and approximate to it more or less,
+though it is impossible that they can ever attain to its perfection.
+
+The possibility of things must therefore be regarded as derived-
+except that of the thing which contains in itself all reality, which
+must be considered to be primitive and original. For all negations-
+and they are the only predicates by means of which all other things
+can be distinguished from the ens realissimum--are mere limitations
+of a greater and a higher--nay, the highest reality; and they
+consequently presuppose this reality, and are, as regards their
+content, derived from it. The manifold nature of things is only an
+infinitely various mode of limiting the conception of the highest
+reality, which is their common substratum; just as all figures are
+possible only as different modes of limiting infinite space. The
+object of the ideal of reason--an object existing only in reason
+itself--is also termed the primal being (ens originarium); as having
+no existence superior to him, the supreme being (ens summum); and as
+being the condition of all other beings, which rank under it, the
+being of all beings (ens entium). But none of these terms indicate
+the objective relation of an actually existing object to other things,
+but merely that of an idea to conceptions; and all our investigations
+into this subject still leave us in perfect uncertainty with regard
+to the existence of this being.
+
+A primal being cannot be said to consist of many other beings with
+an existence which is derivative, for the latter presuppose the
+former, and therefore cannot be constitutive parts of it. It follows
+that the ideal of the primal being must be cogitated as simple.
+
+The deduction of the possibility of all other things from this
+primal being cannot, strictly speaking, be considered as a limitation,
+or as a kind of division of its reality; for this would be regarding
+the primal being as a mere aggregate--which has been shown to be
+impossible, although it was so represented in our first rough
+sketch. The highest reality must be regarded rather as the ground than
+as the sum-total of the possibility of all things, and the manifold
+nature of things be based, not upon the limitation of the primal being
+itself, but upon the complete series of effects which flow from it.
+And thus all our powers of sense, as well as all phenomenal reality,
+phenomenal reality, may be with propriety regarded as belonging to
+this series of effects, while they could not have formed parts of
+the idea, considered as an aggregate. Pursuing this track, and
+hypostatizing this idea, we shall find ourselves authorized to
+determine our notion of the Supreme Being by means of the mere
+conception of a highest reality, as one, simple, all-sufficient,
+eternal, and so on--in one word, to determine it in its
+unconditioned completeness by the aid of every possible predicate.
+The conception of such a being is the conception of God in its
+transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason is the
+object-matter of a transcendental theology.
+
+But, by such an employment of the transcendental idea, we should
+be over stepping the limits of its validity and purpose. For reason
+placed it, as the conception of all reality, at the basis of the
+complete determination of things, without requiring that this
+conception be regarded as the conception of an objective existence.
+Such an existence would be purely fictitious, and the hypostatizing
+of the content of the idea into an ideal, as an individual being, is
+a step perfectly unauthorized. Nay, more, we are not even called upon
+to assume the possibility of such an hypothesis, as none of the
+deductions drawn from such an ideal would affect the complete
+determination of things in general--for the sake of which alone is
+the idea necessary.
+
+It is not sufficient to circumscribe the procedure and the dialectic
+of reason; we must also endeavour to discover the sources of this
+dialectic, that we may have it in our power to give a rational
+explanation of this illusion, as a phenomenon of the human mind. For
+the ideal, of which we are at present speaking, is based, not upon
+an arbitrary, but upon a natural, idea. The question hence arises:
+How happens it that reason regards the possibility of all things as
+deduced from a single possibility, that, to wit, of the highest
+reality, and presupposes this as existing in an individual and
+primal being?
+
+The answer is ready; it is at once presented by the procedure of
+transcendental analytic. The possibility of sensuous objects is a
+relation of these objects to thought, in which something (the
+empirical form) may be cogitated a priori; while that which
+constitutes the matter--the reality of the phenomenon (that element
+which corresponds to sensation)--must be given from without, as
+otherwise it could not even be cogitated by, nor could its possibility
+be presentable to the mind. Now, a sensuous object is completely
+determined, when it has been compared with all phenomenal
+predicates, and represented by means of these either positively or
+negatively. But, as that which constitutes the thing itself--the
+real in a phenomenon, must be given, and that, in which the real of
+all phenomena is given, is experience, one, sole, and all-embracing-
+the material of the possibility of all sensuous objects must be
+presupposed as given in a whole, and it is upon the limitation of this
+whole that the possibility of all empirical objects, their distinction
+from each other and their complete determination, are based. Now, no
+other objects are presented to us besides sensuous objects, and
+these can be given only in connection with a possible experience; it
+follows that a thing is not an object to us, unless it presupposes
+the whole or sum-total of empirical reality as the condition of its
+possibility. Now, a natural illusion leads us to consider this
+principle, which is valid only of sensuous objects, as valid with
+regard to things in general. And thus we are induced to hold the
+empirical principle of our conceptions of the possibility of things,
+as phenomena, by leaving out this limitative condition, to be a
+transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general.
+
+We proceed afterwards to hypostatize this idea of the sum-total of
+all reality, by changing the distributive unity of the empirical
+exercise of the understanding into the collective unity of an
+empirical whole--a dialectical illusion, and by cogitating this
+whole or sum of experience as an individual thing, containing in
+itself all empirical reality. This individual thing or being is
+then, by means of the above-mentioned transcendental subreption,
+substituted for our notion of a thing which stands at the head of
+the possibility of all things, the real conditions of whose complete
+determination it presents.*
+
+[*Footnote: This ideal of the ens realissimum--although merely a mental
+representation--is first objectivized, that is, has an objective
+existence attributed to it, then hypostatized, and finally, by the
+natural progress of reason to the completion of unity, personified,
+as we shall show presently. For the regulative unity of experience
+is not based upon phenomena themselves, but upon the connection of
+the variety of phenomena by the understanding in a consciousness, and
+thus the unity of the supreme reality and the complete determinability
+of all things, seem to reside in a supreme understanding, and,
+consequently, in a conscious intelligence.]
+
+
+
+SECTION III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in
+ Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being.
+
+Notwithstanding the pressing necessity which reason feels, to form
+some presupposition that shall serve the understanding as a proper
+basis for the complete determination of its conceptions, the
+idealistic and factitious nature of such a presupposition is too
+evident to allow reason for a moment to persuade itself into a
+belief of the objective existence of a mere creation of its own
+thought. But there are other considerations which compel reason to
+seek out some resting place in the regress from the conditioned to
+the unconditioned, which is not given as an actual existence from the
+mere conception of it, although it alone can give completeness to the
+series of conditions. And this is the natural course of every human
+reason, even of the most uneducated, although the path at first
+entered it does not always continue to follow. It does not begin
+from conceptions, but from common experience, and requires a basis
+in actual existence. But this basis is insecure, unless it rests
+upon the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary. And this
+foundation is itself unworthy of trust, if it leave under and above
+it empty space, if it do not fill all, and leave no room for a why
+or a wherefore, if it be not, in one word, infinite in its reality.
+
+If we admit the existence of some one thing, whatever it may be,
+we must also admit that there is something which exists necessarily.
+For what is contingent exists only under the condition of some other
+thing, which is its cause; and from this we must go on to conclude
+the existence of a cause which is not contingent, and which consequently
+exists necessarily and unconditionally. Such is the argument by
+which reason justifies its advances towards a primal being.
+
+Now reason looks round for the conception of a being that may be
+admitted, without inconsistency, to be worthy of the attribute of
+absolute necessity, not for the purpose of inferring a priori, from
+the conception of such a being, its objective existence (for if reason
+allowed itself to take this course, it would not require a basis in
+given and actual existence, but merely the support of pure
+conceptions), but for the purpose of discovering, among all our
+conceptions of possible things, that conception which possesses no
+element inconsistent with the idea of absolute necessity. For that
+there must be some absolutely necessary existence, it regards as a
+truth already established. Now, if it can remove every existence
+incapable of supporting the attribute of absolute necessity, excepting
+one--this must be the absolutely necessary being, whether its
+necessity is comprehensible by us, that is, deducible from the
+conception of it alone, or not.
+
+Now that, the conception of which contains a therefore to every
+wherefore, which is not defective in any respect whatever, which is
+all-sufficient as a condition, seems to be the being of which we can
+justly predicate absolute necessity--for this reason, that, possessing
+the conditions of all that is possible, it does not and cannot
+itself require any condition. And thus it satisfies, in one respect
+at least, the requirements of the conception of absolute necessity.
+In this view, it is superior to all other conceptions, which, as
+deficient and incomplete, do not possess the characteristic of
+independence of all higher conditions. It is true that we cannot infer
+from this that what does not contain in itself the supreme and
+complete condition--the condition of all other things--must possess
+only a conditioned existence; but as little can we assert the
+contrary, for this supposed being does not possess the only
+characteristic which can enable reason to cognize by means of an a
+priori conception the unconditioned and necessary nature of its
+existence.
+
+The conception of an ens realissimum is that which best agrees
+with the conception of an unconditioned and necessary being. The
+former conception does not satisfy all the requirements of the latter;
+but we have no choice, we are obliged to adhere to it, for we find
+that we cannot do without the existence of a necessary being; and even
+although we admit it, we find it out of our power to discover in the
+whole sphere of possibility any being that can advance well-grounded
+claims to such a distinction.
+
+The following is, therefore, the natural course of human reason.
+It begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary
+being. In this being it recognizes the characteristics of
+unconditioned existence. It then seeks the conception of that which
+is independent of all conditions, and finds it in that which is itself
+the sufficient condition of all other things--in other words, in
+that which contains all reality. But the unlimited all is an
+absolute unity, and is conceived by the mind as a being one and
+supreme; and thus reason concludes that the Supreme Being, as the
+primal basis of all things, possesses an existence which is absolutely
+necessary.
+
+This conception must be regarded as in some degree satisfactory,
+if we admit the existence of a necessary being, and consider that
+there exists a necessity for a definite and final answer to these
+questions. In such a case, we cannot make a better choice, or rather
+we have no choice at all, but feel ourselves obliged to declare in
+favour of the absolute unity of complete reality, as the highest
+source of the possibility of things. But if there exists no motive
+for coming to a definite conclusion, and we may leave the question
+unanswered till we have fully weighed both sides--in other words, when
+we are merely called upon to decide how much we happen to know about
+the question, and how much we merely flatter ourselves that we know-
+the above conclusion does not appear to be so great advantage, but,
+on the contrary, seems defective in the grounds upon which it is
+supported.
+
+For, admitting the truth of all that has been said, that, namely,
+the inference from a given existence (my own, for example) to the
+existence of an unconditioned and necessary being is valid and
+unassailable; that, in the second place, we must consider a being
+which contains all reality, and consequently all the conditions of
+other things, to be absolutely unconditioned; and admitting too,
+that we have thus discovered the conception of a thing to which may
+be attributed, without inconsistency, absolute necessity--it does not
+follow from all this that the conception of a limited being, in
+which the supreme reality does not reside, is therefore incompatible
+with the idea of absolute necessity. For, although I do not discover
+the element of the unconditioned in the conception of such a being--an
+element which is manifestly existent in the sum-total of all
+conditions--I am not entitled to conclude that its existence is
+therefore conditioned; just as I am not entitled to affirm, in a
+hypothetical syllogism, that where a certain condition does not
+exist (in the present, completeness, as far as pure conceptions are
+concerned), the conditioned does not exist either. On the contrary,
+we are free to consider all limited beings as likewise unconditionally
+necessary, although we are unable to infer this from the general
+conception which we have of them. Thus conducted, this argument is
+incapable of giving us the least notion of the properties of a
+necessary being, and must be in every respect without result.
+
+This argument continues, however, to possess a weight and an
+authority, which, in spite of its objective insufficiency, it has
+never been divested of. For, granting that certain responsibilities
+lie upon us, which, as based on the ideas of reason, deserve to be
+respected and submitted to, although they are incapable of a real or
+practical application to our nature, or, in other words, would be
+responsibilities without motives, except upon the supposition of a
+Supreme Being to give effect and influence to the practical laws: in
+such a case we should be bound to obey our conceptions, which,
+although objectively insufficient, do, according to the standard of
+reason, preponderate over and are superior to any claims that may be
+advanced from any other quarter. The equilibrium of doubt would in
+this case be destroyed by a practical addition; indeed, Reason would
+be compelled to condemn herself, if she refused to comply with the
+demands of the judgement, no superior to which we know--however
+defective her understanding of the grounds of these demands might be.
+
+This argument, although in fact transcendental, inasmuch as it rests
+upon the intrinsic insufficiency of the contingent, is so simple and
+natural, that the commonest understanding can appreciate its value.
+We see things around us change, arise, and pass away; they, or their
+condition, must therefore have a cause. The same demand must again
+be made of the cause itself--as a datum of experience. Now it is
+natural that we should place the highest causality just where we place
+supreme causality, in that being, which contains the conditions of
+all possible effects, and the conception of which is so simple as that
+of an all-embracing reality. This highest cause, then, we regard as
+absolutely necessary, because we find it absolutely necessary to
+rise to it, and do not discover any reason for proceeding beyond it.
+Thus, among all nations, through the darkest polytheism glimmer some
+faint sparks of monotheism, to which these idolaters have been led,
+not from reflection and profound thought, but by the study and natural
+progress of the common understanding.
+
+There are only three modes of proving the existence of a Deity, on
+the grounds of speculative reason.
+
+All the paths conducting to this end begin either from determinate
+experience and the peculiar constitution of the world of sense, and
+rise, according to the laws of causality, from it to the highest cause
+existing apart from the world--or from a purely indeterminate
+experience, that is, some empirical existence--or abstraction is
+made of all experience, and the existence of a supreme cause is
+concluded from a priori conceptions alone. The first is the
+physico-theological argument, the second the cosmological, the third
+the ontological. More there are not, and more there cannot be.
+
+I shall show it is as unsuccessful on the one path--the empirical-
+as on the other--the transcendental, and that it stretches its wings
+in vain, to soar beyond the world of sense by the mere might of
+speculative thought. As regards the order in which we must discuss
+those arguments, it will be exactly the reverse of that in which
+reason, in the progress of its development, attains to them--the order
+in which they are placed above. For it will be made manifest to the
+reader that, although experience presents the occasion and the
+starting-point, it is the transcendental idea of reason which guides
+it in its pilgrimage and is the goal of all its struggles. I shall
+therefore begin with an examination of the transcendental argument,
+and afterwards inquire what additional strength has accrued to this
+mode of proof from the addition of the empirical element.
+
+
+
+SECTION IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of
+ the Existence of God.
+
+It is evident from what has been said that the conception of an
+absolutely necessary being is a mere idea, the objective reality of
+which is far from being established by the mere fact that it is a need
+of reason. On the contrary, this idea serves merely to indicate a
+certain unattainable perfection, and rather limits the operations
+than, by the presentation of new objects, extends the sphere of the
+understanding. But a strange anomaly meets us at the very threshold;
+for the inference from a given existence in general to an absolutely
+necessary existence seems to be correct and unavoidable, while the
+conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any
+conception of such a being.
+
+Philosophers have always talked of an absolutely necessary being,
+and have nevertheless declined to take the trouble of conceiving
+whether--and how--a being of this nature is even cogitable, not to
+mention that its existence is actually demonstrable. A verbal
+definition of the conception is certainly easy enough: it is something
+the non-existence of which is impossible. But does this definition
+throw any light upon the conditions which render it impossible to
+cogitate the non-existence of a thing--conditions which we wish to
+ascertain, that we may discover whether we think anything in the
+conception of such a being or not? For the mere fact that I throw
+away, by means of the word unconditioned, all the conditions which
+the understanding habitually requires in order to regard anything as
+necessary, is very far from making clear whether by means of the
+conception of the unconditionally necessary I think of something, or
+really of nothing at all.
+
+Nay, more, this chance-conception, now become so current, many
+have endeavoured to explain by examples which seemed to render any
+inquiries regarding its intelligibility quite needless. Every
+geometrical proposition--a triangle has three angles--it was said,
+is absolutely necessary; and thus people talked of an object which
+lay out of the sphere of our understanding as if it were perfectly
+plain what the conception of such a being meant.
+
+All the examples adduced have been drawn, without exception, from
+judgements, and not from things. But the unconditioned necessity of
+a judgement does not form the absolute necessity of a thing. On the
+contrary, the absolute necessity of a judgement is only a
+conditioned necessity of a thing, or of the predicate in a
+judgement. The proposition above-mentioned does not enounce that three
+angles necessarily exist, but, upon condition that a triangle
+exists, three angles must necessarily exist--in it. And thus this
+logical necessity has been the source of the greatest delusions.
+Having formed an a priori conception of a thing, the content of
+which was made to embrace existence, we believed ourselves safe in
+concluding that, because existence belongs necessarily to the object
+of the conception (that is, under the condition of my positing this
+thing as given), the existence of the thing is also posited
+necessarily, and that it is therefore absolutely necessary--merely
+because its existence has been cogitated in the conception.
+
+If, in an identical judgement, I annihilate the predicate in
+thought, and retain the subject, a contradiction is the result; and
+hence I say, the former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if I
+suppress both subject and predicate in thought, no contradiction
+arises; for there is nothing at all, and therefore no means of forming
+a contradiction. To suppose the existence of a triangle and not that
+of its three angles, is self-contradictory; but to suppose the
+non-existence of both triangle and angles is perfectly admissible.
+And so is it with the conception of an absolutely necessary being.
+Annihilate its existence in thought, and you annihilate the thing
+itself with all its predicates; how then can there be any room for
+contradiction? Externally, there is nothing to give rise to a
+contradiction, for a thing cannot be necessary externally; nor
+internally, for, by the annihilation or suppression of the thing
+itself, its internal properties are also annihilated. God is
+omnipotent--that is a necessary judgement. His omnipotence cannot be
+denied, if the existence of a Deity is posited--the existence, that
+is, of an infinite being, the two conceptions being identical. But
+when you say, God does not exist, neither omnipotence nor any other
+predicate is affirmed; they must all disappear with the subject, and
+in this judgement there cannot exist the least self-contradiction.
+
+You have thus seen that when the predicate of a judgement is
+annihilated in thought along with the subject, no internal
+contradiction can arise, be the predicate what it may. There is no
+possibility of evading the conclusion--you find yourselves compelled
+to declare: There are certain subjects which cannot be annihilated
+in thought. But this is nothing more than saying: There exist subjects
+which are absolutely necessary--the very hypothesis which you are
+called upon to establish. For I find myself unable to form the
+slightest conception of a thing which when annihilated in thought with
+all its predicates, leaves behind a contradiction; and contradiction
+is the only criterion of impossibility in the sphere of pure a
+priori conceptions.
+
+Against these general considerations, the justice of which no one
+can dispute, one argument is adduced, which is regarded as
+furnishing a satisfactory demonstration from the fact. It is
+affirmed that there is one and only one conception, in which the
+non-being or annihilation of the object is self-contradictory, and
+this is the conception of an ens realissimum. It possesses, you say,
+all reality, and you feel yourselves justified in admitting the
+possibility of such a being. (This I am willing to grant for the
+present, although the existence of a conception which is not
+self-contradictory is far from being sufficient to prove the
+possibility of an object.)* Now the notion of all reality embraces
+in it that of existence; the notion of existence lies, therefore, in
+the conception of this possible thing. If this thing is annihilated
+in thought, the internal possibility of the thing is also annihilated,
+which is self-contradictory.
+
+[*Footnote: A conception is always possible, if it is not
+self-contradictory. This is the logical criterion of possibility,
+distinguishing the object of such a conception from the nihil negativum.
+But it may be, notwithstanding, an empty conception, unless the objective
+reality of this synthesis, but which it is generated, is demonstrated;
+and a proof of this kind must be based upon principles of possible
+experience, and not upon the principle of analysis or contradiction.
+This remark may be serviceable as a warning against concluding, from
+the possibility of a conception--which is logical--the possibility
+of a thing--which is real.]
+
+I answer: It is absurd to introduce--under whatever term
+disguised--into the conception of a thing, which is to be cogitated
+solely in reference to its possibility, the conception of its
+existence. If this is admitted, you will have apparently gained the
+day, but in reality have enounced nothing but a mere tautology. I ask,
+is the proposition, this or that thing (which I am admitting to be
+possible) exists, an analytical or a synthetical proposition? If the
+former, there is no addition made to the subject of your thought by
+the affirmation of its existence; but then the conception in your
+minds is identical with the thing itself, or you have supposed the
+existence of a thing to be possible, and then inferred its existence
+from its internal possibility--which is but a miserable tautology.
+The word reality in the conception of the thing, and the word existence
+in the conception of the predicate, will not help you out of the
+difficulty. For, supposing you were to term all positing of a thing
+reality, you have thereby posited the thing with all its predicates
+in the conception of the subject and assumed its actual existence,
+and this you merely repeat in the predicate. But if you confess, as
+every reasonable person must, that every existential proposition is
+synthetical, how can it be maintained that the predicate of
+existence cannot be denied without contradiction?--a property which
+is the characteristic of analytical propositions, alone.
+
+I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this
+sophistical mode of argumentation, by a strict definition of the
+conception of existence, did not my own experience teach me that the
+illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real
+predicate (a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing)
+resists almost all the endeavours of explanation and illustration.
+A logical predicate may be what you please, even the subject may be
+predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the content of a
+judgement. But the determination of a conception is a predicate, which
+adds to and enlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be
+contained in the conception.
+
+Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of
+something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It
+is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in
+it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition,
+God is omnipotent, contains two conceptions, which have a certain
+object or content; the word is, is no additional predicate--it
+merely indicates the relation of the predicate to the subject. Now,
+if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being
+one), and say: God is, or, There is a God, I add no new predicate to
+the conception of God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of the
+subject with all its predicates--I posit the object in relation to
+my conception. The content of both is the same; and there is no
+addition made to the conception, which expresses merely the
+possibility of the object, by my cogitating the object--in the
+expression, it is--as absolutely given or existing. Thus the real
+contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars contain
+no more than a hundred possible dollars. For, as the latter indicate
+the conception, and the former the object, on the supposition that
+the content of the former was greater than that of the latter, my
+conception would not be an expression of the whole object, and would
+consequently be an inadequate conception of it. But in reckoning my
+wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real dollars than
+in a hundred possible dollars--that is, in the mere conception of
+them. For the real object--the dollars--is not analytically
+contained in my conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my
+conception (which is merely a determination of my mental state),
+although this objective reality--this existence--apart from my
+conceptions, does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid
+hundred dollars.
+
+By whatever and by whatever number of predicates--even to the
+complete determination of it--I may cogitate a thing, I do not in
+the least augment the object of my conception by the addition of the
+statement: This thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but
+something more than what was cogitated in my conception, would
+exist, and I could not affirm that the exact object of my conception
+had real existence. If I cogitate a thing as containing all modes of
+reality except one, the mode of reality which is absent is not added
+to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing
+exists; on the contrary, the thing exists--if it exist at all--with
+the same defect as that cogitated in its conception; otherwise not
+that which was cogitated, but something different, exists. Now, if
+I cogitate a being as the highest reality, without defect or
+imperfection, the question still remains--whether this being exists
+or not? For, although no element is wanting in the possible real
+content of my conception, there is a defect in its relation to my
+mental state, that is, I am ignorant whether the cognition of the
+object indicated by the conception is possible a posteriori. And
+here the cause of the present difficulty becomes apparent. If the
+question regarded an object of sense merely, it would be impossible
+for me to confound the conception with the existence of a thing. For
+the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according
+with the general conditions of experience; while the existence of
+the object permits me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of
+actual experience. At the same time, this connection with the world
+of experience does not in the least augment the conception, although
+a possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind.
+But if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, it is not
+to be wondered at, that we should find ourselves unable to present
+any criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility.
+
+Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is
+necessary to go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the
+object. In the case of sensuous objects, this is attained by their
+connection according to empirical laws with some one of my
+perceptions; but there is no means of cognizing the existence of
+objects of pure thought, because it must be cognized completely a
+priori. But all our knowledge of existence (be it immediately by
+perception, or by inferences connecting some object with a perception)
+belongs entirely to the sphere of experience--which is in perfect
+unity with itself; and although an existence out of this sphere cannot
+be absolutely declared to be impossible, it is a hypothesis the
+truth of which we have no means of ascertaining.
+
+The notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects a highly useful
+idea; but for the very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of
+enlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things. It
+is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being
+which we do not know to exist. The analytical criterion of
+possibility, which consists in the absence of contradiction in
+propositions, cannot be denied it. But the connection of real
+properties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of which an
+a priori judgement cannot be formed, because these realities are not
+presented to us specifically; and even if this were to happen, a
+judgement would still be impossible, because the criterion of the
+possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the
+world of experience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong.
+And thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt
+to establish upon a priori grounds the possibility of this sublime
+ideal being.
+
+The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence
+of a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient; and we may as well
+hope to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as
+the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his
+cash account.
+
+
+
+SECTION V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof
+ of the Existence of God.
+
+It was by no means a natural course of proceeding, but, on the
+contrary, an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools,
+to attempt to draw from a mere idea a proof of the existence of an
+object corresponding to it. Such a course would never have been pursued,
+were it not for that need of reason which requires it to suppose the
+existence of a necessary being as a basis for the empirical regress,
+and that, as this necessity must be unconditioned and a priori, reason
+is bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy, if possible,
+this requirement, and enable us to attain to the a priori cognition
+of such a being. This conception was thought to be found in the idea
+of an ens realissimum, and thus this idea was employed for the attainment
+of a better defined knowledge of a necessary being, of the existence
+of which we were convinced, or persuaded, on other grounds. Thus
+reason was seduced from her natural courage; and, instead of
+concluding with the conception of an ens realissimum, an attempt was
+made to begin with it, for the purpose of inferring from it that
+idea of a necessary existence which it was in fact called in to
+complete. Thus arose that unfortunate ontological argument, which
+neither satisfies the healthy common sense of humanity, nor sustains
+the scientific examination of the philosopher.
+
+The cosmological proof, which we are about to examine, retains the
+connection between absolute necessity and the highest reality; but,
+instead of reasoning from this highest reality to a necessary
+existence, like the preceding argument, it concludes from the given
+unconditioned necessity of some being its unlimited reality. The track
+it pursues, whether rational or sophistical, is at least natural,
+and not only goes far to persuade the common understanding, but
+shows itself deserving of respect from the speculative intellect;
+while it contains, at the same time, the outlines of all the arguments
+employed in natural theology--arguments which always have been, and
+still will be, in use and authority. These, however adorned, and hid
+under whatever embellishments of rhetoric and sentiment, are at bottom
+identical with the arguments we are at present to discuss. This proof,
+termed by Leibnitz the argumentum a contingentia mundi, I shall now
+lay before the reader, and subject to a strict examination.
+
+It is framed in the following manner: If something exists, an
+absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now I, at least,
+exist. Consequently, there exists an absolutely necessary being. The
+minor contains an experience, the major reasons from a general
+experience to the existence of a necessary being.* Thus this
+argument really begins at experience, and is not completely a
+priori, or ontological. The object of all possible experience being
+the world, it is called the cosmological proof. It contains no
+reference to any peculiar property of sensuous objects, by which
+this world of sense might be distinguished from other possible worlds;
+and in this respect it differs from the physico-theological proof,
+which is based upon the consideration of the peculiar constitution
+of our sensuous world.
+
+[*Footnote: This inference is too well known to require more detailed
+discussion. It is based upon the spurious transcendental law of
+causality, that everything which is contingent has a cause, which,
+if itself contingent, must also have a cause; and so on, till the
+series of subordinated causes must end with an absolutely necessary
+cause, without which it would not possess completeness.]
+
+The proof proceeds thus: A necessary being can be determined only in
+one way, that is, it can be determined by only one of all possible
+opposed predicates; consequently, it must be completely determined
+in and by its conception. But there is only a single conception of
+a thing possible, which completely determines the thing a priori: that
+is, the conception of the ens realissimum. It follows that the
+conception of the ens realissimum is the only conception by and in
+which we can cogitate a necessary being. Consequently, a Supreme Being
+necessarily exists.
+
+In this cosmological argument are assembled so many sophistical
+propositions that speculative reason seems to have exerted in it all
+her dialectical skill to produce a transcendental illusion of the most
+extreme character. We shall postpone an investigation of this argument
+for the present, and confine ourselves to exposing the stratagem by
+which it imposes upon us an old argument in a new dress, and appeals
+to the agreement of two witnesses, the one with the credentials of
+pure reason, and the other with those of empiricism; while, in fact,
+it is only the former who has changed his dress and voice, for the
+purpose of passing himself off for an additional witness. That it
+may possess a secure foundation, it bases its conclusions upon
+experience, and thus appears to be completely distinct from the
+ontological argument, which places its confidence entirely in pure
+a priori conceptions. But this experience merely aids reason in making
+one step--to the existence of a necessary being. What the properties
+of this being are cannot be learned from experience; and therefore
+reason abandons it altogether, and pursues its inquiries in the sphere
+of pure conception, for the purpose of discovering what the properties
+of an absolutely necessary being ought to be, that is, what among
+all possible things contain the conditions (requisita) of absolute
+necessity. Reason believes that it has discovered these requisites
+in the conception of an ens realissimum--and in it alone, and hence
+concludes: The ens realissimum is an absolutely necessary being. But
+it is evident that reason has here presupposed that the conception
+of an ens realissimum is perfectly adequate to the conception of a
+being of absolute necessity, that is, that we may infer the
+existence of the latter from that of the former--a proposition which
+formed the basis of the ontological argument, and which is now
+employed in the support of the cosmological argument, contrary to
+the wish and professions of its inventors. For the existence of an
+absolutely necessary being is given in conceptions alone. But if I
+say: "The conception of the ens realissimum is a conception of this
+kind, and in fact the only conception which is adequate to our idea
+of a necessary being," I am obliged to admit, that the latter may be
+inferred from the former. Thus it is properly the ontological argument
+which figures in the cosmological, and constitutes the whole
+strength of the latter; while the spurious basis of experience has
+been of no further use than to conduct us to the conception of
+absolute necessity, being utterly insufficient to demonstrate the
+presence of this attribute in any determinate existence or thing.
+For when we propose to ourselves an aim of this character, we must
+abandon the sphere of experience, and rise to that of pure
+conceptions, which we examine with the purpose of discovering
+whether any one contains the conditions of the possibility of an
+absolutely necessary being. But if the possibility of such a being
+is thus demonstrated, its existence is also proved; for we may then
+assert that, of all possible beings there is one which possesses the
+attribute of necessity--in other words, this being possesses an
+absolutely necessary existence.
+
+All illusions in an argument are more easily detected when they
+are presented in the formal manner employed by the schools, which we
+now proceed to do.
+
+If the proposition: "Every absolutely necessary being is likewise an
+ens realissimum," is correct (and it is this which constitutes the
+nervus probandi of the cosmological argument), it must, like all
+affirmative judgements, be capable of conversion--the conversio per
+accidens, at least. It follows, then, that some entia realissima are
+absolutely necessary beings. But no ens realissimum is in any
+respect different from another, and what is valid of some is valid
+of all. In this present case, therefore, I may employ simple
+conversion, and say: "Every ens realissimum is a necessary being."
+But as this proposition is determined a priori by the conceptions
+contained in it, the mere conception of an ens realissimum must
+possess the additional attribute of absolute necessity. But this is
+exactly what was maintained in the ontological argument, and not
+recognized by the cosmological, although it formed the real ground
+of its disguised and illusory reasoning.
+
+Thus the second mode employed by speculative reason of demonstrating
+the existence of a Supreme Being, is not only, like the first,
+illusory and inadequate, but possesses the additional blemish of an
+ignoratio elenchi--professing to conduct us by a new road to the
+desired goal, but bringing us back, after a short circuit, to the
+old path which we had deserted at its call.
+
+I mentioned above that this cosmological argument contains a perfect
+nest of dialectical assumptions, which transcendental criticism does
+not find it difficult to expose and to dissipate. I shall merely
+enumerate these, leaving it to the reader, who must by this time be
+well practised in such matters, to investigate the fallacies
+residing therein.
+
+The following fallacies, for example, are discoverable in this
+mode of proof: 1. The transcendental principle: "Everything that is
+contingent must have a cause"--a principle without significance,
+except in the sensuous world. For the purely intellectual conception
+of the contingent cannot produce any synthetical proposition, like
+that of causality, which is itself without significance or
+distinguishing characteristic except in the phenomenal world. But in
+the present case it is employed to help us beyond the limits of its
+sphere. 2. "From the impossibility of an infinite ascending series
+of causes in the world of sense a first cause is inferred"; a
+conclusion which the principles of the employment of reason do not
+justify even in the sphere of experience, and still less when an
+attempt is made to pass the limits of this sphere. 3. Reason allows
+itself to be satisfied upon insufficient grounds, with regard to the
+completion of this series. It removes all conditions (without which,
+however, no conception of Necessity can take place); and, as after
+this it is beyond our power to form any other conceptions, it
+accepts this as a completion of the conception it wishes to form of
+the series. 4. The logical possibility of a conception of the total
+of reality (the criterion of this possibility being the absence of
+contradiction) is confounded with the transcendental, which requires
+a principle of the practicability of such a synthesis--a principle
+which again refers us to the world of experience. And so on.
+
+The aim of the cosmological argument is to avoid the necessity of
+proving the existence of a necessary being priori from mere
+conceptions--a proof which must be ontological, and of which we feel
+ourselves quite incapable. With this purpose, we reason from an actual
+existence--an experience in general, to an absolutely necessary
+condition of that existence. It is in this case unnecessary to
+demonstrate its possibility. For after having proved that it exists,
+the question regarding its possibility is superfluous. Now, when we
+wish to define more strictly the nature of this necessary being, we
+do not look out for some being the conception of which would enable
+us to comprehend the necessity of its being--for if we could do this,
+an empirical presupposition would be unnecessary; no, we try to
+discover merely the negative condition (conditio sine qua non),
+without which a being would not be absolutely necessary. Now this
+would be perfectly admissible in every sort of reasoning, from a
+consequence to its principle; but in the present case it unfortunately
+happens that the condition of absolute necessity can be discovered
+in but a single being, the conception of which must consequently
+contain all that is requisite for demonstrating the presence of
+absolute necessity, and thus entitle me to infer this absolute
+necessity a priori. That is, it must be possible to reason conversely,
+and say: The thing, to which the conception of the highest reality
+belongs, is absolutely necessary. But if I cannot reason thus--and
+I cannot, unless I believe in the sufficiency of the ontological
+argument--I find insurmountable obstacles in my new path, and am
+really no farther than the point from which I set out. The
+conception of a Supreme Being satisfies all questions a priori
+regarding the internal determinations of a thing, and is for this
+reason an ideal without equal or parallel, the general conception of
+it indicating it as at the same time an ens individuum among all
+possible things. But the conception does not satisfy the question
+regarding its existence--which was the purpose of all our inquiries;
+and, although the existence of a necessary being were admitted, we
+should find it impossible to answer the question: What of all things
+in the world must be regarded as such?
+
+It is certainly allowable to admit the existence of an
+all-sufficient being--a cause of all possible effects--for the purpose
+of enabling reason to introduce unity into its mode and grounds of
+explanation with regard to phenomena. But to assert that such a
+being necessarily exists, is no longer the modest enunciation of an
+admissible hypothesis, but the boldest declaration of an apodeictic
+certainty; for the cognition of that which is absolutely necessary
+must itself possess that character.
+
+The aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind is either
+to discover a conception which shall harmonize with the idea of
+absolute necessity, or a conception which shall contain that idea.
+If the one is possible, so is the other; for reason recognizes that
+alone as absolutely necessary which is necessary from its
+conception. But both attempts are equally beyond our power--we find
+it impossible to satisfy the understanding upon this point, and as
+impossible to induce it to remain at rest in relation to this
+incapacity.
+
+Unconditioned necessity, which, as the ultimate support and stay
+of all existing things, is an indispensable requirement of the mind,
+is an abyss on the verge of which human reason trembles in dismay.
+Even the idea of eternity, terrible and sublime as it is, as
+depicted by Haller, does not produce upon the mental vision such a
+feeling of awe and terror; for, although it measures the duration of
+things, it does not support them. We cannot bear, nor can we rid
+ourselves of the thought that a being, which we regard as the greatest
+of all possible existences, should say to himself: I am from
+eternity to eternity; beside me there is nothing, except that which
+exists by my will; whence then am I? Here all sinks away from under
+us; and the greatest, as the smallest, perfection, hovers without stay
+or footing in presence of the speculative reason, which finds it as
+easy to part with the one as with the other.
+
+Many physical powers, which evidence their existence by their
+effects, are perfectly inscrutable in their nature; they elude all
+our powers of observation. The transcendental object which forms the
+basis of phenomena, and, in connection with it, the reason why our
+sensibility possesses this rather than that particular kind of
+conditions, are and must ever remain hidden from our mental vision;
+the fact is there, the reason of the fact we cannot see. But an
+ideal of pure reason cannot be termed mysterious or inscrutable,
+because the only credential of its reality is the need of it felt by
+reason, for the purpose of giving completeness to the world of
+synthetical unity. An ideal is not even given as a cogitable object,
+and therefore cannot be inscrutable; on the contrary, it must, as a
+mere idea, be based on the constitution of reason itself, and on
+this account must be capable of explanation and solution. For the very
+essence of reason consists in its ability to give an account, of all
+our conceptions, opinions, and assertions--upon objective, or, when
+they happen to be illusory and fallacious, upon subjective grounds.
+
+
+
+Detection and Explanation of the Dialectical Illusion in
+all Transcendental Arguments for the Existence of a
+Necessary Being.
+
+Both of the above arguments are transcendental; in other words, they
+do not proceed upon empirical principles. For, although the
+cosmological argument professed to lay a basis of experience for its
+edifice of reasoning, it did not ground its procedure upon the
+peculiar constitution of experience, but upon pure principles of
+reason--in relation to an existence given by empirical
+consciousness; utterly abandoning its guidance, however, for the
+purpose of supporting its assertions entirely upon pure conceptions.
+Now what is the cause, in these transcendental arguments, of the
+dialectical, but natural, illusion, which connects the conceptions
+of necessity and supreme reality, and hypostatizes that which cannot
+be anything but an idea? What is the cause of this unavoidable step
+on the part of reason, of admitting that some one among all existing
+things must be necessary, while it falls back from the assertion of
+the existence of such a being as from an abyss? And how does reason
+proceed to explain this anomaly to itself, and from the wavering
+condition of a timid and reluctant approbation--always again
+withdrawn--arrive at a calm and settled insight into its cause?
+
+It is something very remarkable that, on the supposition that
+something exists, I cannot avoid the inference that something exists
+necessarily. Upon this perfectly natural--but not on that account
+reliable--inference does the cosmological argument rest. But, let me
+form any conception whatever of a thing, I find that I cannot cogitate
+the existence of the thing as absolutely necessary, and that nothing
+prevents me--be the thing or being what it may--from cogitating its
+non-existence. I may thus be obliged to admit that all existing things
+have a necessary basis, while I cannot cogitate any single or
+individual thing as necessary. In other words, I can never complete
+the regress through the conditions of existence, without admitting
+the existence of a necessary being; but, on the other hand, I cannot
+make a commencement from this being.
+
+If I must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the basis of
+existing things, and yet am not permitted to cogitate any individual
+thing as in itself necessary, the inevitable inference is that
+necessity and contingency are not properties of things themselves-
+otherwise an internal contradiction would result; that consequently
+neither of these principles are objective, but merely subjective
+principles of reason--the one requiring us to seek for a necessary
+ground for everything that exists, that is, to be satisfied with no
+other explanation than that which is complete a priori, the other
+forbidding us ever to hope for the attainment of this completeness,
+that is, to regard no member of the empirical world as
+unconditioned. In this mode of viewing them, both principles, in their
+purely heuristic and regulative character, and as concerning merely
+the formal interest of reason, are quite consistent with each other.
+The one says: "You must philosophize upon nature," as if there existed
+a necessary primal basis of all existing things, solely for the
+purpose of introducing systematic unity into your knowledge, by
+pursuing an idea of this character--a foundation which is
+arbitrarily admitted to be ultimate; while the other warns you to
+consider no individual determination, concerning the existence of
+things, as such an ultimate foundation, that is, as absolutely
+necessary, but to keep the way always open for further progress in
+the deduction, and to treat every determination as determined by some
+other. But if all that we perceive must be regarded as conditionally
+necessary, it is impossible that anything which is empirically given
+should be absolutely necessary.
+
+It follows from this that you must accept the absolutely necessary
+as out of and beyond the world, inasmuch as it is useful only as a
+principle of the highest possible unity in experience, and you
+cannot discover any such necessary existence in the would, the
+second rule requiring you to regard all empirical causes of unity as
+themselves deduced.
+
+The philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of nature as
+contingent; while matter was considered by them, in accordance with
+the judgement of the common reason of mankind, as primal and
+necessary. But if they had regarded matter, not relatively--as the
+substratum of phenomena, but absolutely and in itself--as an
+independent existence, this idea of absolute necessity would have
+immediately disappeared. For there is nothing absolutely connecting
+reason with such an existence; on the contrary, it can annihilate it
+in thought, always and without self-contradiction. But in thought
+alone lay the idea of absolute necessity. A regulative principle must,
+therefore, have been at the foundation of this opinion. In fact,
+extension and impenetrability--which together constitute our
+conception of matter--form the supreme empirical principle of the
+unity of phenomena, and this principle, in so far as it is empirically
+unconditioned, possesses the property of a regulative principle.
+But, as every determination of matter which constitutes what is real
+in it--and consequently impenetrability--is an effect, which must have
+a cause, and is for this reason always derived, the notion of matter
+cannot harmonize with the idea of a necessary being, in its
+character of the principle of all derived unity. For every one of
+its real properties, being derived, must be only conditionally
+necessary, and can therefore be annihilated in thought; and thus the
+whole existence of matter can be so annihilated or suppressed. If this
+were not the case, we should have found in the world of phenomena
+the highest ground or condition of unity--which is impossible,
+according to the second regulative principle. It follows that
+matter, and, in general, all that forms part of the world of sense,
+cannot be a necessary primal being, nor even a principle of
+empirical unity, but that this being or principle must have its
+place assigned without the world. And, in this way, we can proceed
+in perfect confidence to deduce the phenomena of the world and their
+existence from other phenomena, just as if there existed no
+necessary being; and we can at the same time, strive without ceasing
+towards the attainment of completeness for our deduction, just as if
+such a being--the supreme condition of all existences--were
+presupposed by the mind.
+
+These remarks will have made it evident to the reader that the ideal
+of the Supreme Being, far from being an enouncement of the existence
+of a being in itself necessary, is nothing more than a regulative
+principle of reason, requiring us to regard all connection existing
+between phenomena as if it had its origin from an all-sufficient
+necessary cause, and basing upon this the rule of a systematic and
+necessary unity in the explanation of phenomena. We cannot, at the
+same time, avoid regarding, by a transcendental subreptio, this formal
+principle as constitutive, and hypostatizing this unity. Precisely
+similar is the case with our notion of space. Space is the primal
+condition of all forms, which are properly just so many different
+limitations of it; and thus, although it is merely a principle of
+sensibility, we cannot help regarding it as an absolutely necessary
+and self-subsistent thing--as an object given a priori in itself. In
+the same way, it is quite natural that, as the systematic unity of
+nature cannot be established as a principle for the empirical
+employment of reason, unless it is based upon the idea of an ens
+realissimum, as the supreme cause, we should regard this idea as a
+real object, and this object, in its character of supreme condition,
+as absolutely necessary, and that in this way a regulative should be
+transformed into a constitutive principle. This interchange becomes
+evident when I regard this supreme being, which, relatively to the
+world, was absolutely (unconditionally) necessary, as a thing per
+se. In this case, I find it impossible to represent this necessity
+in or by any conception, and it exists merely in my own mind, as the
+formal condition of thought, but not as a material and hypostatic
+condition of existence.
+
+
+
+SECTION VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof.
+
+If, then, neither a pure conception nor the general experience of an
+existing being can provide a sufficient basis for the proof of the
+existence of the Deity, we can make the attempt by the only other
+mode--that of grounding our argument upon a determinate experience
+of the phenomena of the present world, their constitution and
+disposition, and discover whether we can thus attain to a sound
+conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being. This argument we shall
+term the physico-theological argument. If it is shown to be
+insufficient, speculative reason cannot present us with any
+satisfactory proof of the existence of a being corresponding to our
+transcendental idea.
+
+It is evident from the remarks that have been made in the
+preceding sections, that an answer to this question will be far from
+being difficult or unconvincing. For how can any experience be
+adequate with an idea? The very essence of an idea consists in the
+fact that no experience can ever be discovered congruent or adequate
+with it. The transcendental idea of a necessary and all-sufficient
+being is so immeasurably great, so high above all that is empirical,
+which is always conditioned, that we hope in vain to find materials
+in the sphere of experience sufficiently ample for our conception,
+and in vain seek the unconditioned among things that are conditioned,
+while examples, nay, even guidance is denied us by the laws of empirical
+synthesis.
+
+If the Supreme Being forms a link in the chain of empirical
+conditions, it must be a member of the empirical series, and, like
+the lower members which it precedes, have its origin in some higher
+member of the series. If, on the other hand, we disengage it from the
+chain, and cogitate it as an intelligible being, apart from the series
+of natural causes--how shall reason bridge the abyss that separates
+the latter from the former? All laws respecting the regress from
+effects to causes, all synthetical additions to our knowledge relate
+solely to possible experience and the objects of the sensuous world,
+and, apart from them, are without significance.
+
+The world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle
+of order, variety, beauty, and conformity to ends, that whether we
+pursue our observations into the infinity of space in the one
+direction, or into its illimitable divisions in the other, whether
+we regard the world in its greatest or its least manifestations-
+even after we have attained to the highest summit of knowledge which
+our weak minds can reach, we find that language in the presence of
+wonders so inconceivable has lost its force, and number its power to
+reckon, nay, even thought fails to conceive adequately, and our
+conception of the whole dissolves into an astonishment without power
+of expression--all the more eloquent that it is dumb. Everywhere
+around us we observe a chain of causes and effects, of means and ends,
+of death and birth; and, as nothing has entered of itself into the
+condition in which we find it, we are constantly referred to some
+other thing, which itself suggests the same inquiry regarding its
+cause, and thus the universe must sink into the abyss of
+nothingness, unless we admit that, besides this infinite chain of
+contingencies, there exists something that is primal and
+self-subsistent--something which, as the cause of this phenomenal
+world, secures its continuance and preservation.
+
+This highest cause--what magnitude shall we attribute to it? Of
+the content of the world we are ignorant; still less can we estimate
+its magnitude by comparison with the sphere of the possible. But
+this supreme cause being a necessity of the human mind, what is
+there to prevent us from attributing to it such a degree of perfection
+as to place it above the sphere of all that is possible? This we can
+easily do, although only by the aid of the faint outline of an
+abstract conception, by representing this being to ourselves as
+containing in itself, as an individual substance, all possible
+perfection--a conception which satisfies that requirement of reason
+which demands parsimony in principles, which is free from
+self-contradiction, which even contributes to the extension of the
+employment of reason in experience, by means of the guidance
+afforded by this idea to order and system, and which in no respect
+conflicts with any law of experience.
+
+This argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is
+the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the
+common reason of humanity. It animates the study of nature, as it
+itself derives its existence and draws ever new strength from that
+source. It introduces aims and ends into a sphere in which our
+observation could not of itself have discovered them, and extends
+our knowledge of nature, by directing our attention to a unity, the
+principle of which lies beyond nature. This knowledge of nature
+again reacts upon this idea--its cause; and thus our belief in a
+divine author of the universe rises to the power of an irresistible
+conviction.
+
+For these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob
+this argument of the authority it has always enjoyed. The mind,
+unceasingly elevated by these considerations, which, although
+empirical, are so remarkably powerful, and continually adding to their
+force, will not suffer itself to be depressed by the doubts
+suggested by subtle speculation; it tears itself out of this state
+of uncertainty, the moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms
+of nature and the majesty of the universe, and rises from height to
+height, from condition to condition, till it has elevated itself to
+the supreme and unconditioned author of all.
+
+But although we have nothing to object to the reasonableness and
+utility of this procedure, but have rather to commend and encourage
+it, we cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances to
+demonstrative certainty and to a reception upon its own merits,
+apart from favour or support by other arguments. Nor can it injure
+the cause of morality to endeavour to lower the tone of the arrogant
+sophist, and to teach him that modesty and moderation which are the
+properties of a belief that brings calm and content into the mind,
+without prescribing to it an unworthy subjection. I maintain, then,
+that the physico-theological argument is insufficient of itself to
+prove the existence of a Supreme Being, that it must entrust this to
+the ontological argument--to which it serves merely as an
+introduction, and that, consequently, this argument contains the
+only possible ground of proof (possessed by speculative reason) for
+the existence of this being.
+
+The chief momenta in the physico-theological argument are as follow:
+1. We observe in the world manifest signs of an arrangement full of
+purpose, executed with great wisdom, and argument in whole of a
+content indescribably various, and of an extent without limits. 2.
+This arrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things
+existing in the world--it belongs to them merely as a contingent
+attribute; in other words, the nature of different things could not
+of itself, whatever means were employed, harmoniously tend towards
+certain purposes, were they not chosen and directed for these purposes
+by a rational and disposing principle, in accordance with certain
+fundamental ideas. 3. There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise
+cause (or several), which is not merely a blind, all-powerful
+nature, producing the beings and events which fill the world in
+unconscious fecundity, but a free and intelligent cause of the
+world. 4. The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of
+the reciprocal relation existing between the parts of the world, as
+portions of an artistic edifice--an inference which all our
+observation favours, and all principles of analogy support.
+
+In the above argument, it is inferred from the analogy of certain
+products of nature with those of human art, when it compels Nature
+to bend herself to its purposes, as in the case of a house, a ship,
+or a watch, that the same kind of causality--namely, understanding
+and will--resides in nature. It is also declared that the internal
+possibility of this freely-acting nature (which is the source of all
+art, and perhaps also of human reason) is derivable from another and
+superhuman art--a conclusion which would perhaps be found incapable
+of standing the test of subtle transcendental criticism. But to neither
+of these opinions shall we at present object. We shall only remark
+that it must be confessed that, if we are to discuss the subject of
+cause at all, we cannot proceed more securely than with the guidance
+of the analogy subsisting between nature and such products of
+design--these being the only products whose causes and modes of
+organization are completely known to us. Reason would be unable to
+satisfy her own requirements, if she passed from a causality which
+she does know, to obscure and indemonstrable principles of explanation
+which she does not know.
+
+According to the physico-theological argument, the connection and
+harmony existing in the world evidence the contingency of the form
+merely, but not of the matter, that is, of the substance of the world.
+To establish the truth of the latter opinion, it would be necessary
+to prove that all things would be in themselves incapable of this harmony
+and order, unless they were, even as regards their substance, the
+product of a supreme wisdom. But this would require very different
+grounds of proof from those presented by the analogy with human art.
+This proof can at most, therefore, demonstrate the existence of an
+architect of the world, whose efforts are limited by the
+capabilities of the material with which he works, but not of a creator
+of the world, to whom all things are subject. Thus this argument is
+utterly insufficient for the task before us--a demonstration of the
+existence of an all-sufficient being. If we wish to prove the
+contingency of matter, we must have recourse to a transcendental
+argument, which the physico-theological was constructed expressly to
+avoid.
+
+We infer, from the order and design visible in the universe, as a
+disposition of a thoroughly contingent character, the existence of
+a cause proportionate thereto. The conception of this cause must contain
+certain determinate qualities, and it must therefore be regarded as
+the conception of a being which possesses all power, wisdom, and so
+on, in one word, all perfection--the conception, that is, of an
+all-sufficient being. For the predicates of very great, astonishing,
+or immeasurable power and excellence, give us no determinate
+conception of the thing, nor do they inform us what the thing may be
+in itself. They merely indicate the relation existing between the
+magnitude of the object and the observer, who compares it with himself
+and with his own power of comprehension, and are mere expressions of
+praise and reverence, by which the object is either magnified, or
+the observing subject depreciated in relation to the object. Where
+we have to do with the magnitude (of the perfection) of a thing, we
+can discover no determinate conception, except that which
+comprehends all possible perfection or completeness, and it is only
+the total (omnitudo) of reality which is completely determined in
+and through its conception alone.
+
+Now it cannot be expected that any one will be bold enough to
+declare that he has a perfect insight into the relation which the
+magnitude of the world he contemplates bears (in its extent as well
+as in its content) to omnipotence, into that of the order and design
+in the world to the highest wisdom, and that of the unity of the world
+to the absolute unity of a Supreme Being. Physico-theology is therefore
+incapable of presenting a determinate conception of a supreme cause
+of the world, and is therefore insufficient as a principle of theology--a
+theology which is itself to be the basis of religion.
+
+The attainment of absolute totality is completely impossible on
+the path of empiricism. And yet this is the path pursued in the
+physico-theological argument. What means shall we employ to bridge
+the abyss?
+
+After elevating ourselves to admiration of the magnitude of the
+power, wisdom, and other attributes of the author of the world, and
+finding we can advance no further, we leave the argument on
+empirical grounds, and proceed to infer the contingency of the world
+from the order and conformity to aims that are observable in it.
+From this contingency we infer, by the help of transcendental
+conceptions alone, the existence of something absolutely necessary;
+and, still advancing, proceed from the conception of the absolute
+necessity of the first cause to the completely determined or
+determining conception thereof--the conception of an all-embracing
+reality. Thus the physico-theological, failing in its undertaking,
+recurs in its embarrassment to the cosmological argument; and, as this
+is merely the ontological argument in disguise, it executes its design
+solely by the aid of pure reason, although it at first professed to
+have no connection with this faculty and to base its entire
+procedure upon experience alone.
+
+The physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard with such
+contempt the transcendental mode of argument, and to look down upon
+it, with the conceit of clear-sighted observers of nature, as the
+brain-cobweb of obscure speculatists. For, if they reflect upon and
+examine their own arguments, they will find that, after following
+for some time the path of nature and experience, and discovering
+themselves no nearer their object, they suddenly leave this path and
+pass into the region of pure possibility, where they hope to reach
+upon the wings of ideas what had eluded all their empirical
+investigations. Gaining, as they think, a firm footing after this
+immense leap, they extend their determinate conception--into the
+possession of which they have come, they know not how--over the
+whole sphere of creation, and explain their ideal, which is entirely
+a product of pure reason, by illustrations drawn from experience--though
+in a degree miserably unworthy of the grandeur of the object, while
+they refuse to acknowledge that they have arrived at this cognition
+or hypothesis by a very different road from that of experience.
+
+Thus the physico-theological is based upon the cosmological, and
+this upon the ontological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being;
+and as besides these three there is no other path open to
+speculative reason, the ontological proof, on the ground of pure
+conceptions of reason, is the only possible one, if any proof of a
+proposition so far transcending the empirical exercise of the
+understanding is possible at all.
+
+
+
+SECTION VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative
+ Principles of Reason.
+
+If by the term theology I understand the cognition of a primal
+being, that cognition is based either upon reason alone (theologia
+rationalis) or upon revelation (theologia revelata). The former
+cogitates its object either by means of pure transcendental
+conceptions, as an ens originarium, realissimum, ens entium, and is
+termed transcendental theology; or, by means of a conception derived
+from the nature of our own mind, as a supreme intelligence, and must
+then be entitled natural theology. The person who believes in a
+transcendental theology alone, is termed a deist; he who
+acknowledges the possibility of a natural theology also, a theist.
+The former admits that we can cognize by pure reason alone the existence
+of a Supreme Being, but at the same time maintains that our conception
+of this being is purely transcendental, and that all we can say of
+it is that it possesses all reality, without being able to define it
+more closely. The second asserts that reason is capable of
+presenting us, from the analogy with nature, with a more definite
+conception of this being, and that its operations, as the cause of
+all things, are the results of intelligence and free will. The former
+regards the Supreme Being as the cause of the world--whether by the
+necessity of his nature, or as a free agent, is left undetermined;
+the latter considers this being as the author of the world.
+
+Transcendental theology aims either at inferring the existence of
+a Supreme Being from a general experience, without any closer
+reference to the world to which this experience belongs, and in this
+case it is called cosmotheology; or it endeavours to cognize the
+existence of such a being, through mere conceptions, without the aid
+of experience, and is then termed ontotheology.
+
+Natural theology infers the attributes and the existence of an
+author of the world, from the constitution of, the order and unity
+observable in, the world, in which two modes of causality must be
+admitted to exist--those of nature and freedom. Thus it rises from
+this world to a supreme intelligence, either as the principle of all
+natural, or of all moral order and perfection. In the former case it
+is termed physico-theology, in the latter, ethical or moral-theology.*
+
+[*Footnote: Not theological ethics; for this science contains ethical
+laws, which presuppose the existence of a Supreme Governor of the world;
+while moral-theology, on the contrary, is the expression of a
+conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being, founded upon ethical
+laws.]
+
+As we are wont to understand by the term God not merely an eternal
+nature, the operations of which are insensate and blind, but a Supreme
+Being, who is the free and intelligent author of all things, and as
+it is this latter view alone that can be of interest to humanity, we
+might, in strict rigour, deny to the deist any belief in God at all,
+and regard him merely as a maintainer of the existence of a primal
+being or thing--the supreme cause of all other things. But, as no
+one ought to be blamed, merely because he does not feel himself
+justified in maintaining a certain opinion, as if he altogether denied
+its truth and asserted the opposite, it is more correct--as it is less
+harsh--to say, the deist believes in a God, the theist in a living
+God (summa intelligentia). We shall now proceed to investigate the
+sources of all these attempts of reason to establish the existence
+of a Supreme Being.
+
+It may be sufficient in this place to define theoretical knowledge
+or cognition as knowledge of that which is, and practical knowledge
+as knowledge of that which ought to be. In this view, the theoretical
+employment of reason is that by which I cognize a priori (as
+necessary) that something is, while the practical is that by which
+I cognize a priori what ought to happen. Now, if it is an indubitably
+certain, though at the same time an entirely conditioned truth, that
+something is, or ought to happen, either a certain determinate
+condition of this truth is absolutely necessary, or such a condition
+may be arbitrarily presupposed. In the former case the condition is
+postulated (per thesin), in the latter supposed (per hypothesin).
+There are certain practical laws--those of morality--which are
+absolutely necessary. Now, if these laws necessarily presuppose the
+existence of some being, as the condition of the possibility of
+their obligatory power, this being must be postulated, because the
+conditioned, from which we reason to this determinate condition, is
+itself cognized a priori as absolutely necessary. We shall at some
+future time show that the moral laws not merely presuppose the
+existence of a Supreme Being, but also, as themselves absolutely
+necessary in a different relation, demand or postulate it--although
+only from a practical point of view. The discussion of this argument
+we postpone for the present.
+
+When the question relates merely to that which is, not to that which
+ought to be, the conditioned which is presented in experience is
+always cogitated as contingent. For this reason its condition cannot
+be regarded as absolutely necessary, but merely as relatively
+necessary, or rather as needful; the condition is in itself and a
+priori a mere arbitrary presupposition in aid of the cognition, by
+reason, of the conditioned. If, then, we are to possess a
+theoretical cognition of the absolute necessity of a thing, we
+cannot attain to this cognition otherwise than a priori by means of
+conceptions; while it is impossible in this way to cognize the
+existence of a cause which bears any relation to an existence given
+in experience.
+
+Theoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to an object or
+certain conceptions of an object which is not given and cannot be
+discovered by means of experience. It is opposed to the cognition of
+nature, which concerns only those objects or predicates which can be
+presented in a possible experience.
+
+The principle that everything which happens (the empirically
+contingent) must have a cause, is a principle of the cognition of
+nature, but not of speculative cognition. For, if we change it into
+an abstract principle, and deprive it of its reference to experience
+and the empirical, we shall find that it cannot with justice be
+regarded any longer as a synthetical proposition, and that it is
+impossible to discover any mode of transition from that which exists
+to something entirely different--termed cause. Nay, more, the
+conception of a cause likewise that of the contingent--loses, in
+this speculative mode of employing it, all significance, for its
+objective reality and meaning are comprehensible from experience
+alone.
+
+When from the existence of the universe and the things in it the
+existence of a cause of the universe is inferred, reason is proceeding
+not in the natural, but in the speculative method. For the principle
+of the former enounces, not that things themselves or substances,
+but only that which happens or their states--as empirically
+contingent, have a cause: the assertion that the existence of
+substance itself is contingent is not justified by experience, it is
+the assertion of a reason employing its principles in a speculative
+manner. If, again, I infer from the form of the universe, from the
+way in which all things are connected and act and react upon each other,
+the existence of a cause entirely distinct from the universe--this
+would again be a judgement of purely speculative reason; because the
+object in this case--the cause--can never be an object of possible
+experience. In both these cases the principle of causality, which is
+valid only in the field of experience--useless and even meaningless
+beyond this region, would be diverted from its proper destination.
+
+Now I maintain that all attempts of reason to establish a theology
+by the aid of speculation alone are fruitless, that the principles
+of reason as applied to nature do not conduct us to any theological
+truths, and, consequently, that a rational theology can have no
+existence, unless it is founded upon the laws of morality. For all
+synthetical principles of the understanding are valid only as immanent
+in experience; while the cognition of a Supreme Being necessitates
+their being employed transcendentally, and of this the understanding
+is quite incapable. If the empirical law of causality is to conduct
+us to a Supreme Being, this being must belong to the chain of empirical
+objects--in which case it would be, like all phenomena, itself
+conditioned. If the possibility of passing the limits of experience
+be admitted, by means of the dynamical law of the relation of an effect
+to its cause, what kind of conception shall we obtain by this
+procedure? Certainly not the conception of a Supreme Being, because
+experience never presents us with the greatest of all possible
+effects, and it is only an effect of this character that could witness
+to the existence of a corresponding cause. If, for the purpose of
+fully satisfying the requirements of Reason, we recognize her right
+to assert the existence of a perfect and absolutely necessary being,
+this can be admitted only from favour, and cannot be regarded as the
+result or irresistible demonstration. The physico-theological proof
+may add weight to others--if other proofs there are--by connecting
+speculation with experience; but in itself it rather prepares the mind
+for theological cognition, and gives it a right and natural direction,
+than establishes a sure foundation for theology.
+
+It is now perfectly evident that transcendental questions admit only
+of transcendental answers--those presented a priori by pure
+conceptions without the least empirical admixture. But the question
+in the present case is evidently synthetical--it aims at the extension
+of our cognition beyond the bounds of experience--it requires an
+assurance respecting the existence of a being corresponding with the
+idea in our minds, to which no experience can ever be adequate. Now
+it has been abundantly proved that all a priori synthetical cognition
+is possible only as the expression of the formal conditions of a
+possible experience; and that the validity of all principles depends
+upon their immanence in the field of experience, that is, their
+relation to objects of empirical cognition or phenomena. Thus all
+transcendental procedure in reference to speculative theology is
+without result.
+
+If any one prefers doubting the conclusiveness of the proofs of
+our analytic to losing the persuasion of the validity of these old
+and time honoured arguments, he at least cannot decline answering the
+question--how he can pass the limits of all possible experience by
+the help of mere ideas. If he talks of new arguments, or of improvements
+upon old arguments, I request him to spare me. There is certainly no
+great choice in this sphere of discussion, as all speculative
+arguments must at last look for support to the ontological, and I
+have, therefore, very little to fear from the argumentative
+fecundity of the dogmatical defenders of a non-sensuous reason.
+Without looking upon myself as a remarkably combative person, I
+shall not decline the challenge to detect the fallacy and destroy
+the pretensions of every attempt of speculative theology. And yet
+the hope of better fortune never deserts those who are accustomed to
+the dogmatical mode of procedure. I shall, therefore, restrict
+myself to the simple and equitable demand that such reasoners will
+demonstrate, from the nature of the human mind as well as from that
+of the other sources of knowledge, how we are to proceed to extend
+our cognition completely a priori, and to carry it to that point where
+experience abandons us, and no means exist of guaranteeing the
+objective reality of our conceptions. In whatever way the
+understanding may have attained to a conception, the existence of
+the object of the conception cannot be discovered in it by analysis,
+because the cognition of the existence of the object depends upon
+the object's being posited and given in itself apart from the
+conception. But it is utterly impossible to go beyond our
+conception, without the aid of experience--which presents to the
+mind nothing but phenomena, or to attain by the help of mere
+conceptions to a conviction of the existence of new kinds of objects
+or supernatural beings.
+
+But although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient to
+demonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being, it is of the highest
+utility in correcting our conception of this being--on the supposition
+that we can attain to the cognition of it by some other means--in
+making it consistent with itself and with all other conceptions of
+intelligible objects, clearing it from all that is incompatible with
+the conception of an ens summun, and eliminating from it all
+limitations or admixtures of empirical elements.
+
+Transcendental theology is still therefore, notwithstanding its
+objective insufficiency, of importance in a negative respect; it is
+useful as a test of the procedure of reason when engaged with pure
+ideas, no other than a transcendental standard being in this case
+admissible. For if, from a practical point of view, the hypothesis
+of a Supreme and All-sufficient Being is to maintain its validity
+without opposition, it must be of the highest importance to define
+this conception in a correct and rigorous manner--as the
+transcendental conception of a necessary being, to eliminate all
+phenomenal elements (anthropomorphism in its most extended
+signification), and at the same time to overflow all contradictory
+assertions--be they atheistic, deistic, or anthropomorphic. This is
+of course very easy; as the same arguments which demonstrated the
+inability of human reason to affirm the existence of a Supreme Being
+must be alike sufficient to prove the invalidity of its denial. For
+it is impossible to gain from the pure speculation of reason
+demonstration that there exists no Supreme Being, as the ground of
+all that exists, or that this being possesses none of those properties
+which we regard as analogical with the dynamical qualities of a
+thinking being, or that, as the anthropomorphists would have us
+believe, it is subject to all the limitations which sensibility
+imposes upon those intelligences which exist in the world of
+experience.
+
+A Supreme Being is, therefore, for the speculative reason, a mere
+ideal, though a faultless one--a conception which perfects and
+crowns the system of human cognition, but the objective reality of
+which can neither be proved nor disproved by pure reason. If this
+defect is ever supplied by a moral theology, the problematic
+transcendental theology which has preceded, will have been at least
+serviceable as demonstrating the mental necessity existing for the
+conception, by the complete determination of it which it has
+furnished, and the ceaseless testing of the conclusions of a reason
+often deceived by sense, and not always in harmony with its own ideas.
+The attributes of necessity, infinitude, unity, existence apart from
+the world (and not as a world soul), eternity (free from conditions
+of time), omnipresence (free from conditions of space), omnipotence,
+and others, are pure transcendental predicates; and thus the
+accurate conception of a Supreme Being, which every theology requires,
+is furnished by transcendental theology alone.
+
+
+
+APPENDIX.
+
+Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason.
+
+The result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only
+confirms the truth of what we have already proved in our
+Transcendental Analytic, namely, that all inferences which would
+lead us beyond the limits of experience are fallacious and groundless,
+but it at the same time teaches us this important lesson, that human
+reason has a natural inclination to overstep these limits, and that
+transcendental ideas are as much the natural property of the reason
+as categories are of the understanding. There exists this difference,
+however, that while the categories never mislead us, outward objects
+being always in perfect harmony therewith, ideas are the parents of
+irresistible illusions, the severest and most subtle criticism being
+required to save us from the fallacies which they induce.
+
+Whatever is grounded in the nature of our powers will be found to be
+in harmony with the final purpose and proper employment of these
+powers, when once we have discovered their true direction and aim.
+We are entitled to suppose, therefore, that there exists a mode of
+employing transcendental ideas which is proper and immanent; although,
+when we mistake their meaning, and regard them as conceptions of
+actual things, their mode of application is transcendent and delusive.
+For it is not the idea itself, but only the employment of the idea
+in relation to possible experience, that is transcendent or
+immanent. An idea is employed transcendently, when it is applied to
+an object falsely believed to be adequate with and to correspond to
+it; imminently, when it is applied solely to the employment of the
+understanding in the sphere of experience. Thus all errors of
+subreptio--of misapplication, are to be ascribed to defects of
+judgement, and not to understanding or reason.
+
+Reason never has an immediate relation to an object; it relates
+immediately to the understanding alone. It is only through the
+understanding that it can be employed in the field of experience. It
+does not form conceptions of objects, it merely arranges them and
+gives to them that unity which they are capable of possessing when
+the sphere of their application has been extended as widely as possible.
+Reason avails itself of the conception of the understanding for the
+sole purpose of producing totality in the different series. This
+totality the understanding does not concern itself with; its only
+occupation is the connection of experiences, by which series of
+conditions in accordance with conceptions are established. The
+object of reason is, therefore, the understanding and its proper
+destination. As the latter brings unity into the diversity of
+objects by means of its conceptions, so the former brings unity into
+the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas; as it sets the final
+aim of a collective unity to the operations of the understanding,
+which without this occupies itself with a distributive unity alone.
+
+I accordingly maintain that transcendental ideas can never be
+employed as constitutive ideas, that they cannot be conceptions of
+objects, and that, when thus considered, they assume a fallacious
+and dialectical character. But, on the other hand, they are capable
+of an admirable and indispensably necessary application to objects--as
+regulative ideas, directing the understanding to a certain aim, the
+guiding lines towards which all its laws follow, and in which they
+all meet in one point. This point--though a mere idea (focus imaginarius),
+that is, not a point from which the conceptions of the understanding
+do really proceed, for it lies beyond the sphere of possible
+experience--serves, notwithstanding, to give to these conceptions
+the greatest possible unity combined with the greatest possible
+extension. Hence arises the natural illusion which induces us to
+believe that these lines proceed from an object which lies out of
+the sphere of empirical cognition, just as objects reflected in a
+mirror appear to be behind it. But this illusion--which we may
+hinder from imposing upon us--is necessary and unavoidable, if we
+desire to see, not only those objects which lie before us, but those
+which are at a great distance behind us; that is to say, when, in
+the present case, we direct the aims of the understanding, beyond
+every given experience, towards an extension as great as can
+possibly be attained.
+
+If we review our cognitions in their entire extent, we shall find
+that the peculiar business of reason is to arrange them into a system,
+that is to say, to give them connection according to a principle. This
+unity presupposes an idea--the idea of the form of a whole (of
+cognition), preceding the determinate cognition of the parts, and
+containing the conditions which determine a priori to every part its
+place and relation to the other parts of the whole system. This
+idea, accordingly, demands complete unity in the cognition of the
+understanding--not the unity of a contingent aggregate, but that of
+a system connected according to necessary laws. It cannot be
+affirmed with propriety that this idea is a conception of an object;
+it is merely a conception of the complete unity of the conceptions
+of objects, in so far as this unity is available to the
+understanding as a rule. Such conceptions of reason are not derived
+from nature; on the contrary, we employ them for the interrogation
+and investigation of nature, and regard our cognition as defective
+so long as it is not adequate to them. We admit that such a thing as
+pure earth, pure water, or pure air, is not to be discovered. And yet
+we require these conceptions (which have their origin in the reason,
+so far as regards their absolute purity and completeness) for the purpose
+of determining the share which each of these natural causes has in
+every phenomenon. Thus the different kinds of matter are all referred
+to earths, as mere weight; to salts and inflammable bodies, as pure
+force; and finally, to water and air, as the vehicula of the former,
+or the machines employed by them in their operations--for the
+purpose of explaining the chemical action and reaction of bodies in
+accordance with the idea of a mechanism. For, although not actually
+so expressed, the influence of such ideas of reason is very observable
+in the procedure of natural philosophers.
+
+If reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the
+general, and if the general be certain in se and given, it is only
+necessary that the judgement should subsume the particular under the
+general, the particular being thus necessarily determined. I shall
+term this the demonstrative or apodeictic employment of reason. If,
+however, the general is admitted as problematical only, and is a
+mere idea, the particular case is certain, but the universality of
+the rule which applies to this particular case remains a problem.
+Several particular cases, the certainty of which is beyond doubt,
+are then taken and examined, for the purpose of discovering whether
+the rule is applicable to them; and if it appears that all the
+particular cases which can be collected follow from the rule, its
+universality is inferred, and at the same time, all the causes which
+have not, or cannot be presented to our observation, are concluded
+to be of the same character with those which we have observed. This
+I shall term the hypothetical employment of the reason.
+
+The hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas employed
+as problematical conceptions is properly not constitutive. That is
+to say, if we consider the subject strictly, the truth of the rule,
+which has been employed as an hypothesis, does not follow from the
+use that is made of it by reason. For how can we know all the possible
+cases that may arise? some of which may, however, prove exceptions
+to the universality of the rule. This employment of reason is merely
+regulative, and its sole aim is the introduction of unity into the
+aggregate of our particular cognitions, and thereby the
+approximating of the rule to universality.
+
+The object of the hypothetical employment of reason is therefore the
+systematic unity of cognitions; and this unity is the criterion of
+the truth of a rule. On the other hand, this systematic unity--as a
+mere idea--is in fact merely a unity projected, not to be regarded
+as given, but only in the light of a problem--a problem which serves,
+however, as a principle for the various and particular exercise of
+the understanding in experience, directs it with regard to those cases
+which are not presented to our observation, and introduces harmony
+and consistency into all its operations.
+
+All that we can be certain of from the above considerations is
+that this systematic unity is a logical principle, whose aim is to
+assist the understanding, where it cannot of itself attain to rules,
+by means of ideas, to bring all these various rules under one
+principle, and thus to ensure the most complete consistency and
+connection that can be attained. But the assertion that objects and
+the understanding by which they are cognized are so constituted as
+to be determined to systematic unity, that this may be postulated a
+priori, without any reference to the interest of reason, and that we
+are justified in declaring all possible cognitions--empirical and
+others--to possess systematic unity, and to be subject to general
+principles from which, notwithstanding their various character, they
+are all derivable such an assertion can be founded only upon a
+transcendental principle of reason, which would render this systematic
+unity not subjectively and logically--in its character of a method,
+but objectively necessary.
+
+We shall illustrate this by an example. The conceptions of the
+understanding make us acquainted, among many other kinds of unity,
+with that of the causality of a substance, which is termed power.
+The different phenomenal manifestations of the same substance appear
+at first view to be so very dissimilar that we are inclined to
+assume the existence of just as many different powers as there are
+different effects--as, in the case of the human mind, we have feeling,
+consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, analysis, pleasure, desire
+and so on. Now we are required by a logical maxim to reduce these
+differences to as small a number as possible, by comparing them and
+discovering the hidden identity which exists. We must inquire, for
+example, whether or not imagination (connected with consciousness),
+memory, wit, and analysis are not merely different forms of
+understanding and reason. The idea of a fundamental power, the
+existence of which no effort of logic can assure us of, is the problem
+to be solved, for the systematic representation of the existing
+variety of powers. The logical principle of reason requires us to
+produce as great a unity as is possible in the system of our
+cognitions; and the more the phenomena of this and the other power
+are found to be identical, the more probable does it become, that they
+are nothing but different manifestations of one and the same power,
+which may be called, relatively speaking, a fundamental power. And
+so with other cases.
+
+These relatively fundamental powers must again be compared with each
+other, to discover, if possible, the one radical and absolutely
+fundamental power of which they are but the manifestations. But this
+unity is purely hypothetical. It is not maintained, that this unity
+does really exist, but that we must, in the interest of reason, that
+is, for the establishment of principles for the various rules
+presented by experience, try to discover and introduce it, so far as
+is practicable, into the sphere of our cognitions.
+
+But the transcendental employment of the understanding would lead us
+to believe that this idea of a fundamental power is not problematical,
+but that it possesses objective reality, and thus the systematic unity
+of the various powers or forces in a substance is demanded by the
+understanding and erected into an apodeictic or necessary principle.
+For, without having attempted to discover the unity of the various
+powers existing in nature, nay, even after all our attempts have
+failed, we notwithstanding presuppose that it does exist, and may
+be, sooner or later, discovered. And this reason does, not only, as
+in the case above adduced, with regard to the unity of substance, but
+where many substances, although all to a certain extent homogeneous,
+are discoverable, as in the case of matter in general. Here also
+does reason presuppose the existence of the systematic unity of
+various powers--inasmuch as particular laws of nature are
+subordinate to general laws; and parsimony in principles is not merely
+an economical principle of reason, but an essential law of nature.
+
+We cannot understand, in fact, how a logical principle of unity
+can of right exist, unless we presuppose a transcendental principle,
+by which such a systematic unit--as a property of objects
+themselves--is regarded as necessary a priori. For with what right
+can reason, in its logical exercise, require us to regard the variety
+of forces which nature displays, as in effect a disguised unity, and
+to deduce them from one fundamental force or power, when she is free
+to admit that it is just as possible that all forces should be
+different in kind, and that a systematic unity is not conformable to
+the design of nature? In this view of the case, reason would be
+proceeding in direct opposition to her own destination, by setting
+as an aim an idea which entirely conflicts with the procedure and
+arrangement of nature. Neither can we assert that reason has
+previously inferred this unity from the contingent nature of
+phenomena. For the law of reason which requires us to seek for this
+unity is a necessary law, inasmuch as without it we should not possess
+a faculty of reason, nor without reason a consistent and
+self-accordant mode of employing the understanding, nor, in the
+absence of this, any proper and sufficient criterion of empirical
+truth. In relation to this criterion, therefore, we must suppose the
+idea of the systematic unity of nature to possess objective validity
+and necessity.
+
+We find this transcendental presupposition lurking in different
+forms in the principles of philosophers, although they have neither
+recognized it nor confessed to themselves its presence. That the
+diversities of individual things do not exclude identity of species,
+that the various species must be considered as merely different
+determinations of a few genera, and these again as divisions of
+still higher races, and so on--that, accordingly, a certain systematic
+unity of all possible empirical conceptions, in so far as they can
+be deduced from higher and more general conceptions, must be sought
+for, is a scholastic maxim or logical principle, without which
+reason could not be employed by us. For we can infer the particular
+from the general, only in so far as general properties of things
+constitute the foundation upon which the particular rest.
+
+That the same unity exists in nature is presupposed by
+philosophers in the well-known scholastic maxim, which forbids us
+unnecessarily to augment the number of entities or principles (entia
+praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda). This maxim asserts
+that nature herself assists in the establishment of this unity of
+reason, and that the seemingly infinite diversity of phenomena
+should not deter us from the expectation of discovering beneath this
+diversity a unity of fundamental properties, of which the aforesaid
+variety is but a more or less determined form. This unity, although
+a mere idea, thinkers have found it necessary rather to moderate the
+desire than to encourage it. It was considered a great step when
+chemists were able to reduce all salts to two main genera--acids and
+alkalis; and they regard this difference as itself a mere variety,
+or different manifestation of one and the same fundamental material.
+The different kinds of earths (stones and even metals) chemists have
+endeavoured to reduce to three, and afterwards to two; but still,
+not content with this advance, they cannot but think that behind these
+diversities there lurks but one genus--nay, that even salts and earths
+have a common principle. It might be conjectured that this is merely
+an economical plan of reason, for the purpose of sparing itself
+trouble, and an attempt of a purely hypothetical character, which,
+when successful, gives an appearance of probability to the principle
+of explanation employed by the reason. But a selfish purpose of this
+kind is easily to be distinguished from the idea, according to which
+every one presupposes that this unity is in accordance with the laws
+of nature, and that reason does not in this case request, but
+requires, although we are quite unable to determine the proper
+limits of this unity.
+
+If the diversity existing in phenomena--a diversity not of form (for
+in this they may be similar) but of content--were so great that the
+subtlest human reason could never by comparison discover in them the
+least similarity (which is not impossible), in this case the logical
+law of genera would be without foundation, the conception of a
+genus, nay, all general conceptions would be impossible, and the
+faculty of the understanding, the exercise of which is restricted to
+the world of conceptions, could not exist. The logical principle of
+genera, accordingly, if it is to be applied to nature (by which I mean
+objects presented to our senses), presupposes a transcendental
+principle. In accordance with this principle, homogeneity is
+necessarily presupposed in the variety of phenomena (although we are
+unable to determine a priori the degree of this homogeneity),
+because without it no empirical conceptions, and consequently no
+experience, would be possible.
+
+The logical principle of genera, which demands identity in
+phenomena, is balanced by another principle--that of species, which
+requires variety and diversity in things, notwithstanding their
+accordance in the same genus, and directs the understanding to
+attend to the one no less than to the other. This principle (of the
+faculty of distinction) acts as a check upon the reason and reason
+exhibits in this respect a double and conflicting interest--on the
+one hand, the interest in the extent (the interest of generality) in
+relation to genera; on the other, that of the content (the interest
+of individuality) in relation to the variety of species. In the former
+case, the understanding cogitates more under its conceptions, in the
+latter it cogitates more in them. This distinction manifests itself
+likewise in the habits of thought peculiar to natural philosophers,
+some of whom--the remarkably speculative heads--may be said to be
+hostile to heterogeneity in phenomena, and have their eyes always
+fixed on the unity of genera, while others--with a strong empirical
+tendency--aim unceasingly at the analysis of phenomena, and almost
+destroy in us the hope of ever being able to estimate the character
+of these according to general principles.
+
+The latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical
+principle, the aim of which is the systematic completeness of all
+cognitions. This principle authorizes me, beginning at the genus, to
+descend to the various and diverse contained under it; and in this
+way extension, as in the former case unity, is assured to the system.
+For if we merely examine the sphere of the conception which
+indicates a genus, we cannot discover how far it is possible to
+proceed in the division of that sphere; just as it is impossible, from
+the consideration of the space occupied by matter, to determine how
+far we can proceed in the division of it. Hence every genus must
+contain different species, and these again different subspecies; and
+as each of the latter must itself contain a sphere (must be of a
+certain extent, as a conceptus communis), reason demands that no
+species or sub-species is to be considered as the lowest possible.
+For a species or sub-species, being always a conception, which contains
+only what is common to a number of different things, does not
+completely determine any individual thing, or relate immediately to
+it, and must consequently contain other conceptions, that is, other
+sub-species under it. This law of specification may be thus expressed:
+entium varietates non temere sunt minuendae.
+
+But it is easy to see that this logical law would likewise be
+without sense or application, were it not based upon a
+transcendental law of specification, which certainly does not
+require that the differences existing phenomena should be infinite
+in number, for the logical principle, which merely maintains the
+indeterminateness of the logical sphere of a conception, in relation
+to its possible division, does not authorize this statement; while
+it does impose upon the understanding the duty of searching for
+subspecies to every species, and minor differences in every
+difference. For, were there no lower conceptions, neither could
+there be any higher. Now the understanding cognizes only by means of
+conceptions; consequently, how far soever it may proceed in
+division, never by mere intuition, but always by lower and lower
+conceptions. The cognition of phenomena in their complete
+determination (which is possible only by means of the understanding)
+requires an unceasingly continued specification of conceptions, and
+a progression to ever smaller differences, of which abstraction bad
+been made in the conception of the species, and still more in that
+of the genus.
+
+This law of specification cannot be deduced from experience; it
+can never present us with a principle of so universal an
+application. Empirical specification very soon stops in its
+distinction of diversities, and requires the guidance of the
+transcendental law, as a principle of the reason--a law which
+imposes on us the necessity of never ceasing in our search for
+differences, even although these may not present themselves to the
+senses. That absorbent earths are of different kinds could only be
+discovered by obeying the anticipatory law of reason, which imposes
+upon the understanding the task of discovering the differences
+existing between these earths, and supposes that nature is richer in
+substances than our senses would indicate. The faculty of the
+understanding belongs to us just as much under the presupposition of
+differences in the objects of nature, as under the condition that
+these objects are homogeneous, because we could not possess
+conceptions, nor make any use of our understanding, were not the
+phenomena included under these conceptions in some respects
+dissimilar, as well as similar, in their character.
+
+Reason thus prepares the sphere of the understanding for the
+operations of this faculty: 1. By the principle of the homogeneity
+of the diverse in higher genera; 2. By the principle of the variety
+of the homogeneous in lower species; and, to complete the systematic
+unity, it adds, 3. A law of the affinity of all conceptions which
+prescribes a continuous transition from one species to every other
+by the gradual increase of diversity. We may term these the principles
+of the homogeneity, the specification, and the continuity of forms.
+The latter results from the union of the two former, inasmuch as we
+regard the systematic connection as complete in thought, in the ascent
+to higher genera, as well as in the descent to lower species. For
+all diversities must be related to each other, as they all spring from
+one highest genus, descending through the different gradations of a
+more and more extended determination.
+
+We may illustrate the systematic unity produced by the three logical
+principles in the following manner. Every conception may be regarded
+as a point, which, as the standpoint of a spectator, has a certain
+horizon, which may be said to enclose a number of things that may be
+viewed, so to speak, from that centre. Within this horizon there
+must be an infinite number of other points, each of which has its
+own horizon, smaller and more circumscribed; in other words, every
+species contains sub-species, according to the principle of
+specification, and the logical horizon consists of smaller horizons
+(subspecies), but not of points (individuals), which possess no
+extent. But different horizons or genera, which include under them
+so many conceptions, may have one common horizon, from which, as
+from a mid-point, they may be surveyed; and we may proceed thus,
+till we arrive at the highest genus, or universal and true horizon,
+which is determined by the highest conception, and which contains
+under itself all differences and varieties, as genera, species, and
+subspecies.
+
+To this highest standpoint I am conducted by the law of homogeneity,
+as to all lower and more variously-determined conceptions by the law
+of specification. Now as in this way there exists no void in the whole
+extent of all possible conceptions, and as out of the sphere of
+these the mind can discover nothing, there arises from the
+presupposition of the universal horizon above mentioned, and its
+complete division, the principle: Non datur vacuum formarum. This
+principle asserts that there are not different primitive and highest
+genera, which stand isolated, so to speak, from each other, but all
+the various genera are mere divisions and limitations of one highest
+and universal genus; and hence follows immediately the principle:
+Datur continuum formarum. This principle indicates that all
+differences of species limit each other, and do not admit of
+transition from one to another by a saltus, but only through smaller
+degrees of the difference between the one species and the other. In
+one word, there are no species or sub-species which (in the view of
+reason) are the nearest possible to each other; intermediate species
+or sub-species being always possible, the difference of which from
+each of the former is always smaller than the difference existing
+between these.
+
+The first law, therefore, directs us to avoid the notion that
+there exist different primal genera, and enounces the fact of
+perfect homogeneity; the second imposes a check upon this tendency
+to unity and prescribes the distinction of sub-species, before
+proceeding to apply our general conceptions to individuals. The
+third unites both the former, by enouncing the fact of homogeneity
+as existing even in the most various diversity, by means of the
+gradual transition from one species to another. Thus it indicates a
+relationship between the different branches or species, in so far as
+they all spring from the same stem.
+
+But this logical law of the continuum specierum (formarum logicarum)
+presupposes a transcendental principle (lex continui in natura),
+without which the understanding might be led into error, by
+following the guidance of the former, and thus perhaps pursuing a path
+contrary to that prescribed by nature. This law must, consequently,
+be based upon pure transcendental, and not upon empirical,
+considerations. For, in the latter case, it would come later than
+the system; whereas it is really itself the parent of all that is
+systematic in our cognition of nature. These principles are not mere
+hypotheses employed for the purpose of experimenting upon nature;
+although when any such connection is discovered, it forms a solid
+ground for regarding the hypothetical unity as valid in the sphere
+of nature--and thus they are in this respect not without their use.
+But we go farther, and maintain that it is manifest that these
+principles of parsimony in fundamental causes, variety in effects,
+and affinity in phenomena, are in accordance both with reason and
+nature, and that they are not mere methods or plans devised for the
+purpose of assisting us in our observation of the external world.
+
+But it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to
+which no adequate object can be discovered in experience. And this
+for two reasons. First, because the species in nature are really
+divided, and hence form quanta discreta; and, if the gradual
+progression through their affinity were continuous, the intermediate
+members lying between two given species must be infinite in number,
+which is impossible. Secondly, because we cannot make any
+determinate empirical use of this law, inasmuch as it does not present
+us with any criterion of affinity which could aid us in determining
+how far we ought to pursue the graduation of differences: it merely
+contains a general indication that it is our duty to seek for and,
+if possible, to discover them.
+
+When we arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order
+conformable to their employment in experience, they will stand thus:
+Variety, Affinity, Unity, each of them, as ideas, being taken in the
+highest degree of their completeness. Reason presupposes the existence
+of cognitions of the understanding, which have a direct relation to
+experience, and aims at the ideal unity of these cognitions--a unity
+which far transcends all experience or empirical notions. The affinity
+of the diverse, notwithstanding the differences existing between its
+parts, has a relation to things, but a still closer one to the mere
+properties and powers of things. For example, imperfect experience
+may represent the orbits of the planets as circular. But we discover
+variations from this course, and we proceed to suppose that the
+planets revolve in a path which, if not a circle, is of a character
+very similar to it. That is to say, the movements of those planets
+which do not form a circle will approximate more or less to the
+properties of a circle, and probably form an ellipse. The paths of
+comets exhibit still greater variations, for, so far as our
+observation extends, they do not return upon their own course in a
+circle or ellipse. But we proceed to the conjecture that comets
+describe a parabola, a figure which is closely allied to the
+ellipse. In fact, a parabola is merely an ellipse, with its longer
+axis produced to an indefinite extent. Thus these principles conduct
+us to a unity in the genera of the forms of these orbits, and,
+proceeding farther, to a unity as regards the cause of the motions
+of the heavenly bodies--that is, gravitation. But we go on extending
+our conquests over nature, and endeavour to explain all seeming
+deviations from these rules, and even make additions to our system
+which no experience can ever substantiate--for example, the theory,
+in affinity with that of ellipses, of hyperbolic paths of comets,
+pursuing which, these bodies leave our solar system and, passing
+from sun to sun, unite the most distant parts of the infinite
+universe, which is held together by the same moving power.
+
+The most remarkable circumstance connected with these principles
+is that they seem to be transcendental, and, although only
+containing ideas for the guidance of the empirical exercise of reason,
+and although this empirical employment stands to these ideas in an
+asymptotic relation alone (to use a mathematical term), that is,
+continually approximate, without ever being able to attain to them,
+they possess, notwithstanding, as a priori synthetical propositions,
+objective though undetermined validity, and are available as rules
+for possible experience. In the elaboration of our experience, they
+may also be employed with great advantage, as heuristic [Footnote:
+From the Greek, eurhioko.] principles. A transcendental deduction of
+them cannot be made; such a deduction being always impossible in the
+case of ideas, as has been already shown.
+
+We distinguished, in the Transcendental Analytic, the dynamical
+principles of the understanding, which are regulative principles of
+intuition, from the mathematical, which are constitutive principles
+of intuition. These dynamical laws are, however, constitutive in relation
+to experience, inasmuch as they render the conceptions without which
+experience could not exist possible a priori. But the principles of
+pure reason cannot be constitutive even in regard to empirical
+conceptions, because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be
+discovered, and they cannot therefore have an object in concreto. Now,
+if I grant that they cannot be employed in the sphere of experience,
+as constitutive principles, how shall I secure for them employment
+and objective validity as regulative principles, and in what way can
+they be so employed?
+
+The understanding is the object of reason, as sensibility is the
+object of the understanding. The production of systematic unity in
+all the empirical operations of the understanding is the proper occupation
+of reason; just as it is the business of the understanding to
+connect the various content of phenomena by means of conceptions,
+and subject them to empirical laws. But the operations of the
+understanding are, without the schemata of sensibility,
+undetermined; and, in the same manner, the unity of reason is
+perfectly undetermined as regards the conditions under which, and
+the extent to which, the understanding ought to carry the systematic
+connection of its conceptions. But, although it is impossible to
+discover in intuition a schema for the complete systematic unity of
+all the conceptions of the understanding, there must be some
+analogon of this schema. This analogon is the idea of the maximum of
+the division and the connection of our cognition in one principle.
+For we may have a determinate notion of a maximum and an absolutely
+perfect, all the restrictive conditions which are connected with an
+indeterminate and various content having been abstracted. Thus the
+idea of reason is analogous with a sensuous schema, with this
+difference, that the application of the categories to the schema of
+reason does not present a cognition of any object (as is the case with
+the application of the categories to sensuous schemata), but merely
+provides us with a rule or principle for the systematic unity of the
+exercise of the understanding. Now, as every principle which imposes
+upon the exercise of the understanding a priori compliance with the
+rule of systematic unity also relates, although only in an indirect
+manner, to an object of experience, the principles of pure reason will
+also possess objective reality and validity in relation to experience.
+But they will not aim at determining our knowledge in regard to any
+empirical object; they will merely indicate the procedure, following
+which the empirical and determinate exercise of the understanding
+may be in complete harmony and connection with itself--a result
+which is produced by its being brought into harmony with the principle
+of systematic unity, so far as that is possible, and deduced from it.
+
+I term all subjective principles, which are not derived from
+observation of the constitution of an object, but from the interest
+which Reason has in producing a certain completeness in her
+cognition of that object, maxims of reason. Thus there are maxims of
+speculative reason, which are based solely upon its speculative
+interest, although they appear to be objective principles.
+
+When principles which are really regulative are regarded as
+constitutive, and employed as objective principles, contradictions
+must arise; but if they are considered as mere maxims, there is no
+room for contradictions of any kind, as they then merely indicate
+the different interests of reason, which occasion differences in the
+mode of thought. In effect, Reason has only one single interest, and
+the seeming contradiction existing between her maxims merely indicates
+a difference in, and a reciprocal limitation of, the methods by
+which this interest is satisfied.
+
+This reasoner has at heart the interest of diversity--in
+accordance with the principle of specification; another, the
+interest of unity--in accordance with the principle of aggregation.
+Each believes that his judgement rests upon a thorough insight into
+the subject he is examining, and yet it has been influenced solely
+by a greater or less degree of adherence to some one of the two
+principles, neither of which are objective, but originate solely
+from the interest of reason, and on this account to be termed maxims
+rather than principles. When I observe intelligent men disputing about
+the distinctive characteristics of men, animals, or plants, and even
+of minerals, those on the one side assuming the existence of certain
+national characteristics, certain well-defined and hereditary
+distinctions of family, race, and so on, while the other side maintain
+that nature has endowed all races of men with the same faculties and
+dispositions, and that all differences are but the result of
+external and accidental circumstances--I have only to consider for
+a moment the real nature of the subject of discussion, to arrive at
+the conclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to judge of,
+and that there is little probability of either party being able to
+speak from a perfect insight into and understanding of the nature of
+the subject itself. Both have, in reality, been struggling for the
+twofold interest of reason; the one maintaining the one interest,
+the other the other. But this difference between the maxims of
+diversity and unity may easily be reconciled and adjusted; although,
+so long as they are regarded as objective principles, they must
+occasion not only contradictions and polemic, but place hinderances
+in the way of the advancement of truth, until some means is discovered
+of reconciling these conflicting interests, and bringing reason into
+union and harmony with itself.
+
+The same is the case with the so-called law discovered by Leibnitz, and
+supported with remarkable ability by Bonnet--the law of the continuous
+gradation of created beings, which is nothing more than an inference
+from the principle of affinity; for observation and study of the order
+of nature could never present it to the mind as an objective truth. The
+steps of this ladder, as they appear in experience, are too far apart
+from each other, and the so-called petty differences between different
+kinds of animals are in nature commonly so wide separations that no
+confidence can be placed in such views (particularly when we reflect on
+the great variety of things, and the ease with which we can discover
+resemblances), and no faith in the laws which are said to express the
+aims and purposes of nature. On the other hand, the method of
+investigating the order of nature in the light of this principle, and
+the maxim which requires us to regard this order--it being still
+undetermined how far it extends--as really existing in nature, is
+beyond doubt a legitimate and excellent principle of reason--a
+principle which extends farther than any experience or observation of
+ours and which, without giving us any positive knowledge of anything in
+the region of experience, guides us to the goal of systematic unity.
+
+
+
+Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason.
+
+The ideas of pure reason cannot be, of themselves and in their own
+nature, dialectical; it is from their misemployment alone that
+fallacies and illusions arise. For they originate in the nature of
+reason itself, and it is impossible that this supreme tribunal for
+all the rights and claims of speculation should be itself undeserving
+of confidence and promotive of error. It is to be expected, therefore,
+that these ideas have a genuine and legitimate aim. It is true, the
+mob of sophists raise against reason the cry of inconsistency and
+contradiction, and affect to despise the government of that faculty,
+because they cannot understand its constitution, while it is to its
+beneficial influences alone that they owe the position and the
+intelligence which enable them to criticize and to blame its
+procedure.
+
+We cannot employ an a priori conception with certainty, until we
+have made a transcendental deduction therefore. The ideas of pure
+reason do not admit of the same kind of deduction as the categories.
+But if they are to possess the least objective validity, and to
+represent anything but mere creations of thought (entia rationis
+ratiocinantis), a deduction of them must be possible. This deduction
+will complete the critical task imposed upon pure reason; and it is
+to this part Of our labours that we now proceed.
+
+There is a great difference between a thing's being presented to the
+mind as an object in an absolute sense, or merely as an ideal
+object. In the former case I employ my conceptions to determine the
+object; in the latter case nothing is present to the mind but a mere
+schema, which does not relate directly to an object, not even in a
+hypothetical sense, but which is useful only for the purpose of
+representing other objects to the mind, in a mediate and indirect
+manner, by means of their relation to the idea in the intellect.
+Thus I say the conception of a supreme intelligence is a mere idea;
+that is to say, its objective reality does not consist in the fact
+that it has an immediate relation to an object (for in this sense we
+have no means of establishing its objective validity), it is merely
+a schema constructed according to the necessary conditions of the
+unity of reason--the schema of a thing in general, which is useful
+towards the production of the highest degree of systematic unity in
+the empirical exercise of reason, in which we deduce this or that
+object of experience from the imaginary object of this idea, as the
+ground or cause of the said object of experience. In this way, the
+idea is properly a heuristic, and not an ostensive, conception; it
+does not give us any information respecting the constitution of an
+object, it merely indicates how, under the guidance of the idea, we
+ought to investigate the constitution and the relations of objects
+in the world of experience. Now, if it can be shown that the three
+kinds of transcendental ideas (psychological, cosmological, and
+theological), although not relating directly to any object nor
+determining it, do nevertheless, on the supposition of the existence
+of an ideal object, produce systematic unity in the laws of the
+empirical employment of the reason, and extend our empirical
+cognition, without ever being inconsistent or in opposition with it-
+it must be a necessary maxim of reason to regulate its procedure
+according to these ideas. And this forms the transcendental
+deduction of all speculative ideas, not as constitutive principles
+of the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of our experience,
+but as regulative principles of the systematic unity of empirical
+cognition, which is by the aid of these ideas arranged and emended
+within its own proper limits, to an extent unattainable by the
+operation of the principles of the understanding alone.
+
+I shall make this plainer. Guided by the principles involved in
+these ideas, we must, in the first place, so connect all the
+phenomena, actions, and feelings of the mind, as if it were a simple
+substance, which, endowed with personal identity, possesses a
+permanent existence (in this life at least), while its states, among
+which those of the body are to be included as external conditions,
+are in continual change. Secondly, in cosmology, we must investigate
+the conditions of all natural phenomena, internal as well as external,
+as if they belonged to a chain infinite and without any prime or
+supreme member, while we do not, on this account, deny the existence
+of intelligible grounds of these phenomena, although we never employ
+them to explain phenomena, for the simple reason that they are not
+objects of our cognition. Thirdly, in the sphere of theology, we
+must regard the whole system of possible experience as forming an
+absolute, but dependent and sensuously-conditioned unity, and at the
+same time as based upon a sole, supreme, and all-sufficient ground
+existing apart from the world itself--a ground which is a
+self-subsistent, primeval and creative reason, in relation to which
+we so employ our reason in the field of experience, as if all objects
+drew their origin from that archetype of all reason. In other words,
+we ought not to deduce the internal phenomena of the mind from a
+simple thinking substance, but deduce them from each other under the
+guidance of the regulative idea of a simple being; we ought not to
+deduce the phenomena, order, and unity of the universe from a
+supreme intelligence, but merely draw from this idea of a supremely
+wise cause the rules which must guide reason in its connection of
+causes and effects.
+
+Now there is nothing to hinder us from admitting these ideas to
+possess an objective and hyperbolic existence, except the cosmological
+ideas, which lead reason into an antinomy: the psychological and
+theological ideas are not antinomial. They contain no contradiction;
+and how, then, can any one dispute their objective reality, since he
+who denies it knows as little about their possibility as we who
+affirm? And yet, when we wish to admit the existence of a thing, it
+is not sufficient to convince ourselves that there is no positive
+obstacle in the way; for it cannot be allowable to regard mere
+creations of thought, which transcend, though they do not
+contradict, all our conceptions, as real and determinate objects,
+solely upon the authority of a speculative reason striving to
+compass its own aims. They cannot, therefore, be admitted to be real
+in themselves; they can only possess a comparative reality--that of
+a schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all
+cognition. They are to be regarded not as actual things, but as in
+some measure analogous to them. We abstract from the object of the
+idea all the conditions which limit the exercise of our understanding,
+but which, on the other hand, are the sole conditions of our
+possessing a determinate conception of any given thing. And thus we
+cogitate a something, of the real nature of which we have not the
+least conception, but which we represent to ourselves as standing in
+a relation to the whole system of phenomena, analogous to that in
+which phenomena stand to each other.
+
+By admitting these ideal beings, we do not really extend our
+cognitions beyond the objects of possible experience; we extend merely
+the empirical unity of our experience, by the aid of systematic unity,
+the schema of which is furnished by the idea, which is therefore
+valid--not as a constitutive, but as a regulative principle. For
+although we posit a thing corresponding to the idea--a something, an
+actual existence--we do not on that account aim at the extension of
+our cognition by means of transcendent conceptions. This existence
+is purely ideal, and not objective; it is the mere expression of the
+systematic unity which is to be the guide of reason in the field of
+experience. There are no attempts made at deciding what the ground
+of this unity may be, or what the real nature of this imaginary being.
+
+Thus the transcendental and only determinate conception of God,
+which is presented to us by speculative reason, is in the strictest
+sense deistic. In other words, reason does not assure us of the
+objective validity of the conception; it merely gives us the idea of
+something, on which the supreme and necessary unity of all
+experience is based. This something we cannot, following the analogy
+of a real substance, cogitate otherwise than as the cause of all
+things operating in accordance with rational laws, if we regard it
+as an individual object; although we should rest contented with the
+idea alone as a regulative principle of reason, and make no attempt
+at completing the sum of the conditions imposed by thought. This
+attempt is, indeed, inconsistent with the grand aim of complete
+systematic unity in the sphere of cognition--a unity to which no
+bounds are set by reason.
+
+Hence it happens that, admitting a divine being, I can have no
+conception of the internal possibility of its perfection, or of the
+necessity of its existence. The only advantage of this admission is
+that it enables me to answer all other questions relating to the
+contingent, and to give reason the most complete satisfaction as
+regards the unity which it aims at attaining in the world of
+experience. But I cannot satisfy reason with regard to this hypothesis
+itself; and this proves that it is not its intelligence and insight
+into the subject, but its speculative interest alone which induces
+it to proceed from a point lying far beyond the sphere of our
+cognition, for the purpose of being able to consider all objects as
+parts of a systematic whole.
+
+Here a distinction presents itself, in regard to the way in which we
+may cogitate a presupposition--a distinction which is somewhat subtle,
+but of great importance in transcendental philosophy. I may have
+sufficient grounds to admit something, or the existence of
+something, in a relative point of view (suppositio relativa),
+without being justified in admitting it in an absolute sense
+(suppositio absoluta). This distinction is undoubtedly requisite, in
+the case of a regulative principle, the necessity of which we
+recognize, though we are ignorant of the source and cause of that
+necessity, and which we assume to be based upon some ultimate
+ground, for the purpose of being able to cogitate the universality
+of the principle in a more determinate way. For example, I cogitate
+the existence of a being corresponding to a pure transcendental
+idea. But I cannot admit that this being exists absolutely and in
+itself, because all of the conceptions by which I can cogitate an
+object in a determinate manner fall short of assuring me of its
+existence; nay, the conditions of the objective validity of my
+conceptions are excluded by the idea--by the very fact of its being
+an idea. The conceptions of reality, substance, causality, nay, even
+that of necessity in existence, have no significance out of the sphere
+of empirical cognition, and cannot, beyond that sphere, determine any
+object. They may, accordingly, be employed to explain the
+possibility of things in the world of sense, but they are utterly
+inadequate to explain the possibility of the universe itself
+considered as a whole; because in this case the ground of
+explanation must lie out of and beyond the world, and cannot,
+therefore, be an object of possible experience. Now, I may admit the
+existence of an incomprehensible being of this nature--the object of
+a mere idea, relatively to the world of sense; although I have no ground
+to admit its existence absolutely and in itself. For if an idea
+(that of a systematic and complete unity, of which I shall presently
+speak more particularly) lies at the foundation of the most extended
+empirical employment of reason, and if this idea cannot be
+adequately represented in concreto, although it is indispensably
+necessary for the approximation of empirical unity to the highest
+possible degree--I am not only authorized, but compelled, to realize
+this idea, that is, to posit a real object corresponding thereto.
+But I cannot profess to know this object; it is to me merely a
+something, to which, as the ground of systematic unity in cognition,
+I attribute such properties as are analogous to the conceptions employed
+by the understanding in the sphere of experience. Following the
+analogy of the notions of reality, substance, causality, and
+necessity, I cogitate a being, which possesses all these attributes
+in the highest degree; and, as this idea is the offspring of my reason
+alone, I cogitate this being as self-subsistent reason, and as the
+cause of the universe operating by means of ideas of the greatest
+possible harmony and unity. Thus I abstract all conditions that
+would limit my idea, solely for the purpose of rendering systematic
+unity possible in the world of empirical diversity, and thus
+securing the widest possible extension for the exercise of reason in
+that sphere. This I am enabled to do, by regarding all connections
+and relations in the world of sense, as if they were the dispositions
+of a supreme reason, of which our reason is but a faint image. I then
+proceed to cogitate this Supreme Being by conceptions which have,
+properly, no meaning or application, except in the world of sense.
+But as I am authorized to employ the transcendental hypothesis of such
+a being in a relative respect alone, that is, as the substratum of
+the greatest possible unity in experience--I may attribute to a being
+which I regard as distinct from the world, such properties as belong
+solely to the sphere of sense and experience. For I do not desire,
+and am not justified in desiring, to cognize this object of my idea,
+as it exists in itself; for I possess no conceptions sufficient for
+or task, those of reality, substance, causality, nay, even that of
+necessity in existence, losing all significance, and becoming merely
+the signs of conceptions, without content and without applicability,
+when I attempt to carry them beyond the limits of the world of sense.
+I cogitate merely the relation of a perfectly unknown being to the
+greatest possible systematic unity of experience, solely for the purpose
+of employing it as the schema of the regulative principle which directs
+reason in its empirical exercise.
+
+It is evident, at the first view, that we cannot presuppose the
+reality of this transcendental object, by means of the conceptions
+of reality, substance, causality, and so on, because these conceptions
+cannot be applied to anything that is distinct from the world of
+sense. Thus the supposition of a Supreme Being or cause is purely
+relative; it is cogitated only in behalf of the systematic unity of
+experience; such a being is but a something, of whose existence in
+itself we have not the least conception. Thus, too, it becomes
+sufficiently manifest why we required the idea of a necessary being
+in relation to objects given by sense, although we can never have the
+least conception of this being, or of its absolute necessity.
+
+And now we can clearly perceive the result of our transcendental
+dialectic, and the proper aim of the ideas of pure reason--which
+become dialectical solely from misunderstanding and inconsiderateness.
+Pure reason is, in fact, occupied with itself, and not with any
+object. Objects are not presented to it to be embraced in the unity
+of an empirical conception; it is only the cognitions of the
+understanding that are presented to it, for the purpose of receiving
+the unity of a rational conception, that is, of being connected
+according to a principle. The unity of reason is the unity of
+system; and this systematic unity is not an objective principle,
+extending its dominion over objects, but a subjective maxim, extending
+its authority over the empirical cognition of objects. The
+systematic connection which reason gives to the empirical employment
+of the understanding not only advances the extension of that
+employment, but ensures its correctness, and thus the principle of
+a systematic unity of this nature is also objective, although only
+in an indefinite respect (principium vagum). It is not, however, a
+constitutive principle, determining an object to which it directly
+relates; it is merely a regulative principle or maxim, advancing and
+strengthening the empirical exercise of reason, by the opening up of
+new paths of which the understanding is ignorant, while it never
+conflicts with the laws of its exercise in the sphere of experience.
+
+But reason cannot cogitate this systematic unity, without at the
+same time cogitating an object of the idea--an object that cannot be
+presented in any experience, which contains no concrete example of
+a complete systematic unity. This being (ens rationis ratiocinatae)
+is therefore a mere idea and is not assumed to be a thing which is
+real absolutely and in itself. On the contrary, it forms merely the
+problematical foundation of the connection which the mind introduces
+among the phenomena of the sensuous world. We look upon this
+connection, in the light of the above-mentioned idea, as if it drew
+its origin from the supposed being which corresponds to the idea.
+And yet all we aim at is the possession of this idea as a secure
+foundation for the systematic unity of experience--a unity
+indispensable to reason, advantageous to the understanding, and
+promotive of the interests of empirical cognition.
+
+We mistake the true meaning of this idea when we regard it as an
+enouncement, or even as a hypothetical declaration of the existence
+of a real thing, which we are to regard as the origin or ground of
+a systematic constitution of the universe. On the contrary, it is left
+completely undetermined what the nature or properties of this
+so-called ground may be. The idea is merely to be adopted as a point
+of view, from which this unity, so essential to reason and so
+beneficial to the understanding, may be regarded as radiating. In
+one word, this transcendental thing is merely the schema of a
+regulative principle, by means of which Reason, so far as in her lies,
+extends the dominion of systematic unity over the whole sphere of
+experience.
+
+The first object of an idea of this kind is the ego, considered
+merely as a thinking nature or soul. If I wish to investigate the
+properties of a thinking being, I must interrogate experience. But
+I find that I can apply none of the categories to this object, the
+schema of these categories, which is the condition of their
+application, being given only in sensuous intuition. But I cannot thus
+attain to the cognition of a systematic unity of all the phenomena
+of the internal sense. Instead, therefore, of an empirical
+conception of what the soul really is, reason takes the conception
+of the empirical unity of all thought, and, by cogitating this unity
+as unconditioned and primitive, constructs the rational conception
+or idea of a simple substance which is in itself unchangeable,
+possessing personal identity, and in connection with other real things
+external to it; in one word, it constructs the idea of a simple
+self-subsistent intelligence. But the real aim of reason in this
+procedure is the attainment of principles of systematic unity for
+the explanation of the phenomena of the soul. That is, reason
+desires to be able to represent all the determinations of the internal
+sense as existing in one subject, all powers as deduced from one
+fundamental power, all changes as mere varieties in the condition of
+a being which is permanent and always the same, and all phenomena in
+space as entirely different in their nature from the procedure of
+thought. Essential simplicity (with the other attributes predicated
+of the ego) is regarded as the mere schema of this regulative
+principle; it is not assumed that it is the actual ground of the
+properties of the soul. For these properties may rest upon quite
+different grounds, of which we are completely ignorant; just as the
+above predicates could not give us any knowledge of the soul as it
+is in itself, even if we regarded them as valid in respect of it,
+inasmuch as they constitute a mere idea, which cannot be represented
+in concreto. Nothing but good can result from a psychological idea
+of this kind, if we only take proper care not to consider it as more
+than an idea; that is, if we regard it as valid merely in relation
+to the employment of reason, in the sphere of the phenomena of the
+soul. Under the guidance of this idea, or principle, no empirical laws
+of corporeal phenomena are called in to explain that which is a
+phenomenon of the internal sense alone; no windy hypotheses of the
+generation, annihilation, and palingenesis of souls are admitted. Thus
+the consideration of this object of the internal sense is kept pure,
+and unmixed with heterogeneous elements; while the investigation of
+reason aims at reducing all the grounds of explanation employed in
+this sphere of knowledge to a single principle. All this is best
+effected, nay, cannot be effected otherwise than by means of such a
+schema, which requires us to regard this ideal thing as an actual
+existence. The psychological idea is, therefore, meaningless and
+inapplicable, except as the schema of a regulative conception. For,
+if I ask whether the soul is not really of a spiritual nature--it is
+a question which has no meaning. From such a conception has been
+abstracted, not merely all corporeal nature, but all nature, that
+is, all the predicates of a possible experience; and consequently,
+all the conditions which enable us to cogitate an object to this
+conception have disappeared. But, if these conditions are absent, it
+is evident that the conception is meaningless.
+
+The second regulative idea of speculative reason is the conception
+of the universe. For nature is properly the only object presented to
+us, in regard to which reason requires regulative principles. Nature
+is twofold--thinking and corporeal nature. To cogitate the latter in
+regard to its internal possibility, that is, to determine the
+application of the categories to it, no idea is required--no
+representation which transcends experience. In this sphere, therefore,
+an idea is impossible, sensuous intuition being our only guide; while,
+in the sphere of psychology, we require the fundamental idea (I),
+which contains a priori a certain form of thought namely, the unity
+of the ego. Pure reason has, therefore, nothing left but nature in
+general, and the completeness of conditions in nature in accordance
+with some principle. The absolute totality of the series of these
+conditions is an idea, which can never be fully realized in the
+empirical exercise of reason, while it is serviceable as a rule for
+the procedure of reason in relation to that totality. It requires
+us, in the explanation of given phenomena (in the regress or ascent
+in the series), to proceed as if the series were infinite in itself,
+that is, were prolonged in indefinitum,; while on the other hand, where
+reason is regarded as itself the determining cause (in the region of
+freedom), we are required to proceed as if we had not before us an
+object of sense, but of the pure understanding. In this latter case,
+the conditions do not exist in the series of phenomena, but may be
+placed quite out of and beyond it, and the series of conditions may
+be regarded as if it had an absolute beginning from an intelligible
+cause. All this proves that the cosmological ideas are nothing but
+regulative principles, and not constitutive; and that their aim is
+not to realize an actual totality in such series. The full discussion
+of this subject will be found in its proper place in the chapter on
+the antinomy of pure reason.
+
+The third idea of pure reason, containing the hypothesis of a
+being which is valid merely as a relative hypothesis, is that of the
+one and all-sufficient cause of all cosmological series, in other
+words, the idea of God. We have not the slightest ground absolutely
+to admit the existence of an object corresponding to this idea; for
+what can empower or authorize us to affirm the existence of a being
+of the highest perfection--a being whose existence is absolutely
+necessary--merely because we possess the conception of such a being?
+The answer is: It is the existence of the world which renders this
+hypothesis necessary. But this answer makes it perfectly evident
+that the idea of this being, like all other speculative ideas, is
+essentially nothing more than a demand upon reason that it shall
+regulate the connection which it and its subordinate faculties
+introduce into the phenomena of the world by principles of
+systematic unity and, consequently, that it shall regard all phenomena
+as originating from one all-embracing being, as the supreme and
+all-sufficient cause. From this it is plain that the only aim of
+reason in this procedure is the establishment of its own formal rule
+for the extension of its dominion in the world of experience; that
+it does not aim at an extension of its cognition beyond the limits
+of experience; and that, consequently, this idea does not contain
+any constitutive principle.
+
+The highest formal unity, which is based upon ideas alone, is the
+unity of all things--a unity in accordance with an aim or purpose;
+and the speculative interest of reason renders it necessary to regard
+all order in the world as if it originated from the intention and
+design of a supreme reason. This principle unfolds to the view of
+reason in the sphere of experience new and enlarged prospects, and
+invites it to connect the phenomena of the world according to
+teleological laws, and in this way to attain to the highest possible
+degree of systematic unity. The hypothesis of a supreme
+intelligence, as the sole cause of the universe--an intelligence which
+has for us no more than an ideal existence--is accordingly always of
+the greatest service to reason. Thus, if we presuppose, in relation
+to the figure of the earth (which is round, but somewhat flattened
+at the poles),* or that of mountains or seas, wise designs on the part
+of an author of the universe, we cannot fail to make, by the light
+of this supposition, a great number of interesting discoveries. If
+we keep to this hypothesis, as a principle which is purely regulative,
+even error cannot be very detrimental. For, in this case, error can
+have no more serious consequences than that, where we expected to
+discover a teleological connection (nexus finalis), only a
+mechanical or physical connection appears. In such a case, we merely
+fail to find the additional form of unity we expected, but we do not
+lose the rational unity which the mind requires in its procedure in
+experience. But even a miscarriage of this sort cannot affect the
+law in its general and teleological relations. For although we may
+convict an anatomist of an error, when he connects the limb of some
+animal with a certain purpose, it is quite impossible to prove in a
+single case that any arrangement of nature, be it what it may, is
+entirely without aim or design. And thus medical physiology, by the
+aid of a principle presented to it by pure reason, extends its very
+limited empirical knowledge of the purposes of the different parts
+of an organized body so far that it may be asserted with the utmost
+confidence, and with the approbation of all reflecting men, that every
+organ or bodily part of an animal has its use and answers a certain
+design. Now, this is a supposition which, if regarded as of a
+constitutive character, goes much farther than any experience or
+observation of ours can justify. Hence it is evident that it is
+nothing more than a regulative principle of reason, which aims at
+the highest degree of systematic unity, by the aid of the idea of a
+causality according to design in a supreme cause--a cause which it
+regards as the highest intelligence.
+
+[*Footnote: The advantages which a circular form, in the case of the
+earth, has over every other, are well known. But few are aware that
+the slight flattening at the poles, which gives it the figure of a
+spheroid, is the only cause which prevents the elevations of continents
+or even of mountains, perhaps thrown up by some internal convulsion,
+from continually altering the position of the axis of the earth--and
+that to some considerable degree in a short time. The great protuberance
+of the earth under the Equator serves to overbalance the impetus of
+all other masses of earth, and thus to preserve the axis of the earth,
+so far as we can observe, in its present position. And yet this wise
+arrangement has been unthinkingly explained from the equilibrium of
+the formerly fluid mass.]
+
+If, however, we neglect this restriction of the idea to a purely
+regulative influence, reason is betrayed into numerous errors. For
+it has then left the ground of experience, in which alone are to be
+found the criteria of truth, and has ventured into the region of the
+incomprehensible and unsearchable, on the heights of which it loses
+its power and collectedness, because it has completely severed its
+connection with experience.
+
+The first error which arises from our employing the idea of a
+Supreme Being as a constitutive (in repugnance to the very nature of
+an idea), and not as a regulative principle, is the error of
+inactive reason (ignava ratio).* We may so term every principle
+which requires us to regard our investigations of nature as absolutely
+complete, and allows reason to cease its inquiries, as if it had fully
+executed its task. Thus the psychological idea of the ego, when
+employed as a constitutive principle for the explanation of the
+phenomena of the soul, and for the extension of our knowledge
+regarding this subject beyond the limits of experience--even to the
+condition of the soul after death--is convenient enough for the
+purposes of pure reason, but detrimental and even ruinous to its
+interests in the sphere of nature and experience. The dogmatizing
+spiritualist explains the unchanging unity of our personality
+through all changes of condition from the unity of a thinking
+substance, the interest which we take in things and events that can
+happen only after our death, from a consciousness of the immaterial
+nature of our thinking subject, and so on. Thus he dispenses with
+all empirical investigations into the cause of these internal
+phenomena, and with all possible explanations of them upon purely
+natural grounds; while, at the dictation of a transcendent reason,
+he passes by the immanent sources of cognition in experience,
+greatly to his own ease and convenience, but to the sacrifice of
+all, genuine insight and intelligence. These prejudicial
+consequences become still more evident, in the case of the
+dogmatical treatment of our idea of a Supreme Intelligence, and the
+theological system of nature (physico-theology) which is falsely based
+upon it. For, in this case, the aims which we observe in nature, and
+often those which we merely fancy to exist, make the investigation
+of causes a very easy task, by directing us to refer such and such
+phenomena immediately to the unsearchable will and counsel of the
+Supreme Wisdom, while we ought to investigate their causes in the
+general laws of the mechanism of matter. We are thus recommended to
+consider the labour of reason as ended, when we have merely
+dispensed with its employment, which is guided surely and safely
+only by the order of nature and the series of changes in the world-
+which are arranged according to immanent and general laws. This
+error may be avoided, if we do not merely consider from the view-point
+of final aims certain parts of nature, such as the division and
+structure of a continent, the constitution and direction of certain
+mountain-chains, or even the organization existing in the vegetable
+and animal kingdoms, but look upon this systematic unity of nature
+in a perfectly general way, in relation to the idea of a Supreme
+Intelligence. If we pursue this advice, we lay as a foundation for
+all investigation the conformity to aims of all phenomena of nature
+in accordance with universal laws, for which no particular arrangement
+of nature is exempt, but only cognized by us with more or less
+difficulty; and we possess a regulative principle of the systematic
+unity of a teleological connection, which we do not attempt to
+anticipate or predetermine. All that we do, and ought to do, is to
+follow out the physico-mechanical connection in nature according to
+general laws, with the hope of discovering, sooner or later, the
+teleological connection also. Thus, and thus only, can the principle
+of final unity aid in the extension of the employment of reason in
+the sphere of experience, without being in any case detrimental to
+its interests.
+
+[*Footnote: This was the term applied by the old dialecticians to a
+sophistical argument, which ran thus: If it is your fate to die of
+this disease, you will die, whether you employ a physician or not.
+Cicero says that this mode of reasoning has received this appellation,
+because, if followed, it puts an end to the employment of reason in
+the affairs of life. For a similar reason, I have applied this designation
+to the sophistical argument of pure reason.]
+
+The second error which arises from the misconception of the
+principle of systematic unity is that of perverted reason (perversa
+ratio, usteron roteron rationis). The idea of systematic unity is
+available as a regulative principle in the connection of phenomena
+according to general natural laws; and, how far soever we have to
+travel upon the path of experience to discover some fact or event,
+this idea requires us to believe that we have approached all the
+more nearly to the completion of its use in the sphere of nature,
+although that completion can never be attained. But this error
+reverses the procedure of reason. We begin by hypostatizing the
+principle of systematic unity, and by giving an anthropomorphic
+determination to the conception of a Supreme Intelligence, and then
+proceed forcibly to impose aims upon nature. Thus not only does
+teleology, which ought to aid in the completion of unity in accordance
+with general laws, operate to the destruction of its influence, but
+it hinders reason from attaining its proper aim, that is, the proof,
+upon natural grounds, of the existence of a supreme intelligent cause.
+For, if we cannot presuppose supreme finality in nature a priori, that
+is, as essentially belonging to nature, how can we be directed to
+endeavour to discover this unity and, rising gradually through its
+different degrees, to approach the supreme perfection of an author
+of all--a perfection which is absolutely necessary, and therefore
+cognizable a priori? The regulative principle directs us to presuppose
+systematic unity absolutely and, consequently, as following from the
+essential nature of things--but only as a unity of nature, not
+merely cognized empirically, but presupposed a priori, although only
+in an indeterminate manner. But if I insist on basing nature upon
+the foundation of a supreme ordaining Being, the unity of nature is
+in effect lost. For, in this case, it is quite foreign and unessential
+to the nature of things, and cannot be cognized from the general laws
+of nature. And thus arises a vicious circular argument, what ought
+to have been proved having been presupposed.
+
+To take the regulative principle of systematic unity in nature for
+a constitutive principle, and to hypostatize and make a cause out of
+that which is properly the ideal ground of the consistent and
+harmonious exercise of reason, involves reason in inextricable
+embarrassments. The investigation of nature pursues its own path under
+the guidance of the chain of natural causes, in accordance with the
+general laws of nature, and ever follows the light of the idea of an
+author of the universe--not for the purpose of deducing the
+finality, which it constantly pursues, from this Supreme Being, but
+to attain to the cognition of his existence from the finality which
+it seeks in the existence of the phenomena of nature, and, if possible,
+in that of all things to cognize this being, consequently, as
+absolutely necessary. Whether this latter purpose succeed or not,
+the idea is and must always be a true one, and its employment, when
+merely regulative, must always be accompanied by truthful and
+beneficial results.
+
+Complete unity, in conformity with aims, constitutes absolute
+perfection. But if we do not find this unity in the nature of the
+things which go to constitute the world of experience, that is, of
+objective cognition, consequently in the universal and necessary
+laws of nature, how can we infer from this unity the idea of the
+supreme and absolutely necessary perfection of a primal being, which
+is the origin of all causality? The greatest systematic unity, and
+consequently teleological unity, constitutes the very foundation of
+the possibility of the most extended employment of human reason. The
+idea of unity is therefore essentially and indissolubly connected with
+the nature of our reason. This idea is a legislative one; and hence
+it is very natural that we should assume the existence of a legislative
+reason corresponding to it, from which the systematic unity of nature-
+the object of the operations of reason--must be derived.
+
+In the course of our discussion of the antinomies, we stated that it
+is always possible to answer all the questions which pure reason may
+raise; and that the plea of the limited nature of our cognition, which
+is unavoidable and proper in many questions regarding natural
+phenomena, cannot in this case be admitted, because the questions
+raised do not relate to the nature of things, but are necessarily
+originated by the nature of reason itself, and relate to its own
+internal constitution. We can now establish this assertion, which at
+first sight appeared so rash, in relation to the two questions in
+which reason takes the greatest interest, and thus complete our
+discussion of the dialectic of pure reason.
+
+If, then, the question is asked, in relation to transcendental
+theology,* first, whether there is anything distinct from the world,
+which contains the ground of cosmical order and connection according
+to general laws? The answer is: Certainly. For the world is a sum of
+phenomena; there must, therefore, be some transcendental basis of
+these phenomena, that is, a basis cogitable by the pure
+understanding alone. If, secondly, the question is asked whether
+this being is substance, whether it is of the greatest reality,
+whether it is necessary, and so forth? I answer that this question
+is utterly without meaning. For all the categories which aid me in
+forming a conception of an object cannot be employed except in the
+world of sense, and are without meaning when not applied to objects
+of actual or possible experience. Out of this sphere, they are not
+properly conceptions, but the mere marks or indices of conceptions,
+which we may admit, although they cannot, without the help of
+experience, help us to understand any subject or thing. If, thirdly,
+the question is whether we may not cogitate this being, which is
+distinct from the world, in analogy with the objects of experience?
+The answer is: Undoubtedly, but only as an ideal, and not as a real
+object. That is, we must cogitate it only as an unknown substratum
+of the systematic unity, order, and finality of the world--a unity
+which reason must employ as the regulative principle of its
+investigation of nature. Nay, more, we may admit into the idea certain
+anthropomorphic elements, which are promotive of the interests of this
+regulative principle. For it is no more than an idea, which does not
+relate directly to a being distinct from the world, but to the
+regulative principle of the systematic unity of the world, by means,
+however, of a schema of this unity--the schema of a Supreme
+Intelligence, who is the wisely-designing author of the universe. What
+this basis of cosmical unity may be in itself, we know not--we
+cannot discover from the idea; we merely know how we ought to employ
+the idea of this unity, in relation to the systematic operation of
+reason in the sphere of experience.
+
+[*Footnote: After what has been said of the psychological idea of the
+ego and its proper employment as a regulative principle of the operations
+of reason, I need not enter into details regarding the transcendental
+illusion by which the systematic unity of all the various phenomena
+of the internal sense is hypostatized. The procedure is in this case
+very similar to that which has been discussed in our remarks on the
+theological ideal.]
+
+But, it will be asked again, can we on these grounds, admit the
+existence of a wise and omnipotent author of the world? Without doubt;
+and not only so, but we must assume the existence of such a being.
+But do we thus extend the limits of our knowledge beyond the field
+of possible experience? By no means. For we have merely presupposed
+a something, of which we have no conception, which we do not know as
+it is in itself; but, in relation to the systematic disposition of
+the universe, which we must presuppose in all our observation of nature,
+we have cogitated this unknown being in analogy with an intelligent
+existence (an empirical conception), that is to say, we have endowed
+it with those attributes, which, judging from the nature of our own
+reason, may contain the ground of such a systematic unity. This idea
+is therefore valid only relatively to the employment in experience
+of our reason. But if we attribute to it absolute and objective
+validity, we overlook the fact that it is merely an ideal being that
+we cogitate; and, by setting out from a basis which is not
+determinable by considerations drawn from experience, we place
+ourselves in a position which incapacitates us from applying this
+principle to the empirical employment of reason.
+
+But, it will be asked further, can I make any use of this conception
+and hypothesis in my investigations into the world and nature? Yes,
+for this very purpose was the idea established by reason as a
+fundamental basis. But may I regard certain arrangements, which seemed
+to have been made in conformity with some fixed aim, as the
+arrangements of design, and look upon them as proceeding from the
+divine will, with the intervention, however, of certain other
+particular arrangements disposed to that end? Yes, you may do so;
+but at the same time you must regard it as indifferent, whether it
+is asserted that divine wisdom has disposed all things in conformity
+with his highest aims, or that the idea of supreme wisdom is a
+regulative principle in the investigation of nature, and at the same
+time a principle of the systematic unity of nature according to
+general laws, even in those cases where we are unable to discover that
+unity. In other words, it must be perfectly indifferent to you whether
+you say, when you have discovered this unity: God has wisely willed
+it so; or: Nature has wisely arranged this. For it was nothing but
+the systematic unity, which reason requires as a basis for the
+investigation of nature, that justified you in accepting the idea of
+a supreme intelligence as a schema for a regulative principle; and,
+the farther you advance in the discovery of design and finality, the
+more certain the validity of your idea. But, as the whole aim of
+this regulative principle was the discovery of a necessary and
+systematic unity in nature, we have, in so far as we attain this, to
+attribute our success to the idea of a Supreme Being; while, at the
+same time, we cannot, without involving ourselves in contradictions,
+overlook the general laws of nature, as it was in reference to them
+alone that this idea was employed. We cannot, I say, overlook the
+general laws of nature, and regard this conformity to aims
+observable in nature as contingent or hyperphysical in its origin;
+inasmuch as there is no ground which can justify us in the admission
+of a being with such properties distinct from and above nature. All
+that we are authorized to assert is that this idea may be employed
+as a principle, and that the properties of the being which is
+assumed to correspond to it may be regarded as systematically
+connected in analogy with the causal determination of phenomena.
+
+For the same reasons we are justified in introducing into the idea
+of the supreme cause other anthropomorphic elements (for without these
+we could not predicate anything of it); we may regard it as
+allowable to cogitate this cause as a being with understanding, the
+feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and faculties of desire and will
+corresponding to these. At the same time, we may attribute to this
+being infinite perfection--a perfection which necessarily transcends
+that which our knowledge of the order and design in the world
+authorize us to predicate of it. For the regulative law of
+systematic unity requires us to study nature on the supposition that
+systematic and final unity in infinitum is everywhere discoverable,
+even in the highest diversity. For, although we may discover little
+of this cosmical perfection, it belongs to the legislative prerogative
+of reason to require us always to seek for and to expect it; while
+it must always be beneficial to institute all inquiries into nature
+in accordance with this principle. But it is evident that, by this
+idea of a supreme author of all, which I place as the foundation of
+all inquiries into nature, I do not mean to assert the existence of
+such a being, or that I have any knowledge of its existence; and,
+consequently, I do not really deduce anything from the existence of
+this being, but merely from its idea, that is to say, from the
+nature of things in this world, in accordance with this idea. A
+certain dim consciousness of the true use of this idea seems to have
+dictated to the philosophers of all times the moderate language used
+by them regarding the cause of the world. We find them employing the
+expressions wisdom and care of nature, and divine wisdom, as
+synonymous--nay, in purely speculative discussions, preferring the
+former, because it does not carry the appearance of greater
+pretensions than such as we are entitled to make, and at the same time
+directs reason to its proper field of action--nature and her
+phenomena.
+
+Thus, pure reason, which at first seemed to promise us nothing
+less than the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of
+experience, is found, when thoroughly examined, to contain nothing
+but regulative principles, the virtue and function of which is to
+introduce into our cognition a higher degree of unity than the
+understanding could of itself. These principles, by placing the goal
+of all our struggles at so great a distance, realize for us the most
+thorough connection between the different parts of our cognition,
+and the highest degree of systematic unity. But, on the other hand,
+if misunderstood and employed as constitutive principles of
+transcendent cognition, they become the parents of illusions and
+contradictions, while pretending to introduce us to new regions of
+knowledge.
+
+Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from
+thence to conceptions, and ends with ideas. Although it possesses,
+in relation to all three elements, a priori sources of cognition,
+which seemed to transcend the limits of all experience, a
+thoroughgoing criticism demonstrates that speculative reason can
+never, by the aid of these elements, pass the bounds of possible
+experience, and that the proper destination of this highest faculty
+of cognition is to employ all methods, and all the principles of these
+methods, for the purpose of penetrating into the innermost secrets
+of nature, by the aid of the principles of unity (among all kinds of
+which teleological unity is the highest), while it ought not to
+attempt to soar above the sphere of experience, beyond which there
+lies nought for us but the void inane. The critical examination, in
+our Transcendental Analytic, of all the propositions which professed
+to extend cognition beyond the sphere of experience, completely
+demonstrated that they can only conduct us to a possible experience.
+If we were not distrustful even of the clearest abstract theorems,
+if we were not allured by specious and inviting prospects to escape
+from the constraining power of their evidence, we might spare
+ourselves the laborious examination of all the dialectical arguments
+which a transcendent reason adduces in support of its pretensions;
+for we should know with the most complete certainty that, however honest
+such professions might be, they are null and valueless, because they
+relate to a kind of knowledge to which no man can by any possibility
+attain. But, as there is no end to discussion, if we cannot discover
+the true cause of the illusions by which even the wisest are deceived,
+and as the analysis of all our transcendent cognition into its
+elements is of itself of no slight value as a psychological study,
+while it is a duty incumbent on every philosopher--it was found
+necessary to investigate the dialectical procedure of reason in its
+primary sources. And as the inferences of which this dialectic is
+the parent are not only deceitful, but naturally possess a profound
+interest for humanity, it was advisable at the same time, to give a
+full account of the momenta of this dialectical procedure, and to
+deposit it in the archives of human reason, as a warning to all future
+metaphysicians to avoid these causes of speculative error.
+
+
+
+II.
+
+TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD.
+
+If we regard the sum of the cognition of pure speculative reason
+as an edifice, the idea of which, at least, exists in the human
+mind, it may be said that we have in the Transcendental Doctrine of
+Elements examined the materials and determined to what edifice these
+belong, and what its height and stability. We have found, indeed,
+that, although we had purposed to build for ourselves a tower which
+should reach to Heaven, the supply of materials sufficed merely for
+a habitation, which was spacious enough for all terrestrial
+purposes, and high enough to enable us to survey the level plain of
+experience, but that the bold undertaking designed necessarily
+failed for want of materials--not to mention the confusion of tongues,
+which gave rise to endless disputes among the labourers on the plan
+of the edifice, and at last scattered them over all the world, each
+to erect a separate building for himself, according to his own plans
+and his own inclinations. Our present task relates not to the
+materials, but to the plan of an edifice; and, as we have had
+sufficient warning not to venture blindly upon a design which may be
+found to transcend our natural powers, while, at the same time, we
+cannot give up the intention of erecting a secure abode for the
+mind, we must proportion our design to the material which is presented
+to us, and which is, at the same time, sufficient for all our wants.
+
+I understand, then, by the transcendental doctrine of method, the
+determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure
+reason. We shall accordingly have to treat of the discipline, the
+canon, the architectonic, and, finally, the history of pure reason.
+This part of our Critique will accomplish, from the transcendental
+point of view, what has been usually attempted, but miserably
+executed, under the name of practical logic. It has been badly
+executed, I say, because general logic, not being limited to any
+particular kind of cognition (not even to the pure cognition of the
+understanding) nor to any particular objects, it cannot, without
+borrowing from other sciences, do more than present merely the
+titles or signs of possible methods and the technical expressions,
+which are employed in the systematic parts of all sciences; and thus
+the pupil is made acquainted with names, the meaning and application
+of which he is to learn only at some future time.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I. The Discipline of Pure Reason.
+
+Negative judgements--those which are so not merely as regards
+their logical form, but in respect of their content--are not
+commonly held in especial respect. They are, on the contrary, regarded
+as jealous enemies of our insatiable desire for knowledge; and it
+almost requires an apology to induce us to tolerate, much less to
+prize and to respect them.
+
+All propositions, indeed, may be logically expressed in a negative
+form; but, in relation to the content of our cognition, the peculiar
+province of negative judgements is solely to prevent error. For this
+reason, too, negative propositions, which are framed for the purpose
+of correcting false cognitions where error is absolutely impossible,
+are undoubtedly true, but inane and senseless; that is, they are in
+reality purposeless and, for this reason, often very ridiculous.
+Such is the proposition of the schoolman that Alexander could not have
+subdued any countries without an army.
+
+But where the limits of our possible cognition are very much
+contracted, the attraction to new fields of knowledge great, the
+illusions to which the mind is subject of the most deceptive
+character, and the evil consequences of error of no inconsiderable
+magnitude--the negative element in knowledge, which is useful only
+to guard us against error, is of far more importance than much of that
+positive instruction which makes additions to the sum of our
+knowledge. The restraint which is employed to repress, and finally
+to extirpate the constant inclination to depart from certain rules,
+is termed discipline. It is distinguished from culture, which aims
+at the formation of a certain degree of skill, without attempting to
+repress or to destroy any other mental power, already existing. In
+the cultivation of a talent, which has given evidence of an impulse
+towards self-development, discipline takes a negative,* culture and
+doctrine a positive, part.
+
+
+[*Footnote: I am well aware that, in the language of the schools, the
+term discipline is usually employed as synonymous with instruction.
+But there are so many cases in which it is necessary to distinguish
+the notion of the former, as a course of corrective training, from
+that of the latter, as the communication of knowledge, and the nature
+of things itself demands the appropriation of the most suitable
+expressions for this distinction, that it is my desire that the former
+terms should never be employed in any other than a negative
+signification.]
+
+
+That natural dispositions and talents (such as imagination and wit),
+which ask a free and unlimited development, require in many respects
+the corrective influence of discipline, every one will readily
+grant. But it may well appear strange that reason, whose proper duty
+it is to prescribe rules of discipline to all the other powers of
+the mind, should itself require this corrective. It has, in fact,
+hitherto escaped this humiliation, only because, in presence of its
+magnificent pretensions and high position, no one could readily
+suspect it to be capable of substituting fancies for conceptions,
+and words for things.
+
+Reason, when employed in the field of experience, does not stand
+in need of criticism, because its principles are subjected to the
+continual test of empirical observations. Nor is criticism requisite
+in the sphere of mathematics, where the conceptions of reason must
+always be presented in concreto in pure intuition, and baseless or
+arbitrary assertions are discovered without difficulty. But where
+reason is not held in a plain track by the influence of empirical or
+of pure intuition, that is, when it is employed in the
+transcendental sphere of pure conceptions, it stands in great need
+of discipline, to restrain its propensity to overstep the limits of
+possible experience and to keep it from wandering into error. In fact,
+the utility of the philosophy of pure reason is entirely of this
+negative character. Particular errors may be corrected by particular
+animadversions, and the causes of these errors may be eradicated by
+criticism. But where we find, as in the case of pure reason, a
+complete system of illusions and fallacies, closely connected with
+each other and depending upon grand general principles, there seems
+to be required a peculiar and negative code of mental legislation,
+which, under the denomination of a discipline, and founded upon the
+nature of reason and the objects of its exercise, shall constitute
+a system of thorough examination and testing, which no fallacy will
+be able to withstand or escape from, under whatever disguise or
+concealment it may lurk.
+
+But the reader must remark that, in this the second division of
+our transcendental Critique the discipline of pure reason is not
+directed to the content, but to the method of the cognition of pure
+reason. The former task has been completed in the doctrine of
+elements. But there is so much similarity in the mode of employing
+the faculty of reason, whatever be the object to which it is applied,
+while, at the same time, its employment in the transcendental sphere
+is so essentially different in kind from every other, that, without
+the warning negative influence of a discipline specially directed to
+that end, the errors are unavoidable which spring from the
+unskillful employment of the methods which are originated by reason
+but which are out of place in this sphere.
+
+
+
+SECTION I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dogmatism.
+
+The science of mathematics presents the most brilliant example of
+the extension of the sphere of pure reason without the aid of
+experience. Examples are always contagious; and they exert an especial
+influence on the same faculty, which naturally flatters itself that
+it will have the same good fortune in other case as fell to its lot
+in one fortunate instance. Hence pure reason hopes to be able to extend
+its empire in the transcendental sphere with equal success and
+security, especially when it applies the same method which was
+attended with such brilliant results in the science of mathematics.
+It is, therefore, of the highest importance for us to know whether
+the method of arriving at demonstrative certainty, which is termed
+mathematical, be identical with that by which we endeavour to attain
+the same degree of certainty in philosophy, and which is termed in
+that science dogmatical.
+
+Philosophical cognition is the cognition of reason by means of
+conceptions; mathematical cognition is cognition by means of the
+construction of conceptions. The construction of a conception is the
+presentation a priori of the intuition which corresponds to the
+conception. For this purpose a non-empirical intuition is requisite,
+which, as an intuition, is an individual object; while, as the
+construction of a conception (a general representation), it must be
+seen to be universally valid for all the possible intuitions which
+rank under that conception. Thus I construct a triangle, by the
+presentation of the object which corresponds to this conception,
+either by mere imagination, in pure intuition, or upon paper, in
+empirical intuition, in both cases completely a priori, without
+borrowing the type of that figure from any experience. The
+individual figure drawn upon paper is empirical; but it serves,
+notwithstanding, to indicate the conception, even in its universality,
+because in this empirical intuition we keep our eye merely on the
+act of the construction of the conception, and pay no attention to
+the various modes of determining it, for example, its size, the length
+of its sides, the size of its angles, these not in the least affecting
+the essential character of the conception.
+
+Philosophical cognition, accordingly, regards the particular only in
+the general; mathematical the general in the particular, nay, in the
+individual. This is done, however, entirely a priori and by means of
+pure reason, so that, as this individual figure is determined under
+certain universal conditions of construction, the object of the
+conception, to which this individual figure corresponds as its schema,
+must be cogitated as universally determined.
+
+The essential difference of these two modes of cognition consists,
+therefore, in this formal quality; it does not regard the difference
+of the matter or objects of both. Those thinkers who aim at
+distinguishing philosophy from mathematics by asserting that the
+former has to do with quality merely, and the latter with quantity,
+have mistaken the effect for the cause. The reason why mathematical
+cognition can relate only to quantity is to be found in its form
+alone. For it is the conception of quantities only that is capable
+of being constructed, that is, presented a priori in intuition;
+while qualities cannot be given in any other than an empirical
+intuition. Hence the cognition of qualities by reason is possible only
+through conceptions. No one can find an intuition which shall
+correspond to the conception of reality, except in experience; it
+cannot be presented to the mind a priori and antecedently to the
+empirical consciousness of a reality. We can form an intuition, by
+means of the mere conception of it, of a cone, without the aid of
+experience; but the colour of the cone we cannot know except from
+experience. I cannot present an intuition of a cause, except in an
+example which experience offers to me. Besides, philosophy, as well
+as mathematics, treats of quantities; as, for example, of totality,
+infinity, and so on. Mathematics, too, treats of the difference of
+lines and surfaces--as spaces of different quality, of the
+continuity of extension--as a quality thereof. But, although in such
+cases they have a common object, the mode in which reason considers
+that object is very different in philosophy from what it is in
+mathematics. The former confines itself to the general conceptions;
+the latter can do nothing with a mere conception, it hastens to
+intuition. In this intuition it regards the conception in concreto,
+not empirically, but in an a priori intuition, which it has
+constructed; and in which, all the results which follow from the
+general conditions of the construction of the conception are in all
+cases valid for the object of the constructed conception.
+
+Suppose that the conception of a triangle is given to a
+philosopher and that he is required to discover, by the
+philosophical method, what relation the sum of its angles bears to
+a right angle. He has nothing before him but the conception of a
+figure enclosed within three right lines, and, consequently, with
+the same number of angles. He may analyse the conception of a right
+line, of an angle, or of the number three as long as he pleases, but
+he will not discover any properties not contained in these
+conceptions. But, if this question is proposed to a geometrician, he
+at once begins by constructing a triangle. He knows that two right
+angles are equal to the sum of all the contiguous angles which proceed
+from one point in a straight line; and he goes on to produce one
+side of his triangle, thus forming two adjacent angles which are
+together equal to two right angles. He then divides the exterior of
+these angles, by drawing a line parallel with the opposite side of
+the triangle, and immediately perceives that he has thus got an exterior
+adjacent angle which is equal to the interior. Proceeding in this way,
+through a chain of inferences, and always on the ground of
+intuition, he arrives at a clear and universally valid solution of
+the question.
+
+But mathematics does not confine itself to the construction of
+quantities (quanta), as in the case of geometry; it occupies itself
+with pure quantity also (quantitas), as in the case of algebra,
+where complete abstraction is made of the properties of the object
+indicated by the conception of quantity. In algebra, a certain
+method of notation by signs is adopted, and these indicate the
+different possible constructions of quantities, the extraction of
+roots, and so on. After having thus denoted the general conception
+of quantities, according to their different relations, the different
+operations by which quantity or number is increased or diminished
+are presented in intuition in accordance with general rules. Thus,
+when one quantity is to be divided by another, the signs which
+denote both are placed in the form peculiar to the operation of
+division; and thus algebra, by means of a symbolical construction of
+quantity, just as geometry, with its ostensive or geometrical
+construction (a construction of the objects themselves), arrives at
+results which discursive cognition cannot hope to reach by the aid
+of mere conceptions.
+
+Now, what is the cause of this difference in the fortune of the
+philosopher and the mathematician, the former of whom follows the path
+of conceptions, while the latter pursues that of intuitions, which
+he represents, a priori, in correspondence with his conceptions? The
+cause is evident from what has been already demonstrated in the
+introduction to this Critique. We do not, in the present case, want
+to discover analytical propositions, which may be produced merely by
+analysing our conceptions--for in this the philosopher would have
+the advantage over his rival; we aim at the discovery of synthetical
+propositions--such synthetical propositions, moreover, as can be
+cognized a priori. I must not confine myself to that which I
+actually cogitate in my conception of a triangle, for this is
+nothing more than the mere definition; I must try to go beyond that,
+and to arrive at properties which are not contained in, although
+they belong to, the conception. Now, this is impossible, unless I
+determine the object present to my mind according to the conditions,
+either of empirical, or of pure, intuition. In the former case, I
+should have an empirical proposition (arrived at by actual measurement
+of the angles of the triangle), which would possess neither
+universality nor necessity; but that would be of no value. In the
+latter, I proceed by geometrical construction, by means of which I
+collect, in a pure intuition, just as I would in an empirical
+intuition, all the various properties which belong to the schema of
+a triangle in general, and consequently to its conception, and thus
+construct synthetical propositions which possess the attribute of
+universality.
+
+It would be vain to philosophize upon the triangle, that is, to
+reflect on it discursively; I should get no further than the
+definition with which I had been obliged to set out. There are
+certainly transcendental synthetical propositions which are framed
+by means of pure conceptions, and which form the peculiar
+distinction of philosophy; but these do not relate to any particular
+thing, but to a thing in general, and enounce the conditions under
+which the perception of it may become a part of possible experience.
+But the science of mathematics has nothing to do with such
+questions, nor with the question of existence in any fashion; it is
+concerned merely with the properties of objects in themselves, only
+in so far as these are connected with the conception of the objects.
+
+In the above example, we merely attempted to show the great
+difference which exists between the discursive employment of reason
+in the sphere of conceptions, and its intuitive exercise by means of
+the construction of conceptions. The question naturally arises: What
+is the cause which necessitates this twofold exercise of reason, and
+how are we to discover whether it is the philosophical or the
+mathematical method which reason is pursuing in an argument?
+
+All our knowledge relates, finally, to possible intuitions, for it
+is these alone that present objects to the mind. An a priori or
+non-empirical conception contains either a pure intuition--and in this
+case it can be constructed; or it contains nothing but the synthesis
+of possible intuitions, which are not given a priori. In this latter
+case, it may help us to form synthetical a priori judgements, but only
+in the discursive method, by conceptions, not in the intuitive, by
+means of the construction of conceptions.
+
+The only a priori intuition is that of the pure form of phenomena-
+space and time. A conception of space and time as quanta may be
+presented a priori in intuition, that is, constructed, either alone
+with their quality (figure), or as pure quantity (the mere synthesis
+of the homogeneous), by means of number. But the matter of
+phenomena, by which things are given in space and time, can be
+presented only in perception, a posteriori. The only conception
+which represents a priori this empirical content of phenomena is the
+conception of a thing in general; and the a priori synthetical
+cognition of this conception can give us nothing more than the rule
+for the synthesis of that which may be contained in the
+corresponding a posteriori perception; it is utterly inadequate to
+present an a priori intuition of the real object, which must
+necessarily be empirical.
+
+Synthetical propositions, which relate to things in general, an a
+priori intuition of which is impossible, are transcendental. For
+this reason transcendental propositions cannot be framed by means of
+the construction of conceptions; they are a priori, and based entirely
+on conceptions themselves. They contain merely the rule, by which we
+are to seek in the world of perception or experience the synthetical
+unity of that which cannot be intuited a priori. But they are
+incompetent to present any of the conceptions which appear in them
+in an a priori intuition; these can be given only a posteriori, in
+experience, which, however, is itself possible only through these
+synthetical principles.
+
+If we are to form a synthetical judgement regarding a conception, we
+must go beyond it, to the intuition in which it is given. If we keep
+to what is contained in the conception, the judgement is merely
+analytical--it is merely an explanation of what we have cogitated in
+the conception. But I can pass from the conception to the pure or
+empirical intuition which corresponds to it. I can proceed to
+examine my conception in concreto, and to cognize, either a priori
+or a posterio, what I find in the object of the conception. The
+former--a priori cognition--is rational-mathematical cognition by
+means of the construction of the conception; the latter--a
+posteriori cognition--is purely empirical cognition, which does not
+possess the attributes of necessity and universality. Thus I may
+analyse the conception I have of gold; but I gain no new information
+from this analysis, I merely enumerate the different properties
+which I had connected with the notion indicated by the word. My
+knowledge has gained in logical clearness and arrangement, but no
+addition has been made to it. But if I take the matter which is
+indicated by this name, and submit it to the examination of my senses,
+I am enabled to form several synthetical--although still empirical-
+propositions. The mathematical conception of a triangle I should
+construct, that is, present a priori in intuition, and in this way
+attain to rational-synthetical cognition. But when the
+transcendental conception of reality, or substance, or power is
+presented to my mind, I find that it does not relate to or indicate
+either an empirical or pure intuition, but that it indicates merely
+the synthesis of empirical intuitions, which cannot of course be given
+a priori. The synthesis in such a conception cannot proceed a
+priori--without the aid of experience--to the intuition which
+corresponds to the conception; and, for this reason, none of these
+conceptions can produce a determinative synthetical proposition,
+they can never present more than a principle of the synthesis* of
+possible empirical intuitions. A transcendental proposition is,
+therefore, a synthetical cognition of reason by means of pure
+conceptions and the discursive method, and it renders possible all
+synthetical unity in empirical cognition, though it cannot present
+us with any intuition a priori.
+
+
+[*Footnote: In the case of the conception of cause, I do really go
+beyond the empirical conception of an event--but not to the intuition
+which presents this conception in concreto, but only to the
+time-conditions, which may be found in experience to correspond to
+the conception. My procedure is, therefore, strictly according to
+conceptions; I cannot in a case of this kind employ the construction
+of conceptions, because the conception is merely a rule for the synthesis
+of perceptions, which are not pure intuitions, and which, therefore,
+cannot be given a priori.]
+
+
+There is thus a twofold exercise of reason. Both modes have the
+properties of universality and an a priori origin in common, but
+are, in their procedure, of widely different character. The reason
+of this is that in the world of phenomena, in which alone objects
+are presented to our minds, there are two main elements--the form of
+intuition (space and time), which can be cognized and determined
+completely a priori, and the matter or content--that which is
+presented in space and time, and which, consequently, contains a
+something--an existence corresponding to our powers of sensation. As
+regards the latter, which can never be given in a determinate mode
+except by experience, there are no a priori notions which relate to
+it, except the undetermined conceptions of the synthesis of possible
+sensations, in so far as these belong (in a possible experience) to
+the unity of consciousness. As regards the former, we can determine
+our conceptions a priori in intuition, inasmuch as we are ourselves
+the creators of the objects of the conceptions in space and time-
+these objects being regarded simply as quanta. In the one case, reason
+proceeds according to conceptions and can do nothing more than subject
+phenomena to these--which can only be determined empirically, that
+is, a posteriori--in conformity, however, with those conceptions as
+the rules of all empirical synthesis. In the other case, reason proceeds
+by the construction of conceptions; and, as these conceptions relate
+to an a priori intuition, they may be given and determined in pure
+intuition a priori, and without the aid of empirical data. The
+examination and consideration of everything that exists in space or
+time--whether it is a quantum or not, in how far the particular
+something (which fills space or time) is a primary substratum, or a
+mere determination of some other existence, whether it relates to
+anything else--either as cause or effect, whether its existence is
+isolated or in reciprocal connection with and dependence upon
+others, the possibility of this existence, its reality and necessity
+or opposites--all these form part of the cognition of reason on the
+ground of conceptions, and this cognition is termed philosophical.
+But to determine a priori an intuition in space (its figure), to divide
+time into periods, or merely to cognize the quantity of an intuition
+in space and time, and to determine it by number--all this is an
+operation of reason by means of the construction of conceptions, and
+is called mathematical.
+
+The success which attends the efforts of reason in the sphere of
+mathematics naturally fosters the expectation that the same good
+fortune will be its lot, if it applies the mathematical method in
+other regions of mental endeavour besides that of quantities. Its
+success is thus great, because it can support all its conceptions by
+a priori intuitions and, in this way, make itself a master, as it
+were, over nature; while pure philosophy, with its a priori discursive
+conceptions, bungles about in the world of nature, and cannot accredit
+or show any a priori evidence of the reality of these conceptions.
+Masters in the science of mathematics are confident of the success
+of this method; indeed, it is a common persuasion that it is capable
+of being applied to any subject of human thought. They have hardly
+ever reflected or philosophized on their favourite science--a task
+of great difficulty; and the specific difference between the two modes
+of employing the faculty of reason has never entered their thoughts.
+Rules current in the field of common experience, and which common
+sense stamps everywhere with its approval, are regarded by them as
+axiomatic. From what source the conceptions of space and time, with
+which (as the only primitive quanta) they have to deal, enter their
+minds, is a question which they do not trouble themselves to answer;
+and they think it just as unnecessary to examine into the origin of
+the pure conceptions of the understanding and the extent of their
+validity. All they have to do with them is to employ them. In all this
+they are perfectly right, if they do not overstep the limits of the
+sphere of nature. But they pass, unconsciously, from the world of
+sense to the insecure ground of pure transcendental conceptions
+(instabilis tellus, innabilis unda), where they can neither stand
+nor swim, and where the tracks of their footsteps are obliterated by
+time; while the march of mathematics is pursued on a broad and
+magnificent highway, which the latest posterity shall frequent without
+fear of danger or impediment.
+
+As we have taken upon us the task of determining, clearly and
+certainly, the limits of pure reason in the sphere of
+transcendentalism, and as the efforts of reason in this direction
+are persisted in, even after the plainest and most expressive
+warnings, hope still beckoning us past the limits of experience into
+the splendours of the intellectual world--it becomes necessary to
+cut away the last anchor of this fallacious and fantastic hope. We
+shall, accordingly, show that the mathematical method is unattended
+in the sphere of philosophy by the least advantage--except, perhaps,
+that it more plainly exhibits its own inadequacy--that geometry and
+philosophy are two quite different things, although they go band in
+hand in hand in the field of natural science, and, consequently,
+that the procedure of the one can never be imitated by the other.
+
+The evidence of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms, and
+demonstrations. I shall be satisfied with showing that none of these
+forms can be employed or imitated in philosophy in the sense in
+which they are understood by mathematicians; and that the
+geometrician, if he employs his method in philosophy, will succeed
+only in building card-castles, while the employment of the
+philosophical method in mathematics can result in nothing but mere
+verbiage. The essential business of philosophy, indeed, is to mark
+out the limits of the science; and even the mathematician, unless his
+talent is naturally circumscribed and limited to this particular
+department of knowledge, cannot turn a deaf ear to the warnings of
+philosophy, or set himself above its direction.
+
+I. Of Definitions. A definition is, as the term itself indicates,
+the representation, upon primary grounds, of the complete conception
+of a thing within its own limits.* Accordingly, an empirical
+conception cannot be defined, it can only be explained. For, as
+there are in such a conception only a certain number of marks or
+signs, which denote a certain class of sensuous objects, we can
+never be sure that we do not cogitate under the word which indicates
+the same object, at one time a greater, at another a smaller number
+of signs. Thus, one person may cogitate in his conception of gold,
+in addition to its properties of weight, colour, malleability, that
+of resisting rust, while another person may be ignorant of this
+quality. We employ certain signs only so long as we require them for
+the sake of distinction; new observations abstract some and add new
+ones, so that an empirical conception never remains within permanent
+limits. It is, in fact, useless to define a conception of this kind.
+If, for example, we are speaking of water and its properties, we do
+not stop at what we actually think by the word water, but proceed to
+observation and experiment; and the word, with the few signs
+attached to it, is more properly a designation than a conception of
+the thing. A definition in this case would evidently be nothing more
+than a determination of the word. In the second place, no a priori
+conception, such as those of substance, cause, right, fitness, and
+so on, can be defined. For I can never be sure, that the clear
+representation of a given conception (which is given in a confused
+state) has been fully developed, until I know that the
+representation is adequate with its object. But, inasmuch as the
+conception, as it is presented to the mind, may contain a number of
+obscure representations, which we do not observe in our analysis,
+although we employ them in our application of the conception, I can
+never be sure that my analysis is complete, while examples may make
+this probable, although they can never demonstrate the fact. Instead
+of the word definition, I should rather employ the term exposition--
+a more modest expression, which the critic may accept without
+surrendering his doubts as to the completeness of the analysis of
+any such conception. As, therefore, neither empirical nor a priori
+conceptions are capable of definition, we have to see whether the only
+other kind of conceptions--arbitrary conceptions--can be subjected
+to this mental operation. Such a conception can always be defined;
+for I must know thoroughly what I wished to cogitate in it, as it was
+I who created it, and it was not given to my mind either by the nature
+of my understanding or by experience. At the same time, I cannot say
+that, by such a definition, I have defined a real object. If the
+conception is based upon empirical conditions, if, for example, I have
+a conception of a clock for a ship, this arbitrary conception does
+not assure me of the existence or even of the possibility of the object.
+My definition of such a conception would with more propriety be termed
+a declaration of a project than a definition of an object. There
+are no other conceptions which can bear definition, except those which
+contain an arbitrary synthesis, which can be constructed a priori.
+Consequently, the science of mathematics alone possesses
+definitions. For the object here thought is presented a priori in
+intuition; and thus it can never contain more or less than the
+conception, because the conception of the object has been given by
+the definition--and primarily, that is, without deriving the definition
+from any other source. Philosophical definitions are, therefore,
+merely expositions of given conceptions, while mathematical
+definitions are constructions of conceptions originally formed by
+the mind itself; the former are produced by analysis, the completeness
+of which is never demonstratively certain, the latter by a
+synthesis. In a mathematical definition the conception is formed, in
+a philosophical definition it is only explained. From this it follows:
+
+[*Footnote: The definition must describe the conception completely
+that is, omit none of the marks or signs of which it composed; within
+its own limits, that is, it must be precise, and enumerate no more
+signs than belong to the conception; and on primary grounds, that is
+to say, the limitations of the bounds of the conception must not be
+deduced from other conceptions, as in this case a proof would be necessary,
+and the so-called definition would be incapable of taking its place
+at the bead of all the judgements we have to form regarding an object.]
+
+(a) That we must not imitate, in philosophy, the mathematical
+usage of commencing with definitions--except by way of hypothesis or
+experiment. For, as all so-called philosophical definitions are merely
+analyses of given conceptions, these conceptions, although only in
+a confused form, must precede the analysis; and the incomplete
+exposition must precede the complete, so that we may be able to draw
+certain inferences from the characteristics which an incomplete
+analysis has enabled us to discover, before we attain to the
+complete exposition or definition of the conception. In one word, a
+full and clear definition ought, in philosophy, rather to form the
+conclusion than the commencement of our labours.* In mathematics, on
+the contrary, we cannot have a conception prior to the definition;
+it is the definition which gives us the conception, and it must for
+this reason form the commencement of every chain of mathematical
+reasoning.
+
+[*Footnote: Philosophy abounds in faulty definitions, especially such
+as contain some of the elements requisite to form a complete
+definition. If a conception could not be employed in reasoning
+before it had been defined, it would fare ill with all philosophical
+thought. But, as incompletely defined conceptions may always be
+employed without detriment to truth, so far as our analysis of the
+elements contained in them proceeds, imperfect definitions, that is,
+propositions which are properly not definitions, but merely
+approximations thereto, may be used with great advantage. In
+mathematics, definition belongs ad esse, in philosophy ad melius esse.
+It is a difficult task to construct a proper definition. Jurists are
+still without a complete definition of the idea of right.]
+
+(b) Mathematical definitions cannot be erroneous. For the conception
+is given only in and through the definition, and thus it contains only
+what has been cogitated in the definition. But although a definition
+cannot be incorrect, as regards its content, an error may sometimes,
+although seldom, creep into the form. This error consists in a want
+of precision. Thus the common definition of a circle--that it is a
+curved line, every point in which is equally distant from another point
+called the centre--is faulty, from the fact that the determination
+indicated by the word curved is superfluous. For there ought to be
+a particular theorem, which may be easily proved from the definition,
+to the effect that every line, which has all its points at equal
+distances from another point, must be a curved line--that is, that
+not even the smallest part of it can be straight. Analytical
+definitions, on the other hand, may be erroneous in many respects,
+either by the introduction of signs which do not actually exist in
+the conception, or by wanting in that completeness which forms the
+essential of a definition. In the latter case, the definition is
+necessarily defective, because we can never be fully certain of the
+completeness of our analysis. For these reasons, the method of
+definition employed in mathematics cannot be imitated in philosophy.
+
+2. Of Axioms. These, in so far as they are immediately certain,
+are a priori synthetical principles. Now, one conception cannot be
+connected synthetically and yet immediately with another; because,
+if we wish to proceed out of and beyond a conception, a third
+mediating cognition is necessary. And, as philosophy is a cognition
+of reason by the aid of conceptions alone, there is to be found in
+it no principle which deserves to be called an axiom. Mathematics,
+on the other hand, may possess axioms, because it can always connect
+the predicates of an object a priori, and without any mediating term,
+by means of the construction of conceptions in intuition. Such is the
+case with the proposition: Three points can always lie in a plane.
+On the other hand, no synthetical principle which is based upon
+conceptions, can ever be immediately certain (for example, the
+proposition: Everything that happens has a cause), because I require
+a mediating term to connect the two conceptions of event and cause-
+namely, the condition of time-determination in an experience, and I
+cannot cognize any such principle immediately and from conceptions
+alone. Discursive principles are, accordingly, very different from
+intuitive principles or axioms. The former always require deduction,
+which in the case of the latter may be altogether dispensed with.
+Axioms are, for this reason, always self-evident, while
+philosophical principles, whatever may be the degree of certainty they
+possess, cannot lay any claim to such a distinction. No synthetical
+proposition of pure transcendental reason can be so evident, as is
+often rashly enough declared, as the statement, twice two are four.
+It is true that in the Analytic I introduced into the list of
+principles of the pure understanding, certain axioms of intuition;
+but the principle there discussed was not itself an axiom, but served
+merely to present the principle of the possibility of axioms in
+general, while it was really nothing more than a principle based
+upon conceptions. For it is one part of the duty of transcendental
+philosophy to establish the possibility of mathematics itself.
+Philosophy possesses, then, no axioms, and has no right to impose
+its a priori principles upon thought, until it has established their
+authority and validity by a thoroughgoing deduction.
+
+3. Of Demonstrations. Only an apodeictic proof, based upon
+intuition, can be termed a demonstration. Experience teaches us what
+is, but it cannot convince us that it might not have been otherwise.
+Hence a proof upon empirical grounds cannot be apodeictic. A priori
+conceptions, in discursive cognition, can never produce intuitive
+certainty or evidence, however certain the judgement they present
+may be. Mathematics alone, therefore, contains demonstrations, because
+it does not deduce its cognition from conceptions, but from the
+construction of conceptions, that is, from intuition, which can be
+given a priori in accordance with conceptions. The method of
+algebra, in equations, from which the correct answer is deduced by
+reduction, is a kind of construction--not geometrical, but by symbols-
+in which all conceptions, especially those of the relations of
+quantities, are represented in intuition by signs; and thus the
+conclusions in that science are secured from errors by the fact that
+every proof is submitted to ocular evidence. Philosophical cognition
+does not possess this advantage, it being required to consider the
+general always in abstracto (by means of conceptions), while
+mathematics can always consider it in concreto (in an individual
+intuition), and at the same time by means of a priori
+representation, whereby all errors are rendered manifest to the
+senses. The former--discursive proofs--ought to be termed acroamatic
+proofs, rather than demonstrations, as only words are employed in
+them, while demonstrations proper, as the term itself indicates,
+always require a reference to the intuition of the object.
+
+It follows from all these considerations that it is not consonant
+with the nature of philosophy, especially in the sphere of pure
+reason, to employ the dogmatical method, and to adorn itself with
+the titles and insignia of mathematical science. It does not belong
+to that order, and can only hope for a fraternal union with that science.
+Its attempts at mathematical evidence are vain pretensions, which
+can only keep it back from its true aim, which is to detect the
+illusory procedure of reason when transgressing its proper limits,
+and by fully explaining and analysing our conceptions, to conduct us
+from the dim regions of speculation to the clear region of modest
+self-knowledge. Reason must not, therefore, in its transcendental
+endeavours, look forward with such confidence, as if the path it is
+pursuing led straight to its aim, nor reckon with such security upon
+its premisses, as to consider it unnecessary to take a step back, or
+to keep a strict watch for errors, which, overlooked in the
+principles, may be detected in the arguments themselves--in which case
+it may be requisite either to determine these principles with
+greater strictness, or to change them entirely.
+
+I divide all apodeictic propositions, whether demonstrable or
+immediately certain, into dogmata and mathemata. A direct
+synthetical proposition, based on conceptions, is a dogma; a
+proposition of the same kind, based on the construction of
+conceptions, is a mathema. Analytical judgements do not teach us any
+more about an object than what was contained in the conception we
+had of it; because they do not extend our cognition beyond our
+conception of an object, they merely elucidate the conception. They
+cannot therefore be with propriety termed dogmas. Of the two kinds
+of a priori synthetical propositions above mentioned, only those which
+are employed in philosophy can, according to the general mode of
+speech, bear this name; those of arithmetic or geometry would not be
+rightly so denominated. Thus the customary mode of speaking confirms
+the explanation given above, and the conclusion arrived at, that
+only those judgements which are based upon conceptions, not on the
+construction of conceptions, can be termed dogmatical.
+
+Thus, pure reason, in the sphere of speculation, does not contain
+a single direct synthetical judgement based upon conceptions. By means
+of ideas, it is, as we have shown, incapable of producing
+synthetical judgements, which are objectively valid; by means of the
+conceptions of the understanding, it establishes certain indubitable
+principles, not, however, directly on the basis of conceptions, but
+only indirectly by means of the relation of these conceptions to
+something of a purely contingent nature, namely, possible
+experience. When experience is presupposed, these principles are
+apodeictically certain, but in themselves, and directly, they cannot
+even be cognized a priori. Thus the given conceptions of cause and
+event will not be sufficient for the demonstration of the proposition:
+Every event has a cause. For this reason, it is not a dogma;
+although from another point of view, that of experience, it is capable
+of being proved to demonstration. The proper term for such a
+proposition is principle, and not theorem (although it does require
+to be proved), because it possesses the remarkable peculiarity of being
+the condition of the possibility of its own ground of proof, that
+is, experience, and of forming a necessary presupposition in all
+empirical observation.
+
+If then, in the speculative sphere of pure reason, no dogmata are to
+be found; all dogmatical methods, whether borrowed from mathematics,
+or invented by philosophical thinkers, are alike inappropriate and
+inefficient. They only serve to conceal errors and fallacies, and to
+deceive philosophy, whose duty it is to see that reason pursues a safe
+and straight path. A philosophical method may, however, be
+systematical. For our reason is, subjectively considered, itself a
+system, and, in the sphere of mere conceptions, a system of
+investigation according to principles of unity, the material being
+supplied by experience alone. But this is not the proper place for
+discussing the peculiar method of transcendental philosophy, as our
+present task is simply to examine whether our faculties are capable
+of erecting an edifice on the basis of pure reason, and how far they
+may proceed with the materials at their command.
+
+
+
+SECTION II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics.
+
+Reason must be subject, in all its operations, to criticism, which
+must always be permitted to exercise its functions without
+restraint; otherwise its interests are imperilled and its influence
+obnoxious to suspicion. There is nothing, however useful, however
+sacred it may be, that can claim exemption from the searching
+examination of this supreme tribunal, which has no respect of persons.
+The very existence of reason depends upon this freedom; for the
+voice of reason is not that of a dictatorial and despotic power, it
+is rather like the vote of the citizens of a free state, every member
+of which must have the privilege of giving free expression to his
+doubts, and possess even the right of veto.
+
+But while reason can never decline to submit itself to the
+tribunal of criticism, it has not always cause to dread the
+judgement of this court. Pure reason, however, when engaged in the
+sphere of dogmatism, is not so thoroughly conscious of a strict
+observance of its highest laws, as to appear before a higher
+judicial reason with perfect confidence. On the contrary, it must
+renounce its magnificent dogmatical pretensions in philosophy.
+
+Very different is the case when it has to defend itself, not
+before a judge, but against an equal. If dogmatical assertions are
+advanced on the negative side, in opposition to those made by reason
+on the positive side, its justification kat authrhopon is complete,
+although the proof of its propositions is kat aletheian
+unsatisfactory.
+
+By the polemic of pure reason I mean the defence of its propositions
+made by reason, in opposition to the dogmatical counter-propositions
+advanced by other parties. The question here is not whether its own
+statements may not also be false; it merely regards the fact that
+reason proves that the opposite cannot be established with
+demonstrative certainty, nor even asserted with a higher degree of
+probability. Reason does not hold her possessions upon sufferance;
+for, although she cannot show a perfectly satisfactory title to
+them, no one can prove that she is not the rightful possessor.
+
+It is a melancholy reflection that reason, in its highest
+exercise, falls into an antithetic; and that the supreme tribunal
+for the settlement of differences should not be at union with
+itself. It is true that we had to discuss the question of an
+apparent antithetic, but we found that it was based upon a
+misconception. In conformity with the common prejudice, phenomena were
+regarded as things in themselves, and thus an absolute completeness
+in their synthesis was required in the one mode or in the other (it
+was shown to be impossible in both); a demand entirely out of place
+in regard to phenomena. There was, then, no real self-contradiction
+of reason in the propositions: The series of phenomena given in
+themselves has an absolutely first beginning; and: This series is
+absolutely and in itself without beginning. The two propositions are
+perfectly consistent with each other, because phenomena as phenomena
+are in themselves nothing, and consequently the hypothesis that they
+are things in themselves must lead to self-contradictory inferences.
+
+But there are cases in which a similar misunderstanding cannot be
+provided against, and the dispute must remain unsettled. Take, for
+example, the theistic proposition: There is a Supreme Being; and on
+the other hand, the atheistic counter-statement: There exists no
+Supreme Being; or, in psychology: Everything that thinks possesses
+the attribute of absolute and permanent unity, which is utterly
+different from the transitory unity of material phenomena; and the
+counter-proposition: The soul is not an immaterial unity, and its
+nature is transitory, like that of phenomena. The objects of these
+questions contain no heterogeneous or contradictory elements, for they
+relate to things in themselves, and not to phenomena. There would
+arise, indeed, a real contradiction, if reason came forward with a
+statement on the negative side of these questions alone. As regards
+the criticism to which the grounds of proof on the affirmative side
+must be subjected, it may be freely admitted, without necessitating
+the surrender of the affirmative propositions, which have, at least,
+the interest of reason in their favour--an advantage which the
+opposite party cannot lay claim to.
+
+I cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable thinkers--Sulzer
+among the rest--that, in spite of the weakness of the arguments
+hitherto in use, we may hope, one day, to see sufficient demonstrations
+of the two cardinal propositions of pure reason--the existence of a
+Supreme Being, and the immortality of the soul. I am certain, on the
+contrary, that this will never be the case. For on what ground can
+reason base such synthetical propositions, which do not relate to the
+objects of experience and their internal possibility? But it is also
+demonstratively certain that no one will ever be able to maintain the
+contrary with the least show of probability. For, as he can attempt
+such a proof solely upon the basis of pure reason, he is bound to prove
+that a Supreme Being, and a thinking subject in the character of a pure
+intelligence, are impossible. But where will he find the knowledge
+which can enable him to enounce synthetical judgements in regard to
+things which transcend the region of experience? We may, therefore,
+rest assured that the opposite never will be demonstrated. We need not,
+then, have recourse to scholastic arguments; we may always admit the
+truth of those propositions which are consistent with the speculative
+interests of reason in the sphere of experience, and form, moreover,
+the only means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest.
+Our opponent, who must not be considered here as a critic solely, we
+can be ready to meet with a non liquet which cannot fail to disconcert
+him; while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort, as we have on
+our side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of
+reason, and can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with
+calm indifference.
+
+From this point of view, there is properly no antithetic of pure
+reason. For the only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field
+of pure theology and psychology; but on this ground there can appear
+no combatant whom we need to fear. Ridicule and boasting can be his
+only weapons; and these may be laughed at, as mere child's play.
+This consideration restores to Reason her courage; for what source
+of confidence could be found, if she, whose vocation it is to
+destroy error, were at variance with herself and without any
+reasonable hope of ever reaching a state of permanent repose?
+
+Everything in nature is good for some purpose. Even poisons are
+serviceable; they destroy the evil effects of other poisons generated
+in our system, and must always find a place in every complete
+pharmacopoeia. The objections raised against the fallacies and
+sophistries of speculative reason, are objections given by the nature
+of this reason itself, and must therefore have a destination and
+purpose which can only be for the good of humanity. For what purpose
+has Providence raised many objects, in which we have the deepest
+interest, so far above us, that we vainly try to cognize them with
+certainty, and our powers of mental vision are rather excited than
+satisfied by the glimpses we may chance to seize? It is very doubtful
+whether it is for our benefit to advance bold affirmations regarding
+subjects involved in such obscurity; perhaps it would even be
+detrimental to our best interests. But it is undoubtedly always
+beneficial to leave the investigating, as well as the critical reason,
+in perfect freedom, and permit it to take charge of its own interests,
+which are advanced as much by its limitation, as by its extension of
+its views, and which always suffer by the interference of foreign
+powers forcing it, against its natural tendencies, to bend to certain
+preconceived designs.
+
+Allow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable, and combat him
+only with the weapons of reason. Have no anxiety for the practical
+interests of humanity--these are never imperilled in a purely
+speculative dispute. Such a dispute serves merely to disclose the
+antinomy of reason, which, as it has its source in the nature of
+reason, ought to be thoroughly investigated. Reason is benefited by
+the examination of a subject on both sides, and its judgements are
+corrected by being limited. It is not the matter that may give
+occasion to dispute, but the manner. For it is perfectly permissible
+to employ, in the presence of reason, the language of a firmly
+rooted faith, even after we have been obliged to renounce all
+pretensions to knowledge.
+
+If we were to ask the dispassionate David Hume--a philosopher
+endowed, in a degree that few are, with a well-balanced judgement:
+What motive induced you to spend so much labour and thought in
+undermining the consoling and beneficial persuasion that reason is
+capable of assuring us of the existence, and presenting us with a
+determinate conception of a Supreme Being?--his answer would be:
+Nothing but the desire of teaching reason to know its own powers
+better, and, at the same time, a dislike of the procedure by which
+that faculty was compelled to support foregone conclusions, and
+prevented from confessing the internal weaknesses which it cannot
+but feel when it enters upon a rigid self-examination. If, on the
+other hand, we were to ask Priestley--a philosopher who had no taste
+for transcendental speculation, but was entirely devoted to the
+principles of empiricism--what his motives were for overturning
+those two main pillars of religion--the doctrines of the freedom of
+the will and the immortality of the soul (in his view the hope of a
+future life is but the expectation of the miracle of resurrection)-
+this philosopher, himself a zealous and pious teacher of religion,
+could give no other answer than this: I acted in the interest of
+reason, which always suffers, when certain objects are explained and
+judged by a reference to other supposed laws than those of material
+nature--the only laws which we know in a determinate manner. It
+would be unfair to decry the latter philosopher, who endeavoured to
+harmonize his paradoxical opinions with the interests of religion,
+and to undervalue an honest and reflecting man, because he finds himself
+at a loss the moment he has left the field of natural science. The
+same grace must be accorded to Hume, a man not less well-disposed,
+and quite as blameless in his moral character, and who pushed his abstract
+speculations to an extreme length, because, as he rightly believed,
+the object of them lies entirely beyond the bounds of natural science,
+and within the sphere of pure ideas.
+
+What is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in
+the present case to menace the best interests of humanity? The
+course to be pursued in reference to this subject is a perfectly plain
+and natural one. Let each thinker pursue his own path; if he shows
+talent, if he gives evidence of profound thought, in one word, if he
+shows that he possesses the power of reasoning--reason is always the
+gainer. If you have recourse to other means, if you attempt to
+coerce reason, if you raise the cry of treason to humanity, if you
+excite the feelings of the crowd, which can neither understand nor
+sympathize with such subtle speculations--you will only make
+yourselves ridiculous. For the question does not concern the advantage
+or disadvantage which we are expected to reap from such inquiries;
+the question is merely how far reason can advance in the field of
+speculation, apart from all kinds of interest, and whether we may
+depend upon the exertions of speculative reason, or must renounce
+all reliance on it. Instead of joining the combatants, it is your part
+to be a tranquil spectator of the struggle--a laborious struggle for
+the parties engaged, but attended, in its progress as well as in its
+result, with the most advantageous consequences for the interests of
+thought and knowledge. It is absurd to expect to be enlightened by
+Reason, and at the same time to prescribe to her what side of the
+question she must adopt. Moreover, reason is sufficiently held in
+check by its own power, the limits imposed on it by its own nature
+are sufficient; it is unnecessary for you to place over it additional
+guards, as if its power were dangerous to the constitution of the
+intellectual state. In the dialectic of reason there is no victory
+gained which need in the least disturb your tranquility.
+
+The strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason, and we cannot
+but wish that it had been conducted long ere this with that perfect
+freedom which ought to be its essential condition. In this case, we
+should have had at an earlier period a matured and profound criticism,
+which must have put an end to all dialectical disputes, by exposing
+the illusions and prejudices in which they originated.
+
+There is in human nature an unworthy propensity--a propensity which,
+like everything that springs from nature, must in its final purpose
+be conducive to the good of humanity--to conceal our real sentiments,
+and to give expression only to certain received opinions, which are
+regarded as at once safe and promotive of the common good. It is true,
+this tendency, not only to conceal our real sentiments, but to profess
+those which may gain us favour in the eyes of society, has not only
+civilized, but, in a certain measure, moralized us; as no one can
+break through the outward covering of respectability, honour, and
+morality, and thus the seemingly-good examples which we which we see
+around us form an excellent school for moral improvement, so long as
+our belief in their genuineness remains unshaken. But this disposition
+to represent ourselves as better than we are, and to utter opinions
+which are not our own, can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary
+arrangement of nature to lead us from the rudeness of an uncivilized
+state, and to teach us how to assume at least the appearance and
+manner of the good we see. But when true principles have been
+developed, and have obtained a sure foundation in our habit of
+thought, this conventionalism must be attacked with earnest vigour,
+otherwise it corrupts the heart, and checks the growth of good
+dispositions with the mischievous weed of air appearances.
+
+I am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresentation and
+hypocrisy in the sphere of speculative discussion, where there is less
+temptation to restrain the free expression of thought. For what can
+be more prejudicial to the interests of intelligence than to falsify
+our real sentiments, to conceal the doubts which we feel in regard
+to our statements, or to maintain the validity of grounds of proof
+which we well know to be insufficient? So long as mere personal vanity
+is the source of these unworthy artifices--and this is generally the
+case in speculative discussions, which are mostly destitute of
+practical interest, and are incapable of complete demonstration--the
+vanity of the opposite party exaggerates as much on the other side;
+and thus the result is the same, although it is not brought about so
+soon as if the dispute had been conducted in a sincere and upright
+spirit. But where the mass entertains the notion that the aim of
+certain subtle speculators is nothing less than to shake the very
+foundations of public welfare and morality--it seems not only prudent,
+but even praise worthy, to maintain the good cause by illusory
+arguments, rather than to give to our supposed opponents the advantage
+of lowering our declarations to the moderate tone of a merely
+practical conviction, and of compelling us to confess our inability
+to attain to apodeictic certainty in speculative subjects. But we ought
+to reflect that there is nothing, in the world more fatal to the
+maintenance of a good cause than deceit, misrepresentation, and
+falsehood. That the strictest laws of honesty should be observed in
+the discussion of a purely speculative subject is the least
+requirement that can be made. If we could reckon with security even
+upon so little, the conflict of speculative reason regarding the
+important questions of God, immortality, and freedom, would have
+been either decided long ago, or would very soon be brought to a
+conclusion. But, in general, the uprightness of the defence stands
+in an inverse ratio to the goodness of the cause; and perhaps more
+honesty and fairness are shown by those who deny than by those who
+uphold these doctrines.
+
+I shall persuade myself, then, that I have readers who do not wish
+to see a righteous cause defended by unfair arguments. Such will now
+recognize the fact that, according to the principles of this Critique,
+if we consider not what is, but what ought to be the case, there can
+be really no polemic of pure reason. For how can two persons dispute
+about a thing, the reality of which neither can present in actual or
+even in possible experience? Each adopts the plan of meditating on
+his idea for the purpose of drawing from the idea, if he can, what
+is more than the idea, that is, the reality of the object which it
+indicates. How shall they settle the dispute, since neither is able
+to make his assertions directly comprehensible and certain, but must
+restrict himself to attacking and confuting those of his opponent?
+All statements enounced by pure reason transcend the conditions of
+possible experience, beyond the sphere of which we can discover no
+criterion of truth, while they are at the same time framed in
+accordance with the laws of the understanding, which are applicable
+only to experience; and thus it is the fate of all such speculative
+discussions that while the one party attacks the weaker side of his
+opponent, he infallibly lays open his own weaknesses.
+
+The critique of pure reason may be regarded as the highest
+tribunal for all speculative disputes; for it is not involved in these
+disputes, which have an immediate relation to certain objects and
+not to the laws of the mind, but is instituted for the purpose of
+determining the rights and limits of reason.
+
+Without the control of criticism, reason is, as it were, in a
+state of nature, and can only establish its claims and assertions by
+war. Criticism, on the contrary, deciding all questions according to
+the fundamental laws of its own institution, secures to us the peace
+of law and order, and enables us to discuss all differences in the
+more tranquil manner of a legal process. In the former case,
+disputes are ended by victory, which both sides may claim and which
+is followed by a hollow armistice; in the latter, by a sentence, which,
+as it strikes at the root of all speculative differences, ensures to
+all concerned a lasting peace. The endless disputes of a dogmatizing
+reason compel us to look for some mode of arriving at a settled
+decision by a critical investigation of reason itself; just as
+Hobbes maintains that the state of nature is a state of injustice
+and violence, and that we must leave it and submit ourselves to the
+constraint of law, which indeed limits individual freedom, but only
+that it may consist with the freedom of others and with the common
+good of all.
+
+This freedom will, among other things, permit of our openly
+stating the difficulties and doubts which we are ourselves unable to
+solve, without being decried on that account as turbulent and
+dangerous citizens. This privilege forms part of the native rights
+of human reason, which recognizes no other judge than the universal
+reason of humanity; and as this reason is the source of all progress
+and improvement, such a privilege is to be held sacred and inviolable.
+It is unwise, moreover, to denounce as dangerous any bold assertions
+against, or rash attacks upon, an opinion which is held by the largest
+and most moral class of the community; for that would be giving them
+an importance which they do not deserve. When I hear that the
+freedom of the will, the hope of a future life, and the existence of
+God have been overthrown by the arguments of some able writer, I
+feel a strong desire to read his book; for I expect that he will add
+to my knowledge and impart greater clearness and distinctness to my
+views by the argumentative power shown in his writings. But I am
+perfectly certain, even before I have opened the book, that he has
+not succeeded in a single point, not because I believe I am in
+possession of irrefutable demonstrations of these important
+propositions, but because this transcendental critique, which has
+disclosed to me the power and the limits of pure reason, has fully
+convinced me that, as it is insufficient to establish the affirmative,
+it is as powerless, and even more so, to assure us of the truth of
+the negative answer to these questions. From what source does this
+free-thinker derive his knowledge that there is, for example, no
+Supreme Being? This proposition lies out of the field of possible
+experience, and, therefore, beyond the limits of human cognition.
+But I would not read at, all the answer which the dogmatical
+maintainer of the good cause makes to his opponent, because I know
+well beforehand, that he will merely attack the fallacious grounds
+of his adversary, without being able to establish his own
+assertions. Besides, a new illusory argument, in the construction of
+which talent and acuteness are shown, is suggestive of new ideas and
+new trains of reasoning, and in this respect the old and everyday
+sophistries are quite useless. Again, the dogmatical opponent of
+religion gives employment to criticism, and enables us to test and
+correct its principles, while there is no occasion for anxiety in
+regard to the influence and results of his reasoning.
+
+But, it will be said, must we not warn the youth entrusted to
+academical care against such writings, must we not preserve them
+from the knowledge of these dangerous assertions, until their
+judgement is ripened, or rather until the doctrines which we wish to
+inculcate are so firmly rooted in their minds as to withstand all
+attempts at instilling the contrary dogmas, from whatever quarter they
+may come?
+
+If we are to confine ourselves to the dogmatical procedure in the
+sphere of pure reason, and find ourselves unable to settle such
+disputes otherwise than by becoming a party in them, and setting
+counter-assertions against the statements advanced by our opponents,
+there is certainly no plan more advisable for the moment, but, at
+the same time, none more absurd and inefficient for the future, than
+this retaining of the youthful mind under guardianship for a time,
+and thus preserving it--for so long at least--from seduction into error.
+But when, at a later period, either curiosity, or the prevalent
+fashion of thought places such writings in their hands, will the
+so-called convictions of their youth stand firm? The young thinker,
+who has in his armoury none but dogmatical weapons with which to
+resist the attacks of his opponent, and who cannot detect the latent
+dialectic which lies in his own opinions as well as in those of the
+opposite party, sees the advance of illusory arguments and grounds
+of proof which have the advantage of novelty, against as illusory
+grounds of proof destitute of this advantage, and which, perhaps,
+excite the suspicion that the natural credulity of his youth has
+been abused by his instructors. He thinks he can find no better
+means of showing that he has out grown the discipline of his
+minority than by despising those well-meant warnings, and, knowing
+no system of thought but that of dogmatism, he drinks deep draughts
+of the poison that is to sap the principles in which his early years
+were trained.
+
+Exactly the opposite of the system here recommended ought to be
+pursued in academical instruction. This can only be effected, however,
+by a thorough training in the critical investigation of pure reason.
+For, in order to bring the principles of this critique into exercise
+as soon as possible, and to demonstrate their perfect even in the
+presence of the highest degree of dialectical illusion, the student
+ought to examine the assertions made on both sides of speculative
+questions step by step, and to test them by these principles. It
+cannot be a difficult task for him to show the fallacies inherent in
+these propositions, and thus he begins early to feel his own power
+of securing himself against the influence of such sophistical
+arguments, which must finally lose, for him, all their illusory power.
+And, although the same blows which overturn the edifice of his
+opponent are as fatal to his own speculative structures, if such he
+has wished to rear; he need not feel any sorrow in regard to this
+seeming misfortune, as he has now before him a fair prospect into
+the practical region in which he may reasonably hope to find a more
+secure foundation for a rational system.
+
+There is, accordingly, no proper polemic in the sphere of pure
+reason. Both parties beat the air and fight with their own shadows,
+as they pass beyond the limits of nature, and can find no tangible
+point of attack--no firm footing for their dogmatical conflict.
+Fight as vigorously as they may, the shadows which they hew down,
+immediately start up again, like the heroes in Walhalla, and renew
+the bloodless and unceasing contest.
+
+But neither can we admit that there is any proper sceptical
+employment of pure reason, such as might be based upon the principle
+of neutrality in all speculative disputes. To excite reason against
+itself, to place weapons in the hands of the party on the one side
+as well as in those of the other, and to remain an undisturbed and
+sarcastic spectator of the fierce struggle that ensues, seems, from
+the dogmatical point of view, to be a part fitting only a malevolent
+disposition. But, when the sophist evidences an invincible obstinacy
+and blindness, and a pride which no criticism can moderate, there is
+no other practicable course than to oppose to this pride and obstinacy
+similar feelings and pretensions on the other side, equally well or
+ill founded, so that reason, staggered by the reflections thus
+forced upon it, finds it necessary to moderate its confidence in
+such pretensions and to listen to the advice of criticism. But we
+cannot stop at these doubts, much less regard the conviction of our
+ignorance, not only as a cure for the conceit natural to dogmatism,
+but as the settlement of the disputes in which reason is involved with
+itself. On the contrary, scepticism is merely a means of awakening
+reason from its dogmatic dreams and exciting it to a more careful
+investigation into its own powers and pretensions. But, as
+scepticism appears to be the shortest road to a permanent peace in
+the domain of philosophy, and as it is the track pursued by the many
+who aim at giving a philosophical colouring to their contemptuous
+dislike of all inquiries of this kind, I think it necessary to present
+to my readers this mode of thought in its true light.
+
+
+
+Scepticism not a Permanent State for Human Reason.
+
+The consciousness of ignorance--unless this ignorance is
+recognized to be absolutely necessary ought, instead of forming the
+conclusion of my inquiries, to be the strongest motive to the
+pursuit of them. All ignorance is either ignorance of things or of
+the limits of knowledge. If my ignorance is accidental and not
+necessary, it must incite me, in the first case, to a dogmatical
+inquiry regarding the objects of which I am ignorant; in the second,
+to a critical investigation into the bounds of all possible knowledge.
+But that my ignorance is absolutely necessary and unavoidable, and
+that it consequently absolves from the duty of all further
+investigation, is a fact which cannot be made out upon empirical
+grounds--from observation--but upon critical grounds alone, that is,
+by a thoroughgoing investigation into the primary sources of
+cognition. It follows that the determination of the bounds of reason
+can be made only on a priori grounds; while the empirical limitation
+of reason, which is merely an indeterminate cognition of an
+ignorance that can never be completely removed, can take place only
+a posteriori. In other words, our empirical knowledge is limited by
+that which yet remains for us to know. The former cognition of our
+ignorance, which is possible only on a rational basis, is a science;
+the latter is merely a perception, and we cannot say how far the
+inferences drawn from it may extend. If I regard the earth, as it
+really appears to my senses, as a flat surface, I am ignorant how
+far this surface extends. But experience teaches me that, how far
+soever I go, I always see before me a space in which I can proceed
+farther; and thus I know the limits--merely visual--of my actual
+knowledge of the earth, although I am ignorant of the limits of the
+earth itself. But if I have got so far as to know that the earth is
+a sphere, and that its surface is spherical, I can cognize a priori
+and determine upon principles, from my knowledge of a small part of
+this surface--say to the extent of a degree--the diameter and
+circumference of the earth; and although I am ignorant of the
+objects which this surface contains, I have a perfect knowledge of
+its limits and extent.
+
+The sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems to us
+to be a level surface, with an apparent horizon--that which forms
+the limit of its extent, and which has been termed by us the idea of
+unconditioned totality. To reach this limit by empirical means is
+impossible, and all attempts to determine it a priori according to
+a principle, are alike in vain. But all the questions raised by pure
+reason relate to that which lies beyond this horizon, or, at least,
+in its boundary line.
+
+The celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers of human
+reason who believe that they have given a sufficient answer to all
+such questions by declaring them to lie beyond the horizon of our
+knowledge--a horizon which, however, Hume was unable to determine.
+His attention especially was directed to the principle of causality;
+and he remarked with perfect justice that the truth of this principle,
+and even the objective validity of the conception of a cause, was not
+commonly based upon clear insight, that is, upon a priori cognition.
+Hence he concluded that this law does not derive its authority from
+its universality and necessity, but merely from its general
+applicability in the course of experience, and a kind of subjective
+necessity thence arising, which he termed habit. From the inability
+of reason to establish this principle as a necessary law for the
+acquisition of all experience, he inferred the nullity of all the
+attempts of reason to pass the region of the empirical.
+
+This procedure of subjecting the facta of reason to examination,
+and, if necessary, to disapproval, may be termed the censura of
+reason. This censura must inevitably lead us to doubts regarding all
+transcendent employment of principles. But this is only the second
+step in our inquiry. The first step in regard to the subjects of
+pure reason, and which marks the infancy of that faculty, is that of
+dogmatism. The second, which we have just mentioned, is that of
+scepticism, and it gives evidence that our judgement has been improved
+by experience. But a third step is necessary--indicative of the
+maturity and manhood of the judgement, which now lays a firm
+foundation upon universal and necessary principles. This is the period
+of criticism, in which we do not examine the facta of reason, but
+reason itself, in the whole extent of its powers, and in regard to
+its capability of a priori cognition; and thus we determine not merely
+the empirical and ever-shifting bounds of our knowledge, but its necessary
+and eternal limits. We demonstrate from indubitable principles, not
+merely our ignorance in respect to this or that subject, but in regard
+to all possible questions of a certain class. Thus scepticism is a
+resting place for reason, in which it may reflect on its dogmatical
+wanderings and gain some knowledge of the region in which it happens
+to be, that it may pursue its way with greater certainty; but it
+cannot be its permanent dwelling-place. It must take up its abode only
+in the region of complete certitude, whether this relates to the
+cognition of objects themselves, or to the limits which bound all
+our cognition.
+
+Reason is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended plane, of
+the bounds of which we have only a general knowledge; it ought
+rather to be compared to a sphere, the radius of which may be found
+from the curvature of its surface--that is, the nature of a priori
+synthetical propositions--and, consequently, its circumference and
+extent. Beyond the sphere of experience there are no objects which
+it can cognize; nay, even questions regarding such supposititious
+objects relate only to the subjective principles of a complete
+determination of the relations which exist between the
+understanding-conceptions which lie within this sphere.
+
+We are actually in possession of a priori synthetical cognitions, as
+is proved by the existence of the principles of the understanding,
+which anticipate experience. If any one cannot comprehend the
+possibility of these principles, he may have some reason to doubt
+whether they are really a priori; but he cannot on this account
+declare them to be impossible, and affirm the nullity of the steps
+which reason may have taken under their guidance. He can only say:
+If we perceived their origin and their authenticity, we should be able
+to determine the extent and limits of reason; but, till we can do
+this, all propositions regarding the latter are mere random
+assertions. In this view, the doubt respecting all dogmatical
+philosophy, which proceeds without the guidance of criticism, is
+well grounded; but we cannot therefore deny to reason the ability to
+construct a sound philosophy, when the way has been prepared by a
+thorough critical investigation. All the conceptions produced, and
+all the questions raised, by pure reason, do not lie in the sphere
+of experience, but in that of reason itself, and hence they must be
+solved, and shown to be either valid or inadmissible, by that faculty.
+We have no right to decline the solution of such problems, on the
+ground that the solution can be discovered only from the nature of
+things, and under pretence of the limitation of human faculties, for
+reason is the sole creator of all these ideas, and is therefore
+bound either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory
+nature.
+
+The polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the
+dogmatist, who erects a system of philosophy without having examined
+the fundamental objective principles on which it is based, for the
+purpose of evidencing the futility of his designs, and thus bringing
+him to a knowledge of his own powers. But, in itself, scepticism
+does not give us any certain information in regard to the bounds of
+our knowledge. All unsuccessful dogmatical attempts of reason are
+facia, which it is always useful to submit to the censure of the
+sceptic. But this cannot help us to any decision regarding the
+expectations which reason cherishes of better success in future
+endeavours; the investigations of scepticism cannot, therefore, settle
+the dispute regarding the rights and powers of human reason.
+
+Hume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all sceptical
+philosophers, and his writings have, undoubtedly, exerted the most
+powerful influence in awakening reason to a thorough investigation
+into its own powers. It will, therefore, well repay our labours to
+consider for a little the course of reasoning which he followed and
+the errors into which he strayed, although setting out on the path
+of truth and certitude.
+
+Hume was probably aware, although he never clearly developed the
+notion, that we proceed in judgements of a certain class beyond our
+conception if the object. I have termed this kind of judgement
+synthetical. As regard the manner in which I pass beyond my conception
+by the aid of experience, no doubts can be entertained. Experience
+is itself a synthesis of perceptions; and it employs perceptions to
+increment the conception, which I obtain by means of another
+perception. But we feel persuaded that we are able to proceed beyond
+a conception, and to extend our cognition a priori. We attempt this
+in two ways--either, through the pure understanding, in relation to
+that which may become an object of experience, or, through pure
+reason, in relation to such properties of things, or of the
+existence of things, as can never be presented in any experience. This
+sceptical philosopher did not distinguish these two kinds of
+judgements, as he ought to have done, but regarded this augmentation
+of conceptions, and, if we may so express ourselves, the spontaneous
+generation of understanding and reason, independently of the
+impregnation of experience, as altogether impossible. The so-called
+a priori principles of these faculties he consequently held to be
+invalid and imaginary, and regarded them as nothing but subjective
+habits of thought originating in experience, and therefore purely
+empirical and contingent rules, to which we attribute a spurious
+necessity and universality. In support of this strange assertion, he
+referred us to the generally acknowledged principle of the relation
+between cause and effect. No faculty of the mind can conduct us from
+the conception of a thing to the existence of something else; and
+hence he believed he could infer that, without experience, we
+possess no source from which we can augment a conception, and no
+ground sufficient to justify us in framing a judgement that is to
+extend our cognition a priori. That the light of the sun, which shines
+upon a piece of wax, at the same time melts it, while it hardens clay,
+no power of the understanding could infer from the conceptions which
+we previously possessed of these substances; much less is there any
+a priori law that could conduct us to such a conclusion, which
+experience alone can certify. On the other hand, we have seen in our
+discussion of transcendental logic, that, although we can never
+proceed immediately beyond the content of the conception which is
+given us, we can always cognize completely a priori--in relation,
+however, to a third term, namely, possible experience--the law of
+its connection with other things. For example, if I observe that a
+piece of wax melts, I can cognize a priori that there must have been
+something (the sun's heat) preceding, which this law; although,
+without the aid of experience, I could not cognize a priori and in
+a determinate manner either the cause from the effect, or the effect
+from the cause. Hume was, therefore, wrong in inferring, from the
+contingency of the determination according to law, the contingency
+of the law itself; and the passing beyond the conception of a thing
+to possible experience (which is an a priori proceeding, constituting
+the objective reality of the conception), he confounded with our synthesis
+of objects in actual experience, which is always, of course,
+empirical. Thus, too, he regarded the principle of affinity, which
+has its seat in the understanding and indicates a necessary connection,
+as a mere rule of association, lying in the imitative faculty of
+imagination, which can present only contingent, and not objective
+connections.
+
+The sceptical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose
+principally from a defect, which was common to him with the
+dogmatists, namely, that he had never made a systematic review of
+all the different kinds of a priori synthesis performed by the
+understanding. Had he done so, he would have found, to take one
+example among many, that the principle of permanence was of this
+character, and that it, as well as the principle of causality,
+anticipates experience. In this way he might have been able to
+describe the determinate limits of the a priori operations of
+understanding and reason. But he merely declared the understanding
+to be limited, instead of showing what its limits were; he created
+a general mistrust in the power of our faculties, without giving us
+any determinate knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and
+unavoidable ignorance; he examined and condemned some of the
+principles of the understanding, without investigating all its
+powers with the completeness necessary to criticism. He denies, with
+truth, certain powers to the understanding, but he goes further, and
+declares it to be utterly inadequate to the a priori extension of
+knowledge, although he has not fully examined all the powers which
+reside in the faculty; and thus the fate which always overtakes
+scepticism meets him too. That is to say, his own declarations are
+doubted, for his objections were based upon facta, which are
+contingent, and not upon principles, which can alone demonstrate the
+necessary invalidity of all dogmatical assertions.
+
+As Hume makes no distinction between the well-grounded claims of the
+understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason, against
+which, however, his attacks are mainly directed, reason does not
+feel itself shut out from all attempts at the extension of a priori
+cognition, and hence it refuses, in spite of a few checks in this or
+that quarter, to relinquish such efforts. For one naturally arms
+oneself to resist an attack, and becomes more obstinate in the resolve
+to establish the claims he has advanced. But a complete review of
+the powers of reason, and the conviction thence arising that we are
+in possession of a limited field of action, while we must admit the
+vanity of higher claims, puts an end to all doubt and dispute, and
+induces reason to rest satisfied with the undisturbed possession of
+its limited domain.
+
+To the uncritical dogmatist, who has not surveyed the sphere of
+his understanding, nor determined, in accordance with principles,
+the limits of possible cognition, who, consequently, is ignorant of
+his own powers, and believes he will discover them by the attempts
+he makes in the field of cognition, these attacks of scepticism are
+not only dangerous, but destructive. For if there is one proposition
+in his chain of reasoning which be he cannot prove, or the fallacy
+in which he cannot evolve in accordance with a principle, suspicion
+falls on all his statements, however plausible they may appear.
+
+And thus scepticism, the bane of dogmatical philosophy, conducts
+us to a sound investigation into the understanding and the reason.
+When we are thus far advanced, we need fear no further
+attacks; for the limits of our domain are clearly marked out, and we
+can make no claims nor become involved in any disputes regarding the
+region that lies beyond these limits. Thus the sceptical procedure
+in philosophy does not present any solution of the problems of reason,
+but it forms an excellent exercise for its powers, awakening its
+circumspection, and indicating the means whereby it may most fully
+establish its claims to its legitimate possessions.
+
+
+
+SECTION III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis.
+
+This critique of reason has now taught us that all its efforts to
+extend the bounds of knowledge, by means of pure speculation, are
+utterly fruitless. So much the wider field, it may appear, lies open
+to hypothesis; as, where we cannot know with certainty, we are at
+liberty to make guesses and to form suppositions.
+
+Imagination may be allowed, under the strict surveillance of reason,
+to invent suppositions; but, these must be based on something that
+is perfectly certain--and that is the possibility of the object. If
+we are well assured upon this point, it is allowable to have recourse
+to supposition in regard to the reality of the object; but this
+supposition must, unless it is utterly groundless, be connected, as
+its ground of explanation, with that which is really given and
+absolutely certain. Such a supposition is termed a hypothesis.
+
+It is beyond our power to form the least conception a priori of
+the possibility of dynamical connection in phenomena; and the category
+of the pure understanding will not enable us to excogitate any
+such connection, but merely helps us to understand it, when we meet
+with it in experience. For this reason we cannot, in accordance with
+the categories, imagine or invent any object or any property of an
+object not given, or that may not be given in experience, and employ
+it in a hypothesis; otherwise, we should be basing our chain of
+reasoning upon mere chimerical fancies, and not upon conceptions of
+things. Thus, we have no right to assume the existence of new
+powers, not existing in nature--for example, an understanding with
+a non-sensuous intuition, a force of attraction without contact, or
+some new kind of substances occupying space, and yet without the property
+of impenetrability--and, consequently, we cannot assume that there
+is any other kind of community among substances than that observable
+in experience, any kind of presence than that in space, or any kind
+of duration than that in time. In one word, the conditions of possible
+experience are for reason the only conditions of the possibility of
+things; reason cannot venture to form, independently of these
+conditions, any conceptions of things, because such conceptions,
+although not self-contradictory, are without object and without
+application.
+
+The conceptions of reason are, as we have already shown, mere ideas,
+and do not relate to any object in any kind of experience. At the same
+time, they do not indicate imaginary or possible objects. They are
+purely problematical in their nature and, as aids to the heuristic
+exercise of the faculties, form the basis of the regulative principles
+for the systematic employment of the understanding in the field of
+experience. If we leave this ground of experience, they become mere
+fictions of thought, the possibility of which is quite indemonstrable;
+and they cannot, consequently, be employed as hypotheses in the
+explanation of real phenomena. It is quite admissible to cogitate
+the soul as simple, for the purpose of enabling ourselves to employ
+the idea of a perfect and necessary unity of all the faculties of
+the mind as the principle of all our inquiries into its internal
+phenomena, although we cannot cognize this unity in concreto. But to
+assume that the soul is a simple substance (a transcendental
+conception) would be enouncing a proposition which is not only
+indemonstrable--as many physical hypotheses are--but a proposition
+which is purely arbitrary, and in the highest degree rash. The
+simple is never presented in experience; and, if by substance is
+here meant the permanent object of sensuous intuition, the possibility
+of a simple phenomenon is perfectly inconceivable. Reason affords no
+good grounds for admitting the existence of intelligible beings, or
+of intelligible properties of sensuous things, although--as we have
+no conception either of their possibility or of their impossibility--it
+will always be out of our power to affirm dogmatically that they do
+not exist. In the explanation of given phenomena, no other things
+and no other grounds of explanation can be employed than those which
+stand in connection with the given phenomena according to the known
+laws of experience. A transcendental hypothesis, in which a mere
+idea of reason is employed to explain the phenomena of nature, would
+not give us any better insight into a phenomenon, as we should be
+trying to explain what we do not sufficiently understand from known
+empirical principles, by what we do not understand at all. The
+principles of such a hypothesis might conduce to the satisfaction of
+reason, but it would not assist the understanding in its application
+to objects. Order and conformity to aims in the sphere of nature
+must be themselves explained upon natural grounds and according to
+natural laws; and the wildest hypotheses, if they are only physical,
+are here more admissible than a hyperphysical hypothesis, such as that
+of a divine author. For such a hypothesis would introduce the
+principle of ignava ratio, which requires us to give up the search
+for causes that might be discovered in the course of experience and
+to rest satisfied with a mere idea. As regards the absolute totality
+of the grounds of explanation in the series of these causes, this can
+be no hindrance to the understanding in the case of phenomena;
+because, as they are to us nothing more than phenomena, we have no
+right to look for anything like completeness in the synthesis of the
+series of their conditions.
+
+Transcendental hypotheses are therefore inadmissible; and we
+cannot use the liberty of employing, in the absence of physical,
+hyperphysical grounds of explanation. And this for two reasons; first,
+because such hypothesis do not advance reason, but rather stop it in
+its progress; secondly, because this licence would render fruitless
+all its exertions in its own proper sphere, which is that of
+experience. For, when the explanation of natural phenomena happens
+to be difficult, we have constantly at hand a transcendental ground
+of explanation, which lifts us above the necessity of investigating
+nature; and our inquiries are brought to a close, not because we
+have obtained all the requisite knowledge, but because we abut upon
+a principle which is incomprehensible and which, indeed, is so far
+back in the track of thought as to contain the conception of the
+absolutely primal being.
+
+The next requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis is its
+sufficiency. That is, it must determine a priori the consequences
+which are given in experience and which are supposed to follow from
+the hypothesis itself. If we require to employ auxiliary hypotheses,
+the suspicion naturally arises that they are mere fictions; because
+the necessity for each of them requires the same justification as in
+the case of the original hypothesis, and thus their testimony is
+invalid. If we suppose the existence of an infinitely perfect cause,
+we possess sufficient grounds for the explanation of the conformity
+to aims, the order and the greatness which we observe in the universe;
+but we find ourselves obliged, when we observe the evil in the world
+and the exceptions to these laws, to employ new hypothesis in
+support of the original one. We employ the idea of the simple nature
+of the human soul as the foundation of all the theories we may form
+of its phenomena; but when we meet with difficulties in our way, when
+we observe in the soul phenomena similar to the changes which take
+place in matter, we require to call in new auxiliary hypotheses. These
+may, indeed, not be false, but we do not know them to be true, because
+the only witness to their certitude is the hypothesis which they
+themselves have been called in to explain.
+
+We are not discussing the above-mentioned assertions regarding the
+immaterial unity of the soul and the existence of a Supreme Being as
+dogmata, which certain philosophers profess to demonstrate a priori,
+but purely as hypotheses. In the former case, the dogmatist must
+take care that his arguments possess the apodeictic certainty of a
+demonstration. For the assertion that the reality of such ideas is
+probable is as absurd as a proof of the probability of a proposition
+in geometry. Pure abstract reason, apart from all experience, can
+either cognize nothing at all; and hence the judgements it enounces
+are never mere opinions, they are either apodeictic certainties, or
+declarations that nothing can be known on the subject. Opinions and
+probable judgements on the nature of things can only be employed to
+explain given phenomena, or they may relate to the effect, in
+accordance with empirical laws, of an actually existing cause. In
+other words, we must restrict the sphere of opinion to the world of
+experience and nature. Beyond this region opinion is mere invention;
+unless we are groping about for the truth on a path not yet fully
+known, and have some hopes of stumbling upon it by chance.
+
+But, although hypotheses are inadmissible in answers to the
+questions of pure speculative reason, they may be employed in the
+defence of these answers. That is to say, hypotheses are admissible
+in polemic, but not in the sphere of dogmatism. By the defence of
+statements of this character, I do not mean an attempt at
+discovering new grounds for their support, but merely the refutation
+of the arguments of opponents. All a priori synthetical propositions
+possess the peculiarity that, although the philosopher who maintains
+the reality of the ideas contained in the proposition is not in
+possession of sufficient knowledge to establish the certainty of his
+statements, his opponent is as little able to prove the truth of the
+opposite. This equality of fortune does not allow the one party to
+be superior to the other in the sphere of speculative cognition; and
+it is this sphere, accordingly, that is the proper arena of these
+endless speculative conflicts. But we shall afterwards show that, in
+relation to its practical exercise, Reason has the right of
+admitting what, in the field of pure speculation, she would not be
+justified in supposing, except upon perfectly sufficient grounds;
+because all such suppositions destroy the necessary completeness of
+speculation--a condition which the practical reason, however, does
+not consider to be requisite. In this sphere, therefore, Reason is
+mistress of a possession, her title to which she does not require to
+prove--which, in fact, she could not do. The burden of proof
+accordingly rests upon the opponent. But as he has just as little
+knowledge regarding the subject discussed, and is as little able to
+prove the non-existence of the object of an idea, as the philosopher
+on the other side is to demonstrate its reality, it is evident that
+there is an advantage on the side of the philosopher who maintains
+his proposition as a practically necessary supposition (melior est
+conditio possidentis). For he is at liberty to employ, in
+self-defence, the same weapons as his opponent makes use of in
+attacking him; that is, he has a right to use hypotheses not for the
+purpose of supporting the arguments in favour of his own propositions,
+but to show that his opponent knows no more than himself regarding
+the subject under 'discussion and cannot boast of any speculative
+advantage.
+
+Hypotheses are, therefore, admissible in the sphere of pure reason
+only as weapons for self-defence, and not as supports to dogmatical
+assertions. But the opposing party we must always seek for in
+ourselves. For speculative reason is, in the sphere of
+transcendentalism, dialectical in its own nature. The difficulties
+and objections we have to fear lie in ourselves. They are like old
+but never superannuated claims; and we must seek them out, and settle
+them once and for ever, if we are to expect a permanent peace. External
+tranquility is hollow and unreal. The root of these contradictions,
+which lies in the nature of human reason, must be destroyed; and
+this can only be done by giving it, in the first instance, freedom
+to grow, nay, by nourishing it, that it may send out shoots, and
+thus betray its own existence. It is our duty, therefore, to try to
+discover new objections, to put weapons in the bands of our
+opponent, and to grant him the most favourable position in the arena
+that he can wish. We have nothing to fear from these concessions; on
+the contrary, we may rather hope that we shall thus make ourselves
+master of a possession which no one will ever venture to dispute.
+
+The thinker requires, to be fully equipped, the hypotheses of pure
+reason, which, although but leaden weapons (for they have not been
+steeled in the armoury of experience), are as useful as any that can
+be employed by his opponents. If, accordingly, we have assumed, from
+a non-speculative point of view, the immaterial nature of the soul,
+and are met by the objection that experience seems to prove that the
+growth and decay of our mental faculties are mere modifications of
+the sensuous organism--we can weaken the force of this objection by
+the assumption that the body is nothing but the fundamental phenomenon,
+to which, as a necessary condition, all sensibility, and consequently
+all thought, relates in the present state of our existence; and that
+the separation of soul and body forms the conclusion of the sensuous
+exercise of our power of cognition and the beginning of the
+intellectual. The body would, in this view of the question, be
+regarded, not as the cause of thought, but merely as its restrictive
+condition, as promotive of the sensuous and animal, but as a hindrance
+to the pure and spiritual life; and the dependence of the animal
+life on the constitution of the body, would not prove that the whole
+life of man was also dependent on the state of the organism. We
+might go still farther, and discover new objections, or carry out to
+their extreme consequences those which have already been adduced.
+
+Generation, in the human race as well as among the irrational
+animals, depends on so many accidents--of occasion, of proper
+sustenance, of the laws enacted by the government of a country of vice
+even, that it is difficult to believe in the eternal existence of a
+being whose life has begun under circumstances so mean and trivial,
+and so entirely dependent upon our own control. As regards the
+continuance of the existence of the whole race, we need have no
+difficulties, for accident in single cases is subject to general laws;
+but, in the case of each individual, it would seem as if we could
+hardly expect so wonderful an effect from causes so insignificant.
+But, in answer to these objections, we may adduce the transcendental
+hypothesis that all life is properly intelligible, and not subject
+to changes of time, and that it neither began in birth, nor will end
+in death. We may assume that this life is nothing more than a sensuous
+representation of pure spiritual life; that the whole world of sense
+is but an image, hovering before the faculty of cognition which we
+exercise in this sphere, and with no more objective reality than a
+dream; and that if we could intuite ourselves and other things as they
+really are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures,
+our connection with which did not begin at our birth and will not
+cease with the destruction of the body. And so on.
+
+We cannot be said to know what has been above asserted, nor do we
+seriously maintain the truth of these assertions; and the notions
+therein indicated are not even ideas of reason, they are purely
+fictitious conceptions. But this hypothetical procedure is in
+perfect conformity with the laws of reason. Our opponent mistakes
+the absence of empirical conditions for a proof of the complete
+impossibility of all that we have asserted; and we have to show him
+that he has not exhausted the whole sphere of possibility and that
+he can as little compass that sphere by the laws of experience and
+nature, as we can lay a secure foundation for the operations of reason
+beyond the region of experience. Such hypothetical defences against
+the pretensions of an opponent must not be regarded as declarations
+of opinion. The philosopher abandons them, so soon as the opposite
+party renounces its dogmatical conceit. To maintain a simply
+negative position in relation to propositions which rest on an
+insecure foundation, well befits the moderation of a true philosopher;
+but to uphold the objections urged against an opponent as proofs of
+the opposite statement is a proceeding just as unwarrantable and
+arrogant as it is to attack the position of a philosopher who advances
+affirmative propositions regarding such a subject.
+
+It is evident, therefore, that hypotheses, in the speculative
+sphere, are valid, not as independent propositions, but only
+relatively to opposite transcendent assumptions. For, to make the
+principles of possible experience conditions of the possibility of
+things in general is just as transcendent a procedure as to maintain
+the objective reality of ideas which can be applied to no objects
+except such as lie without the limits of possible experience. The
+judgements enounced by pure reason must be necessary, or they must
+not be enounced at all. Reason cannot trouble herself with opinions.
+But the hypotheses we have been discussing are merely problematical
+judgements, which can neither be confuted nor proved; while,
+therefore, they are not personal opinions, they are indispensable as
+answers to objections which are liable to be raised. But we must
+take care to confine them to this function, and guard against any
+assumption on their part of absolute validity, a proceeding which
+would involve reason in inextricable difficulties and contradictions.
+
+
+
+SECTION IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs.
+
+It is a peculiarity, which distinguishes the proofs of transcendental
+synthetical propositions from those of all other a priori synthetical
+cognitions, that reason, in the case of the former, does not apply its
+conceptions directly to an object, but is first obliged to prove, a
+priori, the objective validity of these conceptions and the possibility
+of their syntheses. This is not merely a prudential rule, it is
+essential to the very possibility of the proof of a transcendental
+proposition. If I am required to pass, a priori, beyond the conception
+of an object, I find that it is utterly impossible without the guidance
+of something which is not contained in the conception. In mathematics,
+it is a priori intuition that guides my synthesis; and, in this case,
+all our conclusions may be drawn immediately from pure intuition. In
+transcendental cognition, so long as we are dealing only with
+conceptions of the understanding, we are guided by possible experience.
+That is to say, a proof in the sphere of transcendental cognition does
+not show that the given conception (that of an event, for example)
+leads directly to another conception (that of a cause)--for this would
+be a saltus which nothing can justify; but it shows that experience
+itself, and consequently the object of experience, is impossible
+without the connection indicated by these conceptions. It follows that
+such a proof must demonstrate the possibility of arriving,
+synthetically and a priori, at a certain knowledge of things, which was
+not contained in our conceptions of these things. Unless we pay
+particular attention to this requirement, our proofs, instead of
+pursuing the straight path indicated by reason, follow the tortuous
+road of mere subjective association. The illusory conviction, which
+rests upon subjective causes of association, and which is considered as
+resulting from the perception of a real and objective natural affinity,
+is always open to doubt and suspicion. For this reason, all the
+attempts which have been made to prove the principle of sufficient
+reason, have, according to the universal admission of philosophers,
+been quite unsuccessful; and, before the appearance of transcendental
+criticism, it was considered better, as this principle could not be
+abandoned, to appeal boldly to the common sense of mankind (a
+proceeding which always proves that the problem, which reason ought to
+solve, is one in which philosophers find great difficulties), rather
+than attempt to discover new dogmatical proofs.
+
+But, if the proposition to be proved is a proposition of pure
+reason, and if I aim at passing beyond my empirical conceptions by
+the aid of mere ideas, it is necessary that the proof should first
+show that such a step in synthesis is possible (which it is not), before
+it proceeds to prove the truth of the proposition itself. The so-called
+proof of the simple nature of the soul from the unity of apperception,
+is a very plausible one. But it contains no answer to the objection,
+that, as the notion of absolute simplicity is not a conception which
+is directly applicable to a perception, but is an idea which must be
+inferred--if at all--from observation, it is by no means evident how
+the mere fact of consciousness, which is contained in all thought,
+although in so far a simple representation, can conduct me to the
+consciousness and cognition of a thing which is purely a thinking
+substance. When I represent to my mind the power of my body as in
+motion, my body in this thought is so far absolute unity, and my
+representation of it is a simple one; and hence I can indicate this
+representation by the motion of a point, because I have made
+abstraction of the size or volume of the body. But I cannot hence
+infer that, given merely the moving power of a body, the body may be
+cogitated as simple substance, merely because the representation in
+my mind takes no account of its content in space, and is consequently
+simple. The simple, in abstraction, is very different from the
+objectively simple; and hence the Ego, which is simple in the first
+sense, may, in the second sense, as indicating the soul itself, be
+a very complex conception, with a very various content. Thus it is
+evident that in all such arguments there lurks a paralogism. We
+guess (for without some such surmise our suspicion would not be
+excited in reference to a proof of this character) at the presence
+of the paralogism, by keeping ever before us a criterion of the
+possibility of those synthetical propositions which aim at proving
+more than experience can teach us. This criterion is obtained from
+the observation that such proofs do not lead us directly from the
+subject of the proposition to be proved to the required predicate,
+but find it necessary to presuppose the possibility of extending our
+cognition a priori by means of ideas. We must, accordingly, always
+use the greatest caution; we require, before attempting any proof,
+to consider how it is possible to extend the sphere of cognition by
+the operations of pure reason, and from what source we are to derive
+knowledge, which is not obtained from the analysis of conceptions,
+nor relates, by anticipation, to possible experience. We shall thus
+spare ourselves much severe and fruitless labour, by not expecting
+from reason what is beyond its power, or rather by subjecting it to
+discipline, and teaching it to moderate its vehement desires for the
+extension of the sphere of cognition.
+
+The first rule for our guidance is, therefore, not to attempt a
+transcendental proof, before we have considered from what source we
+are to derive the principles upon which the proof is to be based,
+and what right we have to expect that our conclusions from these
+principles will be veracious. If they are principles of the
+understanding, it is vain to expect that we should attain by their
+means to ideas of pure reason; for these principles are valid only
+in regard to objects of possible experience. If they are principles
+of pure reason, our labour is alike in vain. For the principles of
+reason, if employed as objective, are without exception dialectical
+and possess no validity or truth, except as regulative principles of
+the systematic employment of reason in experience. But when such
+delusive proof are presented to us, it is our duty to meet them with
+the non liquet of a matured judgement; and, although we are unable
+to expose the particular sophism upon which the proof is based, we
+have a right to demand a deduction of the principles employed in it;
+and, if these principles have their origin in pure reason alone,
+such a deduction is absolutely impossible. And thus it is
+unnecessary that we should trouble ourselves with the exposure and
+confutation of every sophistical illusion; we may, at once, bring
+all dialectic, which is inexhaustible in the production of
+fallacies, before the bar of critical reason, which tests the
+principles upon which all dialectical procedure is based. The second
+peculiarity of transcendental proof is that a transcendental
+proposition cannot rest upon more than a single proof. If I am drawing
+conclusions, not from conceptions, but from intuition corresponding
+to a conception, be it pure intuition, as in mathematics, or empirical,
+as in natural science, the intuition which forms the basis of my
+inferences presents me with materials for many synthetical
+propositions, which I can connect in various modes, while, as it is
+allowable to proceed from different points in the intention, I can
+arrive by different paths at the same proposition.
+
+But every transcendental proposition sets out from a conception, and
+posits the synthetical condition of the possibility of an object
+according to this conception. There must, therefore, be but one ground
+of proof, because it is the conception alone which determines the
+object; and thus the proof cannot contain anything more than the
+determination of the object according to the conception. In our
+Transcendental Analytic, for example, we inferred the principle: Every
+event has a cause, from the only condition of the objective
+possibility of our conception of an event. This is that an event
+cannot be determined in time, and consequently cannot form a part of
+experience, unless it stands under this dynamical law. This is the
+only possible ground of proof; for our conception of an event
+possesses objective validity, that is, is a true conception, only
+because the law of causality determines an object to which it can
+refer. Other arguments in support of this principle have been
+attempted--such as that from the contingent nature of a phenomenon;
+but when this argument is considered, we can discover no criterion
+of contingency, except the fact of an event--of something happening,
+that is to say, the existence which is preceded by the non-existence
+of an object, and thus we fall back on the very thing to be proved.
+If the proposition: "Every thinking being is simple," is to be proved,
+we keep to the conception of the ego, which is simple, and to which
+all thought has a relation. The same is the case with the transcendental
+proof of the existence of a Deity, which is based solely upon the
+harmony and reciprocal fitness of the conceptions of an ens
+realissimum and a necessary being, and cannot be attempted in any
+other manner.
+
+This caution serves to simplify very much the criticism of all
+propositions of reason. When reason employs conceptions alone, only
+one proof of its thesis is possible, if any. When, therefore, the
+dogmatist advances with ten arguments in favour of a proposition, we
+may be sure that not one of them is conclusive. For if he possessed
+one which proved the proposition he brings forward to demonstration-
+as must always be the case with the propositions of pure reason-
+what need is there for any more? His intention can only be similar
+to that of the advocate who had different arguments for different
+judges; this availing himself of the weakness of those who examine
+his arguments, who, without going into any profound investigation,
+adopt the view of the case which seems most probable at first sight
+and decide according to it.
+
+The third rule for the guidance of pure reason in the conduct of a
+proof is that all transcendental proofs must never be apagogic or
+indirect, but always ostensive or direct. The direct or ostensive
+proof not only establishes the truth of the proposition to be
+proved, but exposes the grounds of its truth; the apagogic, on the
+other hand, may assure us of the truth of the proposition, but it
+cannot enable us to comprehend the grounds of its possibility. The
+latter is, accordingly, rather an auxiliary to an argument, than a
+strictly philosophical and rational mode of procedure. In one respect,
+however, they have an advantage over direct proofs, from the fact that
+the mode of arguing by contradiction, which they employ, renders our
+understanding of the question more clear, and approximates the proof
+to the certainty of an intuitional demonstration.
+
+The true reason why indirect proofs are employed in different
+sciences is this. When the grounds upon which we seek to base a
+cognition are too various or too profound, we try whether or not we
+may not discover the truth of our cognition from its consequences.
+The modus ponens of reasoning from the truth of its inferences to the
+truth of a proposition would be admissible if all the inferences
+that can be drawn from it are known to be true; for in this case there
+can be only one possible ground for these inferences, and that is
+the true one. But this is a quite impracticable procedure, as it
+surpasses all our powers to discover all the possible inferences
+that can be drawn from a proposition. But this mode of reasoning is
+employed, under favour, when we wish to prove the truth of an
+hypothesis; in which case we admit the truth of the conclusion-
+which is supported by analogy--that, if all the inferences we have
+drawn and examined agree with the proposition assumed, all other
+possible inferences will also agree with it. But, in this way, an
+hypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated truth. The modus
+tollens of reasoning from known inferences to the unknown proposition,
+is not only a rigorous, but a very easy mode of proof. For, if it
+can be shown that but one inference from a proposition is false,
+then the proposition must itself be false. Instead, then, of
+examining, in an ostensive argument, the whole series of the grounds
+on which the truth of a proposition rests, we need only take the
+opposite of this proposition, and if one inference from it be false,
+then must the opposite be itself false; and, consequently, the
+proposition which we wished to prove must be true.
+
+The apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences
+where it is impossible to mistake a subjective representation for an
+objective cognition. Where this is possible, it is plain that the
+opposite of a given proposition may contradict merely the subjective
+conditions of thought, and not the objective cognition; or it may
+happen that both propositions contradict each other only under a
+subjective condition, which is incorrectly considered to be objective,
+and, as the condition is itself false, both propositions may be false,
+and it will, consequently, be impossible to conclude the truth of
+the one from the falseness of the other.
+
+In mathematics such subreptions are impossible; and it is in this
+science, accordingly, that the indirect mode of proof has its true
+place. In the science of nature, where all assertion is based upon
+empirical intuition, such subreptions may be guarded against by the
+repeated comparison of observations; but this mode of proof is of
+little value in this sphere of knowledge. But the transcendental
+efforts of pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective,
+which is the real medium of all dialectical illusion; and thus
+reason endeavours, in its premisses, to impose upon us subjective
+representations for objective cognitions. In the transcendental sphere
+of pure reason, then, and in the case of synthetical propositions,
+it is inadmissible to support a statement by disproving the
+counter-statement. For only two cases are possible; either, the
+counter-statement is nothing but the enouncement of the
+inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the subjective conditions
+of reason, which does not affect the real case (for example, we cannot
+comprehend the unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being,
+and hence every speculative proof of the existence of such a being
+must be opposed on subjective grounds, while the possibility of this
+being in itself cannot with justice be denied); or, both propositions,
+being dialectical in their nature, are based upon an impossible
+conception. In this latter case the rule applies: non entis nulla sunt
+predicata; that is to say, what we affirm and what we deny, respecting
+such an object, are equally untrue, and the apagogic mode of
+arriving at the truth is in this case impossible. If, for example,
+we presuppose that the world of sense is given in itself in its
+totality, it is false, either that it is infinite, or that it is
+finite and limited in space. Both are false, because the hypothesis
+is false. For the notion of phenomena (as mere representations) which
+are given in themselves (as objects) is self-contradictory; and the
+infinitude of this imaginary whole would, indeed, be unconditioned,
+but would be inconsistent (as everything in the phenomenal world is
+conditioned) with the unconditioned determination and finitude of
+quantities which is presupposed in our conception.
+
+The apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illusions
+which have always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of
+dogmatical philosophy. It may be compared to a champion who
+maintains the honour and claims of the party he has adopted by
+offering battle to all who doubt the validity of these claims and
+the purity of that honour; while nothing can be proved in this way,
+except the respective strength of the combatants, and the advantage,
+in this respect, is always on the side of the attacking party.
+Spectators, observing that each party is alternately conqueror and
+conquered, are led to regard the subject of dispute as beyond the
+power of man to decide upon. But such an opinion cannot be
+justified; and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners the
+remark:
+
+ Non defensoribus istis
+ Tempus eget.
+
+Each must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental
+deduction of the grounds of proof employed in his argument, and thus
+enable us to see in what way the claims of reason may be supported.
+If an opponent bases his assertions upon subjective grounds, he may
+be refuted with ease; not, however to the advantage of the dogmatist,
+who likewise depends upon subjective sources of cognition and is in
+like manner driven into a corner by his opponent. But, if parties employ
+the direct method of procedure, they will soon discover the
+difficulty, nay, the impossibility of proving their assertions, and
+will be forced to appeal to prescription and precedence; or they will,
+by the help of criticism, discover with ease the dogmatical
+illusions by which they had been mocked, and compel reason to renounce
+its exaggerated pretensions to speculative insight and to confine
+itself within the limits of its proper sphere--that of practical
+principles.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II. The Canon of Pure Reason.
+
+It is a humiliating consideration for human reason that it is
+incompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation, but, on
+the contrary, stands in need of discipline to check its deviations
+from the straight path and to expose the illusions which it
+originates. But, on the other hand, this consideration ought to
+elevate and to give it confidence, for this discipline is exercised
+by itself alone, and it is subject to the censure of no other power.
+The bounds, moreover, which it is forced to set to its speculative
+exercise, form likewise a check upon the fallacious pretensions of
+opponents; and thus what remains of its possessions, after these
+exaggerated claims have been disallowed, is secure from attack or
+usurpation. The greatest, and perhaps the only, use of all
+philosophy of pure reason is, accordingly, of a purely negative
+character. It is not an organon for the extension, but a discipline
+for the determination, of the limits of its exercise; and without
+laying claim to the discovery of new truth, it has the modest merit
+of guarding against error.
+
+At the same time, there must be some source of positive cognitions
+which belong to the domain of pure reason and which become the
+causes of error only from our mistaking their true character, while
+they form the goal towards which reason continually strives. How
+else can we account for the inextinguishable desire in the human
+mind to find a firm footing in some region beyond the limits of the
+world of experience? It hopes to attain to the possession of a
+knowledge in which it has the deepest interest. It enters upon the
+path of pure speculation; but in vain. We have some reason, however,
+to expect that, in the only other way that lies open to it--the path
+of practical reason--it may meet with better success.
+
+I understand by a canon a list of the a priori principles of the
+proper employment of certain faculties of cognition. Thus general
+logic, in its analytical department, is a formal canon for the
+faculties of understanding and reason. In the same way, Transcendental
+Analytic was seen to be a canon of the pure understanding; for it
+alone is competent to enounce true a priori synthetical cognitions.
+But, when no proper employment of a faculty of cognition is
+possible, no canon can exist. But the synthetical cognition of pure
+speculative reason is, as has been shown, completely impossible. There
+cannot, therefore, exist any canon for the speculative exercise of
+this faculty--for its speculative exercise is entirely dialectical;
+and, consequently, transcendental logic, in this respect, is merely
+a discipline, and not a canon. If, then, there is any proper mode of
+employing the faculty of pure reason--in which case there must be a
+canon for this faculty--this canon will relate, not to the
+speculative, but to the practical use of reason. This canon we now
+proceed to investigate.
+
+
+
+SECTION I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason.
+
+There exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to venture
+beyond the field of experience, to attempt to reach the utmost
+bounds of all cognition by the help of ideas alone, and not to rest
+satisfied until it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of
+its cognitions into a self-subsistent systematic whole. Is the
+motive for this endeavour to be found in its speculative, or in its
+practical interests alone?
+
+Setting aside, at present, the results of the labours of pure reason
+in its speculative exercise, I shall merely inquire regarding the
+problems the solution of which forms its ultimate aim, whether reached
+or not, and in relation to which all other aims are but partial and
+intermediate. These highest aims must, from the nature of reason,
+possess complete unity; otherwise the highest interest of humanity
+could not be successfully promoted.
+
+The transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things:
+the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the
+existence of God. The speculative interest which reason has in those
+questions is very small; and, for its sake alone, we should not
+undertake the labour of transcendental investigation--a labour full
+of toil and ceaseless struggle. We should be loth to undertake this
+labour, because the discoveries we might make would not be of the
+smallest use in the sphere of concrete or physical investigation. We
+may find out that the will is free, but this knowledge only relates
+to the intelligible cause of our volition. As regards the phenomena
+or expressions of this will, that is, our actions, we are bound, in
+obedience to an inviolable maxim, without which reason cannot be
+employed in the sphere of experience, to explain these in the same
+way as we explain all the other phenomena of nature, that is to say,
+according to its unchangeable laws. We may have discovered the
+spirituality and immortality of the soul, but we cannot employ this
+knowledge to explain the phenomena of this life, nor the peculiar
+nature of the future, because our conception of an incorporeal
+nature is purely negative and does not add anything to our
+knowledge, and the only inferences to be drawn from it are purely
+fictitious. If, again, we prove the existence of a supreme
+intelligence, we should be able from it to make the conformity to aims
+existing in the arrangement of the world comprehensible; but we should
+not be justified in deducing from it any particular arrangement or
+disposition, or inferring any where it is not perceived. For it is
+a necessary rule of the speculative use of reason that we must not
+overlook natural causes, or refuse to listen to the teaching of
+experience, for the sake of deducing what we know and perceive from
+something that transcends all our knowledge. In one word, these
+three propositions are, for the speculative reason, always
+transcendent, and cannot be employed as immanent principles in
+relation to the objects of experience; they are, consequently, of no
+use to us in this sphere, being but the valueless results of the
+severe but unprofitable efforts of reason.
+
+If, then, the actual cognition of these three cardinal propositions is
+perfectly useless, while Reason uses her utmost endeavours to induce us
+to admit them, it is plain that their real value and importance relate
+to our practical, and not to our speculative interest.
+
+I term all that is possible through free will, practical. But if the
+conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical, reason
+can have only a regulative, and not a constitutive, influence upon
+it, and is serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its
+empirical laws. In the moral philosophy of prudence, for example,
+the sole business of reason is to bring about a union of all the ends,
+which are aimed at by our inclinations, into one ultimate end--that
+of happiness--and to show the agreement which should exist among the
+means of attaining that end. In this sphere, accordingly, reason
+cannot present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action,
+for our guidance towards the aims set up by the senses, and is
+incompetent to give us laws which are pure and determined completely
+a priori. On the other hand, pure practical laws, the ends of which
+have been given by reason entirely a priori, and which are not
+empirically conditioned, but are, on the contrary, absolutely
+imperative in their nature, would be products of pure reason. Such
+are the moral laws; and these alone belong to the sphere of the
+practical exercise of reason, and admit of a canon.
+
+All the powers of reason, in the sphere of what may be termed pure
+philosophy, are, in fact, directed to the three above-mentioned
+problems alone. These again have a still higher end--the answer to
+the question, what we ought to do, if the will is free, if there is
+a God and a future world. Now, as this problem relates to our in
+reference to the highest aim of humanity, it is evident that the
+ultimate intention of nature, in the constitution of our reason, has
+been directed to the moral alone.
+
+We must take care, however, in turning our attention to an object
+which is foreign* to the sphere of transcendental philosophy, not to
+injure the unity of our system by digressions, nor, on the other hand,
+to fail in clearness, by saying too little on the new subject of
+discussion. I hope to avoid both extremes, by keeping as close as
+possible to the transcendental, and excluding all psychological,
+that is, empirical, elements.
+
+[*Footnote: All practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure
+and pain, and consequently--in an indirect manner, at least--to objects
+of feeling. But as feeling is not a faculty of representation, but
+lies out of the sphere of our powers of cognition, the elements of
+our judgements, in so far as they relate to pleasure or pain, that
+is, the elements of our practical judgements, do not belong to
+transcendental philosophy, which has to do with pure a priori
+cognitions alone.]
+
+I have to remark, in the first place, that at present I treat of the
+conception of freedom in the practical sense only, and set aside the
+corresponding transcendental conception, which cannot be employed as
+a ground of explanation in the phenomenal world, but is itself a problem
+for pure reason. A will is purely animal (arbitrium brutum) when it
+is determined by sensuous impulses or instincts only, that is, when
+it is determined in a pathological manner. A will, which can be determined
+independently of sensuous impulses, consequently by motives
+presented by reason alone, is called a free will (arbitrium
+liberum); and everything which is connected with this free will,
+either as principle or consequence, is termed practical. The existence
+of practical freedom can be proved from experience alone. For the
+human will is not determined by that alone which immediately affects
+the senses; on the contrary, we have the power, by calling up the
+notion of what is useful or hurtful in a more distant relation, of
+overcoming the immediate impressions on our sensuous faculty of
+desire. But these considerations of what is desirable in relation to
+our whole state, that is, is in the end good and useful, are based
+entirely upon reason. This faculty, accordingly, enounces laws,
+which are imperative or objective laws of freedom and which tell us
+what ought to take place, thus distinguishing themselves from the laws
+of nature, which relate to that which does take place. The laws of
+freedom or of free will are hence termed practical laws.
+
+Whether reason is not itself, in the actual delivery of these
+laws, determined in its turn by other influences, and whether the
+action which, in relation to sensuous impulses, we call free, may not,
+in relation to higher and more remote operative causes, really form
+a part of nature--these are questions which do not here concern us.
+They are purely speculative questions; and all we have to do, in the
+practical sphere, is to inquire into the rule of conduct which
+reason has to present. Experience demonstrates to us the existence
+of practical freedom as one of the causes which exist in nature,
+that is, it shows the causal power of reason in the determination of
+the will. The idea of transcendental freedom, on the contrary,
+requires that reason--in relation to its causal power of commencing
+a series of phenomena--should be independent of all sensuous
+determining causes; and thus it seems to be in opposition to the law
+of nature and to all possible experience. It therefore remains a
+problem for the human mind. But this problem does not concern reason
+in its practical use; and we have, therefore, in a canon of pure
+reason, to do with only two questions, which relate to the practical
+interest of pure reason: Is there a God? and, Is there a future
+life? The question of transcendental freedom is purely speculative,
+and we may therefore set it entirely aside when we come to treat of
+practical reason. Besides, we have already discussed this subject in
+the antinomy of pure reason.
+
+
+
+SECTION II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining
+ Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason.
+
+Reason conducted us, in its speculative use, through the field of
+experience and, as it can never find complete satisfaction in that
+sphere, from thence to speculative ideas--which, however, in the end
+brought us back again to experience, and thus fulfilled the purpose
+of reason, in a manner which, though useful, was not at all in accordance
+with our expectations. It now remains for us to consider whether
+pure reason can be employed in a practical sphere, and whether it will
+here conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure
+reason, as we have just stated them. We shall thus ascertain
+whether, from the point of view of its practical interest, reason
+may not be able to supply us with that which, on the speculative side,
+it wholly denies us.
+
+The whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is
+centred in the three following questions:
+
+ 1. WHAT CAN I KNOW?
+ 2. WHAT OUGHT I TO DO?
+ 3. WHAT MAY I HOPE?
+
+The first question is purely speculative. We have, as I flatter
+myself, exhausted all the replies of which it is susceptible, and have
+at last found the reply with which reason must content itself, and
+with which it ought to be content, so long as it pays no regard to
+the practical. But from the two great ends to the attainment of which
+all these efforts of pure reason were in fact directed, we remain just
+as far removed as if we had consulted our ease and declined the task
+at the outset. So far, then, as knowledge is concerned, thus much,
+at least, is established, that, in regard to those two problems, it
+lies beyond our reach.
+
+The second question is purely practical. As such it may indeed
+fall within the province of pure reason, but still it is not
+transcendental, but moral, and consequently cannot in itself form
+the subject of our criticism.
+
+The third question: If I act as I ought to do, what may I then
+hope?--is at once practical and theoretical. The practical forms a
+clue to the answer of the theoretical, and--in its highest form-
+speculative question. For all hoping has happiness for its object
+and stands in precisely the same relation to the practical and the
+law of morality as knowing to the theoretical cognition of things and
+the law of nature. The former arrives finally at the conclusion that
+something is (which determines the ultimate end), because something
+ought to take place; the latter, that something is (which operates
+as the highest cause), because something does take place.
+
+Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires; extensive, in
+regard to their multiplicity; intensive, in regard to their degree;
+and protensive, in regard to their duration. The practical law based
+on the motive of happiness I term a pragmatical law (or prudential
+rule); but that law, assuming such to exist, which has no other motive
+than the worthiness of being happy, I term a moral or ethical law.
+The first tells us what we have to do, if we wish to become possessed
+of happiness; the second dictates how we ought to act, in order to
+deserve happiness. The first is based upon empirical principles; for
+it is only by experience that I can learn either what inclinations
+exist which desire satisfaction, or what are the natural means of
+satisfying them. The second takes no account of our desires or the
+means of satisfying them, and regards only the freedom of a rational
+being, and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom
+can harmonize with the distribution of happiness according to
+principles. This second law may therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure
+reason, and may be cognized a priori.
+
+I assume that there are pure moral laws which determine, entirely
+a priori (without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness),
+the conduct of a rational being, or in other words, to use which it
+makes of its freedom, and that these laws are absolutely imperative
+(not merely hypothetically, on the supposition of other empirical
+ends), and therefore in all respects necessary. I am warranted in
+assuming this, not only by the arguments of the most enlightened
+moralists, but by the moral judgement of every man who will make the
+attempt to form a distinct conception of such a law.
+
+Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative, but in
+its practical, or, more strictly, its moral use, principles of the
+possibility of experience, of such actions, namely, as, in
+accordance with ethical precepts, might be met with in the history
+of man. For since reason commands that such actions should take place,
+it must be possible for them to take place; and hence a particular
+kind of systematic unity--the moral--must be possible. We have
+found, it is true, that the systematic unity of nature could not be
+established according to speculative principles of reason, because,
+while reason possesses a causal power in relation to freedom, it has
+none in relation to the whole sphere of nature; and, while moral
+principles of reason can produce free actions, they cannot produce
+natural laws. It is, then, in its practical, but especially in its
+moral use, that the principles of pure reason possess objective
+reality.
+
+I call the world a moral world, in so far as it may be in accordance
+with all the ethical laws--which, by virtue of the freedom of
+reasonable beings, it can be, and according to the necessary laws of
+morality it ought to be. But this world must be conceived only as an
+intelligible world, inasmuch as abstraction is therein made of all
+conditions (ends), and even of all impediments to morality (the
+weakness or pravity of human nature). So far, then, it is a mere idea-
+though still a practical idea--which may have, and ought to have, an
+influence on the world of sense, so as to bring it as far as
+possible into conformity with itself. The idea of a moral world has,
+therefore, objective reality, not as referring to an object of
+intelligible intuition--for of such an object we can form no
+conception whatever--but to the world of sense--conceived, however,
+as an object of pure reason in its practical use--and to a corpus
+mysticum of rational beings in it, in so far as the liberum
+arbitrium of the individual is placed, under and by virtue of moral
+laws, in complete systematic unity both with itself and with the
+freedom of all others.
+
+That is the answer to the first of the two questions of pure
+reason which relate to its practical interest: Do that which will
+render thee worthy of happiness. The second question is this: If I
+conduct myself so as not to be unworthy of happiness, may I hope
+thereby to obtain happiness? In order to arrive at the solution of
+this question, we must inquire whether the principles of pure
+reason, which prescribe a priori the law, necessarily also connect
+this hope with it.
+
+I say, then, that just as the moral principles are necessary
+according to reason in its practical use, so it is equally necessary
+according to reason in its theoretical use to assume that every one
+has ground to hope for happiness in the measure in which he has made
+himself worthy of it in his conduct, and that therefore the system
+of morality is inseparably (though only in the idea of pure reason)
+connected with that of happiness.
+
+Now in an intelligible, that is, in the moral world, in the
+conception of which we make abstraction of all the impediments to
+morality (sensuous desires), such a system of happiness, connected
+with and proportioned to morality, may be conceived as necessary,
+because freedom of volition--partly incited, and partly restrained
+by moral laws--would be itself the cause of general happiness; and
+thus rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, would
+be themselves the authors both of their own enduring welfare and
+that of others. But such a system of self-rewarding morality is only
+an idea, the carrying out of which depends upon the condition that
+every one acts as he ought; in other words, that all actions of
+reasonable beings be such as they would be if they sprung from a
+Supreme Will, comprehending in, or under, itself all particular wills.
+But since the moral law is binding on each individual in the use of
+his freedom of volition, even if others should not act in conformity
+with this law, neither the nature of things, nor the causality of
+actions and their relation to morality, determine how the consequences
+of these actions will be related to happiness; and the necessary
+connection of the hope of happiness with the unceasing endeavour to
+become worthy of happiness, cannot be cognized by reason, if we take
+nature alone for our guide. This connection can be hoped for only on
+the assumption that the cause of nature is a supreme reason, which
+governs according to moral laws.
+
+I term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect
+will, united with supreme blessedness, is the cause of all happiness
+in the world, so far as happiness stands in strict relation to
+morality (as the worthiness of being happy), the ideal of the supreme
+Good. It is only, then, in the ideal of the supreme original good,
+that pure reason can find the ground of the practically necessary
+connection of both elements of the highest derivative good, and
+accordingly of an intelligible, that is, moral world. Now since we are
+necessitated by reason to conceive ourselves as belonging to such a
+world, while the senses present to us nothing but a world of
+phenomena, we must assume the former as a consequence of our conduct
+in the world of sense (since the world of sense gives us no hint of
+it), and therefore as future in relation to us. Thus God and a future
+life are two hypotheses which, according to the principles of pure
+reason, are inseparable from the obligation which this reason imposes
+upon us.
+
+Morality per se constitutes a system. But we can form no system of
+happiness, except in so far as it is dispensed in strict proportion
+to morality. But this is only possible in the intelligible world, under
+a wise author and ruler. Such a ruler, together with life in such a
+world, which we must look upon as future, reason finds itself
+compelled to assume; or it must regard the moral laws as idle
+dreams, since the necessary consequence which this same reason
+connects with them must, without this hypothesis, fall to the
+ground. Hence also the moral laws are universally regarded as
+commands, which they could not be did they not connect a priori
+adequate consequences with their dictates, and thus carry with them
+promises and threats. But this, again, they could not do, did they
+not reside in a necessary being, as the Supreme Good, which alone can
+render such a teleological unity possible.
+
+Leibnitz termed the world, when viewed in relation to the rational
+beings which it contains, and the moral relations in which they
+stand to each other, under the government of the Supreme Good, the
+kingdom of Grace, and distinguished it from the kingdom of Nature,
+in which these rational beings live, under moral laws, indeed, but
+expect no other consequences from their actions than such as follow
+according to the course of nature in the world of sense. To view
+ourselves, therefore, as in the kingdom of grace, in which all
+happiness awaits us, except in so far as we ourselves limit our
+participation in it by actions which render us unworthy of
+happiness, is a practically necessary idea of reason.
+
+Practical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions,
+that is, subjective principles, are termed maxims. The judgements of
+moral according to in its purity and ultimate results are framed
+according ideas; the observance of its laws, according to according
+to maxims.
+
+The whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims; but
+this is impossible, unless with the moral law, which is a mere idea,
+reason connects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct
+which is in conformity with the moral law an issue either in this or
+in another life, which is in exact conformity with our highest aims.
+Thus, without a God and without a world, invisible to us now, but
+hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of
+approbation and of admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose
+and action. For they do not satisfy all the aims which are natural
+to every rational being, and which are determined a priori by pure
+reason itself, and necessary.
+
+Happiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being the
+complete good. Reason does not approve of it (however much inclination
+may desire it), except as united with desert. On the other hand,
+morality alone, and with it, mere desert, is likewise far from being
+the complete good. To make it complete, he who conducts himself in
+a manner not unworthy of happiness, must be able to hope for the
+possession of happiness. Even reason, unbiased by private ends, or
+interested considerations, cannot judge otherwise, if it puts itself
+in the place of a being whose business it is to dispense all happiness
+to others. For in the practical idea both points are essentially
+combined, though in such a way that participation in happiness is
+rendered possible by the moral disposition, as its condition, and
+not conversely, the moral disposition by the prospect of happiness.
+For a disposition which should require the prospect of happiness as
+its necessary condition would not be moral, and hence also would not
+be worthy of complete happiness--a happiness which, in the view of
+reason, recognizes no limitation but such as arises from our own
+immoral conduct.
+
+Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of
+rational beings (whereby they are made worthy of happiness),
+constitutes alone the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely
+must transport ourselves according to the commands of pure but
+practical reason. This world is, it is true, only an intelligible
+world; for of such a systematic unity of ends as it requires, the
+world of sense gives us no hint. Its reality can be based on nothing
+else but the hypothesis of a supreme original good. In it
+independent reason, equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme
+cause, founds, maintains, and fulfils the universal order of things,
+with the most perfect teleological harmony, however much this order
+may be hidden from us in the world of sense.
+
+This moral theology has the peculiar advantage, in contrast with
+speculative theology, of leading inevitably to the conception of a
+sole, perfect, and rational First Cause, whereof speculative
+theology does not give us any indication on objective grounds, far
+less any convincing evidence. For we find neither in transcendental
+nor in natural theology, however far reason may lead us in these,
+any ground to warrant us in assuming the existence of one only
+Being, which stands at the head of all natural causes, and on which
+these are entirely dependent. On the other band, if we take our
+stand on moral unity as a necessary law of the universe, and from this
+point of view consider what is necessary to give this law adequate
+efficiency and, for us, obligatory force, we must come to the
+conclusion that there is one only supreme will, which comprehends
+all these laws in itself. For how, under different wills, should we
+find complete unity of ends? This will must be omnipotent, that all
+nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to
+it; omniscient, that it may have knowledge of the most secret feelings
+and their moral worth; omnipresent, that it may be at hand to supply
+every necessity to which the highest weal of the world may give rise;
+eternal, that this harmony of nature and liberty may never fail; and
+so on.
+
+But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences-
+which, as mere nature, is only a world of sense, but, as a system of
+freedom of volition, may be termed an intelligible, that is, moral
+world (regnum gratiae)--leads inevitably also to the teleological
+unity of all things which constitute this great whole, according to
+universal natural laws--just as the unity of the former is according
+to universal and necessary moral laws--and unites the practical with
+the speculative reason. The world must be represented as having
+originated from an idea, if it is to harmonize with that use of reason
+without which we cannot even consider ourselves as worthy of reason-
+namely, the moral use, which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme
+good. Hence the investigation of nature receives a teleological
+direction, and becomes, in its widest extension, physico-theology.
+But this, taking its rise in moral order as a unity founded on the
+essence of freedom, and not accidentally instituted by external commands,
+establishes the teleological view of nature on grounds which must be
+inseparably connected with the internal possibility of things. This
+gives rise to a transcendental theology, which takes the ideal of
+the highest ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity;
+and this principle connects all things according to universal and
+necessary natural laws, because all things have their origin in the
+absolute necessity of the one only Primal Being.
+
+What use can we make of our understanding, even in respect of
+experience, if we do not propose ends to ourselves? But the highest
+ends are those of morality, and it is only pure reason that can give
+us the knowledge of these. Though supplied with these, and putting
+ourselves under their guidance, we can make no teleological use of
+the knowledge of nature, as regards cognition, unless nature itself
+has established teleological unity. For without this unity we should
+not even possess reason, because we should have no school for reason,
+and no cultivation through objects which afford the materials for
+its conceptions. But teleological unity is a necessary unity, and
+founded on the essence of the individual will itself. Hence this will,
+which is the condition of the application of this unity in concreto,
+must be so likewise. In this way the transcendental enlargement of
+our rational cognition would be, not the cause, but merely the effect
+of the practical teleology which pure reason imposes upon us.
+
+Hence, also, we find in the history of human reason that, before the
+moral conceptions were sufficiently purified and determined, and
+before men had attained to a perception of the systematic unity of
+ends according to these conceptions and from necessary principles,
+the knowledge of nature, and even a considerable amount of intellectual
+culture in many other sciences, could produce only rude and vague
+conceptions of the Deity, sometimes even admitting of an astonishing
+indifference with regard to this question altogether. But the more
+enlarged treatment of moral ideas, which was rendered necessary by
+the extreme pure moral law of our religion, awakened the interest,
+and thereby quickened the perceptions of reason in relation to this
+object. In this way, and without the help either of an extended
+acquaintance with nature, or of a reliable transcendental insight (for
+these have been wanting in all ages), a conception of the Divine Being
+was arrived at, which we now bold to be the correct one, not because
+speculative reason convinces us of its correctness, but because it
+accords with the moral principles of reason. Thus it is to pure
+reason, but only in its practical use, that we must ascribe the
+merit of having connected with our highest interest a cognition, of
+which mere speculation was able only to form a conjecture, but the
+validity of which it was unable to establish--and of having thereby
+rendered it, not indeed a demonstrated dogma, but a hypothesis
+absolutely necessary to the essential ends of reason.
+
+But if practical reason has reached this elevation, and has attained
+to the conception of a sole Primal Being as the supreme good, it
+must not, therefore, imagine that it has transcended the empirical
+conditions of its application, and risen to the immediate cognition
+of new objects; it must not presume to start from the conception which
+it has gained, and to deduce from it the moral laws themselves. For
+it was these very laws, the internal practical necessity of which led
+us to the hypothesis of an independent cause, or of a wise ruler of
+the universe, who should give them effect. Hence we are not entitled
+to regard them as accidental and derived from the mere will of the
+ruler, especially as we have no conception of such a will, except as
+formed in accordance with these laws. So far, then, as practical
+reason has the right to conduct us, we shall not look upon actions
+as binding on us, because they are the commands of God, but we shall
+regard them as divine commands, because we are internally bound by
+them. We shall study freedom under the teleological unity which
+accords with principles of reason; we shall look upon ourselves as
+acting in conformity with the divine will only in so far as we hold
+sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from the nature of
+actions themselves, and we shall believe that we can obey that will
+only by promoting the weal of the universe in ourselves and in others.
+Moral theology is, therefore, only of immanent use. It teaches us to
+fulfil our destiny here in the world, by placing ourselves in
+harmony with the general system of ends, and warns us against the
+fanaticism, nay, the crime of depriving reason of its legislative
+authority in the moral conduct of life, for the purpose of directly
+connecting this authority with the idea of the Supreme Being. For this
+would be, not an immanent, but a transcendent use of moral theology,
+and, like the transcendent use of mere speculation, would inevitably
+pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason.
+
+
+
+SECTION III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.
+
+The holding of a thing to be true is a phenomenon in our
+understanding which may rest on objective grounds, but requires, also,
+subjective causes in the mind of the person judging. If a judgement
+is valid for every rational being, then its ground is objectively
+sufficient, and it is termed a conviction. If, on the other hand, it
+has its ground in the particular character of the subject, it is
+termed a persuasion.
+
+Persuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the judgement, which
+lies solely in the subject, being regarded as objective. Hence a
+judgement of this kind has only private validity--is only valid for
+the individual who judges, and the holding of a thing to be true in
+this way cannot be communicated. But truth depends upon agreement with
+the object, and consequently the judgements of all understandings,
+if true, must be in agreement with each other (consentientia uni
+tertio consentiunt inter se). Conviction may, therefore, be
+distinguished, from an external point of view, from persuasion, by
+the possibility of communicating it and by showing its validity for
+the reason of every man; for in this case the presumption, at least,
+arises that the agreement of all judgements with each other, in
+spite of the different characters of individuals, rests upon the
+common ground of the agreement of each with the object, and thus the
+correctness of the judgement is established.
+
+Persuasion, accordingly, cannot be subjectively distinguished from
+conviction, that is, so long as the subject views its judgement simply
+as a phenomenon of its own mind. But if we inquire whether the grounds
+of our judgement, which are valid for us, produce the same effect on
+the reason of others as on our own, we have then the means, though
+only subjective means, not, indeed, of producing conviction, but of
+detecting the merely private validity of the judgement; in other
+words, of discovering that there is in it the element of mere
+persuasion.
+
+If we can, in addition to this, develop the subjective causes of the
+judgement, which we have taken for its objective grounds, and thus
+explain the deceptive judgement as a phenomenon in our mind, apart
+altogether from the objective character of the object, we can then
+expose the illusion and need be no longer deceived by it, although,
+if its subjective cause lies in our nature, we cannot hope altogether
+to escape its influence.
+
+I can only maintain, that is, affirm as necessarily valid for
+every one, that which produces conviction. Persuasion I may keep for
+myself, if it is agreeable to me; but I cannot, and ought not, to
+attempt to impose it as binding upon others.
+
+Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgement in
+relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objectively
+valid), has the three following degrees: opinion, belief, and
+knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgement,
+subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjectively
+sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient.
+Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient.
+Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself); objective
+sufficiency is termed certainty (for all). I need not dwell longer
+on the explanation of such simple conceptions.
+
+I must never venture to be of opinion, without knowing something, at
+least, by which my judgement, in itself merely problematical, is
+brought into connection with the truth--which connection, although
+not perfect, is still something more than an arbitrary fiction.
+Moreover, the law of such a connection must be certain. For if, in
+relation to this law, I have nothing more than opinion, my judgement
+is but a play of the imagination, without the least relation to truth.
+In the judgements of pure reason, opinion has no place. For, as they
+do not rest on empirical grounds and as the sphere of pure reason is
+that of necessary truth and a priori cognition, the principle of
+connection in it requires universality and necessity, and consequently
+perfect certainty--otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at
+all. Hence it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics; we
+must know, or abstain from forming a judgement altogether. The case
+is the same with the maxims of morality. For we must not hazard an
+action on the mere opinion that it is allowed, but we must know it
+to be so. In the transcendental sphere of reason, on the other hand,
+the term opinion is too weak, while the word knowledge is too strong.
+From the merely speculative point of view, therefore, we cannot form
+a judgement at all. For the subjective grounds of a judgement, such
+as produce belief, cannot be admitted in speculative inquiries,
+inasmuch as they cannot stand without empirical support and are
+incapable of being communicated to others in equal measure.
+
+But it is only from the practical point of view that a theoretically
+insufficient judgement can be termed belief. Now the practical
+reference is either to skill or to morality; to the former, when the
+end proposed is arbitrary and accidental, to the latter, when it is
+absolutely necessary.
+
+If we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions of its
+attainment are hypothetically necessary. The necessity is
+subjectively, but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I am
+acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can be
+attained. On the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely and for
+every one, if I know for certain that no one can be acquainted with
+any other conditions under which the attainment of the proposed end
+would be possible. In the former case my supposition--my judgement
+with regard to certain conditions--is a merely accidental belief; in
+the latter it is a necessary belief. The physician must pursue some
+course in the case of a patient who is in danger, but is ignorant of
+the nature of the disease. He observes the symptoms, and concludes,
+according to the best of his judgement, that it is a case of phthisis.
+His belief is, even in his own judgement, only contingent: another
+man might, perhaps come nearer the truth. Such a belief, contingent
+indeed, but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for
+the attainment of certain ends, I term Pragmatical belief.
+
+The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his
+persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that is, his firm
+belief, is a bet. It frequently happens that a man delivers his
+opinions with so much boldness and assurance, that he appears to be
+under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error.
+The offer of a bet startles him, and makes him pause. Sometimes it
+turns out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at
+ten. For he does not hesitate, perhaps, to venture a ducat, but if
+it is proposed to stake ten, he immediately becomes aware of the
+possibility of his being mistaken--a possibility which has hitherto
+escaped his observation. If we imagine to ourselves that we have to
+stake the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition,
+our judgement drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, and discover
+the actual strength of our belief. Thus pragmatical belief has
+degrees, varying in proportion to the interests at stake.
+
+Now, in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in
+reference to some object, and where, accordingly, our judgement is
+purely theoretical, we can still represent to ourselves, in thought,
+the possibility of a course of action, for which we suppose that we
+have sufficient grounds, if any means existed of ascertaining the
+truth of the matter. Thus we find in purely theoretical judgements
+an analogon of practical judgements, to which the word belief may
+properly be applied, and which we may term doctrinal belief. I
+should not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition-
+if there were any possibility of bringing it to the test of
+experience--that, at least, some one of the planets, which we see,
+is inhabited. Hence I say that I have not merely the opinion, but
+the strong belief, on the correctness of which I would stake even many
+of the advantages of life, that there are inhabitants in other worlds.
+
+Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God
+belongs to doctrinal belief. For, although in respect to the
+theoretical cognition of the universe I do not require to form any
+theory which necessarily involves this idea, as the condition of my
+explanation of the phenomena which the universe presents, but, on
+the contrary, am rather bound so to use my reason as if everything
+were mere nature, still teleological unity is so important a condition
+of the application of my reason to nature, that it is impossible for
+me to ignore it--especially since, in addition to these
+considerations, abundant examples of it are supplied by experience.
+But the sole condition, so far as my knowledge extends, under which
+this unity can be my guide in the investigation of nature, is the
+assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things
+according to the wisest ends. Consequently, the hypothesis of a wise
+author of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the
+investigation of nature--is the condition under which alone I can
+fulfil an end which is contingent indeed, but by no means unimportant.
+Moreover, since the result of my attempts so frequently confirms the
+utility of this assumption, and since nothing decisive can be
+adduced against it, it follows that it would be saying far too
+little to term my judgement, in this case, a mere opinion, and that,
+even in this theoretical connection, I may assert that I firmly
+believe in God. Still, if we use words strictly, this must not be
+called a practical, but a doctrinal belief, which the theology of
+nature (physico-theology) must also produce in my mind. In the
+wisdom of a Supreme Being, and in the shortness of life, so inadequate
+to the development of the glorious powers of human nature, we may find
+equally sufficient grounds for a doctrinal belief in the future life
+of the human soul.
+
+The expression of belief is, in such cases, an expression of modesty
+from the objective point of view, but, at the same time, of firm
+confidence, from the subjective. If I should venture to term this
+merely theoretical judgement even so much as a hypothesis which I am
+entitled to assume; a more complete conception, with regard to another
+world and to the cause of the world, might then be justly required
+of me than I am, in reality, able to give. For, if I assume
+anything, even as a mere hypothesis, I must, at least, know so much
+of the properties of such a being as will enable me, not to form the
+conception, but to imagine the existence of it. But the word belief
+refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its
+subjective influence on the conduct of my reason, which forces me to
+hold it fast, though I may not be in a position to give a
+speculative account of it.
+
+But mere doctrinal belief is, to some extent, wanting in
+stability. We often quit our hold of it, in consequence of the
+difficulties which occur in speculation, though in the end we
+inevitably return to it again.
+
+It is quite otherwise with moral belief. For in this sphere action
+is absolutely necessary, that is, I must act in obedience to the moral
+law in all points. The end is here incontrovertibly established, and
+there is only one condition possible, according to the best of my
+perception, under which this end can harmonize with all other ends,
+and so have practical validity--namely, the existence of a God and
+of a future world. I know also, to a certainty, that no one can be
+acquainted with any other conditions which conduct to the same unity
+of ends under the moral law. But since the moral precept is, at the
+same time, my maxim (as reason requires that it should be), I am
+irresistibly constrained to believe in the existence of God and in
+a future life; and I am sure that nothing can make me waver in this
+belief, since I should thereby overthrow my moral maxims, the
+renunciation of which would render me hateful in my own eyes.
+
+Thus, while all the ambitious attempts of reason to penetrate beyond
+the limits of experience end in disappointment, there is still
+enough left to satisfy us in a practical point of view. No one, it
+is true, will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God and
+a future life; for, if he knows this, he is just the man whom I have
+long wished to find. All knowledge, regarding an object of mere
+reason, can be communicated; and I should thus be enabled to hope that
+my own knowledge would receive this wonderful extension, through the
+instrumentality of his instruction. No, my conviction is not
+logical, but moral certainty; and since it rests on subjective grounds
+(of the moral sentiment), I must not even say: It is morally certain
+that there is a God, etc., but: I am morally certain, that is, my
+belief in God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral
+nature that I am under as little apprehension of having the former
+torn from me as of losing the latter.
+
+The only point in this argument that may appear open to suspicion is
+that this rational belief presupposes the existence of moral
+sentiments. If we give up this assumption, and take a man who is
+entirely indifferent with regard to moral laws, the question which
+reason proposes, becomes then merely a problem for speculation and
+may, indeed, be supported by strong grounds from analogy, but not by
+such as will compel the most obstinate scepticism to give way.* But
+in these questions no man is free from all interest. For though the
+want of good sentiments may place him beyond the influence of moral
+interests, still even in this case enough may be left to make him fear
+the existence of God and a future life. For he cannot pretend to any
+certainty of the non-existence of God and of a future life, unless-
+since it could only be proved by mere reason, and therefore
+apodeictically--he is prepared to establish the impossibility of both,
+which certainly no reasonable man would undertake to do. This would
+be a negative belief, which could not, indeed, produce morality and
+good sentiments, but still could produce an analogon of these, by
+operating as a powerful restraint on the outbreak of evil
+dispositions.
+
+[*Footnote: The human mind (as, I believe, every rational being must
+of necessity do) takes a natural interest in morality, although this
+interest is not undivided, and may not be practically in
+preponderance. If you strengthen and increase it, you will find the
+reason become docile, more enlightened, and more capable of uniting
+the speculative interest with the practical. But if you do not take
+care at the outset, or at least midway, to make men good, you will
+never force them into an honest belief.]
+
+But, it will be said, is this all that pure reason can effect, in
+opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience? Nothing more
+than two articles of belief? Common sense could have done as much as
+this, without taking the philosophers to counsel in the matter!
+
+I shall not here eulogize philosophy for the benefits which the
+laborious efforts of its criticism have conferred on human reason-
+even granting that its merit should turn out in the end to be only
+negative--for on this point something more will be said in the next
+section. But, I ask, do you require that that knowledge which concerns
+all men, should transcend the common understanding, and should only
+be revealed to you by philosophers? The very circumstance which has
+called forth your censure, is the best confirmation of the correctness
+of our previous assertions, since it discloses, what could not have
+been foreseen, that Nature is not chargeable with any partial
+distribution of her gifts in those matters which concern all men
+without distinction and that, in respect to the essential ends of
+human nature, we cannot advance further with the help of the highest
+philosophy, than under the guidance which nature has vouchsafed to
+the meanest understanding.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason.
+
+By the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system.
+Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science; it will
+be an aggregate, and not a system. Thus architectonic is the
+doctrine of the scientific in cognition, and therefore necessarily
+forms part of our methodology.
+
+Reason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an unconnected and
+rhapsodistic state, but requires that the sum of our cognitions should
+constitute a system. It is thus alone that they can advance the ends
+of reason. By a system I mean the unity of various cognitions under
+one idea. This idea is the conception--given by reason--of the form
+of a whole, in so far as the conception determines a priori not only
+the limits of its content, but the place which each of its parts is
+to occupy. The scientific idea contains, therefore, the end and the
+form of the whole which is in accordance with that end. The unity of
+the end, to which all the parts of the system relate, and through
+which all have a relation to each other, communicates unity to the
+whole system, so that the absence of any part can be immediately
+detected from our knowledge of the rest; and it determines a priori
+the limits of the system, thus excluding all contingent or arbitrary
+additions. The whole is thus an organism (articulatio), and not an
+aggregate (coacervatio); it may grow from within (per
+intussusceptionem), but it cannot increase by external additions
+(per appositionem). It is, thus, like an animal body, the growth of
+which does not add any limb, but, without changing their
+proportions, makes each in its sphere stronger and more active.
+
+We require, for the execution of the idea of a system, a schema,
+that is, a content and an arrangement of parts determined a priori
+by the principle which the aim of the system prescribes. A schema
+which is not projected in accordance with an idea, that is, from the
+standpoint of the highest aim of reason, but merely empirically, in
+accordance with accidental aims and purposes (the number of which
+cannot be predetermined), can give us nothing more than technical
+unity. But the schema which is originated from an idea (in which
+case reason presents us with aims a priori, and does not look for them
+to experience), forms the basis of architectonical unity. A science,
+in the proper acceptation of that term, cannot be formed
+technically, that is, from observation of the similarity existing
+between different objects, and the purely contingent use we make of
+our knowledge in concreto with reference to all kinds of arbitrary
+external aims; its constitution must be framed on architectonical
+principles, that is, its parts must be shown to possess an essential
+affinity, and be capable of being deduced from one supreme and
+internal aim or end, which forms the condition of the possibility of
+the scientific whole. The schema of a science must give a priori the
+plan of it (monogramma), and the division of the whole into parts,
+in conformity with the idea of the science; and it must also
+distinguish this whole from all others, according to certain
+understood principles.
+
+No one will attempt to construct a science, unless he have some idea
+to rest on as a proper basis. But, in the elaboration of the
+science, he finds that the schema, nay, even the definition which he
+at first gave of the science, rarely corresponds with his idea; for
+this idea lies, like a germ, in our reason, its parts undeveloped
+and hid even from microscopical observation. For this reason, we ought
+to explain and define sciences, not according to the description which
+the originator gives of them, but according to the idea which we
+find based in reason itself, and which is suggested by the natural
+unity of the parts of the science already accumulated. For it will
+of ten be found that the originator of a science and even his latest
+successors remain attached to an erroneous idea, which they cannot
+render clear to themselves, and that they thus fail in determining
+the true content, the articulation or systematic unity, and the limits
+of their science.
+
+It is unfortunate that, only after having occupied ourselves for a
+long time in the collection of materials, under the guidance of an
+idea which lies undeveloped in the mind, but not according to any
+definite plan of arrangement--nay, only after we have spent much
+time and labour in the technical disposition of our materials, does
+it become possible to view the idea of a science in a clear light,
+and to project, according to architectonical principles, a plan of
+the whole, in accordance with the aims of reason. Systems seem, like
+certain worms, to be formed by a kind of generatio aequivoca--by the
+mere confluence of conceptions, and to gain completeness only with
+the progress of time. But the schema or germ of all lies in reason;
+and thus is not only every system organized according to its own idea,
+but all are united into one grand system of human knowledge, of which
+they form members. For this reason, it is possible to frame an
+architectonic of all human cognition, the formation of which, at the
+present time, considering the immense materials collected or to be
+found in the ruins of old systems, would not indeed be very difficult.
+Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan of the
+architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason; and we begin from
+the point where the main root of human knowledge divides into two,
+one of which is reason. By reason I understand here the whole higher
+faculty of cognition, the rational being placed in contradistinction
+to the empirical.
+
+If I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition,
+objectively considered, all cognition is, from a subjective point of
+view, either historical or rational. Historical cognition is
+cognitio ex datis, rational, cognitio ex principiis. Whatever may be
+the original source of a cognition, it is, in relation to the person
+who possesses it, merely historical, if he knows only what has been
+given him from another quarter, whether that knowledge was
+communicated by direct experience or by instruction. Thus the Person
+who has learned a system of philosophy--say the Wolfian--although he
+has a perfect knowledge of all the principles, definitions, and
+arguments in that philosophy, as well as of the divisions that have
+been made of the system, possesses really no more than an historical
+knowledge of the Wolfian system; he knows only what has been told him,
+his judgements are only those which he has received from his teachers.
+Dispute the validity of a definition, and he is completely at a loss
+to find another. He has formed his mind on another's; but the
+imitative faculty is not the productive. His knowledge has not been
+drawn from reason; and although, objectively considered, it is
+rational knowledge, subjectively, it is merely historical. He has
+learned this or that philosophy and is merely a plaster cast of a
+living man. Rational cognitions which are objective, that is, which
+have their source in reason, can be so termed from a subjective
+point of view, only when they have been drawn by the individual
+himself from the sources of reason, that is, from principles; and it
+is in this way alone that criticism, or even the rejection of what
+has been already learned, can spring up in the mind.
+
+All rational cognition is, again, based either on conceptions, or on
+the construction of conceptions. The former is termed philosophical,
+the latter mathematical. I have already shown the essential difference
+of these two methods of cognition in the first chapter. A cognition
+may be objectively philosophical and subjectively historical--as is
+the case with the majority of scholars and those who cannot look
+beyond the limits of their system, and who remain in a state of
+pupilage all their lives. But it is remarkable that mathematical
+knowledge, when committed to memory, is valid, from the subjective
+point of view, as rational knowledge also, and that the same
+distinction cannot be drawn here as in the case of philosophical
+cognition. The reason is that the only way of arriving at this
+knowledge is through the essential principles of reason, and thus it
+is always certain and indisputable; because reason is employed in
+concreto--but at the same time a priori--that is, in pure and,
+therefore, infallible intuition; and thus all causes of illusion and
+error are excluded. Of all the a priori sciences of reason, therefore,
+mathematics alone can be learned. Philosophy--unless it be in an
+historical manner--cannot be learned; we can at most learn to
+philosophize.
+
+Philosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition. We must use
+this term in an objective sense, if we understand by it the archetype
+of all attempts at philosophizing, and the standard by which all
+subjective philosophies are to be judged. In this sense, philosophy is
+merely the idea of a possible science, which does not exist in
+concreto, but to which we endeavour in various ways to approximate,
+until we have discovered the right path to pursue--a path overgrown by
+the errors and illusions of sense--and the image we have hitherto tried
+in vain to shape has become a perfect copy of the great prototype.
+Until that time, we cannot learn philosophy--it does not exist; if it
+does, where is it, who possesses it, and how shall we know it? We can
+only learn to philosophize; in other words, we can only exercise our
+powers of reasoning in accordance with general principles, retaining at
+the same time, the right of investigating the sources of these
+principles, of testing, and even of rejecting them.
+
+Until then, our conception of philosophy is only a scholastic
+conception--a conception, that is, of a system of cognition which we
+are trying to elaborate into a science; all that we at present know
+being the systematic unity of this cognition, and consequently the
+logical completeness of the cognition for the desired end. But there
+is also a cosmical conception (conceptus cosmicus) of philosophy,
+which has always formed the true basis of this term, especially when
+philosophy was personified and presented to us in the ideal of a
+philosopher. In this view philosophy is the science of the relation
+of all cognition to the ultimate and essential aims of human reason
+(teleologia rationis humanae), and the philosopher is not merely an
+artist--who occupies himself with conceptions--but a lawgiver,
+legislating for human reason. In this sense of the word, it would be
+in the highest degree arrogant to assume the title of philosopher,
+and to pretend that we had reached the perfection of the prototype
+which lies in the idea alone.
+
+The mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logician--how
+far soever the first may have advanced in rational, and the two latter
+in philosophical knowledge--are merely artists, engaged in the
+arrangement and formation of conceptions; they cannot be termed
+philosophers. Above them all, there is the ideal teacher, who
+employs them as instruments for the advancement of the essential
+aims of human reason. Him alone can we call philosopher; but he
+nowhere exists. But the idea of his legislative power resides in the
+mind of every man, and it alone teaches us what kind of systematic
+unity philosophy demands in view of the ultimate aims of reason.
+This idea is, therefore, a cosmical conception.*
+
+[*Footnote: By a cosmical conception, I mean one in which all men
+necessarily take an interest; the aim of a science must accordingly
+be determined according to scholastic conceptions, if it is regarded
+merely as a means to certain arbitrarily proposed ends.]
+
+In view of the complete systematic unity of reason, there can only
+be one ultimate end of all the operations of the mind. To this all
+other aims are subordinate, and nothing more than means for its
+attainment. This ultimate end is the destination of man, and the
+philosophy which relates to it is termed moral philosophy. The
+superior position occupied by moral philosophy, above all other
+spheres for the operations of reason, sufficiently indicates the
+reason why the ancients always included the idea--and in an especial
+manner--of moralist in that of philosopher. Even at the present day,
+we call a man who appears to have the power of self-government, even
+although his knowledge may be very limited, by the name of
+philosopher.
+
+The legislation of human reason, or philosophy, has two objects-
+nature and freedom--and thus contains not only the laws of nature,
+but also those of ethics, at first in two separate systems, which,
+finally, merge into one grand philosophical system of cognition. The
+philosophy of nature relates to that which is, that of ethics to
+that which ought to be.
+
+But all philosophy is either cognition on the basis of pure
+reason, or the cognition of reason on the basis of empirical
+principles. The former is termed pure, the latter empirical
+philosophy.
+
+The philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic, that is, an
+inquiry into the powers of reason in regard to pure a priori
+cognition, and is termed critical philosophy; or it is, secondly,
+the system of pure reason--a science containing the systematic
+presentation of the whole body of philosophical knowledge, true as
+well as illusory, given by pure reason--and is called metaphysic. This
+name may, however, be also given to the whole system of pure
+philosophy, critical philosophy included, and may designate the
+investigation into the sources or possibility of a priori cognition,
+as well as the presentation of the a priori cognitions which form a
+system of pure philosophy--excluding, at the same time, all
+empirical and mathematical elements.
+
+Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and that of the
+practical use of pure reason, and is, accordingly, either the
+metaphysic of nature, or the metaphysic of ethics. The former contains
+all the pure rational principles--based upon conceptions alone (and
+thus excluding mathematics)--of all theoretical cognition; the latter,
+the principles which determine and necessitate a priori all action.
+Now moral philosophy alone contains a code of laws--for the regulation
+of our actions--which are deduced from principles entirely a priori.
+Hence the metaphysic of ethics is the only pure moral philosophy, as
+it is not based upon anthropological or other empirical
+considerations. The metaphysic of speculative reason is what is
+commonly called metaphysic in the more limited sense. But as pure
+moral philosophy properly forms a part of this system of cognition,
+we must allow it to retain the name of metaphysic, although it is not
+requisite that we should insist on so terming it in our present
+discussion.
+
+It is of the highest importance to separate those cognitions which
+differ from others both in kind and in origin, and to take great
+care that they are not confounded with those with which they are
+generally found connected. What the chemist does in the analysis of
+substances, what the mathematician in pure mathematics, is, in a still
+higher degree, the duty of the philosopher, that the value of each
+different kind of cognition, and the part it takes in the operations
+of the mind, may be clearly defined. Human reason has never wanted
+a metaphysic of some kind, since it attained the power of thought,
+or rather of reflection; but it has never been able to keep this sphere
+of thought and cognition pure from all admixture of foreign
+elements. The idea of a science of this kind is as old as
+speculation itself; and what mind does not speculate--either in the
+scholastic or in the popular fashion? At the same time, it must be
+admitted that even thinkers by profession have been unable clearly
+to explain the distinction between the two elements of our
+cognition--the one completely a priori, the other a posteriori; and
+hence the proper definition of a peculiar kind of cognition, and
+with it the just idea of a science which has so long and so deeply
+engaged the attention of the human mind, has never been established.
+When it was said: "Metaphysic is the science of the first principles
+of human cognition," this definition did not signalize a peculiarity
+in kind, but only a difference in degree; these first principles
+were thus declared to be more general than others, but no criterion
+of distinction from empirical principles was given. Of these some are
+more general, and therefore higher, than others; and--as we cannot
+distinguish what is completely a priori from that which is known to
+be a posteriori--where shall we draw the line which is to separate
+the higher and so-called first principles, from the lower and
+subordinate principles of cognition? What would be said if we were
+asked to be satisfied with a division of the epochs of the world
+into the earlier centuries and those following them? "Does the
+fifth, or the tenth century belong to the earlier centuries?" it would
+be asked. In the same way I ask: Does the conception of extension
+belong to metaphysics? You answer, "Yes." Well, that of body too?
+"Yes." And that of a fluid body? You stop, you are unprepared to admit
+this; for if you do, everything will belong to metaphysics. From
+this it is evident that the mere degree of subordination--of the
+particular to the general--cannot determine the limits of a science;
+and that, in the present case, we must expect to find a difference
+in the conceptions of metaphysics both in kind and in origin. The
+fundamental idea of metaphysics was obscured on another side by the
+fact that this kind of a priori cognition showed a certain
+similarity in character with the science of mathematics. Both have
+the property in common of possessing an a priori origin; but, in the
+one, our knowledge is based upon conceptions, in the other, on the
+construction of conceptions. Thus a decided dissimilarity between
+philosophical and mathematical cognition comes out--a dissimilarity
+which was always felt, but which could not be made distinct for want
+of an insight into the criteria of the difference. And thus it
+happened that, as philosophers themselves failed in the proper
+development of the idea of their science, the elaboration of the
+science could not proceed with a definite aim, or under trustworthy
+guidance. Thus, too, philosophers, ignorant of the path they ought
+to pursue and always disputing with each other regarding the
+discoveries which each asserted he had made, brought their science
+into disrepute with the rest of the world, and finally, even among
+themselves.
+
+All pure a priori cognition forms, therefore, in view of the
+peculiar faculty which originates it, a peculiar and distinct unity;
+and metaphysic is the term applied to the philosophy which attempts
+to represent that cognition in this systematic unity. The speculative
+part of metaphysic, which has especially appropriated this
+appellation--that which we have called the metaphysic of nature--and
+which considers everything, as it is (not as it ought to be), by means
+of a priori conceptions, is divided in the following manner.
+
+Metaphysic, in the more limited acceptation of the term, consists of
+two parts--transcendental philosophy and the physiology of pure
+reason. The former presents the system of all the conceptions and
+principles belonging to the understanding and the reason, and which
+relate to objects in general, but not to any particular given
+objects (Ontologia); the latter has nature for its subject-matter,
+that is, the sum of given objects--whether given to the senses, or,
+if we will, to some other kind of intuition--and is accordingly
+physiology, although only rationalis. But the use of the faculty of
+reason in this rational mode of regarding nature is either physical
+or hyperphysical, or, more properly speaking, immanent or transcendent.
+The former relates to nature, in so far as our knowledge regarding
+it may be applied in experience (in concreto); the latter to that
+connection of the objects of experience, which transcends all
+experience. Transcendent physiology has, again, an internal and an
+external connection with its object, both, however, transcending
+possible experience; the former is the physiology of nature as a
+whole, or transcendental cognition of the world, the latter of the
+connection of the whole of nature with a being above nature, or
+transcendental cognition of God.
+
+Immanent physiology, on the contrary, considers nature as the sum of
+all sensuous objects, consequently, as it is presented to us--but
+still according to a priori conditions, for it is under these alone
+that nature can be presented to our minds at all. The objects of
+immanent physiology are of two kinds: 1. Those of the external senses,
+or corporeal nature; 2. The object of the internal sense, the soul,
+or, in accordance with our fundamental conceptions of it, thinking
+nature. The metaphysics of corporeal nature is called physics; but,
+as it must contain only the principles of an a priori cognition of
+nature, we must term it rational physics. The metaphysics of
+thinking nature is called psychology, and for the same reason is to
+be regarded as merely the rational cognition of the soul.
+
+Thus the whole system of metaphysics consists of four principal
+parts: 1. Ontology; 2. Rational Physiology; 3. Rational cosmology;
+and 4. Rational theology. The second part--that of the rational doctrine
+of nature--may be subdivided into two, physica rationalis* and
+psychologia rationalis.
+
+[*Footnote: It must not be supposed that I mean by this appellation
+what is generally called physica general is, and which is rather
+mathematics than a philosophy of nature. For the metaphysic of nature
+is completely different from mathematics, nor is it so rich in results,
+although it is of great importance as a critical test of the
+application of pure understanding-cognition to nature. For want of
+its guidance, even mathematicians, adopting certain common notions-
+which are, in fact, metaphysical--have unconsciously crowded their
+theories of nature with hypotheses, the fallacy of which becomes
+evident upon the application of the principles of this metaphysic,
+without detriment, however, to the employment of mathematics in this
+sphere of cognition.]
+
+The fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason of necessity
+dictates this division; it is, therefore, architectonical--in
+accordance with the highest aims of reason, and not merely
+technical, or according to certain accidentally-observed
+similarities existing between the different parts of the whole
+science. For this reason, also, is the division immutable and of
+legislative authority. But the reader may observe in it a few points
+to which he ought to demur, and which may weaken his conviction of
+its truth and legitimacy.
+
+In the first place, how can I desire an a priori cognition or
+metaphysic of objects, in so far as they are given a posteriori? and
+how is it possible to cognize the nature of things according to a
+priori principles, and to attain to a rational physiology? The
+answer is this. We take from experience nothing more than is requisite
+to present us with an object (in general) of the external or of the
+internal sense; in the former case, by the mere conception of matter
+(impenetrable and inanimate extension), in the latter, by the
+conception of a thinking being--given in the internal empirical
+representation, I think. As to the rest, we must not employ in our
+metaphysic of these objects any empirical principles (which add to
+the content of our conceptions by means of experience), for the purpose
+of forming by their help any judgements respecting these objects.
+
+Secondly, what place shall we assign to empirical psychology,
+which has always been considered a part of metaphysics, and from which
+in our time such important philosophical results have been expected,
+after the hope of constructing an a priori system of knowledge had
+been abandoned? I answer: It must be placed by the side of empirical
+physics or physics proper; that is, must be regarded as forming a part
+of applied philosophy, the a priori principles of which are
+contained in pure philosophy, which is therefore connected, although
+it must not be confounded, with psychology. Empirical psychology
+must therefore be banished from the sphere of metaphysics, and is
+indeed excluded by the very idea of that science. In conformity,
+however, with scholastic usage, we must permit it to occupy a place
+in metaphysics--but only as an appendix to it. We adopt this course
+from motives of economy; as psychology is not as yet full enough to
+occupy our attention as an independent study, while it is, at the same
+time, of too great importance to be entirely excluded or placed
+where it has still less affinity than it has with the subject of
+metaphysics. It is a stranger who has been long a guest; and we make
+it welcome to stay, until it can take up a more suitable abode in a
+complete system of anthropology--the pendant to empirical physics.
+
+The above is the general idea of metaphysics, which, as more was
+expected from it than could be looked for with justice, and as these
+pleasant expectations were unfortunately never realized, fell into
+general disrepute. Our Critique must have fully convinced the reader
+that, although metaphysics cannot form the foundation of religion,
+it must always be one of its most important bulwarks, and that human
+reason, which naturally pursues a dialectical course, cannot do
+without this science, which checks its tendencies towards dialectic
+and, by elevating reason to a scientific and clear self-knowledge,
+prevents the ravages which a lawless speculative reason would
+infallibly commit in the sphere of morals as well as in that of
+religion. We may be sure, therefore, whatever contempt may be thrown
+upon metaphysics by those who judge a science not by its own nature,
+but according to the accidental effects it may have produced, that
+it can never be completely abandoned, that we must always return to
+it as to a beloved one who has been for a time estranged, because the
+questions with which it is engaged relate to the highest aims of
+humanity, and reason must always labour either to attain to settled
+views in regard to these, or to destroy those which others have
+already established.
+
+Metaphysic, therefore--that of nature, as well as that of ethics,
+but in an especial manner the criticism which forms the propaedeutic
+to all the operations of reason--forms properly that department of
+knowledge which may be termed, in the truest sense of the word,
+philosophy. The path which it pursues is that of science, which,
+when it has once been discovered, is never lost, and never misleads.
+Mathematics, natural science, the common experience of men, have a
+high value as means, for the most part, to accidental ends--but at
+last also, to those which are necessary and essential to the existence
+of humanity. But to guide them to this high goal, they require the
+aid of rational cognition on the basis of pure conceptions, which,
+be it termed as it may, is properly nothing but metaphysics.
+
+For the same reason, metaphysics forms likewise the completion of
+the culture of human reason. In this respect, it is indispensable,
+setting aside altogether the influence which it exerts as a science.
+For its subject-matter is the elements and highest maxims of reason,
+which form the basis of the possibility of some sciences and of the
+use of all. That, as a purely speculative science, it is more useful
+in preventing error than in the extension of knowledge, does not
+detract from its value; on the contrary, the supreme office of
+censor which it occupies assures to it the highest authority and
+importance. This office it administers for the purpose of securing
+order, harmony, and well-being to science, and of directing its
+noble and fruitful labours to the highest possible aim--the
+happiness of all mankind.
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV. The History of Pure Reason.
+
+This title is placed here merely for the purpose of designating a
+division of the system of pure reason of which I do not intend to
+treat at present. I shall content myself with casting a cursory
+glance, from a purely transcendental point of view--that of the nature
+of pure reason--on the labours of philosophers up to the present time.
+They have aimed at erecting an edifice of philosophy; but to my eye
+this edifice appears to be in a very ruinous condition.
+
+It is very remarkable, although naturally it could not have been
+otherwise, that, in the infancy of philosophy, the study of the nature
+of God and the constitution of a future world formed the commencement,
+rather than the conclusion, as we should have it, of the speculative
+efforts of the human mind. However rude the religious conceptions
+generated by the remains of the old manners and customs of a less
+cultivated time, the intelligent classes were not thereby prevented
+from devoting themselves to free inquiry into the existence and nature
+of God; and they easily saw that there could be no surer way of
+pleasing the invisible ruler of the world, and of attaining to
+happiness in another world at least, than a good and honest course
+of life in this. Thus theology and morals formed the two chief
+motives, or rather the points of attraction in all abstract inquiries.
+But it was the former that especially occupied the attention of
+speculative reason, and which afterwards became so celebrated under
+the name of metaphysics.
+
+I shall not at present indicate the periods of time at which the
+greatest changes in metaphysics took place, but shall merely give a
+hasty sketch of the different ideas which occasioned the most
+important revolutions in this sphere of thought. There are three
+different ends in relation to which these revolutions have taken
+place.
+
+1. In relation to the object of the cognition of reason,
+philosophers may be divided into sensualists and intellectualists.
+Epicurus may be regarded as the head of the former, Plato of the
+latter. The distinction here signalized, subtle as it is, dates from
+the earliest times, and was long maintained. The former asserted
+that reality resides in sensuous objects alone, and that everything
+else is merely imaginary; the latter, that the senses are the
+parents of illusion and that truth is to be found in the understanding
+alone. The former did not deny to the conceptions of the understanding
+a certain kind of reality; but with them it was merely logical, with
+the others it was mystical. The former admitted intellectual
+conceptions, but declared that sensuous objects alone possessed real
+existence. The latter maintained that all real objects were
+intelligible, and believed that the pure understanding possessed a
+faculty of intuition apart from sense, which, in their opinion, served
+only to confuse the ideas of the understanding.
+
+2. In relation to the origin of the pure cognitions of reason, we
+find one school maintaining that they are derived entirely from
+experience, and another that they have their origin in reason alone.
+Aristotle may be regarded as the bead of the empiricists, and Plato
+of the noologists. Locke, the follower of Aristotle in modern times,
+and Leibnitz of Plato (although he cannot be said to have imitated
+him in his mysticism), have not been able to bring this question to
+a settled conclusion. The procedure of Epicurus in his sensual system,
+in which he always restricted his conclusions to the sphere of
+experience, was much more consequent than that of Aristotle and Locke.
+The latter especially, after having derived all the conceptions and
+principles of the mind from experience, goes so far, in the employment
+of these conceptions and principles, as to maintain that we can
+prove the existence of God and the existence of God and the
+immortality of them objects lying beyond the soul--both of them of
+possible experience--with the same force of demonstration as any
+mathematical proposition.
+
+3. In relation to method. Method is procedure according to
+principles. We may divide the methods at present employed in the field
+of inquiry into the naturalistic and the scientific. The naturalist
+of pure reason lays it down as his principle that common reason,
+without the aid of science--which he calls sound reason, or common
+sense--can give a more satisfactory answer to the most important
+questions of metaphysics than speculation is able to do. He must
+maintain, therefore, that we can determine the content and
+circumference of the moon more certainly by the naked eye, than by
+the aid of mathematical reasoning. But this system is mere misology
+reduced to principles; and, what is the most absurd thing in this
+doctrine, the neglect of all scientific means is paraded as a peculiar
+method of extending our cognition. As regards those who are
+naturalists because they know no better, they are certainly not to
+be blamed. They follow common sense, without parading their
+ignorance as a method which is to teach us the wonderful secret, how
+we are to find the truth which lies at the bottom of the well of
+Democritus.
+
+ Quod sapio satis est mihi, non ego curo Esse quod
+ Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones. PERSIUS
+ -- Satirae, iii. 78-79.
+
+is their motto, under which they may lead a pleasant and praiseworthy
+life, without troubling themselves with science or troubling science
+with them.
+
+As regards those who wish to pursue a scientific method, they have
+now the choice of following either the dogmatical or the sceptical,
+while they are bound never to desert the systematic mode of procedure.
+When I mention, in relation to the former, the celebrated Wolf, and
+as regards the latter, David Hume, I may leave, in accordance with
+my present intention, all others unnamed. The critical path alone is
+still open. If my reader has been kind and patient enough to accompany
+me on this hitherto untravelled route, he can now judge whether, if
+he and others will contribute their exertions towards making this
+narrow footpath a high road of thought, that which many centuries have
+failed to accomplish may not be executed before the close of the
+present--namely, to bring Reason to perfect contentment in regard to
+that which has always, but without permanent results, occupied her
+powers and engaged her ardent desire for knowledge.
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